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Directors’ duties of care and loyalty and their enforcement by derivative action, are 
important elements in the company law system. Such mechanisms are introduced to ensure 
that directors are subject to a satisfactory level of accountability and control while 
managing a company. This research employed the comparative law approach to identifying 
problems in, and to proposing reform for, the Saudi Arabian law of directors’ duty to act 
with care and in good faith in the company’s general interests, and to avoid conflicts of 
interest, with particular focus on the corporate opportunities and self-dealing transactions 
and the Saudi law of derivative actions. 
 
The main objective of this study was to propose a reform of Saudi law of directors’ duties 
and of derivative actions. By using the company law of the United Kingdom (UK) as 
benchmark, this study evaluates the clarity, certainty and accessibility of Saudi law and 
identifies weaknesses and deficiencies. The feasibility of transplanting selective legal ideas 
and rules from the UK company law to its Saudi counterpart in order to develop a 
framework for legal reform in Saudi Arabia is examined. 
 
The argument here is that the Saudi law of directors’ duties of care and loyalty and 
derivative actions suffers from serious deficiencies, despite the introduction of the new 
Companies Law of 2015. While the new Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 
have tackled some issues in the areas of directors’ duties, there is still room for 
improvement. The uncertainty in the law of directors’ duties and enforcement is sufficient 
in itself to justify the reform of law. Moreover, the limits of other legal and non-legal 
mechanisms of accountability in the Saudi context suggest that alternative mechanisms 
would not adequately ensure the accountability of directors. 
 
Throughout the examination of the feasibility of reform by way of legal transplantation, the 
study takes into account that the UK legal model is only transferable if it can be adapted to 
fit within the institutional structure and legal environment in Saudi Arabia. This is 
necessary to ensure proper reception of foreign rules by the new environment of the host 
country. The finding is that transferability of most UK legal models and rules is feasible. 
Throughout this consideration of a reform agenda for the Saudi law of directors’ duties and 
derivative actions, the research has been guided by a policy that requires striking a balance 
between the need to increase directors’ accountability and the need to protect the directors’ 
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It is a fundamental feature of an organisation such as a company to vest the decision-
making authority in its board of directors.1 This wholesale delegation of decision-making 
power to directors can be rationalised on the basis that there are practical challenges for 
shareholders to engage in the day-to-day management of the company’s business, either 
due to their large numbers or their lack of proficiency.2 Since the way that directors run the 
company will affect the interests of shareholders, the company’s growth and, more 
generally, its economic prosperity, the question of how companies should be governed is a 
matter of critical concern for any given company because the system of corporate 
governance is expected to affect the corporate behaviour and the process of decision-
making within the company.3 In this regard, a good system of corporate governance might 
be understood as one that involves rules and processes that ensure that directors do not 
misuse their managerial powers,4 holding them accountable for abusive practices,5 and 
create incentives for them to act effectively and appropriately.  
 
Directors’ duties of care and loyalty, as mechanisms of corporate governance and 
accountability, can be described as legal norms that control directors’ behaviour when 
exercising their discretion.6 These mechanisms are designed to provide directors with 
behavioural norms and a legal basis for disciplining them for non-compliance with such 
norms of conduct. Importantly, the efficacy of such duties depends on the availability of 
mechanisms of enforcement when they have been breached.7 A derivative action through 
which shareholders, especially minority shareholders, can sue directors for their 
                                                        
1 J Armour, H Hansmann and R Kraakman,‘What is Corporate Law?’ in R Kraakman et al. (eds), The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2nd edn, Oxford, OUP 2009) 5. 
2 P Davies and S Worthington, Gower Principles of Modern Company Law (10th edn, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2016) 350. 
3 Seemingly, corporate governance is not an easy concept to describe and has been defined in different ways 
since scholars have approached the topic from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, including law, 
economics, management and political science, see generally S Turnbull,‘Corporate Governance: Its Scope, 
Concerns and Theories’ (1997) 5 Corporate Governance: An International Review  180. One of respected 
definitions of corporate governance, at least in the UK, is to define it as ‘the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled’, see Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 
The Cadbury Report (UK, December 1992) para. 2.5, <http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf> 
accessed 1 September 2017.   
4 J Birds et al., Boyle & Birds’ Company Law (8th edn, Bristol, Jordans 2011) 363. 
5 J Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability (3rd edn, Chichester, John Wiley & Sons 2010) 6. 
6 A Keay, Directors’ Duties (2nd edn, Bristol, Jordans 2014) 5–6. 
7 A Keay, ‘An Assessment of Private Enforcement Actions for Directors’ Breaches of Duty’ (2014) 33 Civil 
Justice Quarterly 76, 76. 
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wrongdoing on behalf of the company is an essential mechanism to enforce the company’s 
rights and ensure directors’ accountability.8  
 
The central problem lies where the company law involves serious aspects of uncertainty 
and deficiency in designing directors’ duties in addition to establishing an inaccessible 
derivative action that brings directors who misbehave to account. The law of Saudi Arabia, 
which is the subject of this thesis, is an example of such company law that suffers from 
ambiguity brought about by an absence of detailed regulation of directors’ duties, along 
with a lack of clear judicial guidance. Arguably, poorly suited standards and rules for legal 
liability might provide directors with incentives to act disloyally and incompetently. 
Despite the enactment of the new Companies Law 2015 (CL 2015) and even with the 
introduction of new Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 (CGRs 2017), there is 
still room for reform to ensure that directors’ exercise of powers is subject to sufficient 
control and accountability. Similarly, the CL 2015 fails to design a clear derivative action 
regime that could enhance directors’ accountability towards the company and its 
shareholders, especially minority shareholders. With inaccessible derivative action, the 
system of enforcement of breaches of directors’ duties will be lacking a mechanism that 
creates incentives for directors to comply with their duties by holding them accountable for 
misconduct,9 given the possible role of derivative actions to deter directors from breaches 
of their duties and to protect the company and shareholders.10 Indeed, the argument for 
sound law of directors’ duties and derivative actions, as will be illustrated,11 is further 
borne out by the limits and drawbacks of other main mechanisms of control and 
accountability in Saudi Arabia. 
 
The main objective of this research is to propose reform of the law of directors’ duties and 
of derivative actions. By employing the United Kingdom (UK) company law as a 
benchmark, this study evaluates the clarity, certainty and accessibility of Saudi law of 
directors’ duties of care, loyalty and of private enforcement by litigation, identifying 
weaknesses and deficiencies in this area of law. It also explores causes and effects of legal 
uncertainty and deficiency found in the Saudi law of directors’ duties and private 
enforcement by derivative actions. This research examines why there is a need for 
legislative intervention to promote the role of directors’ duties and enforcement by 
derivative actions in enhancing the directors’ accountability and providing greater legal 
                                                        
8 A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (Oxford, OUP 2007) 18. 
9 Ibid 52. 
10 See generally ibid 51–63. 
11 See generally the discussion in Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
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protection for shareholders, including minority shareholders. The centrality of a sound 
company law regime that establishes well-designed duties, reinforced by accessible 
derivative litigation, in relation to the reform of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia is 
emphasised by evaluating the role of other principal legal and non-legal mechanisms that 
operate within the accountability framework for directors.  
 
Of the key contributions this research makes is to offer recommendations for legal reform 
by examining the extent to which the Saudi legislature can benefit from the experience of 
the UK law of directors’ duties and of derivative actions. To be specific, the feasibility of 
transplanting selective legal ideas and rules from the UK company law to its Saudi 
counterpart is investigated from the theoretical point of view, given the institutional 
infrastructure and legal environment in Saudi Arabia. The research addresses the question 
of whether selective UK legal models and rules can be adopted in the Saudi context, and if 
so, to what extent can foreign rules be adapted, if necessary, to fit with the new 
environment of a host country (Saudi Arabia). One of the central arguments presented is 
that while considering the remedy of deficiencies identified in the Saudi law, the proposed 
legal reform should be designed in a way that increases directors’ accountability without 
damaging their incentives to exercise their managerial powers effectively. 
 
The primary reasons behind the conduct of this research in the area of directors’ duties and 
enforcement by derivative actions are as follows: First, the uncertainty within this area of 
Saudi company law, due to the absence of a clear detailed legislative statement and 
inactive role of courts in developing the law, is one of the main justifications for proposing 
statutory reform. In this regard, it is necessary to take on the commitment, as a comparative 
Saudi legal scholar, to search for the most effectual model of corporate governance as a 
means of reforming the researcher’s own legal system and examine the feasibility of legal 
transfer of foreign models to his own country. Indeed, the principal presupposition is that 
reform of Saudi law of directors’ duties and derivative actions should be the top priority 
for Saudi lawmakers.  
 
Second, it seems that there is clear intention from the Saudi state to reform its company 
law system, especially in relation to directors’ accountability and legal protection for 
shareholders. This is best exemplified by the recent legal development taking place in the 
area of corporate governance by the introduction of CL 2015 and the new CGRs 2017. 
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Following the announcement of the new Saudi Vision 2030,12 Saudi Arabia, with a view to 
developing vibrant equity markets, attracting more domestic and foreign investment, and 
improving the business environment, will not hesitate to reform laws, including those 
shaping the corporate governance system to accomplish the goals of the 2030 Vision. 
Thus, this research attempts to offer recommendations that would contribute to the 
promotion of a good corporate governance system by designing a law that creates 
incentives for directors to act competently and honestly by imposing legal liability on those 
who do not. Arguably, legal reform that establishes well-formulated duties of directors 
accompanied by effective mechanism of enforcement is likely to enhance the legal 
protection for shareholders. This would consequently increase the investors’ willingness to 
invest in the market and therefore contribute to the development of equity markets.13  
 
Third, a legal reform approach based upon legal transplantation can be regarded as a good 
way of importing the highest-quality legal solutions for solving deficiencies in the Saudi 
law of directors’ duties and the enforcement thereof.14 The UK has developed one of the 
best corporate governance systems in the world15 in which substantial levels of protection 
for investors is offered.16 Further, the UK has a long-established duty of care17, fiduciary 
duties18 and derivative actions19 within the context of company law. Consequently, the UK 
experience would appear to offer reasonable solutions to the legal uncertainty and 
deficiency identified in the Saudi company law.  
 
It is essential to define the scope of the research and articulate the specific issues that are 
explored within this thesis. Directors are subject to a number of obligations. As the aim of 
                                                        
12 The Saudi Vision 2030 is a comprehensive development plan that involves, inter alia, a set of economic 
policies that are aimed at diversifying the sources of national revenue of economy and ending excessive 
dependence on oil-based revenue. It is a significant part of the vision to build a thriving economy that would 
enhance the contribution of the private sector to the economy. This will be accomplished by seven avenues of 
which the formation of advanced capital markets and the attraction of foreign investment are main elements. 
Saudi policy-makers have set a number of implementing and transformative programmes that help the 
Kingdom to achieve the goals of the vision. For more details, see the website of Saudi Vision 2030 at 
http://vision2030.gov.sa/en  
13 See R la Porta et al., ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Governance’ (2000) 58(3) Journal of Financial 
Economics 15–17.  
14 This argument is put forward by many legal writers to justify the legal change by means of legal 
transplants; see, for example, J Fedtke, ‘Legal Transplants’ in J Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law (2nd edn, Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 550.  
15 See, for example, A Shleifer and R Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52 The Journal of 
Finance  737, 737. 
16 Ibid 769. 
17 See, for example, Charitable Corporation v Sutton (1742) 2 Atkyns 400, which is one of the early 
company cases regarding the duty of care. 
18 See, for example, Re Cameron’s Coalbrook Railway Co (1854) 18 Bev 339, which is one of the early 
company cases regarding fiduciary duties. 
19 See, for example, Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189.  
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this research is to provide an in-depth analysis of the law of directors’ duties, while 
acknowledging that there is an increasing body of literature in this area of law, there is 
accordingly necessity for narrowing down the scope of detailed analysis to specific forms 
of directors’ duties. This thesis only addresses general obligations owed to the company, 
excluding those obligations personally owed to shareholders and or creditors…etc. In 
addition, the research only concerns the duties of care and of loyalty. Regarding the latter, 
the focus will primarily be on the following elements: (i) the duty to act in good faith in the 
general interest of the company; (ii) the duty to avoid conflicts of interest with particular 
focus on the exploitation of corporate opportunities; and (iii) the duty to avoid conflicts of 
interest in self-dealing transactions. These issues are selected on the basis that they pose 
particular problems in the Saudi context. Concerning the enforcement of directors’ 
obligations, the scope of this research is limited to breaches of duties owed to the company 
and, accordingly, to the company’s actions against directors and litigation commenced by a 
shareholder on behalf of the company (i.e., derivative litigation). An analysis of personal 
actions brought by shareholders against directors is not within the scope of this thesis.  
 
Another point worth mentioning is that among statutory forms of commercial companies 
found in the Saudi CL 2015, this thesis mainly focuses on the governance system of joint 
stock companies, the only type of company that is allowed to be listed in the Saudi stock 
market.20 It should, however, be stressed here that unless otherwise stated the proposed 
reforms are relevant to all joint stock companies, listed or not, because the legal system of 
directors’ duties and private enforcement actions, as an element of corporate law, is 
technically applicable to all companies. That said, the discussion pays more attention to 
joint stock companies listed in the Saudi stock market due to the availability of 
information. Furthermore, the subject of corporate governance for publically traded 
companies attracts much more attention in most economies with the emergence of financial 
crises and corporate scandals that not only negatively affect the large segment of investors, 
employees and creditors, but also the economy as whole.21 
 
As the main objectives of this study are to employ the UK model of directors’ duties and 
derivative actions for evaluating the Saudi law and examining the feasibility of transferring 
some rules to the Saudi law, a comparative law approach was adopted in this research. It is 
                                                        
20 See article 11 of Saudi Listing Rules 2004 (LRs 2004). 
21The economic costs of corporate scandals are best illustrated by the wave of corporate bankruptcies and 
scandals that swept through the United States of America (US) at the beginning of the current millennium; 
see C Garham, R Litan and S Sukhtanker, ‘Cooking the Books: The Costs to the Economy’ (Brookings 
Policy Brief Series, Brookings Institution, August 2002) < https://www.brookings.edu/research/cooking-the-
books-the-cost-to-the-economy/ > accessed 11 May 2017. 
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an important element of this approach that the comparison of similar ‘legal institutions’, or 
rules employed to solve similar legal problems in two or more legal systems, also takes 
into account the wider contexts in which those rules operate.22 This involves the 
formulation and clarification of differences and similarities between various legal systems 
as well as that the particular legal issues.23 An essential aspect of a comparative study is 
that it identifies weaknesses in the laws of one country and so can serve as a basis for 
considering practicable legal solutions. To be specific, a comparatist might go beyond the 
mere description and analysis of differences and similarities between jurisdictions and 
evaluates the potential of learning from foreign laws and applying that learning to solve 
legal problems at home.24 This element of comparative law concerns the study of legal 
transplant and the reception of foreign rules, which often explains the process in terms of 
the ‘fit’ between transplanted law and local conditions.25    
 
Given the universal nature of the problems in company law,26 it seems beneficial to take 
lessons from other jurisdictions by conducting comparative research through which 
solutions that contribute to law reform might be located and made available for legislatures 
to import from foreign jurisdictions into their own.27 For example, Beach, who was one of 
the members of the team formed to draft the Saudi Capital Market Law 2003 (CML 2003), 
also emphasises the importance of comparative law research in legal reform by pointing 
out that ‘drafting [the CML 2003] was a priceless opportunity to show how comparative 
legal studies can be used to produce practical results’.28 Thus, legal research may be 
regarded as one of the catalysts of legal change.29 
 
Following the detection of defects in the current Saudi law of directors’ duties and 
enforcement by derivative actions, the present research addresses the question of the 
feasibility of legal transplantation as a strategy for reform in Saudi Arabia. The movement 
of legal models and ideas from one country to another, which is well known as a ‘legal 
                                                        
22 See K Zweigert and H Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (T Weir tr, 3rd edn, Clarendon Press 
1998) 4–5. 
23 See M Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2014) 20.  
24 Zweigert and Kotz (n 22) 15–17.    
25 Siems (n 23) 198-199.  
26 D Donald, ‘Approaching Comparative Company Law’ (2008) 14 Fordham Journal Corporate and Financial 
Law  83, 89 (footnote 28). 
27 See B Grossfeld, The Strength and Weakness of Comparative Law (T Weir tr, Clarendon Press 1990) 15–
18.  
28 J Beach, ‘The Saudi Arabian Capital Market Law: A Practical Study of the Creation of Law in Developing 
Markets’ (2005) 41 Stanford Journal of International Law 307, 355. 
29 See P Mitchell, ‘Patterns of Legal Change’ (2012) 65 Current Legal Problems 177, 197–200. 
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transplant’,30 might be considered as ‘the most fertile source of development’ of legal 
systems.31 The body of comparative law literature on the concept of legal transplants, 
however, shows that it is a controversial issue among jurists and legal thinkers, particularly 
in relation to the capability of legal patterns and ideas to be successfully diffused across 
national frontiers.  
 
Watson suggests that the growth of legal systems can largely be attributed to the borrowing 
of foreign legal rules32and many legal-historical examples support his position.33Most 
importantly, Watson claims that the law is largely independent from surrounding social 
structures; in other words, the close link between the rule of law and the society in which 
they operate is almost absent.34 Thus, the practice of legal transplantation, as Watson 
argues, ‘is socially easy’.35 Watson’s theory has attracted strong criticism from various 
standpoints on the basis that the law is relatively isolated from its ‘context’.36 The strongest 
criticism was expressed by Legrand, who pointed out that the meaning of a legal rule is 
unique to a particular culture.37 Legrand suggests that as long as the rule is not an 
‘autonomous entity unencumbered by historical, epistemological, or cultural baggage’,38 it 
cannot be diffused across national frontiers without being changed.39 Accordingly, Legrand 
concluded that legal borrowing was ‘impossible’.40 In fact, on the basis of evidence 
currently available, it seems reasonable to disagree with Legrand’s viewpoint, as there are 
many successful cases of legal transplantation.41  
 
In the literature on legal transplants, several moderate viewpoints stand between Watson’s 
hypothesis and Legrand’s theory. Those intermediate positions tend to focus on 
highlighting various aspects of the process of transplantation, such as identifying factors 
that may influence the receptivity of legal rules, and specifying key conditions for the 
success and failure of legal transplantation.42 For example, Kahn-Freund opines that the 
                                                        
30 A Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (2nd edn, Athens, University of Georgia 
Press 1993) 21. 
31 Ibid 95. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid 6–7.  
34 A Watson, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Change’ (1978) Cambridge Law Journal 37 313, 314–315. 
35 Watson (n 30) 95.  
36 O Kahn-Freund, ‘On Use and Misuse of Comparative Law’ (1974) Modern Law Review 37 1, 27. 
37 See P Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of Legal Transplants’ (1997) Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 4 111, 117. 
38 Ibid 114, 115–117. 
39 Ibid 117. 
40 Ibid 114. 
41 For instance, for Japanese importation of directors’ duty of loyalty from the US corporate law, see 
H Kanda and C Milhaupt, ‘Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s Fiduciary Duty in Japanese 
Corporate Law’ (2003) 51 The American Journal of Comparative Law 887.  
42 Siems (n 23) 197– 200. 
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‘transferability’ of foreign models is possible; however, the principal question to address 
concerns the benchmark to which the success or failure of adoption is measured.43 Khan-
Freund put forward the view that since there is a close relationship between the law and its 
geographical, economic, social and, importantly, political environment,44 the transferability 
of legal rules depends on whether or not the foreign rule can be adjusted to the 
environment of the host country.45 It is also submitted that there is a need to ensure 
compatibility between the foreign law and the legal environment of the host country as a 
key condition for successful legal transplant.46 More importantly, it has been asserted that 
legal rules vary in relation to their cultural and societal context.47 This line of argument 
suggests that rules that are culturally and societally embedded are more difficult to transfer 
across legal systems than those that are not bound to a particular society.48 In this regard, 
company law is generally seen as falling within the category of laws that is not strongly 
linked to cultural values and therefore such law will be much easier to ‘move relatively 
freely’ across cultural frontiers.49  
 
Given the above viewpoints, it could be said, as a starting point, that legal transplantation 
is theoretically possible, at least in relation to the field of laws such as the company law. 
Nevertheless, this research does not recommend the blind copying of the law from the UK 
to Saudi Arabia without having regard to the appropriateness of imported rules in the Saudi 
context. By using legal transplantation, this thesis tests what kind of cross-border 
movement of corporate rules is feasible within the legal context of Saudi Arabia. In other 
words, the research will examine to what extent the Saudi law, as a Sharia-based law, can 
adopt the Anglo-American model of corporate law. Based on the above viewpoints about 
the possibility of legal transplantation, the methodology developed here concerns the 
examining the feasibility of transplantation using Saudi company law as a case study. It 
will be argued in this research that the test used for examining the feasibility of legal 
transferability demonstrates that substantial legal transplantation form the UK is largely 
possible in the context of Saudi company law but with key caveats.  
 
                                                        
43 Kahn-Freund (n 36) 6. 
44 Ibid 7–8 and 12.   
45 Ibid 6. 
46 See generally, D Berkowitz, K Pistor And J Richard, ‘Economic Development, Legality, and the 
Transplant Effect’ (2003) 47 European Economic Review 165. 
47 Ibid 13, where Khan-Freund gives examples of family law that show ‘the diminishing strength of 
environmental obstacles to transplantation’. 
48 Ibid 17. 
49 See, for example, R Cotterrell, ‘Is There a Logic of Legal Transplants’ in D Nelken and J Feest (eds), 
Adapting Legal Cultures ( Hart Publishing 2001) 81–82. 
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The methodological approach adopted was that a foreign rule is only feasible if it can be 
adapted to fit within the institutional structure and legal environment in Saudi Arabia.50 For 
example, for the purpose of this thesis, it is necessary to consider whether a relevant UK 
rule is compatible with Islamic (Sharia) instructions, which is the paramount law of Saudi 
Arabia.51 The disparity in the roles and capabilities of courts between the UK and Saudi 
Arabia is also taken into account to ensure that rules imported from the UK concerning 
duties of directors and the enforcement of its breaches through derivative litigation are 
likely to fit within the Saudi legal infrastructure. While designing the proposed reform, the 
differences in the typical patterns of ownership structure in the UK and Saudi Arabia are 
taken into consideration where necessary to ensure greater protection for minority 
shareholders. It should also be noted here that while the UK law belongs to the common 
law, Saudi law has rules of Islamic origin and tends to be influenced by the French civil 
law tradition, at least in relation to commercial law.52 Although the UK and Saudi belong 
to different legal families, this would not represent an insurmountable barrier to legal 
importation because it might be true to say that the practical evidence of movement of 
legal ideas across borders has blurred the theoretical distinction between various legal 
families.53  
 
One point to consider is that the comparative study principally used the doctrinal approach 
in discussing problems in, and potential solutions to, the Saudi legal system of directors’ 
duties and derivative actions. This suggests that all relevant primary and secondary 
resources in the UK and Saudi Arabia are crucial sources of data in this research. It should 
be noted here that although the Saudi judiciary has recently adopted a policy to publish 
previous judicial decisions, only few selective judgments were made available to the public 
and there have been no judgments among the published decisions published that were 
relevant to the subject matter of the present research.54 Thus, when analysing the Saudi 
law, and in relation to general assumptions that would also apply to joint stock companies, 
                                                        
50 See Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (n 46).  
51See section (1.2), Chapter 1 in this thesis.  
52 See, for example, M Hanson, ‘The Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia’ 
(1987) 2 Arab LQ 272. 
53 Some scholars have put this argument forward; see, for example, Fedtke (n 14) 550. For examples of 
movements of rules across jurisdictions of different legal families, see K Pistor et al., ‘Evolution of Corporate 
Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six Countries’ (2003) 18 The World Bank Research Observer 
89, 99–101.  
54 The researcher examined judicial rulings in the field of company law published on the website of the Board 
of Grievance for the years 1987–2012. There are only a few cases on matters relating to joint stock 
companies and there is no decision related to the topic of the research. It should be also noted that judgments 
and judicial principles are not published systemically and periodically. 
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the research referred to two judgments related to limited liability companies55 to clarify the 
position of Saudi law. 
 
This thesis is structured into six chapters. Chapter 1 provides a general overview of the 
Saudi legal system within which joint stock companies operate. Chapter 2 rationalises why 
there is a need to reform the company law in the field of directors’ duties and in relation to 
judicial mechanisms of enforcement. It assesses the current board accountability 
framework in Saudi Arabia with the purpose of establishing where directors’ duties and 
formal enforcement thereof sit within the entire framework. The evaluation covers the 
main mechanisms of board accountability and control: monitoring by blockholders, 
shareholders’ internal mechanisms at the general meeting, the role of independent directors 
and markets.  
 
In Chapter 3 the argument of legal uncertainty is developed throughout the comparative 
analysis of director’s duty of care in the UK and Saudi Arabia, exploring the areas of 
deficiency that need to be reformed in Saudi Arabia. Similarly, Chapter 4 offers a critical 
analysis of three forms of duty of loyalty: (i) the duty to act in good faith in the general 
interest of the company; (ii) the duty to avoid conflicts of interest with particular focus on 
the exploitation of corporate opportunities; and (iii) the duty to avoid conflicts of interest in 
its application in the area of self-dealing transactions. The main argument presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4 is that the absence of a detailed legislative statement on directors’ duties 
coupled with the inactive role of courts in developing the law has given rise to serious 
levels of uncertainty in Saudi law compared to its UK counterpart. Chapter 5 evaluates the 
UK and Saudi laws, exploring significant areas of inaccessibility and deficiency in the 
private enforcement action in general and derivative action in particular. In this chapter 
public enforcement is assessed with the purpose of emphasising the important role that 
private enforcement action plays in complementing public enforcement. 
 
Following the identification of legal deficiencies in Saudi law, Chapter 6 considers the 
reform agenda by way of legal transplantation. To this end, the thesis examines the 
feasibility of transplanting selective legal ideas and rules from the UK law to Saudi law, 
taking the institutional structure and legal environment of Saudi Arabia into consideration.  
In the final part of the thesis conclusions are drawn and comments are made that are 
relevant to the proposed reform and to any future study that is required.  
                                                        
55 It is equivalent to UK private company limited by shares, see footnote 162, Chapter 1 in this thesis. 
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Generally speaking, a business firm does not operate in an institutional vacuum, but rather 
under formal and informal constraints.56 The corporate governance and the way in which 
the firm operates are influenced by a set of forces external to the firm such as the legal 
system of the country,57 and by a set of internal factors that determine the relationships 
between the key members in the firm58 (e.g., directors’ duties and shareholders’ rights).59 
Importantly, the internal regulations of corporate governance are strengthened by external 
laws and institutions, which provide rules and standards for conduct, and legal mechanisms 
for enforcing duties and rights.60 This suggests that legal rules and institutions must operate 
effectively in a country in order to determine the efficacy of the internal mechanisms of a 
company’s corporate governance, such as directors’ duties. 
 
When discussing the Saudi legal framework, it is necessary to take into account the 
religious characteristics of Saudi law. Islam retains a significant influence over Saudi 
society, and pervades various aspects of individual and communal life.61 The Saudi state 
can be categorised as a good example of a typical Muslim society where the political 
system, culture and law are based upon Islamic principles. Nevertheless, the increasing 
demand for economic and social growth, coupled with a lack of legal infrastructure, has led 
to the Saudi state modernising the legal system by supplementing Sharia with a body of 
legislation of foreign origin, such as those governing business organisations (e.g., joint 
stock companies). These changes also resulted in new government institutions responsible 
for the enforcement of applicable rules, which is an important pillar of the entire legal 
framework.62 
                                                        
56 Institutions (i.e., humanly devised constraints) can be classified into ‘informal constraints’ (e.g., customs 
and traditions) and ‘formal rules’ (e.g., laws), see D North, ‘Institutions’ (1991) 5 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 97, 97.  
57 M Iskander and N Chamlou, Corporate Governance: A Framework for Implementation (World Bank 
Publication, Washington, May 2000) 4–5, <http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/ 
WDSP/IB/2000/09/08/000094946_00082605593465/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf > accessed 1 May 2015.  
58 Ibid 4–5. 
59 Ibid 5–6. 
60 Ibid 5. 
61 F Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System : Studies of Saudi Arabia, (Leiden, Brill 2000) xiv–xv. 





This chapter provides a brief overview of the current legal framework for joint stock 
companies in Saudi Arabia, and determines the external structure of governance for this 
type of company. It identifies the main characteristics of the overall Saudi legal system and 
concisely surveys its unique aspects in order to provide an accurate understanding of the 
current legal framework for joint stock companies. The chapter is divided into four main 
sections. First, the significance and influence of Sharia law within the Saudi legal system 
are established and explored. Second, the status of the state legislation, as a source of legal 
obligations, is analysed, scrutinising the relationship between the law of Islamic origin and 
the state laws of foreign origin. In the third part, the chapter shifts its focus to consider the 
main laws and regulations that inform the regulatory structure of companies, namely the 
Companies Law 2015 (CL 2015), the Capital Market Law 2003 (CML 2003) and the 
Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 (CGRs 2017). Finally, the main formal 
enforcement institutions, namely the courts and the main regulators, which are made up of 
the Ministry of Commerce and Investment (MOCI) and the Capital Market Authority 
(CMA), which are assumed to be responsible for the enforcement of directors’ duties, are 
described. 
 
1.2 The Primacy of Sharia in the Saudi Legal System 
 
The significance of Sharia, as the paramount law of the Saudi state, had been made clear 
even before the deceleration of the Kingdom’s unification in 1932, when King Abdulaziz 
announced that the Holy Qur’an, the Sunnah (Traditions of the Prophet)63 and the Fiqh 
(Islamic Jurisprudence) were the main sources of Saudi law.64 The primacy of Sharia has 
remained in the Saudi state and was further confirmed by the Basic Law of Governance 
1992 (BLG 1992),65 the first written constitution of Saudi Arabia. 
 
The influence of Sharia on the content of the BLG 1992 is evidenced by the fact that the 
role of Sharia is explicitly referred to in relation to the determination of the Kingdom’s 
identity,66 the structure of its governance,67 the basis of Saudi society,68 its economic 
                                                        
63 The Qur’an and the Sunnah are together referred to as Sharia, see section (1.2.1) in this Chapter. 
64 The King’s Announcement published in the Official Gazette of Umm Al-Qura on 9/12/1924.  
65 An English translation of the BLG 1992 is found at 
<http://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewStaticPage.aspx?lang=en&PageID=25> accessed 28 August 2017. 
66 See article 1 of the BLG 1992. 
67 Articles 5–8 of the BLG 1992. 
68 Articles 9–11 and 13 of the BLG 1992. 
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principles,69 and the state’s rights and duties.70 Sharia indisputably remains the source of 
legal obligations71 and the paramount law in Saudi Arabia. The BLG 1992 affirms that the 
Saudis’ ‘constitution shall be the Book of Allah [Qur’an] and the Sunnah’,72 and further 
states that courts are required to apply the cases before them to Qur’anic and Sunnah 
provisions. The BLG 1992 and other legislation rank lower than the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah, which maintain their status as the primary sources of Saudi law and the basis of 
the Kingdom’s governance.73  
 
As Vogel correctly notes, Islamic law is generally more prevalent in Saudi Arabia, 
compared with other Islamic states.74 It is a combination of historical and socio-political 
factors that has led to the dominance of Sharia law within the Saudi legal structure. For 
example, the position of Saudi Arabia as the birthplace of Islam and the homeland of two 
Holy Mosques;75 the function of Islamic religion in safeguarding the legitimacy of the 
Saudi political system;76 Saudis’ wish to be governed by Sharia (as many tend to regard 
Islamic law as their ‘indigenous law’);77 the long history of the application of Sharia in the 
Arabian Peninsula,78 and the historical fact that Saudi Arabia was not subject to Western 
colonisation,79 have all participated in establishing and perpetuating the primacy of Sharia 
law within the Saudi legal system. Having established this, it is now useful to clarify the 
nature and main elements of Islamic law, as this will help to define how Sharia will be 
understood within this research.  
 
1.2.1 Sharia law as a main source of legal obligations 
  
Sharia law, which is technically ‘the canon law of Islam’,80 is characterised by the divine 
source of its injunctions and principles.81 Sharia law may be defined as ‘the entire system 
                                                        
69 Articles 17 and 21 of the BLG 1992. 
70 See, for example, articles 23, 26 and 38 of the BLG 1992. 
71 M Al-Jaber, Saudi Commercial Law (Arabic), (5th edn, Riyadh, 2000) 24. 
72 See Articles 1 and 48 of the BLG 1992 respectively. 
73 See article 7 of the BLG 1992. 
74 Vogel (n 61) xiv. 
75 A Al-Shalhoub, The Constitutional System in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Between Islamic Sharia and 
Comparative Law (Arabic) (Riyadh, King Fahd National Library 1999) 37. 
76 F M Al-Saud, ‘Political development in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: An Assessment of the Majlis Ash-
Shura’ (PhD thesis, University of Durham 2000) 12 and 38–39. 
77 Vogel (n 61) xiv.   
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 J Schacht, ‘Islamic Law in Contemporary States’ (1959) 8 The American Journal of Comparative Law 133, 
136.  
81 The divine sources of Islamic law are the Qur’an and the Sunnah. 
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of law and jurisprudence associated with the religion of Islam,82 including (1) the primary 
sources of law (Sharia), and (2) the subordinate sources of law and the methodology used 
to deduce and apply the law (Islamic jurisprudence)’.83 According to Islamic law literature, 
there are primary and secondary sources of Sharia law, both of which are described briefly 
below.  
 
1.2.1.1 Primary sources of Sharia law 
 
The Qur’an and the Sunnah are the primary sources of Islamic law. With regard to the 
Qur’an, it is the first and most important source of law due to the fact that it is the actual 
words of Almighty Allah revealed to the Prophet Mohammed (peace be upon him 
(PBUH)). Consequently, Muslims believe that any activity or action that does not 
contradict the Qur’an is deemed to be permissible.84 In terms of the classification of 
Qur’anic provisions, while there is a set of purely religious rules85 and moral principles,86 a 
number of the verses in the Qur’an are concerned with what can be regarded by Western 
jurists as legal material. This includes injunctions and principles relating to the spheres of 
family and inheritance, crimes and penalties, trade, business, and contracts.87 In relation to 
business transactions, the Qur’an involves a number of injunctions and principles. For 
example, Muslims are religiously required (i) to fulfil their contractual obligations,88 and to 
comply with the principles of honesty, trustworthiness, truthfulness and justice89 in all their 
affairs, including business transactions.90  
 
The Sunnah is the second source of Islamic law after the Qur’an and its binding nature is 
indicated in many Qur’anic verses.91 The Sunnah refers to the Prophet’s ‘sayings’ and 
‘deeds’, in addition to practices that received his ‘silence and [so] tacit approval’.92 The 
                                                        
82 The law in Islam is inseparable from the religion, see I Abdal-Haqq, ‘Islamic Law: An overview of its 
Origin and Elements’ (1996) 1 The Journal of Islamic Law 1,12. 
83 Ibid 5. 
84 S Ramadan, Islamic Law: Its Scope and Equity (London, PR Macmillan 1961)31–33. 
85 This includes the Islamic creed and faith, and daily praying. 
86 For example, the kind treatment of one’s parents, see Qur’an 17:23.  
87 See Al-Shalhoub (n 75) 90–91. 
88 See Qur’an 5: 1).   
89 See Qur’an 83:1–3); Qur’an 55:9; Qur’an 4:58. It is worth noting here that such business–legal principles 
mentioned and their implications on the directorial decisions and actions will be considered, where relevant, 
in this thesis. 
90 L Miles and S Goulding, ‘Corporate Governance in Western (Anglo-American) and Islamic Communities: 
Prospects for Convergence?’ (2010) 2 Journal of Business Law 126, 132–133; A M Abu-Tapanjeh, 
‘Corporate Governance from the Islamic Perspective: A Comparative Analysis with OECD Principles’ 
(2009) 20 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 556, 561 and 562. 
91 See for example, Qur’an 4:80. 
92 S Mahmassani, Falsafat Al-Tashri Fi Al-Islam: The Philosophy of Jurisprudence in Islam (English) 
(Leiden, Brill, 1961) 71. 
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function of the Sunnah is to complete, or in some cases interpret, some of the general 
provisions set forth in the Qur’an and to regulate other additional matters.93 As with the 
Qur’an, the Sunnah contains a number of legal principles regarding the conduct of 
business, such as the prohibition of gharar94 (i.e., ambiguity and uncertainty)95 where 
Sharia law forbids a transaction if there is excessive uncertainty around the pillars and 
conditions of the transaction.96  
 
1.2.1.2 Secondary sources of Sharia law 
 
Where the Qur’an and the Sunnah provide no guidance on a particular issue, it is the role 
of Muslim jurists to give their legal opinion by drawing on secondary sources of law. Ijma 
(consensus of all Muslim jurists at any time after the death of Prophet)97 and Qiyas 
(analogical reasoning)98 are binding sources of law but come below the Qur’an and Sunnah 
in the hierarchy of Islamic legal sources.99  
 
In seeking solutions to legal problems, Jurists may also refer to other, less significant, 
sources, which themselves have been the subject of much debate in the literature of Islamic 
jurisprudence.100 These sources are employed to form new rules on the strength of equity 
and justice in the general interests of society.101 This category of sources of Islamic law 
mainly comprises Masalih Mursalah (public interest), Istihsn (preference102 or equity and 
justice103), Istidlal and Istis’hab (deduction and presumption of continuity),104 Urf (local 
custom)105, and Sadd Al-tharaea (a means of blocking rules that lead to undesirable 
ends).106 It is necessary to emphasise that the recourse to this group of sources by several 
Muslim states, including Saudi Arabia, has been key to meeting the needs of their 
                                                        
93 See Al-Shalhoub (n 75) 92.  
94 It was narrated that Abu Hurairah said: ‘The Messenger of Allah forbade . . . the gharar sale’, Sahih 
Muslim (Book 21, Hadith No. 1513 707).  
95 M Saleem, Islamic Commercial Law (Singapore, Wiley 2013) 3. 
96 Ibid 3– 4. 
97 M Al-Uthaymeen, A System of Roots of Jurisprudence and Its Principles (Arabic) (3rd edn, Riyadh, Dar 
Ibn Al-Jawzi 2012) 208. 
98 Mahmassani (n 92) 79  
99 Al-Uthaymeen (n 97) 208 
100 See R A Al-Shoronbassy, The Introduction to Islamic Jurisprudence: Development, Schools, Sources, 
Doctrines and Theories (Arabic) (2nd edn, Alexandria, 1983) 227. 
101 Mahmassani (n 92) 83–84.  
102 Ibid 85.  
103 See F A Hassan, ‘The Sources of Islam Law’ (1982) 76 American Society of International Law 
Proceedings 65, 68. 
104 Mahmassani (n 92) 85–91.  
105 Al-Shoronbassy (n 100) 240. 
106 Ibid 250.  
 16 
 
societies, and many states introduced their legal reform agendas on the basis of public 
interest.107  
 
Notwithstanding the established hierarchy of Islamic sources of law, the development of 
Sharia law can be mainly attributed to the jurists’ recourse to Ijtihad (endeavour to 
formulate a legal rule or interpretation),108 in the absence of detailed guidance in the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah.109 Hence, Sharia law is regarded as ‘a jurists’ law’ because it is the 
task of jurists to ‘expound law’ via the use of interpretation.110 Ijtihad can be exercised 
through numerous methodologies such as analogical reasoning, preference, public interest 
and so on.111 As a result of the differences between jurists in their understanding of Sharia, 
and in the methodologies applied to deducting rules, various schools of thought have 
emerged within Islamic jurisprudence.112 It suffices to say here that in Islamic Sunni 
jurisprudence, there are four main orthodox schools of thought (Madhahib al Fiqhiya): (i) 
Hanafi, (ii) Maliki, (iii) Shafi’i and (iv) Hanbali.113 While it is true that differences in 
opinion exist between the schools, they also exist between jurists who belong to the same 
school.114 
 
1.2.2 Sharia law in practice: General considerations 
 
It is necessary from the outset to consider that Sharia tends to provide only general 
principles in relation to commercial and corporate matters, leaving the formulation of 
detailed rules to the society concerned according to the level of development.115 Thus, the 
state is empowered to introduce detailed rules to supplement general principles of 
Sharia.116 This by implication means that any deficiency identified in Saudi company law 
cannot be attributable to Sharia because any deficiency is necessarily attributable to the 
                                                        
107 See the discussion in section (1.3) in this Chapter. 
108 See, for example, Al-Shoronbassy (n 100) 253; B Weiss, ‘Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of 
Ijtihad’ (1978) 26 The American Journal of Comparative Law 199, 200–201.  
109 Abdal-Haqq (n 82) 35. 
110 Weiss (n 108) 201. 
111 Mahmassani (n 92) 92. 
112 Abdal-Haqq (n 82) 44–45.  
113 Ibid 44.  
114 See R Peters, ‘From Jurists’ Law to Statute Law or What Happens When the Shari’a is Codified’ (2002) 7 
Mediterranean Politics 82, 84–86. 
115 Thus, the Saudi corporate statute, as will be shown in this Chapter, is the main source of law governing 
joint stock companies, including various relationships within the company such as the relationship between 
directors and shareholders; see generally G Hagel, ‘A Practitioner’s Introduction to Saudi Arabian Law’ 
(1983) 16 Vand J Transnat’l L 113 .  
116 See B Seaman, ‘Islamic Law and Modern Government: Saudi Arabia Supplements the Shari’a to Regulate 
Development’ (1979) 18 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 413, 415; for more deatlis, see section (1.3) 
in this Chapter.   
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state legislator and its inability to provide the detailed rules necessary to promote legal 
certainty. 
 
As far as the application of Sharia law in Saudi Arabia is concerned, two important factors 
should be taken into account. First, judges are not bound, in theory, to follow a particular 
view or school, and they have the discretion to ‘judge by what [they believe] to be the 
truth’.117 In practice, courts mostly adopt the views of the Hanbali School when 
adjudicating disputes,118 and it is generally acknowledged that Saudi Arabia in its 
application of Sharia law adheres to Hanbali jurisprudence.119 Nevertheless, this wide 
judicial discretion has, among other things,120 given rise to inconsistent applications of 
Sharia law and accordingly to the presence of legal uncertainty within Saudi law. This is 
the case despite the courts’ adherence, in general, to the interpretations of Hanbali 
jurisprudence,121 as different solutions to the same legal problem exist within the school.122  
 
Second, there is no codification of Sharia rules123 as there are in the civil law model. The 
Saudi state has neither a civil nor penal code and the absence of codified Islamic rules was 
initially due to the resistance of religious scholars (Ulama).124 The lack of codification has 
contributed to inconsistency in judicial decisions.125 As such, it can be suggested, as many 
do,126 that the codification of Islamic rules would be extremely advantageous in the Saudi 
legal context. Codification would limit judges’ discretion by establishing a set of rules that 
                                                        
117 Vogel (n 61) 83 in reference to the statement of former President of the Permanent Board of the Supreme 
Judicial Council. 
118Ibid 10, 83 and 118.  
119 See A Ansary, ‘A Brief Overview of the Saudi Arabian Legal System’ (Hauser Global Law School 
Program, July 2008) 10 <http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/saudi_arabia.htm#_Toc200894559> 
accessed 26 August 2017. 
120 For example, the absence of judicial precedents in Saudi law.  
121 R B Khnayn, ‘A Viewpoint About the Compilation of Preponderant Views of Jurists’ (Arabic) (1991) 33 
Journal of Islamic Research 26, 26 
<http://www.alifta.net/Fatawa/FatawaDetails.aspx?languagename=ar&View=Page&PageID=4602&PageNo
=1&BookID=2> accessed 1 February 2015.  
122 Al-Shoronbassy (n 100) 291–296. 
123 See, for example, Seaman (n 116) 440.  
124 G N Sfeir, ‘The Saudi Approach to Law Reform’ (1988) 36 Am J Comp L 729, 732–733. The Board of 
Senior Ulama, in its 2001 recommendation, gave several reasons for their opposition to codification, see The 






accessed 26 August 2017. 
125 Vogel (n 61) 348–349.  
126 See, for example, F M Almajid, ‘A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of 
Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective’ (PhD thesis, 
University of Manchester 2008) 166. 
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would be recognised and consistently applied, thereby reducing uncertainty within the 
legal system.  
 
To this end, the Saudi regulator has recently decided to address this issue. Based upon the 
approval of the Board of Senior Ulama, a specialised committee has been formed to 
prepare a draft of a ‘Compendium of Judicial Rulings’ in relation to Sharia matters that are 
necessary for judicial work.127 Owing to the paucity of information regarding the 
committee’s work, this move towards the compilation of judicial rulings has raised several 
questions as to the nature and content of the Compendium. Crucially, it is unclear whether 
the Compendium will have a binding effect or only provide guidance to the courts. 
Furthermore, there are doubts concerning whether or not the Compendium will contain a 
comprehensive account of Islamic jurisprudence as the committee has been given the 
discretion to determine which matters are necessary for judicial work. 
 
1.3 State Legislation as a Source of Legal Obligations 
 
It would be inaccurate and misleading to suggest that Sharia law is the law of Saudi 
Arabia. While this is, to large extent, correct, it does not reflect the exact content of Saudi 
law since the scope of Saudi law is wider than Sharia law; in other words, Saudi law 
consists of rules of Islamic origin, as well as laws and regulations of foreign origin, which 
are adapted so that they do not conflict with Sharia. Perhaps the most precise account of 
the Saudi legal system is given by Vogel who describes it as having two categories of 
rules: one founded in Islamic law and the other a category of ‘man-made’ law (positive 
law).128 Vogel further notes that while the former is ‘fundamental and dominant’, the latter 
is ‘subordinate’.129  
 
Remarkably, the BLG 1992 lacks clear mention of legislation as a source of law in Saudi 
Arabia. Nonetheless, the regulator’s entitlement to enact laws and the binding 
characteristic of state legislation can be inferred from the BLG 1992. For example, the Law 
clearly recognises the jurisdiction of Legislative (Regulatory) Authority to introduce new 
laws130 and additionally charges the King, as head of state, with the duty to oversee the 
                                                        
127 Section 1 of the Royal Order No. (A/20) dated 30/11/2014. The recent Royal Order was based on the 
Board of Senior Ulama Decision No. 236, dated 4 February 2010.  
128 F E Vogel, ‘Islamic Governance in the Gulf: A Framework for Analysis, Comparison, and Prediction’ in 
G Sick and L Potter (ed), The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and 
Religion (London, Macmillan Press Ltd 1997) 275–276. 
129 Ibid  
130 See article 67 of the BLG 1992. 
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implementation of state laws.131 Furthermore, courts are statutorily required to apply ‘laws 
not in conflict with the Qur’an and the Sunnah’.132 Although legislation as a source of law 
is not explicitly recognised, the Saudi legislature, through the use of Islamic principle of 
public interest (al-maslaha al-mursalah), has the right, recognised by Sharia, to pass laws 
and regulations to meet the needs of modern society.133 The public interest as a basis of 
law-making is established by the BLG 1992,134 so long as the exercise of legislation 
produces laws that fall within the Sharia framework.135 In fact, the flexible nature of 
Islamic law, which includes the general principle that ‘all things not specifically prohibited 
are allowed’, clears the way for the codification of foreign legal ideas in Saudi Arabia.136 It 
should again be stressed that the legitimate exercise of legislation on the basis of public 
interest is only valid for ‘supplementing’, but not ‘contradicting’ Sharia,137 an important 
consideration that will be taken into account later when examining the feasibility of 
reforming the Saudi law of directors’ duties by way of legal transplantation.138  
 
It is unquestionable that the economic development of the Kingdom has been a major 
contributing factor to legal change and reform.139 As the government’s revenues from oil 
products rose and the Saudi economy began to develop, the Saudi rulers attempted to 
harmonise Islamic rules with economic, social and industrial growth, by producing a body 
of statutory laws to deal with a vast range of areas, such as constitutional and criminal 
matters, judiciary and human rights, health and education, and commerce and finance.140 It 
is worth mentioning that French law inspired most laws introduced during the early period 
of Saudi legal reform.141 This influence was attributable to the fact that the drafting of those 
laws was done by Egyptian legal experts who followed the French legal tradition. As they 
worked in close collaboration with Saudi scholars who also received their legal education 
from schools of law in France, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon,142 it is easy to see the logic 
behind the influence of French law over the content of many Saudi laws, including those 
                                                        
131 See article 55 of the BLG 1992. 
132 See article 48 of the BLG 1992. 
133 See Ansary (n 119) 5.   
134 See article 67 of the BLG 1992.  
135 Ansary (n 119) 5. 
136 Hanson (n 52) 289. 
137 R Aba-Namay, ‘The New Saudi Representative Assembly’ (1998) 5 Islamic L & Soc’y 235, 236 – 237. 
138 This issue will be further discussed in Chapter 6 in this thesis. 
139 See Sfeir (n 124) 733–734; Hanson (n 52) 272. 
140 The first piece of legislation enacted in the history of Saudi Arabia was the CCL1931. The list of primary 
laws as well as main secondary statutes issued by the Council of Ministers are on the website of Beureau of 
Experts at the Council of Ministers <www.boe.gov.sa.>  
141 Hanson (n 52) 288.  
142 Ibid 288–289. Legal systems of aforementioned Arab countries are influenced by French civil law 
tradition, see Zweigert and Kötz (n 22)110–111. 
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that fall within the area of commercial law. This is exemplified by the CCL 1931143 and the 
CL 1965,144 which are largely inspired by French law. Hence, it has become common to 
describe Saudi law, at least in relation to its commercial law, as a French-based legal 
system.145 However, this does not mean that Saudi lawmakers were confined to following 
the French civil legal system and were reluctant to adopt legal ideas found in other legal 
systems. For example, Saudi benefits from the Anglo-American model and experiences in 
respect of the reform of capital market law and corporate governance regulation. 
According to Beach, who had a direct hand in shaping the content of the CML 2003, the 
law includes rules based upon existing securities laws from US, European, Asian and 
Middle Eastern sources.146 Recently, the MOCI, which has participated with the CMA in 
preparing the new CGRs 2017, clearly stated that many foreign and international 
documents and reports in respect of corporate governance (e.g., the UK Corporate 
Governance Code) had been drawn on while preparing the new draft of the CGRs.147  
 
1.4 Main Saudi Laws Determining the Governance of Joint Stock Companies  
 
Since the corporate form is considered a fundamental basis for ‘industrialization, the 
creation of viable market economies, and ultimately economic prosperity’,148 the law of 
business organisations was one of the areas covered by the Saudi governmental agenda of 
legal reform. Similar to other developing economies,149 Saudi lawmakers passed the first 
corporate statute in the mid-1960s (the CL 1965), importing the law of companies from 
other jurisdictions.150 This move towards the promulgation of a new corporate statute by 
way of transplantation was justified, inter alia, by the fact that there was no recognition of 
the Western legal notions of corporation, legal personality and limited liability in the 
                                                        
143 See Sfeir (n 124) 732 and 739. 
144 Hanson (n 52) 290. Hanson gives an example of the French influence over the regulation of companies by 
pointing out that the types of company mentioned in the CL1965 directly match their French counterparts set 
forth in the pre-1966 Code of French Companies. 
145 See, for instance, J L Brand, ‘Aspects of Saudi Arabian Law and Practice’ (1986) 9 B C Int’l & Comp L 
Rev 1, 25 and 26; N Foster, ‘Islamic Perspectives on the Law of Business Organizations: Part 1: An 
Overview of the Classical Sharia and a Brief Comparison of the Sharia Regimes with Western-style Law’ 
(2010) 11 European Business Organization Law Review 3, 34. 
146  Beach (n 28) 308. 
147 See the MOCI statement, available on the website of the Ministry of Commerce and Investment at 
<http://mci.gov.sa/LawsRegulations/Projects/Pages/cg.aspx#0> accessed 20 April 2017. 
148 Pistor et al. (n 53) 89. 
149 There are many examples of developing and transition economies that receive their laws primarily from 
either one of the major legal families (England, France and Germany) or the United States; see, for instance, 
ibid, 94 and 99–101. 
150 See footnotes 141–145 and accompanying text in this Chapter.  
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classic Islamic law literature, as Muslim jurists were only familiar with a partnership with 
unlimited liability and with interdependent legal personality.151 
 
Company law, which is the arena for determining legal rights and obligations of various 
corporate constituencies, is one of the central pillars of effective corporate governance. 
Law and regulation are understood as external formal institutions of corporate governance 
that have a significant role in governing and disciplining the conduct of insiders, whether 
directors or shareholders.152 Under Saudi law, there are three laws that are the most 
germane to the discussion of this study: The CL 2015, as a major source of corporate 
governance, involves the majority of statutory rules governing joint stock companies, and 
is particularly concerned with the rights of shareholders, directors’ duties and the 
enforcement mechanisms thereof. In addition to the corporate legislation, since joint stock 
companies are the only type of company that can be listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange, 
such companies are subject to the CML 2003, which aims to protect capital market 
participants, particularly investors. 
 
As an additional source of corporate governance, a number of Implementing Regulations 
issued by the CMA in which the Corporate Governance Regulations (i.e., the CGRs 2017 
is the recent version of the Regulations) are designed to establish the regulation of different 
relationships within the company, namely those between directors, managers, shareholders 
and stakeholders.153 The inclusion of the CGRs 2017 in the discussion of this study is due 
to the fact that it contains important rules that shape the regulation of directors’ duties, 
which is the main theme of this study, in addition to a set of ex ante mechanisms 
introduced to protect shareholders against directors’ abuse of power.  
 
1.4.1 Primary legislation for companies: The Company Law 2015  
 
Under Saudi law, the company (sharika) is statutorily defined as ‘a contract pursuant to 
which each of two or more persons undertake to participate in an enterprise aiming at 
profit, by offering in specie or/and as work a share, for sharing in the profits or losses 
                                                        
151 It has been said that the concept of partnership tends to be insufficient for the ‘emerging banking, mass 
transportation, and manufacturing sectors’, see generally T Kuran, ‘The Absence of the Corporation in 
Islamic Law: Origins and Persistence’ (2005) 53 The American Journal of Comparative Law 785, 786–787; 
Foster (n 145) 29–33. 
152 See Iskander and Chamlou (n 57) 3, 5.   
153 See the CMA’s statement regarding the issuance of new CGRs 2017, published on the website of the 
CMA at <https://cma.org.sa/en/MediaCenter/PR/Pages/NewCGR.aspx> accessed 29 August 2017. 
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resulting from such enterprise’.154 It can be inferred from this definition that since statutory 
companies are set up by a contract and that the Saudi law of contacts is subject to the rule 
of Sharia,155 this means that Sharia law ultimately affects Saudi company law. As an 
example of this: if the subject matter of a contract is unlawful from the perspective of the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah, this results in the invalidity of the contract.156 Thus, the company 
will be invalid due to the unlawfulness of its objective.157 It should also be noted that all 
types of statutory company are considered profit firms in which profitability is the main 
reason for the formation of the business enterprises, as set forth in the CL 2015.  
  
The forms of business organisation mentioned in the CL 2015 are:158 general 
partnerships,159 limited partnerships,160 syndicate partnerships (these are formed for specific 
transactions and have no legal personality and no need to be disclosed),161 limited liability 
companies162 and joint stock companies. 
 
With regard to joint stock companies, the CL 2015 contains an entire chapter containing 
98 articles (52–150) that cover the central regulation of joint stock companies in the 
Kingdom. The CL 2015 defines this type of company as one whose capital is divided into 
transferable shares of equal value, where the liability of its members for the company’s 
debt is limited to the value of their shares.163 Saudi corporate law provides joint stock 
companies with a legal form that possesses the core legal characteristics of a large modern 
company:164 (i) a separate legal personality,165 including limited liability of members for the 
                                                        
154 Article 2 of the CL 2015. Since there is no official English translation of the CL 2015, the researcher has 
translated the new CL 2015 with the assistance of the translated text of the CL 1965 taken from MOCI after 
making the necessary amendments to reflect the new version of the law.  
155 See C Childress, ‘Saudi Arabian Contract Law: A Comparative Perspective’ (1990) 2 St Thomas Law 
Forum 69.   
156 See S E Rayner, The theory of Contracts in Islamic Law (Arab and Islamic Laws Series, London, Graham 
& Trotman 1991) 91 and 95. 
157 Al-Jaber (n 71) 194.  
158 Article 3 of the CL 2015. 
159 See particularly articles 17–37 of the CL 2015.  
160 See specifically articles 38–42 of the CL 2015.  
161 See 43 of the CL 2015.  
162 See particularly articles 151–181 of the CL 2015. It is worth mentioning here that partners of limited 
liability companies are not responsible for the company’s debt other than their shares in the company’s 
capital. The management of the limited liability company is statutorily delegated to at least a single manager 
who is formally distinct from its members. Shares are only transferable in accordance with conditions set 
down in the company’s memorandum. Unlike joint stock companies, it is prohibited for limited liability 
companies to resort to the initial public offering (IPO). Arguably, a limited liability company can be 
categorised as a closed company in which it is much closer to the UK private company limited by shares 
which is grouped with the French SARL in the book of Kraakman et al., see Armour, Hansmann and 
Kraakman (n 1) 17. Surely, the limited liability company corresponds directly to its French counterpart 
(SARL), see Hanson (n 52) 290. 
163 Article 52 of the CL 2015. 
164 Armour, Hansmann and Kraakman (n 1) 1, 5–16. 
165 Article 14 of the CL 2015. 
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company’s debt;166 (ii) full transferability of shares;167 (iii) the delegation of management to 
the board;168 and (iv) the relationship between the right of its members to control the 
company and to receive the profit in return for the supply of the company’s capital.169 In 
this regard, the Saudi joint stock company can be considered in the category of large 
corporate enterprises such as UK public companies by shares, which have similar core 
legal characteristics to the modern corporate form.170 Similar to UK law,171 under the Saudi 
law, for the firm to offer its shares to the public, it must be established as, or converted 
into, a joint stock company172 in accordance with the provisions of the CL 2015.173  
 
Within the structure of the joint stock company, two fundamental elements  are identified 
in the CL 2015. The first is the establishment of the body of shareholders. In this regard, 
although the CL 2015 does not give a definition of a shareholder, there is a close link 
between equity ownership and the acquisition of the capacity of a shareholder,174 in which 
a shareholder can be described as any person175 who owns at least one share of the 
company’s capital stock. The second essential organisational element of joint stock 
companies is that the main power over the company’s affairs must be vested in a delegated 
board structure, namely the board of directors.176 According to article 68 (1), the number of 
directors appointed to the board must be no fewer than three and no more than eleven. 
 
The CL 2015, as with its predecessor of 1965, does not define the term director. However, 
it seems that a director is understood in Saudi law to refer to any person formally appointed 
as a member of the board of directors.177 By contrast, the UK Companies Act 2006 
(CA 2006) defines the ‘director’ as ‘any person occupying the position of a director’.178 In 
UK law, directors can be divided into de jure directors and de facto directors. While the 
                                                        
166 Article 52 of the CL 2015.  
167 Article 52 of the CL 2015. This does mean free tradability of shares as the law may impose or allow for 
restriction on the transferability of shares, see articles 107 and 108 of the CL 2015. 
168 Article 68(1) of the CL 2015. 
169 See particularly articles 11(1), 88(a)(1), 110, 113(1) of the CL 2015. 
170 See Davies and Worthington (n 2) 10–11. 
171 A public company is one that is allowed to offer its securities to the public, see ibid 12; see also 
section 755 of the CA 2006.  
172 A S Awwad, ‘Legal Regulation of the Saudi Stock Market: Evaluation, and Prospects For Reforms’ (PhD 
thesis, University of Warwick 2000) 85; see also article 11(a) of LRs 2004. 
173 See particularly articles 56–67 of the CL 2015 which are devoted to the company’s incorporation.  
174 See The Board of Grievances, Case No. 592/1/S, Appeal Division Decision No. 7/V/940 2007(1429H), 
<http://bogcases.bog.gov.sa/JudicialRules/1428/classification2/Volume1/Folder2/57_1.pdf> accessed 
1 February 2015.  
175 This includes both natural persons or legal persons, such as corporate entities, see S Yahea, The Brief in 
Saudi Commercial Law (Arabic), (6th edn, Arabian Modern Office 2010) 147.  
176 Article 68(1) of the CL 2015. 
177 See article 68(1) of the CL 2015. 
178 See section 250 of the CA 2006.  
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former has been properly and ‘formally’ selected,179 the latter is referred to as a director 
who has not been formally appointed.180 Under the common law, for a person to be a de 
facto director, the person needs to participate in the management of the company and carry 
out the same functions as other directors would;181 otherwise, he/she will not be considered 
as a de facto director regardless of whether he/she is called as a director.182 In the UK, the 
statutory definition of a director set out in section 250 of the CA 2006, as Keay points out, 
comprises the de facto director183 in which the general statutory duties can also be applied 
to the de facto director.184 In addition to the recognition of the de jure director and the de 
facto director, there is an additional type of director recognised by the UK law: the shadow 
director.185 The CA 2006 makes it clear that the shadow director is subject to the general 
duties of directors set forth in Part 10 of the CA 2006.186 In contrast with the UK, given the 
absence of statutory definition of ‘director’ in Saudi law, there is no clear recognition of 
the concepts of ‘de facto director’, or of ‘shadow director’, and this would raise uncertainty 
as to where the directors’ duties lie.187  
 
It is clear under the Saudi law, as mentioned above, that the concept of director refers to 
any person who is formally appointed as a member of the board. This, by implication, 
means that the directors’ duties apply to various types of board member (i.e., executive 
director, non-executive director and independent director).188 However, while the CL 2015 
does not place directors into various categories,189 a question could be raised about whether 
different functions undertaken by directors are recognised in terms of the application of 
directors’ duties; an important consideration that will be addressed later.190 It should be 
noted that the board might include a nominee director, such as the government 
representative to the board.191 The nominee director, under the Saudi law, is undoubtedly 
                                                        
179 See Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Tjolle (1998) BCC 282, 288–289. 
180 Ibid.  
181 Ibid. 282–283 
182 Ibid.  
183 See Keay (n 6) 15–16.  
184 Ibid 16.  
185 See section 251 of the CA 2006, which defines the shadow director under sub-section (1) as ‘a person in 
accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of the company are accustomed to act’. 
186 See section 170 (5) of the CA 2006. 
187 Although it is important for ensuring the accountability of directors to define the director broadly to 
include a de facto director, this issue is beyond the scope of the analysis carried out in this research as it will 
not be dealt with in the proposed reform of the Saudi law of directors’ duties.  
188 It is noteworthy that since the board is entitled to delegate particular powers and functions to non-
members, the latter is subject to the same rules on duties and responsibilities that apply to directors, 
article 75(1) of the CL 2015. 
189 This is also the case in relation to their predecessor of 1965. However, the CGRs have recognised those 
types of directors since the first version issued in 2006, see section (2.7), Chapter 2 in this thesis.  
190 This is particularly relevant to the application of duty of care, see section (3.4), Chapter 3 in this thesis. 
191 Examples of companies with nominee directors are mentioned in section (2.5.3), Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
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subject to those duties applied to other members of the board of directors.192 This is also 
the case in the UK law where the nominee director owes the same obligations owed by 
other directors.193  
 
1.4.2 Primary legislation for listed companies: The Capital Market Law 2003194 
 
For the purpose of ensuring greater fairness and transparency in the trading of securities 
and giving investors more protection and confidence in the market, the Saudi legislator 
decided to reset the regulatory and supervisory framework of the market through the 
introduction of the CML 2003, which was developed by way of legal transplantation.195 
With regard to the scope of the CML 2003, the law applies to dealings relevant to 
securities listed or to be listed on the stock market. According to the CML 2003, a non-
exhaustive list of securities governed by the law is set down in article 2, and includes the 
company’s shares.196 The Saudi securities law makes it clear that instruments such as 
cheques, bills of exchange and insurance policies do not fall within the statutory definition 
of securities and therefore are not subject to the CML 2003.197  
 
One of the most significant aspects of the CML 2003 is the creation of the market regulator 
(CMA),198 which is solely responsible for supervising and controlling Saudi market 
operations. The CMA has law-making power in order to accomplish the statutory 
objectives of the CML 2003.199 Through using these regulative powers, the CMA has 
introduced a number of regulations200 such as the Listing Rules 2004 (LRs 2004) and the 
Merger and Acquisition Regulations 2007 (MARs 2007).201 What is more germane to the 
discussion of this thesis is the introduction of the recent version of CGRs in 2017, which 
repeals the 2006 version.  
 
                                                        
192 See the Decree of Minster of Commerce and Investment No. 423 6 February 1989, the Council of 
Minsters’ Decrees No. 17 30 October 1981 and No. 80 2 January 1985.  
193 See Keay (n 6) 12.  
194 An English translation of the CML 2003 is on the website of the CMA 
<https://cma.org.sa/en/RulesRegulations/CMALaw/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 31 August 2017. 
195 Beach (n 28) 355. 
196 See article 2 of the CML 2003.  
197 Article 3 of the CML 2003. 
198 See article 4 of the CML 2003. The CMA will be considered in section (1.6) in this Chapter. 
199 Article 5 of the CML 2003. 
200 The regulations have been subject to amendments, where necessary, by the CMA. An English translation 
of recent version of regulations is on the website of the CMA 
<https://cma.org.sa/en/RulesRegulations/Pages/default.aspx>.  
201 See the website of the CMA <http://www.cma.org.sa/en/Pages/home.aspx>.  
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Given the legal status of joint stock companies, the CML 2003 clearly provides for the 
establishment of the ‘Saudi Stock Exchange’(Tadawul).202 The Tadawul is the primary 
market available for the trading of securities in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi stock market has 
witnessed a significant growth following the new regulatory and legal framework 
established by the CML 2003.203 This is illustrated by the increase in numbers of listed 
companies from 73 in 2000204 to more than 171 companies at the end of 2015.205 Recently, 
a parallel equity market (Nomu) was lunched in Saudi Arabia with less strict listing 
requirement. This will provide an alternative platform for companies, especially small and 
medium enterprises, to go public.206 At present, there are only nine companies listed on 
Nomu.207  
 
1.4.3 Secondary legislation: The Corporate Governance Regulations 2017  
 
The CGRs were initially introduced in 2006 in response to the collapse of the Saudi stock 
market in the same year. This event underlined for the state the need for better corporate 
governance practices.208 The CGRs 2006 were repealed with the introduction of 
CGRs 2017, which have been introduced with the aim of promoting the governance of 
listed companies, which will, in turn, contribute significantly to economic growth.209 
Unlike the 2006 version,210 the CGRs 2017211 include greater detail regarding the 
governance of listed companies. It is not possible here due to the limited space and purpose 
of this thesis to consider every provision but only those relevant to the analysis carried out 
in the subsequent chapters. 
 
The central question to be posed concerns the binding nature of the provisions contained in 
the CGRs 2017. It is clear from article 2(b) that the CGRs 2017 are ‘mandatory to 
                                                        
202 Article 20(a) of the CML 2003. 
203 For more discussion, see Almajid (n 126).   
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Of Dundee 2009) 2. 
209 See the announcement of CMA, dated 15/02/2017 
<https://cma.org.sa/en/MediaCenter/PR/Pages/NewCGR.aspx> accessed 1 September 2017. 
210 The CGRs 2006 only consist of 19 articles. 
211 While the CGRs 2017 applies to listed companies, there is an identical draft of the CGRs 2017 that applies 
to unlisted joint stock companies, but is voluntary in nature. 
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companies except the provisions that contain a reference of being guiding’.212 This means 
that the company has no option other than to incorporate the mandatory rules of the 
CGRs 2017 into its own corporate governance code.213 Given the mandatory nature of the 
CGRs 2017, the subsequent point to consider concerns how the regulations will be 
implemented. A closer look at the CMA’s approach to the mandatory provisions of the 
CGRs 2006 indicates that these mandatory rules will be implemented on a ‘comply or be 
penalised’ basis. Unlike the new regulations, the CGRs 2006 are not, in nature, legally 
binding214 and most of the provisions are implemented on a ‘comply or explain’ basis,215 as 
it is in the UK where the Corporate Governance Code is based upon the principle of 
‘comply or explain’.216 However, not all provisions of the previous CGRs 2006 are 
voluntary. The CMA was given the discretionary power to render any particular rule 
compulsory,217 and it took the ‘comply or be penalised’ approach to enforcing mandatory 
provisions; for example, the CMA imposed a fine of SAR 50 thousand (more than 
USD 13,000) on the Fawaz Abdulaziz Al-Hokair Company for failing to conform with 
mandatory art 12(e) of the CGRs 2006, which required the appointment of independent 
directors on the board of the company.218 Given the CMA’s approach to enforcing 
mandatory rules in the CGRs 2006, one may assume that the CMA would perhaps 
implement mandatory provisions on the comply or be penalised basis; this an important 
consideration to take into account while assessing the public enforcement of breaches of 




                                                        
212 As a matter of fact, most provisions of the CGRs 2017 are mandatory except some provisions that are 
clearly referred to as non-binding, such as sub-article 66(b), articles 83 and 85.  
213 See article 94 of the CGRs 2017. 
214 Article 1(b) of the CGRs 2006.   
215As an exception of the voluntary nature of the Regulations, article 1(c) of the CGRs 2006 provides that ‘a 
company must disclose in the Board of Directors’ report, the provisions that have been implemented and the 
provisions that have not been implemented as well as the reasons for not implementing them’. 
216 Since the first version of the Code which was produced in the Cadbury Report in 1992, the Code has 
retained adherence to the ‘comply or explain’ principle, as a basis for the corporate governance regulation, 
although the Code has since then been subject to several amendments, see The Cadbury Report (n 3) paras 
1.3, 1.10 and 3.7; for the most recent version of the Code, see the UK Corporate Governance Code 2016, 
section ‘Comply or Explain’, <https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/ca7e94c4-b9a9-49e2-a824-
ad76a322873c/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-April-2016.pdf> accessed 1 September 2017. For an 
analysis of the UK approach of ‘comply or explain’, see I MacNeil and X Li, ‘‘Comply or Explain’: Market 
Discipline and Non-compliance with the Combined Code’ (2006) 14 Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 486.  
217 See article 1(b) of the CGRs 2006.  
218 See the Board of CMA’s decision dated on 14/10/2012, available in English at 
<http://www.cma.org.sa/En/News/Pages/CMA_N_1221.aspx> accessed 29 May 2013. 
219 See section (5.2), Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
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1.5 Judicial Institutions in Saudi Arabia 
 
In order for any formal legal system to make a significant contribution to the processes of 
economic and social development, it is critical to establish a business-friendly legal 
framework. A strong system of enforcement is a fundamental pillar of that framework.220 
The enforcement of law and the resolution of disputes, to a large extent, depend upon the 
effectiveness and fairness of the judicial branch which, as Shihata correctly points out, 
‘serves as a final arbiter of a functioning legal system’, and which in return has an essential 
role to play in a system based on the rule of law.221 Hay, Shleifer and Vishny stressed the 
important role of the judiciary when they asserted that in a system based on the rule of law 
people learnt ‘what the legal rules say, [structure] their economic transactions using these 
rules, [seek] to punish or obtain compensation from those who break the rules, and [turn] 
to the public officials, such as the courts . . . to enforce these rules’.222 Accordingly, to 
develop an effective legal framework at the national level, it is necessary to establish a 
well-functioning judiciary that is staffed by trained judges, is bound to apply laws223 and 
will supply a predictable decision without onerous delay.224  
 
The presence of fair and efficient courts is particularly seen as necessary in order to 
provide investors with remedies in the case of a breach of legal rules.225 The role of judges 
as legal enforcers tends to acquire further importance when the discussion turns to 
directors’ breaches of their obligations of care and loyalty (open-ended standards), since 
judicial intervention in the process of enforcement of directors’ duties, as will be seen later 
in this thesis, tends to be necessary in establishing the boundaries of directors’ 
obligations226 and assessing, or even influencing, directorial decisions ex post.227 Thus, it is 
necessary to give a brief account of the Saudi judicial system as the analysis below will be 
essential to understanding the argument presented in the thesis. 
 
                                                        
220 I Shihata, ‘The Role of Law in Business Development’ (1996) 20 Fordham Int’l LJ 1577, 1579–1582 
221 Ibid 1582.  
222 R Hay, A Shleifer and R Vishny, ‘Toward a Theory of Legal Reform’ (1996) 40 European Economic 
Review 559, 559.  
223 IShihata (n 220) 1582.  
224 Ibid 1582–1583; Hay, Shleifer and Vishny (n 222) 560. 
225 B Black, ‘The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets’ (2000) 48 UCLA L 
Rev 781, 790, 803–804 and 807; See also R la Porta et al., ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of Political 
Economy 1113, 1140.  
226 K Pistor and C Xu, ‘Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions Lessons from the Incomplete 
Law Theory’ (ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 01/2002 ) 4 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=343480> accessed 1 June 2017.  
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It is important to make it clear from the outset that Saudi Arabia has no system of 
publishing judicial rulings. The judiciary only publishes selectively what they think should 
be made available to the public. Nevertheless, this can be seen as a stepping stone towards 
more predictability and transparency compared to the period before the 2007 judicial 
reform. One of the significant features of the Saudi court system is that no Saudi court 
applies judicial precedent (stare decisis)228 as there is nothing in the law compelling judges 
to follow such a doctrine and judicial rulings make no reference to precedent. By 
implication, this means that Saudi judges are not bound by previous decisions or the 
decisions of a superior court.229 To clarify the role of judges, it might be beneficial to 
distinguish between the two main bodies of law in Saudi Arabia: Sharia law and the state 
laws. In relation to non-codified rules of Islamic origin, judicial rulings are not considered 
to be a source of Sharia law and the authority to develop the Islamic law, as stated above, 
belongs to jurists rather than judges who refer to the former for statements of law.230 
Accordingly, given the lack of judicial precedent, Islamic law is best described as a 
‘jurists’ law’, not a ‘judges’ law’. 231 With respect to codified rules of foreign origin, in the 
absence of the doctrine of judicial precedent, Saudi judges seemingly have relatively 
limited power within the context of written legal codes since they simply tend to enforce 
codified rules. The courts’ power is limited to interpreting the law and does not extend to 
the entitlement to change the law, as the power to introduce new laws and amend existing 
rules lies with the Saudi regulatory branch.232 It can therefore be inferred that, similar to the 
civil law traditions, there is no system of binding judicial precedent in Saudi Arabia and 
the court often adheres to the formal application of written rules without deviation. This 
understanding of the tradition of Saudi courts will be relevant to the discussion regarding 
the role of the court in filling the legislative vacuum, and the feasibility of transferring the 
UK standards and rules for directors’ duties to a legal system influenced by, or similar to, 
the civil law court tradition.233  
 
 
                                                        
228 See D J Karl, ‘Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia: What Foreign Attorneys Should Know’ (1991) 25 George 
Washington Journal of International Law and Economics 131, 149.  
229 Ibid. 
230See the above discussion in sections (1.2.1.2) and (1.2.2) in this Chapter. For more details about the 
practice of Saudi courts in applying the Sharia, see Vogel (n 61). 
231 Ibid 24.  
232 See A Al-Jarbou, ‘Judicial Independence: Case Study of Saudi Arabia’ (2004) 19 Arab Law Quarterly 5, 
51 who points out that court will not even have the power to nullify the unconstitutional provision and its 
authority will be limited to notify the Legislative (Regulatory) Branch with regard to the unconstitutionality 
of a statutory provision.  
233 See the discussion in Chapters 3, 4 and 6 in this thesis. 
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1.5.1 The major features of the court system: The 2007 project for reform 
 
A considerable stride towards overhauling the court system was made with the introduction 
of the Judiciary Law 2007 (JL 2007) and the Board of Grievances Law 2007 (BGL 
2007)234 which repealed the Judiciary Law 1975 (JL 1975) and the Board of Grievances 
Law 1982 (BGL 1982) respectively.235 According to Saudi officials, the Saudi government 
allocated a budget of SAR 7 billion (over USD 1.8 billion) to carry out the project for 
judicial reform.236 The money was used (and is still being used) to upgrade judicial 
facilities and services, including the construction of buildings for new courts, and to train 
and appoint judges and other judicial and administrative staff.237 The reform project also 
involves the revision of judicial statutes.238 In practice, this comprehensive reorganisation 
of the existing judicial infrastructure cannot be completed quickly and the judicial system 
has remained in a period of transition since 2007.239 This is clearly illustrated by the fact 
that the Board of Grievances retained jurisdiction over commercial proceedings (including 
company law cases) until the completion of the commercial courts’ facilities in 
September 2017.240 
 
One of the main features of the post-2007 judicial branch is that it contains two main 
judicial bodies: the Ordinary Judiciary (Ordinary Courts System)241 and the Board of 
Grievances (the Administrative Courts system). While the former has jurisdiction over 
civil, criminal and commercial disputes,242 the latter has jurisdiction over administrative 
disputes.243 Another significant development in the implementation of the new judicial 
reform project is the gradual transfer of quasi-judicial committees entitled to hear civil and 
commercial disputes and criminal cases to the Ordinary Judiciary.244 However, such 
judicial arrangements are not aimed at transferring specific administrative tribunals that 
                                                        
234 An English translation of the Laws are on the website of Beureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers 
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243 See particularly articles 1 and 13 of the BGL 2007.  
244 Implementation Mechanism 2007 (n 237) para 1/9/1. 
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have already been exempted from falling within the domain of the Ordinary Judiciary.245 
The status of these committees is supposed to remain unchanged until the Supreme 
Judiciary Council has reached its decision, in the form of a recommendation, as to whether 
any of the committees should be abolished and so transfer their responsibilities to the 
ordinary courts.246  
 
One of the quasi-judicial committees that falls outside the jurisdiction of the Ordinary 
Judiciary is the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD), which was 
set up by the CML 2003 to have exclusive jurisdiction over claims and disputes concerning 
the application of the CML 2003, its Implementing Regulations and instructions from the 
CMA or the Saudi Stock Exchange.247 The CRSD is statutorily entitled to hear legal 
proceedings brought by a private actor against another if the causes of the action are, for 
example, liability for material misrepresentation in ‘a prospectus’,248 or in ‘the sale or 
purchase of a security’.249 The jurisdiction of the CRSD extends to hearing claims made by 
the CMA to enforce the capital market’s rules250 and claims brought against the CMA’s 
decisions.251 The committee holds ‘all necessary powers to investigate and settle 
complaints and suits’252 in which it is, for example, entitled to issue subpoenas, give 
rulings, impose sanctions, order the provision of evidence253 and award damages.254 The 
CML 2003 established a two-tier litigation system in which the decisions of the committee 
can be appealed against before the Appeal Panel,255 the decisions of which are final and 
definitive.256  
 
1.5.2 The Ordinary Judiciary: The founding of specialised courts 
 
It is important to pay specific attention to the new reorganisation of the Ordinary Judiciary 
within whose jurisdiction company law cases fall. The most significant contribution of the 
JL 2007 lies in the creation of the Supreme Court (Cassation Court), which sits at the top 
of a pyramidal structure of ordinary courts.257 As the highest court in the Kingdom, the 
                                                        
245 Ibid para 1/9/1. 
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247 Article 25(a) of the CML 2003. 
248 Article 55(a) of the CML 2003. 
249 Article 56(a) of the CML 2003. 
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251 Article 25(c) of the CML 2003.  
252 Article 25(a) of the CML 2003. 
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Supreme Court is statutorily responsible for reviewing appeal courts’ judgments and 
decisions in relation to certain situations set forth in the JL 2007.258 In addition, the 2007 
law makes it clear that the Supreme Court, through its General Assembly, has the authority 
to establish general principles in respect of judicial matters.259 In this regard, the Supreme 
Court could play a significant role in confronting the inconsistency of judicial rulings by 
adopting legal principles that can be applied consistently.260  
 
Under the new judicial reform, in the first instance, courts are grouped into five 
categories:261 (i) general courts,262 (ii) criminal courts,263 (iii) personal status (family) 
courts,264 (iv) commercial courts and (v) labour courts.265 Indeed, one of the main features 
of the JL 2007 is the creation of specialised first instance courts within the domain of the 
Ordinary Judiciary.266 These courts are expected to ‘have limited and frequently exclusive 
jurisdiction’ in a particular area of law.267 This might consequently contribute to fewer 
appeals against judgments.268 
 
Another significant aspect of the JL 2007 is the adoption of a new system for the courts of 
appeal. The law requires that at least one court of appeal operates in every Saudi 
province.269 Each appeal court performs its judicial tasks through specialised divisions270 
grouped as follows: civil divisions, criminal divisions, personal status (family) divisions, 
commercial divisions and labour divisions.271 Importantly, the court of appeal, instead of 
having limited power of reversal,272 is entitled to make its own judgment, giving it the 
power to affirm, modify, or reverse the lower court decision,273 or remand the case to the 
court of first instance for trial.274 
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The founding of independent commercial courts with specialised appeal divisions, which 
are intended to adjudicate commercial disputes, including company law cases, is important 
for the purposes of the present research.275 This means that the Board of Grievances should 
no longer have jurisdiction over disputes arising from the application of the CL 2015.276 
According to the Implementation Mechanism 2007, the effect of the new judicial system is 
that the jurisdictions of the commercial first instance and appeal divisions of the Board of 
Grievances have been transferred to the new commercial courts and commercial appeal 
divisions respectively.277 It follows that the commercial courts are now staffed by the same 
judicial staff who have been deciding commercial cases up to this point278 and who are 
expected to have familiarity and long-standing expertise in corporate matters.279 It is useful 
to note that since the launch of commercial courts on 22 September 2017, the Board of 
Grievances no longer has jurisdiction over commercial cases, including corporate 
matters.280  
 
There is no doubt that the establishment of specialised commercial courts is considered to 
be one of the major benefits of the judicial reforms. In the words of Kechichian, the 
creation of commercial courts within the justice system is intended to ‘ensure that 
everyone operate[s] within a sound investment climate, [and] to protect businesses from 
the vagaries of periodic disputes’.281 Arguably, the commercial courts have the potential to 
contribute significantly to the codification of Sharia rules and principles in the field of 
commercial law. It could also be claimed that one of the major obstacles to increased 
foreign investment has been the lack of specialised commercial courts. Provided that such 
courts are staffed by well-trained judges specialised in commercial matters, the existence 
of the courts could promote fair and prompt litigation.282 This, in turn, could attract 
domestic and foreign investment, and increase investors’ confidence in the justice system 
and judicial rulings. 
 
                                                        
275 For a non-exhaustive list of the commercial courts’ jurisdictions over commercial proceedings, see 
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It is worth mentioning that while adjudicating disputes, commercial courts are expected to 
apply state commercial legislations (e.g., the CL 2015), terms of contract and commercial 
customs.283 In the absence of statutory provision governing the relevant matters falling 
within the scope of legislation, commercial courts should refer to general rules derived 
from Islamic law to resolve relevant disputes.284 However, as will be explored throughout 
the chapters of this thesis, the role of the court in filling the legislative vacuum sufficiently 
is questionable as far as the application of directors’ duties is concerned.285  
 
1.6 Main Regulators of Corporate Governance 
 
There are two main regulatory authorities that have a role in the public enforcement of 
rules of corporate governance: (i) the MOCI and (ii) the CMA. With the passing of the new 
Saudi corporate legislation in 2015, both regulators have a role to play in ensuring the 
compliance and proper implementation of the CL 2015. While the MOCI has responsibility 
for all types of companies, including unlisted joint stock companies, the CMA is the 
competent authority for ensuring the proper implementation of the CL 2015 by companies 
listed in the Saudi market.286 In this regard, the MOCI and CMA, each according to its 
competence, has the power to pass resolutions and secondary regulations necessary for 
implementing relevant provisions of the law.287 The supervision and monitoring function is 
one of the important tasks assigned to the regulators;288 for example, the competent 
authority is entitled to initiate an investigation and inspect the company’s accounts and 
other related documents.289 Under the CL 2015, the competent authority has the power to 
refer violators to the public prosecutor in relation to conventions set out in articles 211 and 
212,290 along with the power to impose fines without referral to the public prosecutor on 
those committing any violation set out in article 213.291     
  
It should be borne in mind regarding the Saudi securities market that the CMA was 
founded with the purpose of protecting investors and fostering market integrity.292 To this 
end, the CMA has the necessary powers to fulfil its statutory responsibilities, which 
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include the regulation and development of the Exchange;293 the regulation and monitoring 
of all matters relating to the issuance and trading of securities;294 the protection of investors 
from unfair and illegal activities in the stock market;295 achieving ‘fairness, efficiency and 
transparency in securities transactions’;296 and ensuring investors’ receipt of full and 
continuous disclosure of information in relation to securities and their issuers.297 One of the 
main powers vested in the CMA as a public enforcer is either to impose penalties on 
wrongdoers liable for any breach of the CML 2003 and its Implementing Regulations, or 
request the CRSD to do so.298 The CMA is also entitled to bring legal action before the 
CRSD against violators of securities law and regulations, and seek any of the sanctions 
from the non-exhaustive list set out in article 59 (a) of the CML 2003.299 
 
1.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has given an overview of the legal system in which Saudi joint stock 
companies operate. It has highlighted the fact that Sharia has a strong influence over the 
general legal context and is the paramount law of Saudi Arabia. The primacy of Sharia is 
best illustrated by the requirement that the exercise of legislation is only legitimate when it 
produces laws that fall within the Sharia framework. Meanwhile, the fact that the Saudi 
legal system includes laws developed with the support of other jurisdictions’ experience, 
demonstrates the flexible nature of Sharia, which permits the importation of rules of non-
Islamic origin as long as they do not conflict with fundamental principles of Sharia. This 
overview has stressed that a joint stock company is a corporate form of organisation that 
has been established in statute. The corporate legislation (i.e. the CL 2015, as the recent 
version of the CL) is the main source of law governing joint stock companies, including 
various relationships within the company, such as the relationship between directors and 
shareholders. Once a joint stock company goes public, it is also subject to the CML 2003 
and its Implementing Regulations in which the new CGRs 2017, unlike its predecessor of 
2006, is legally binding. This, by implication, means that it should be implemented on the 
‘comply or be penalised’ basis. 
 
                                                        
293 Article 5(1) of the CML 2003. 
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This chapter has also considered two main public enforcers of corporate governance, 
namely the Saudi court system and the main regulatory agencies (the MOCI and the 
CMA). The analysis has shown that Sharia and the state legislators are the main sources of 
legal obligations and the power of judges is often limited to enforcing rules found in those 
sources. Similar to the civil law tradition, Saudi judges tend to apply, not to make, the law; 
a valid consideration that should be taken into account when discussing the feasibility of 
legal transplantation of directors’ duties. It has also been stressed that the recent 
reorganisation of the court system can be seen as a great stride forward in promoting an 
effective judicial system and encouraging fair and prompt litigation. Finally, the chapter 
then focused on the fact that both MOCI and the CMA are responsible for ensuring the 
proper implementation of the provisions contained in the CL 2015. While unlisted 
companies are under the supervision and monitoring of the MOCI, the CMA is responsible 
for ensuring listed companies’ compliance with the CL 2015, in addition to its original 
role, as a public enforcer of securities law and regulations. 
 
Having given an overview of the legal framework of joint stock companies, the focus will 
now shift to assessing where the directors’ duties and formal their enforcement sit within 
the system of corporate governance. An evaluation of the mechanisms of accountability of 
directors is presented in Chapter 2.   
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Chapter 2: An Assessment of the Main Problems Within the 




In any modern company, management powers are delegated to the board of directors 
because there are practical challenges, including a general lack of proficiency, that prevent 
shareholders from engaging in the day-to-day management of a company’s business.300 
Even if shareholders possessed the necessary skills and expertise to fulfil the tasks of the 
management, they tend to lack the incentives necessary for involving themselves in day-to-
day management,301 or engaging in the complexities of reaching optimal decisions.302 
Therefore, it is less costly and more efficient to empower a central decision-making body 
(in the present case the board of directors) to run the company.303 In order to achieve ‘the 
best possible decision-making’, it is inevitable that the directors require wide discretionary 
powers while managing the company.304 The primary problem with wide powers is that 
directors may misuse them in ways that damage the interests of shareholders.  
 
Thus, there is a need for mechanisms that ensure the proper use of powers and hold 
directors accountable for any misuse. The control and accountability framework for 
directors includes a number of mechanisms,305 of which directors’ duties and the private 
enforcement action (e.g. derivative actions) are important elements.306 In this regard, 
company law is important because it is concerned with establishing directors’ duties and 
associated mechanisms of enforcement. This suggests that if a significant degree of 
uncertainty and deficiency exists in this area of law, this will undermine the effectiveness 
                                                        
300 Davies and Worthington (n 2) 349–350. 
301 F Easterbrook and D Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press 1996). The authors claim that ‘no shareholder, no matter how large his stake, has the right incentives 
unless that stake is 100 percent’.   
302 See B Sharfman, ‘What’s Wrong with Shareholder Empowerment?’ (2012) 37 The Journal of Corporation 
Law 903, 904–905 and 908.  
303 According to theorists such as Kenneth Arrow, given the high costs of transmission of dispersed 
information within the organisation, ‘the centralisation of decision-making serves to economise on the 
transmission and handling of information’, K Arrow, The Limits of Organization (New York, W.W. Norton 
1974) 68 –70; see also M Dooley, ‘Two Models of Corporate Governance’ (1992) 47 The Business Lawyer 
461, 467. 
304 A Keay, Board Accountability in Corporate Governance (London, Routledge 2015) 261. 
305 For example, shareholder voting and markets; see R Jones, ‘Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the 
Board: Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance’ (2006) 92 Iowa Law Review 105; mechanisms 
of accountability also include (independent) non-executive director institution and monitoring by 
blockholders, see N Brennan and J Solomon, ‘Corporate Governance, Accountability and Mechanisms of 
Accountability: An Overview’ (2008) 21 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 885.   
306 Keay (n 304) 206, 219. 
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of such mechanisms within the system of corporate governance. Specifically, this 
uncertainty will weaken the role of the law of directors’ duties and derivative actions, 
which create incentives for directors to act competently and loyally by imposing legal 
liability on those who fail to do so. This issue of uncertainty tends to attract much more 
attention when other corporate governance mechanisms are ineffective, or at least operate 
within limits, which supports the need to establish a sound legal liability system ( i.e. 
directors’ duties accompanied by private enforcement action) within the accountability 
framework for directors. 
 
This chapter identifies the major problems that prevail within the current board 
accountability framework in Saudi Arabia with the purpose of defining where directors’ 
duties and their enforcement sit within the entire framework. In carrying out this task, the 
chapter assesses four main mechanisms of board accountability and control: (i) monitoring 
by blockholders; (ii) shareholders’ internal mechanisms at the general meeting; (iii) the 
role of independent directors; and (iv) the markets. With regard to the structure, the chapter 
starts by considering how the law allocates decision-making power within the company, 
followed by a discussion why there is a need for director accountability. The causes and 
impacts of legal uncertainty in the law of directors’ duties and private enforcement action 
are then examined. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to exploring the drawbacks and 
limitations of the four mechanisms mentioned above.  
 
2.2 The Division of Decision-Making Power in Company Law 
 
Legally speaking, decisions concerning the management of a company are normally taken 
in two ways: (i) at the general meeting of shareholders or (ii) by the board of directors. In 
theory, depending upon the type of corporate decision, authority to make it could be 
directly conferred on either of the company’s two organs or could be shared by, for 
instance, granting the board the power to make decisions subject to the approval of the 
general meeting. 
 
In the UK the CA 2006 does not include a general statement determining the distribution 
of decision-making power between the board and the general meeting. The only mention of 
this matter is found in the Model Articles for Public Companies (Model Articles) issued 
pursuant to the CA 2006, which allocates the power as a default rule.307 This was also the 
situation before the CA 2006, where Table A pursuant to the CA 1985 provides a default 
                                                        
307 See articles 3–5 of the Model Articles. 
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rule of the division of decision-making power.308 In the UK the distribution of powers 
between the board and the shareholder body ‘rests on contract’, mainly the company’s 
bylaw,309 in which the source of the company’s authorities comes from the shareholder 
body which can, in theory, withhold powers from the board.310 Under Table A and the 
Model Articles, the company’s articles of association will typically confer on the board 
responsibility for corporate management and permit the board to exercise all corporate 
powers311 with the right to delegate power to executive directors and managers.312 As a 
default rule, the shareholder body, by special resolution, reserves the right to instruct the 
board to act in a particular way.313 Importantly, the majority of cases in the UK have 
enforced the division of powers as determined by the company’s articles of association, 
giving no enforceability to any instruction issued by shareholders to the board at the 
general meeting, except for an instruction issued by the passing of a special resolution.314  
 
As far as Saudi company law is concerned, in contrast to UK company law, the board’s 
authority to manage a company is statutorily provided for315 and this cannot be altered by 
the company’s bylaws. The CL 2015, like its predecessor of 1965,316 further makes it clear 
that the board shall possess the broadest powers while managing the company’s affairs and 
may delegate any of its powers to one or more of its members or to non-members, namely 
senior managers. 317 This leads one to assert that under the Saudi law it is the statute not the 
shareholder body that confers powers on the board of directors. 
 
While the powers of a company are primarily held by the directors, the Saudi corporate 
statute, like UK company law, requires the approval of the shareholder body for the most 
fundamental corporate decisions such as amendments to the company’s articles318 and 
mergers.319 Importantly, the general meeting is also entitled to increase the number of 
decisions that require shareholder approval by inserting provisions that reserve additional 
                                                        
308 See section 70 of Table A.  
309 K. Wedderburn, ‘Control of Corporate Actions’ (1989) 52 Modern Law Review 401, 402.  
310 D Kershaw, Company law in context : text and materials, (2nd edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2012) 191–192.  
311 See section 70 of Table A and article 3 of the Model Articles.  
312 See section 72 of Table A and article 5 of the Model Articles.        
313 See article 4 of the Model Articles. 
314See, for example, Automatic Self-cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd v Cuninghame (1906) 2 Ch 34 , 38, 
40, 43 and 44; John Shaw and Sons v Shaw and Shaw (1935) 2 KB 113 , 134. Seemingly, it has been 
generally accepted that this is the position of UK common law, see Davies and Worthington (n 2) 358–360;  
Kershaw (n 310) 200. But for contrary views, see, for instance, Marshall's Valve Gear Co. Ltd. v Manning, 
Wardle & Co. Ltd. (1909) 1 Ch 267 , 272–274. 
315 See article 68(1) of the CL 2015, which has affirmed the ruling under article 66 of the CL 1965. 
316 Article 73 of the CL 1965 
317 Article 75(1) of the CL 2015. 
318 For the Saudi law, see article 88(1) of the CL 2015. Regarding the UK, see section 21 of the CA 2006. 
319 See article 94(4) of the CL 2015. Concerning the UK, see section 907 (1) of the CA 2006.  
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powers for the general meeting into the company’s articles.320 As an exception to this rule, 
article 75(2) of the CL 2015321 enables a majority of shareholders by an ordinary resolution 
to impose limitations on the board’s exercise of certain powers mentioned in sub-article 2 
(e.g., selling or mortgaging the company’s assets). This exception is only valid in the 
absence of express provision in the company’s articles that empower the board to exercise 
the relevant powers in article 75(2). In any event, it is noteworthy that even if more 
decision-making powers can be gained through changing the articles of association, it is 
significant that the default position in Saudi Arabia means that the shareholder body would 
need to withdraw some powers from directors, thus widening the scope of their approval 
rights. In practice, it appears that the articles of associations of many companies invest the 
board of directors with very wide authority in making various corporate decisions 
including some of, if not all, those mentioned in article 75(2) of the CL 2015.322  
 
When the balancing of powers between the board of directors and the general meeting of 
shareholders is opened up for discussion, it is necessary to recall that the board of directors 
being given management powers is the fundamental component of corporate law. Although 
the legal source of allocation of powers may differ from one jurisdiction to another, this 
does not much change the reality that the decision-making power ultimately resides in the 
board of directors. For example, in jurisdictions like the United States (particularly in the 
Delaware corporate law), the board’s power to manage the company is derived from the 
corporate statute and this has been used as a basis to argue for director primacy.323 
Bainbridge, a leading advocate of director primacy in corporate governance, argues in 
answering the question of whether shareholder primacy, which inter alia assumes ultimate 
shareholder control over the corporation,324 prevails in US Delaware corporate law that 
‘there is no such thing as shareholder primacy – it exists in neither law nor fact’.325 In 
public companies, director primacy has been created by rules vesting ultimate decision-
                                                        
320 See particularly article 75(1) of the CL 2015. 
321 It is similar to its immediate predecessor article 73 of the CL 1965. The main difference between the two 
provisions is that article 75(2) of the CL 2015 grants certain powers, as a default rule, to the board of 
directors, whereas article 73 of the CL 1965 prohibits the exercise of such powers unless otherwise stipulated 
in the company’s articles of association.  
322 See, for instance, section 20 of Saudi British Bank’s bylaw <http://www.sabb.com/en/about-sabb/about/>; 
section 16 of Jarir Marketing Co.’s bylaw <http://www.jarir.com/sa-en/jarir-company-profile>; and 
section 15 of Zamil Industrial Investment Co.’s bylaw <http://www.zamilindustrial.com/?lang=en>. The 
articles of associations of the aforementioned companies are available on the websites of the respective 
companies, accessed 29 March 2016.    
323 S Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, (Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2008) 34–36.   
324 According to Bainbridge’s explanation, the concept of shareholder primacy can be divided into two 
branches, namely (i) the shareholder wealth maximisation norm, as an objective of the company; and (ii) the 
ultimate shareholder control, see ibid 53.   
325 S Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance’ (2003) 97 Northwestern 
University Law Review 547, 574.  
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making authority in the board of directors.326 Furthermore, director primacy, as has been 
said, can be inferred from the limited scope of powers reserved for the general meeting of 
shareholders.327  
 
In contrast with the United States, the legal source of the board’s authority in the UK, as 
mentioned above, is the company’s article of association,328 which supports the prevalence 
of shareholder primacy in the UK.329 Furthermore, unlike the US legal model of corporate 
governance, the UK model is deemed to be much more ‘shareholder-centric’.330 
Nevertheless, it can be claimed that the UK law, in reality, arguably includes underlying 
aspects of directors’ primacy.331 To explain this point, Moore argued that although 
directors derive their decision-making power from shareholders, the board’s supreme role 
in managing the company is not merely seen as a ‘responsibility’ but, more importantly, as 
a ‘constitutional right’ that ‘is consequently defensible by the board against [shareholders]’ 
who try to challenge ‘the board’s executive prerogative’.332 This argument, as Moore points 
out, is further upheld by the position of the UK case law, which opposed the hierarchical 
relationship between the board and the general meeting of shareholders, in which no 
corporate body enjoys constitutional primacy over the other;333 the case law rather 
considers it to be “a reciprocal one between contracting equals”.334 On the contrary, it has 
been said that the board’s primacy over the company’s management is confirmed by the 
UK law by showing that shareholders, in most circumstances, remain ‘formally’ subject to 
‘the prerogative of the board’ on a day-to-day basis.335 Furthermore, while shareholders 
under the UK law enjoy the right of instruction, the shareholders’ interference in the 
authority attributed to the board, as mentioned above, is not permitted unless the right of 
instruction is exercised according to a specific procedure,336 which might be highly 
                                                        
326 Ibid 559–560. 
327 Ibid 559 and 569.  
328 See footnotes 307 – 312 and accompanying text in this Chapter. 
329 See S Watson, ‘The Significance of the Source of the Powers of Boards of Directors in UK Company 
Law’ (2011) 6 Journal of Business Law 597, 606 and 611.  
330 See M Moore, Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the State (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2013) 28.   
331 See ibid 29; S Galletti, ‘The Existing Division of Corporate Decision-Making Power in the UK, USA and 
Europe: A Comparative Perspective’ (2015) Corporate Governance Journal, Bond University 2–4 
<http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgej/36> accessed 22 April 2016. In the view of Watson, although the 
board of directors derives its management power from the company’s articles of association in the UK, the 
legal source of board authority has little or no practical importance unless there is a clear evidence linking the 
legal source of the board’s authority and the amount of power given to directors, see Watson (n 329)  611–
612. 
332 Moore (n 330) 25.     
333 Ibid 28. 
334 See ibid 28 where Moore refers to John Shaw and Sons v Shaw and Shaw (n 314) as an example of the 
case law on this particular issue.     
335 Moore (n 330) 29.  
336 See footnotes 313 – 314 and accompanying text in this Chapter.    
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impractical. As a matter of fact, the shareholder instruction provision (i.e., section 70 of 
Table A or article 4 of the Model Articles) is rarely embraced by public companies in the 
UK.337 As one commentator asserts, if this provision were widely adopted into the bylaws 
of public companies, it would ‘entrench shareholder primacy in a manner not yet 
achieved’.338 The argument in favour of director’s supremacy can be further supported by 
the fact that the shareholders’ power to declare dividends is formally subject to the board’s 
recommendation concerning the amount of dividends.339  
 
The Saudi law approach to distributing powers between the shareholder body and the 
board of directors does not differ much from other jurisdictions. The law noticeably tilts 
the balance of power towards the board of directors. This assumption can be inferred from 
the fact that the board derives its management power from the statute rather than the 
shareholders. Even though the law permits shareholders to reserve certain decisions for 
themselves through the bylaw amendment, this does not change the fact that the default 
position is set in favour of the board of directors. In addition, while Saudi corporate statute, 
as a mentioned above, vests wide and discretionary powers of management in the board of 
directors, shareholder voting rights are basically limited to the election and removal of 
directors340 and the granting of their approval in relation to very limited corporate 
matters.341 In terms of formality, most general meeting resolutions, such as those relating to 
the change in the company’s capital,342 mergers,343 the payment of dividends344 and self-
dealing transactions345 require the board’s recommendation before shareholder engagement 
is possible. Even the shareholders’ selection of directors is indirectly affected or shared by 
the board of directors.346 This is also the case in relation to the shareholders’ appointment 
                                                        
337 See Watson (n 329) 612.  
338 Ibid. 
339 See article 70 (2) of the Model Articles.  
340 Article 68(3) of the CL 2015.  
341 See, for example, articles 11 and 12 of the CGRs 2017. 
342 See ‘Procedures and Phases of Establishing Joint Stock Companies and of Amending Their Capital in 
Accordance with the Companies Law and the Capital Market Law’ issued by the Minister of Commerce and 
Investment and the Chairman of the CMA’s Board in 2005 and published on the website of CMA at 
<http://cma.org.sa/Ar/News/Pages/CMA_N124.aspx> accessed 23 April 2016. 
343 In relation to companies listed on the Tadawul, see particularly article 3(f), (i) and (k) of the MARs 2007. 
344 The law requires ex ante shareholder approval for the payment of dividends to shareholders (article 131(2) 
of the CL 2015) according to the proposed method for the distribution of dividends mentioned in the Board’s 
annual report, see article 126(2) of the CL 2015. In practice, a general meeting resolution approving the 
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345 Article 71(1) of the CL 2015.  
346 See particularly section (2.6.2) in this Chapter. 
 43 
 
of auditors, who are indirectly selected by the board based upon the recommendation of the 
audit committee.347  
 
Therefore, the above discussion suggests that the allocation of power between the general 
meeting of shareholders and the board of directors favours the latter from a legal 
standpoint, and decision-making powers reside in the board of directors in Saudi law. This 
further indicates that directors are given substantial discretionary powers to run the 
company’s affairs. 
 
2.3 Rationale for Board Accountability 
 
As a result of extensive discretionary powers being conferred on the board of directors, 
there must be effective mechanisms to ensure the board’s accountability, guarding the 
company (practically shareholders) against the risk of misuse of management powers. The 
necessity of accountability can be based on various rationales, of which the following are 
the most significant. More generally, it can be contended that the presence of 
accountability mechanisms is a prerequisite for promoting a good system of corporate 
governance.348 To be sure, the enhancement of effective corporate governance, as has been 
frequently claimed, would also bring about a strong corporate performance.349 Arguably, 
board accountability is, therefore, expected to deter many serious errors and to encourage 
careful exercises in decision-making,350 which can, in turn promote good corporate 
performance.351   
 
One of the principal arguments put forward as a basis for accountability is to connect the 
latter with the concept of power.352 One commentator points out that accountability can be 
regarded as ‘a norm of governance’, establishing manners of wielding power and responses 
to power.353 In the corporate governance context, accountability has to be present in 
exchange for the granting of power to the board 354 in order to ensure that the power is 
                                                        
347 See article 81 of the CGRs 2017, which is similar to article 16 of the CGRs 2006 in this regard. 
348 Keay (n 304) 173.  
349 See H Hutchinson, ‘Director Primacy and Corporate Governance: Shareholder Voting Rights Captured by 
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351 Keay (n 304) 174. 
352 A Licht, ‘Accountability and Corporate Governance’ (September 2002) 17–22 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=328401> accessed 1 April 2016. 
353 Ibid 17.  
354 A Keay And J Loughrey, ‘The Framework for Board Accountability in Corporate Governance’ (2015) 35 
Legal Studies 252, 260. 
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exercised in a way that does not harm shareholders’ interests.355 It can further be said that 
the presence of accountability legitimates the exercise of powers given to the board.356 If 
there was no accountability, shareholders would distrust any decision made by the board357 
because directors being ‘beyond challenge would make them all suspect’.358 This lack of 
shareholders’ trust in the board of directors might in the end lead to shareholders’ 
reluctance to invest additional capital.359 Indeed, given the fact that directors’ actions and 
decisions can considerably affect shareholders’ interests, it is not surprising to see 
shareholders dissatisfied if directors are able to exercise their wide powers without the 
potential of being held accountable for their actions.   
 
Another reason for accountability can be drawn from the agency theory, as many 
emphasise the function of accountability in reducing agency costs (i.e., pursuing goals and 
objectives that impose costs on shareholders) caused by the delegation of management 
power to a group of individuals other than shareholders.360 In this regard, there are two 
main types of directorial wrongdoings. First, is what is referred to as a ‘shirking’ which is 
described as the director’s failure to make the required effort in managing the company’s 
affairs.361 In fact, this failure does not normally result from the aversion of work but rather 
from the strong wish to conduct other activities at the expense of taking time and effort to 
manage the company.362 The second type of self-interest conduct that imposes costs upon 
shareholders is ‘stealing’, which refers to the act of ‘diverting some or all of the firm’s 
assets placed under his management to his personal and exclusive benefit’.363 As far as 
stealing is concerned, the directors’ diversion of corporate wealth can take a number of 
forms in which the engagement in self-dealing transactions and the appropriation of 
corporate opportunities are the most important.364 According to the agency theory of the 
company, one of the key objectives of the corporate governance system is to reduce 
conflicting interests within the agency relationship by putting in place mechanisms that 
                                                        
355 Ibid.  
356 Moore (n 330) 41. 
357 Keay and Loughrey (n 354) 263.  
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align the interests of agents (i.e., directors) with the principal’s interests (shareholders).365 
The failure to do so, as the theory assumes,366 is likely to give rise to directors’ engagement 
in stealing and/or shirking,367 and to produce disincentives for directors to maximise 
shareholders’ interests.368 Therefore, some commentators maintain that directors’ 
accountability is needed to ensure that directors do not involve themselves in advancing 
their self-interest (i.e., opportunism or stealing) or failing to exert the utmost effort to 
preserve the interests of the company and its shareholders (i.e., shirking).369 Directors’ 
accountability can be seen as a significant factor in ensuring the directors’ proper 
performance of their obligations and to enhance their loyalty to the company.370 
 
2.4 Legal Uncertainty in the Directors’ Duties System: Causes and Effects 
 
Duties of care and loyalty imposed upon company directors can be seen as an essential 
element in the system of accountability for directors. These duties intend to place 
constraints on the director’s exercise of managerial powers.371 As has been correctly 
claimed in relation to the duty of loyalty, in the absence of fiduciary principles that apply 
to a director, he/she ‘would have no broad criterion of accountability by which to 
determine the overall propriety of [his/her] conduct’ when using his/her discretionary 
powers.372 Importantly, there is no doubt that duties of directors tend be inadequate without 
a mechanism of enforcement.373 If directors had breached their duties of care and loyalty, 
and the law failed to provide an accessible mechanism of enforcement, this would 
consequently undermine the accountability of directors towards the company and its 
shareholders.374 Put differently, the company law system can enhance the accountability of 
the board through a well-designed framework of the duties of care and loyalty, coupled 
with an effective mechanism of private enforcement action.375  
                                                        
365 See generally Jensen and Meckling (n 361). 
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In this regard, it should be borne in mind that it is the main purpose of a corporate law 
system to promote certainty in the rules and standards that apply to various corporate 
participants and relationships. By designing an effective regulation of directors’ duties and 
derivative actions in the statutory law, this would produce legal system of directors’ duties 
in Saudi that works for all companies not only for a particular company. The value of 
improving certainty in the law of directors’ duties can be identified by considering the 
legal uncertainty associated with an alternative regulation of directors’ duties. To explain 
this point: in addition to its role in saving the parties (e.g. shareholders) the transaction 
costs they would incur if they had to supply such regulation privately,376 the codification of 
directors’ duties and derivative actions with a clear and effective set of rules and standards 
would reduce legal uncertainty.377  
 
Further, the design of standards for duties and derivative actions by individual companies 
may take different forms, resulting in the development of an inconsistent and incoherent 
body of law. In contrast, specifying the standards for duties with clear accessible derivative 
actions in the statutory law, would promote certainty in the legal system of directors’ 
duties for all companies, and therefore lead to the coherent and consistent application of 
the entire law of directors’ duties. In addition, a coherent and consistently applied system 
of company law would significantly lower the costs of the corporate community needing to 
learn the content of the law due to the increase in the predictability of judicial decisions.378  
 
Furthermore, in jurisdictions like Saudi Arabia where there is an absence of judicial 
precedent (stare decisis),379 the legal predictability and stability in the regulation of 
directors’ duties and derivative actions will be best achieved by reserving the law-making 
competence to the legislature, which should clearly specify legal norms in the statutory 
law. One benefit of codification of rights and duties is that ‘the rules only need to be 
looked up’.380 A sound drafting of rules would simplify the understanding of the content of 
the law, providing effective enforcement of legal duties and largely ensuring the consistent 
                                                                                                                                                                        
directors’ duties can lead to ‘less reliance’ on some other accountability mechanisms) 
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application of the law.381 Arguably, with the absence of a clear system of statutory rules, 
judge’s decisions are less predictable, which increases the costs incurred by the corporate 
community as they are required to understand the content of law in advance. Having said 
that, this means that the certainty of law does matter in determining the effectiveness of the 
legal system of directors’ duties (i.e., substantive rules and standards for directors’ duties 
and the private enforcement thereof by way of lawsuits). Indeed, significant aspects of 
uncertainty and deficiency in the law related to directors’ duties would lead to a decrease 
in the accountability of directors.382  
 
Generally speaking, the certainty and clarity in law governing commercial and business 
matters are important because businesspeople need to ‘know where they stand’.383 
According to one commentator, the concept of legal certainty can be understood from two 
sides. First, it can refer to the idea of ‘legal clarification’ involving ‘clarity’, 
‘predictability’, ‘stability’ and ‘transparency’, which prompts the question of whether the 
law exists in the first place or if it does exist, ‘to which extent the legal norms should (or 
actually do) leave room for interpretation’?384 This means that the legal uncertainty, on the 
one hand, and the ‘unpredictability of law’ and lack of stability, on the other hand, are two 
sides of the same coin; in other words, the law is considered certain if it is predictable and 
‘treat[s] similar cases consistently’.385 Second, legal certainty can be viewed as a notion of 
‘value-oriented justice’ in which the certainty of law will be satisfied if the law is 
accessible, practicable and enforceable.386 This understanding of certainty will allow room 
for interpretation and a certain degree of flexibility in the application of the law, which is 
necessary to establish a properly working legal structure that can accommodate 
unpredictable circumstances.387 In this regard, one of the difficulties faced by lawmakers is 
to draw an appropriate balance between legal clarity and the flexibility to take into 
consideration unforeseen events.388 
  
It has been said that the manner in which the law is designed determines the degree of legal 
uncertainty.389 Put differently, the law comprises a combination of rules and principles. 
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While the former is a precise statement that concerns ‘relatively specific acts’, the latter is 
a general statement that applies to ‘highly unspecific actions’.390 Arguably, one of the 
features of the principle is its flexibility to capture a variety of situations by broadening the 
application of the law.391 This has led legal scholars to adopt the view that principles are 
linked with less certainty compared with rules.392 As a result, it has been suggested that the 
law should be structured in such a manner that it contains ‘rules as much as possible’ due 
to the greater certainty and predictability involved in their application.393 The issue of 
whether or not rules are more certain than principles or vice versa is controversial in legal 
scholarship.394 Without going into detail, it suffices to say at this stage that both rules and 
principles could involve a certain degree of uncertainty in which principles in some cases 
could be more certain than rules and the reverse is true.395  
 
With regard to Saudi company law, one of its main issues is the presence of legal 
uncertainty. As a general source of legal uncertainty, unforeseen contingencies that were 
unexpected at the time of law making contribute to the difficulty of predicting ex ante 
‘how the law will be applied ex post by the [enforcer]’.396 Furthermore, a number of Saudi 
corporate legal provisions were drafted in an unclear fashion, including those relating to 
directors’ duties and enforcement. A closer look at the content of the CL 1965 uncovers a 
large number of outdated rules, which would be suitable for regulating the business 
environment in the 1960s, but would definitely not accommodate the current growing 
environment of investment. Therefore, the CL 2015 has been introduced to reformulate 
many rules providing more certainty in the application of the law. Nevertheless, some 
issues remain unresolved and uncertain. For instance, there is no proper formulation of the 
rules and standards of conduct and review for the duties of care and of loyalty to act in the 
company’s interests. To explain this point, the aforementioned duties are properly 
formulated in the sense that the law designs duties that strike the right balance between 
control/accountability and discretion/authority in a particular context. Clearly, a law that 
                                                        
390 J Raz, ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’ (1972) 81 The Yale Law Journal 823, 838. 
391 Ibid 838 and 841–842. 
392 This observation about the general assumption in legal theory is made by some legal scholars; see, for 
example, J Braithwaite, ‘Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty’ (2002) 27 Austl J Leg Phil 
47, 50.  
393 Raz (n 390) 841.      
394 See, for example ibid, arguing rules are likely to be more certain and predictable; see, for example 
J Braithwaite (n 392), claiming that principles generate more certainty in regulating ‘complex actions in 
changing environments where large economic interests at stake’.  
395 See generally Braithwaite (n 392 ); see also Kaplow (n 378) 584–590, which examines to what extent the 
law should be designed by its ex ante creation (i.e., rules) or its ex post creation (i.e., standards). He claims 
that there are situations in practice where rules could be more certain than principles and vice versa.  
396 See, for example, G Dari-Mattiacci and B Deffains, ‘Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process’ 
(Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No 2005/10, 2005)  4–5 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=869368> accessed 2 June 2016. 
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does not draw a distinction between the duty of care and the duties of loyalty in terms of 
the remedy required when the duty is breached, lacks legal clarity. Another aspect of legal 
uncertainty is illustrated by the failure of the Saudi corporate statute to clarify the scope of 
the duty to avoid conflict of interests, which consequently leaves questions unanswered as 
to the effectiveness of the law to deal with some instances of opportunistic activity. Those 
issues will be explored further throughout the comparative study in Chapters 3 and 4. The 
vagueness and ambiguity are further evident in the content of article 78 of the CL 1965 and 
its new version in the CL 2015 (article 80), which fails to clearly define a derivative action, 
as a mechanism of enforcement of directors’ duties.397 In addition, Saudi company law 
contains a combination of rules and principles. Though a law that contains open-ended 
concepts and standards might be appropriate to jurisdictions where the enforcer (e.g., 
courts) have strong ‘residual law making power’,398 which includes the recognition of legal 
precedent as a source of law, this is not the case in Saudi Arabia.399 Open-ended legal 
norms normally require an enforcer who possesses the capability to exercise ‘wide 
discretion to deal with matters as they fit on a case-by-case basis’, which, again, is 
problematic within the Saudi context.400 This issue is returned to in Chapter 6 when the 
reform of Saudi law is examined.  
 
Some effects can be detected as a result of legal uncertainty in Saudi law. First, generally, 
it is unlikely to promote an effective environment for business and investment without 
accessibility to laws defining rights and obligations. This argument is made in the 
following terms by Tom Bingham: ‘No one would choose to do business, perhaps 
involving large sums of money, in a country where the parties’ rights and obligations were 
vague or undecided’.401 Second, in the absence of legal clarity, doubts will remain among 
those subject to the law about whether or not a particular behaviour will be captured or 
protected by the provisions of law. For example, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, the lack 
of sufficient clarity concerning the directors’ duties to act in good faith in the general 
interest of the company and to avoid the exploitation of corporate opportunities could 
affect the expectations of shareholders and directors alike as to the legal consequences of 
directorial conduct.402 Third, it has been said that legal uncertainty tends to constrain 
                                                        
397 This issue will be discussed in detail in section (5.6), Chapter 5 in this thesis.  
398 See generally, K Pistor and C Xu, ‘Incomplete Law: A Conceptual and Analytical Framework and its 
Application to the Evolution of Financial Market Regulation’ (Working Paper No. 204, 2002)  4, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=310588> accessed 2 June 2016. 
399 See Dari-Mattiacci and Deffains (n 396) 9 and 10.  
400 See Cheffins (n 362) 282.  
401 See T H Bingham, The Rule of Law (London, Allen Lane 2010) 38. 
402 See the analysis conducted in Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
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decision making.403 This can possibly occur when the decision-making depends on the 
perspective of the law in relation to a particular matter.404 For example, directors should 
make decisions based on ‘complete’ information and in the interest of the ‘company’.405 
The uncertainty about what constitutes ‘complete’ may limit their ability to make informed 
decisions that satisfy this legal obligation. Similarly, what is meant by the elusive concept 
of ‘company’ may affect the director’s discretion while managing the company.406 Fourth, 
another cost of uncertainty is to weaken the effectiveness of law in guiding and controlling 
managerial behaviour. Even if directors have strong incentives to comply with the law, 
uncertainty and confusion about the exact meaning of law suffice to lead them to behave 
differently from the way they should. Importantly, it could also increase opportunistic 
actions on the part of directors. Fifth, the ill-defined and vague provisions set down in 
company law tend to weaken the enforcement of rules by the courts,407 an issue that will be 
taken into account while considering the reform of directors’ duties in Chapter 6.  
 
The argument of legal uncertainty will be developed throughout the analysis of Saudi law 
of directors’ duties and of private enforcement by litigation in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. While 
revealing several grounds for the presence of deficiency and ambiguity would be sufficient 
to justify the reform of law, the need for sound law of directors’ duties and enforcement 
thereof is further borne out by the limits and drawbacks of other mechanisms of 
accountability. Indeed, the legal framework of directors’ duties has been well-recognised 
as a last resort, when other monitoring mechanisms and market forces fall short as 
mechanisms for board accountability.408 
 
The rest of this chapter assesses the major mechanisms of accountability found in the Saudi 
corporate governance system that are intended to monitor and discipline those responsible 
for managing the company. The main argument put forward in the coming sections is that 
these mechanisms of controlling directors’ behaviour tend to be inadequate. Even if it was 
claimed that effective devices of monitoring do exist, such mechanisms operate within 
limits and so this cannot mask the need to enhance the board’s accountability through 
effective rules and standards for directors’ duties coupled with an accessible private 
enforcement action in the form of derivative litigation.  
                                                        
403 MacNeil (n 385) 72. 
404 Ibid. 
405 Article 30(17) of the CGRs 2017.   
406 This issue will be considered in sections (4.2.3.3) and (4.2.3.4), Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
407 B Black and R Kraakman, ‘A Self-enforcing Model of Corporate Law’ (1995) 109 Harv L Rev 1911, 
1925–1926. 




2.5 Blockholder and Control of Companies  
 
The role of shareholders in exercising corporate control is closely linked to the proportion 
of shares owned. The importance of corporate ownership, as an internal mechanism of 
monitoring and disciplining managers, has been theoretically established in the literature. 
For example, as several studies illustrate, depending upon the nature of the ownership 
structure, shareholders will often have either too little or too much incentive and power to 
monitor and control the management.409 In the following subsections, an outline of the 
financial and legal literature on ownership and control is given; following which, the 
pattern of share ownership and the resultant degree of control in Saudi companies are 
explored. This will be followed by a discussion of scenarios where ineffective monitoring 
of management may occur due to the presence of a blockholder (i.e., government agency).  
 
2.5.1 Models of corporate ownership and control: General analysis 
 
Broadly speaking, companies can be mainly categorised according to the pattern of 
ownership into either companies with dispersed share ownership or companies with 
concentrated share ownership.410 From many studies of ownership structures, scholars 
conclude that the vast majority of large companies around the world have concentrated 
ownership and the presence of diffused ownership seems to be the exception rather than 
the rule.411  
 
Dispersed share ownership refers to the ownership structure where the company’s equity 
capital is held diffusedly and there is no single large shareholder capable of controlling the 
company’s affairs.412 The diffuse share ownership seems to be the predominant structure of 
most public companies in the UK and US;413 for example, in the UK414 a recent study 
conducted by Faccio and Lang reported on the basis of data from 1996 that approximately 
                                                        
409 See, for example, A Shleifer and R Vishny, ‘Large Shareholders and Corporate Control’ (1986) 94 
Journal of Political Economy 461; Shleifer and Vishny (n 15). 
410 R la Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes and A Shleifer, ‘Corporate Ownership around the World’ (1999) 54 The 
Journal of Finance 471. 
411 See for instance, ibid 474, 496.  
412 I MacNeil, An Introduction to the Law on Financial Investment (2nd edn, Oxford, Hart Publishing 2012) 
308. 
413 See, for example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (n 410) 496 and 493. 
414 There is some similarity between the US and the UK in relation in the structure of ownership and control. 
Therefore, it suffices here to devote the analysis to the ownership pattern in the UK.   
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63% of 1,953 publically traded companies were widely held.415 In jurisdictions where 
diffuse share ownership is the norm, there would be a lack of strong incentive on the part 
of a shareholder to participate actively in corporate governance because a small 
shareholder ‘will have to bear the cost while other shareholders will share the benefits’. 416 
This results in giving directors/managers a ‘free hand to manage’ while shareholders 
distance themselves from playing an active role in monitoring the company’s 
management.417 It can broadly be said that shareholders in diffusedly held companies are 
rationally apathetic, leading to corporate control being in the hands of 
directors/managers.418  
 
Unlike in the UK and the US, the pattern of corporate ownership that prevails in most 
jurisdictions is the concentrated share ownership.419 This ownership structure refers to the 
situation where a company with publicly traded shares has at least one shareholder with 
sufficient voting powers to influence the company’s management.420 Empirical research 
indicates that the concentrated ownership is the norm in most continental European 
companies in which share ownership is concentrated in the hands of wealthy families and 
other firms.421 Similarly, the concentrated ownership structure prevails in most firms in 
East Asia, as demonstrated by Claessens et al. in their survey of 2980 publically traded 
companies in nine Eastern Asian countries.422  
 
In the case of companies with concentrated share ownership, cash flow and control 
interests can provide a single large shareholder with the necessary power and motivation to 
participate actively in corporate governance because he/she will be the actual beneficiary 
from this direct intervention,423 otherwise known as a voice.424 To be specific, the 
controlling shareholder tends to be sufficiently armed with the power and incentive to 
                                                        
415 M Faccio and L Lang, ‘The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations’ (2002) 65 Journal of 
Financial Economics 365, 368 (footnote 5) and 379.   
416 MacNeil (n 412) 308. 
417 B Cheffins, ‘Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom’ (2001) 
30 The Journal of Legal Studies 459, 461 
418 Pacces (n 361) 28; M Goergen and L Renneboog, ‘Strong Managers and Passive Institutional Investors in 
the UK’ in F Barca and M Becht (eds), The Control of Corporate Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2002) 259. 
419 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (n 410) 474 and 491. 
420 Shleifer and Vishny (n 409) 754.  
421 See, for example, M Becht and C Mayer, ‘Introduction’ in F Barca and M Becht (eds), The Control of 
Corporate Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002) 2-3; Faccio and Lang (n 415) 378–388. 
422 This does not apply to Japan where public companies are generally widely held, see S Claessens, 
S Djankov and L Lang, ‘The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations’ (2000) 58 
Journal of Financial Economics 81, 103. 
423 MacNeil (n 412) 308–309. 
424 A Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, 
(Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press 1970).  
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engage with the company’s management through sitting on the board of directors,425 and so 
is able either to bring about changes in the company’s policies and actions,426 or to remove 
directors or managers in response to poor performance.427 Hence, the corporate control 
based upon concentrated ownership is likely to be one of shareholder control.428 Within the 
controlling shareholder system, the classic form of control, which the majority of corporate 
governance literature assumes, is a majority control pattern.429 It refers to the scenario 
where a blockholder (or group of blockholders acting together) owns more than 50% of the 
company’s shares.430 However, the company could also be under shareholder control even 
though the shareholder holds less than 50% of the cash flow rights attached to the 
company’s equity, this form of control is known as ‘minority control’.431 In this situation, 
the blockholder with a significant holding of shares, can in fact exercise a form of working 
control when the company’s remaining shares are diffused and no competitor has sufficient 
shares to challenge them successfully.432 This suggests that the exercise of control by 
shareholder can be maintained without the need to hold a majority of a company’s shares 
and cash flow interests.  
 
2.5.2 The pattern of ownership and control in Saudi companies 
 
Saudi Arabia is not an exception to the domination of concentrated ownership in most 
countries. In the Saudi stock market the concentrated share ownership, as shown below, 
tends to be the norm in the Saudi stock market.433  
                                                        
425 For example, an empirical study conducted by La Porta et al. has shown that the controlling shareholders 
particularly families are part of the top management of the firm; see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(n 410) 500, 511.  
426 Markus P Urban, The Influence of Blockholders on Agency Costs and Firm Value: An Empirical 
Examination of Blockholder Characteristics and Interrelationships for German Listed Firms (wiesbaden, 
Springer 2015) 105; A Edmans, ‘Blockholders and Corporate Governance’ (2014) 6 Annual Review of 
Financial Economics 23.   
427 From the theoretical point of view, a dominant shareholder with sufficient voting control can change the 
company’s board of directors through launching takeover bids or proxy fights or through informal 
negotiations with existing management (i.e. a jawboning mechanism), see Shleifer and Vishny (n 409).  
428 See Pacces (n 361) 28. 
429 See, for example, M Roe, ‘Corporate Law’s Limits’ (2002) 31 The Journal of Legal Studies 233, 238, 
which analyses how a blockholder holding the controlling stock attempts not to lose control by owning at 
least 51% of the company’s equity. 
430 Majority control was considered a first step towards ‘the separation of ownership and control’, see 
A A Berle and G C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, (New York, Macmillan 
Company 1933) 70–72 
431 Ibid 80. 
432 Ibid.  
433 The share ownership is mostly concentrated in the hands of government funds and wealthy families, see, 
for example, J Piesse, R Strange And F Toonsi, ‘Is There a Distinctive MENA Model of Corporate 
Governance?’ (2012) 16 J Manag Gov 645; M Alghamdi, ‘Family Business Agency Problems, Ownership 
Concentration and Corporate Performance: Theory and Evidence from Saudi Arabia’(Proceedings of the 26th 




As mentioned earlier, a joint stock company is the only type of company that is statutorily 
allowed to list its equity shares on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul).434 Unfortunately, 
information as to the ownership structure of unlisted joint stock companies is not 
publically available. Therefore, this section will only focus on analysing the ownership and 
control of joint stock companies listed in Tadawul because the CMA requires the 
disclosure of the identity and the holdings of investors who own 5% or more of a listed 
company’s stock, including any change in the owners’ equity above this threshold.435 This 
data will assist in the task of determining the structure of ownership and control in listed 
companies and the degree of control exercised by a blockholder, if present.  
 
Since concentrated ownership is the typical pattern of corporate ownership in the Saudi 
equity market, this means that most companies have a blockholder. This then raises the 
question as to the level of control exercised by the blockholder. In order to give a clear 
picture of levels of control exercised by the shareholder, it is useful to examine various 
ownership thresholds that determine shareholders’ rights. The first threshold is a holding of 
at least 2%,436 which enables shareholders to submit a request to the competent authority437 
to call for an annual general meeting (AGM) in any of circumstances set down in corporate 
statute.438 The next threshold occurs with ownership of 5% or more, which gives relevant 
shareholders the right to call an AGM439 and put forward a motion to the court for the order 
of inspection over the company in the case that they suspect anything suspicious in relation 
to the directors’ management of the company or the auditors’ independence and 
credibility.440 Ownership of at least 25% confers on a shareholder(s) a blocking minority 
and veto power concerning vital corporate resolutions that require a super majority to be 
passed. In particular, the respective shareholder(s) have the power to block an 
extraordinary general meeting’s (EGM) decision in relation to capital increase or 
reduction, the extension of company’s terms, the termination of the company or the merger 
                                                                                                                                                                        
https://wbiworldconpro.com/uploads/london-conference-2014/finance/1396842795_322-Al-Ghamdi.pdf > 
accessed 11 March 2017. 
434 See, section (1.4.1), Chapter 1 in this thesis. 
435 See article 45 of the LRs 2004. 
436 This ownership threshold will not be taken into account in the following analysis because there is no 
information available on the shareholders’ ownership at this threshold.  
437 It refers to the MOCI. However, with regard to companies listed in the equity market, it refers to the 
CMA.  
438 See article 90(3) of the CL 2015.  
439 Article 90(1) of the CL 2015. 
440 Article 100(1) of the CL 2015. 
 55 
 
of the company into another one.441 Ownership of 33% and more additionally provides the 
shareholders with a further veto power in the EGM442 and enables them, for instance, to 
block the amendment of the company’s articles of association,443 the issuance of preference 
shares and the issuance of debt instruments.444 The next threshold is a holding of at least 
50% representing the simple majority, which empowers respective shareholders to decide 
on all resolutions at the AGM.445 It, inter alia, grants them the right to appoint and remove 
members of the board of directors,446 approve the acts of directors in relation to conflict of 
interest transactions,447 and commence a lawsuit against errant directors.448 The final 
significant control thresholds occur with at least a two-thirds ownership and with a 
shareholding of 75% or more, this enables shareholders to exercise a wide discretion on 
the most vital decisions of the EGM. While the former confers, for instance, the power to 
amend the company’s articles of association, the 75% threshold provides owners with 
specific control rights such as the right to increase the corporate capital and approve 
mergers.  
 
In the light of the ownership levels and associated rights outlined above, it is important to 
explore if blockholders in Saudi listed companies can reach these levels because this 
determines the capability of blockholders to monitor directors, at least from the legal point 
of view. Table 2.1 provides details of 171 companies listed in Tadawul that have a 
blockholder (or a group of blockholders)449 with an ownership equal to or above the 
aforementioned thresholds. Here, it is not uncommon to detect at least one blockholder 
holding 5% or more of a company’s equity. The data demonstrates that approximately 91% 
of listed companies have a shareholder with ownership of at least 5%. The large number of 
companies with a shareholder who is able to block the most important decisions at the 
general meeting is illustrated by the fact that about half of the companies (49%) have a 
shareholder with a blocking minority of 25%, and, additionally, more than one-third of the 
companies (34%) have a blockholder with a blocking minority of 33%. In the Saudi stock 
market, only 22 companies, accounting for nearly 13%, appear to be governed by a simple 
                                                        
441 The law requires a special resolution passed by a majority of 75% votes cast in the EGM with regard to 
only the aforementioned matters, see article 94(4) of the CL 2015. 
442 Except for those stated in the immediately preceding footnote, resolutions of the EGM must be approved 
by a two-thirds majority of votes cast, see article 94(4) of the CL 2015. 
443 Article 88(1) of the CL 2015. 
444 Articles 114 and 122 (2) of the CL 2015. 
445 Article 93(3) of the CL 2015. 
446 Article 68 (3) of the CL 2015. 
447 Articles 71 and 72 of the CL 2015. 
448 Article 79 of the CL 2015. 
449 This means that the ownership of shares by individuals within the same family, as well as shares owned by 
different government agencies, are aggregated into one group in this survey. 
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majority shareholder. There are also very few companies under the control of a 
supermajority shareholder whether the supermajority threshold is two-thirds (seven 
companies) or three-quarters (four companies).  
 
Table 2.1: Distribution of the blockholders (B) according to significant control thresholds 
in the Saudi Stock Market in December 2015 
Blockholder’s ownership size  
(Control threshold) 
Distribution of the blockholders (B)  
in the sample companies 
Number Percentage 
5% ≤ B 156 91.2 
25% ≤ B 84 49 
33% ≤ B 59 34.5 
50% ≤ B 22 12.8 
66% ≤ B 7 4 
75% ≤ B 4 2.3 
Source: The own survey of 171 companies listed in the Saudi Stock Market (Tadawul) based upon 
official data published the Tadawul website (December 2015) 450 
 
It can be seen from these figures that while a shareholder is able to reach the blocking 
minority thresholds in a considerable number of companies, it is uncommon to find a 
shareholder with a holding of 50% or 75% of the company’s shares. As a matter of fact, 
out of 171 companies listed in the market, 134 have a blockholder whose voting power 
does not exceed the 50% voting rights. Furthermore, no shareholder in 72 companies 
enjoys voting control in excess of a quarter of the voting rights. From the legal perspective, 
although there are many companies with at least one shareholder holding a blocking 
minority, this does not offer them direct power to affect decisions taken in the general 
meeting. As the data illustrates, there are only 22 companies where a blockholder, in legal 
terms, appears to have sufficient power to exercise control over decisions taken in the 
general meeting and so monitor directorial actions and decisions.  
 
However, this does not prevent the possibility of shareholders exercising actual control 
over the company’s affairs even without holding the majority of the company’s shares. 
This can perhaps be measured by the ability of blockholders to appoint board members in a 
manner that is disproportionate to their equity ownership451 and in which the blockholder 
exercises de facto control rather than a de jure one. According to Piesse et al., a 
blockholder, especially in some family-controlled companies, tends to have the ability to 
disproportionately influence board nominations beyond his ownership rights.452 
                                                        
450 In this survey, the ownership of shares by individuals within the same family is regarded as a single 
group. This is also the case in relation to shares owned by different government agencies. 




Additionally, it has been observed that there is disproportionate board representation in 
some companies controlled by families or individuals; for example, a blockholder 
(i.e., family controller) with a shareholding of 20% in Zamil Industrial Investment 
Company has nominated 40% of the board members.453 Another example is Dar Alarkan 
Real Estate Development Company, which shows the ability of a blockholder (i.e., an 
individual) with ownership of only 6.44% of the company’s shares to appoint more than 
35% of the members of the board of directors.454 This seemingly explains why blockholder 
ownership does not usually exceed the 50% control threshold.  
 
Under the system of concentrated ownership, the problem of rational apathy (i.e., the 
absence of incentive and of power) is presumably solved due to the presence of a large 
shareholder.455 However, it should be borne in mind that in every direct intervention, a 
free-rider problem arises because the dominant shareholder bears all the costs of voice 
mechanism while only gaining ‘a fraction of the benefits’.456 The impact of the free-ride 
problem hinges on the size of the shareholding block; in other words, it has been argued 
that a larger block is needed in order to minimise the effect of the free-ride problem and 
maximise incentives to intervene in corporate governance.457 Since the degree of simple 
control by a single shareholder is relatively low in the Saudi market (only 22 companies 
out of 171 have a majority shareholder), the strength of voice and the blockholder’s 
incentive to intervene could be affected by the size of the shareholding block. Another 
point that should be taken into account is that the data suggest that most companies are 
under minority control, a model that assumes the presence of a single shareholder owning 
less than 50% with no competitor having sufficient shares to challenge them 
successfully.458 The literature suggests that a single shareholder with a larger block is 
needed to overcome the incentive problem in order to intervene.459 However, this 
perception might be affected by the existence of companies held by multiple 
blockholders.460 As has been argued, the problem of the free-rider worsens in the case of 
                                                        
453 See the profile of Zamil Industrial Co. (Building and Construction Sector) on the Tadawul website at 
<http://www.tadawul.com.sa> accessed 20 December 2015. 
454 The blockholder is a board member along with other family members who have been elected as directors, 
see the profile of Dar Al Arkan Co. (Real Estate Development Sector) on the Tadawul website at 
<http://www.tadawul.com.sa> accessed 20 December 2015. 
455 See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (n 409) 753–754; Urban (n 426) 101–102. 
456 See Edmans (n 426) 25. 
457 Ibid 35; Urban (n 426) 102.  
458 See  Berle and Means (n 430) 80.    
459 See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (n 409); E Maug, ‘Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a 
Tarde-off between Liquidity and Control?’ (1998) 53 The Journal of Finance 65, where their models assume 
the presence of a single blockholder.  
460 There are many Saudi companies that are held by more than a single blockholder; see, for example, the 
profiles of the following companies: Emaar (Sector of Real Estate Development), Taiba (Sector of Real 
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‘splitting block between multiple investors’, which consequently weakens the strength of 
the voice mechanism or reduces the blockholders’ incentive to intervene.461  
 
As long as the discussion is related to the ownership structure as an internal mechanism of 
corporate governance, it is clear that the ownership structure tends to determine the types 
of agency conflict that should be regarded as the most serious in public companies. Agency 
conflict refers to the problems that arise when the interest of one party (principal) hinges 
upon actions taken by another (agent). A divergence of interests between the principal and 
the agent would, theoretically, incentivise the agent to act in his own interest at the expense 
of the principal.462 Put differently, where the diffusion of corporate ownership is the norm 
in most public companies, corporate control is likely to be in the hands of directors or 
managers and the interests of the controlling board of directors may be incompatible with 
those of shareholders (director/shareholder agency problem).463 By contrast, in jurisdictions 
where corporate ownership is normally concentrated in large-block shareholders, the 
corporate management will be under their control and the interest of non-controlling 
shareholders tends to be ignored (majority/minority shareholder agency problem).464 This 
suggests that in countries with concentrated ownership it is assumed that the presence of 
large-block shareholders should handle the agency conflict between directors and 
shareholders. Nevertheless, even if the blockholder has the incentive and capability to 
monitor the management, this does not undermine the importance of sufficient legal 
protection for shareholders, including the minority shareholder, in developing an effective 
corporate governance system.465 Further, it should always be the job of the state to ensure 
that a director (who could be a controlling shareholder) is accountable for his/her 
misconduct regardless of the ownership structure. In this regard, Davies, in considering 
whether the different structure of shareholdings in large companies (concentrated and 
diffused ownership) leads to the different corporate governance problems faced by EU 
member states, made an interesting remark: 
 
In both countries with fragmented shareholdings across the board and countries with 
concentrated stakes but also fragmented non-controlling shareholding, there is at one 
level a similar corporate governance problem. That can perhaps best be expressed in 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Estate Development), Buba Arabia (Insurance sector) and Amiantit (Building and Construction Sector), 
available on the Tadawul website at <https://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/tadawul/home> accessed 
20 December 2015. 
461 Edmans (n 426) 26.  
462 Jensen and Meckling (n 361) 308. 
463 See O Hart, ‘Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications’ (1995) 105 The Economic Journal 
678, 680–681. 
464 Ibid 683–684.   
465 See Shleifer and Vishny (n 15) 739.   
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terms of ensuring the accountability of management to the non-controlling 
shareholders.466  
 
This means that an effective enforcement of directors’ duties, reinforced by a clear and 
proper framework of standards, would ensure board accountability towards even non-
controlling shareholders in the case where directors are under the control of shareholders. 
Therefore, any failing or uncertainty in the legal system of directors’ duties tends to 
significantly undermine the board’s accountability and, more generally, the availability of 
good corporate governance.  
 
While the pattern of the ownership structure is irrelevant when it comes to the need to 
ensure the legal accountability of directors, the following section will show that the 
identity of the blockholders does matter in relation to their incentive to monitor the 
management. Hence, the presence of blockholders may not be in and of itself sufficient to 
reduce agency costs that result from the delegation of management powers to the board of 
directors.   
 
2.5.3 The state as a blockholder: A model of ineffective monitoring 
 
As explained above, conventional wisdom suggests that the director/shareholder agency 
problem is not an issue where concentrated share ownership is the norm in most 
companies. This can, however, be challenged. Depending on the identity of the 
blockholder, issues can arise in terms of their incentive to intervene and their capability to 
monitor the management effectively.467 The following discussion will illustrate that there 
can be significant disparity between the interests of directors and shareholders when the 
state is a blockholder.  
 
The state, through its government agencies, is considered to be the largest investor in the 
Saudi stock market.468 There are three government entities investing in the market: the 
Public Investment Fund (PIF), which is a blockholder in 19 listed companies;469 the 
General Organisation for Social Insurance (GOSI), which is a blockholder in 31 listed 
                                                        
466 P Davies, Corporate Governance, (Acts of the Conference on Company Law and the Single Market: 
European Comission, 15 and 16 December 1997) 62 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/otherdocs/actes_en.pdf> accessed 3 January 2016. 
467 See, for example, Piesse, Strange and Toonsi (n 433) 656. 
468 This information is based upon the financial report drawn up by Aleqtisadiah in July 2014, see T Al-
Sayah, Aleqtisadiah Newspaper (edn 7577, 10 July 2014) (Arabic) 
<http://www.aleqt.com/2014/07/10/article_865848.html> accessed 7 March 2016. 
469 See T Al-Sayah, Aleqtisadiah Newspaper (edn 7983, 20 August 2015) (Arabic) 
<http://www.aleqt.com/2015/08/20/article_983393.html> accessed 7 March 2016. 
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companies;470 The Public Pension Agency (PPA), is a blockholder in 20 out of 171 
companies listed in the market.471According to recent reports published in 2015, the market 
value of shares owned by the state through its funds and institutions in the stock exchange 
amount to approximately SAR 700 billion (about USD 186.6 billion).472 This has shown 
that listed companies where the state is a blockholder are the major forces in the Saudi 
stock market, and their problems are consequently important and critical to market growth. 
  
The PIF, GOSI and the PPA, as the investment arms of the government, are state-owned, 
under its de facto control, and ultimately managed by government bureaucrats and salaried 
employees.473 One of the central issues revolving around state-controlled companies is that 
officials (agents) appointed to monitor or be involved in the governance of such 
companies, unlike shareholders, do not typically have ‘personal equity stake’ in the 
company.474 For example, the Saudi government’s representatives on the board of directors 
or in the general meeting do not normally own shares at all in any relevant company,475 and 
this also the case in relation to those who monitor and appoint them. This consequently 
means that they neither bear any economic risk of corporate failure nor directly benefit 
from the company’s success.476 As a result, there might be a lack of sufficient incentives on 
the part of government’s representatives to manage the company diligently and adequately 
supervise directorial performance.477 This incentive problem is worsened by the lack of 
monitoring, which is sometimes referred to as the absence of an owner.478 It has been 
contended that since citizens (in this case Saudis) are the real owners, the ownership is 
widely diffused, resulting in poor monitoring of the company due to the ‘free-rider’ 
                                                        
470 Ibid. 
471 Ibid.  
472 See the Statistical Report, published in CNBC Arabiya (23 May 2015) (Arabic) 
<http://www.cnbcarabia.com/?p=226299> accessed 29 February 2016. 
473 For example, PPA is administratively connected to the Ministry of Civil Service and its board is headed 
by the Minister of Civil Service. The PIF had been formally part of the Ministry of Finance since its 
establishment in 1971 until recently the PIF has become under the supervision of the Council of Economic 
and Development Affairs (CEDA) in which the PIF’s Board of Directors is chaired by the Head of CEDA, 
see High Order No. 23975 dated 22/3/2015, 
<http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=ar&newsid=1341658> accessed 1 May 2016.  
474 See OECD Proceedings, Corporate Governance, State-Owned Enterprises and Privatisation, (Paris, 
OECD Publishing 1997) 41 <http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/governance/ 
corporate-governance-state-owned-enterprises-and-privatisation_9789264162730-en#page39> accessed 
11 May 2016. 
475 See, for example, the board’s annual report of Riyadh Bank in 2014; the board’s annual report of SABIC 
in 2015; the board’s annual report of Yanbu Cement Co. in 2015; and the board’s annual report of Qassim 
Cement Co. in 2015, which can all be viewed Tadawul website through the profile of each company at 
<http://www.tadawul.com.sa> accessed 12 March 2016. 
476 D Chen, Corporate Governance, Enforcement and Financial Development: The Chinese Experience, 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 2013) 94. 
477 OECD Proceedings (n 474) 41.    
478 D Clarke, ‘Corporate Governance in China: An Overview’ (2003) 14 China Economic Review 494, 499–
500.    
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problem.479 The lack of effective monitoring can also be expected from the government 
agencies that hold the shares on behalf of citizens, mainly due to the absence of economic 
motivation.480 Therefore, it could be suggested that the presence of imperfect monitoring 
on the part of a governmental blockholder probably gives rise to wide management 
discretion and poor corporate performance.481 It is worth saying that in some cases 
preferential policies are granted to state-controlled companies, such as for purchasing raw 
materials from the government at a subsidised price,482 or the receipt of subsidies in the 
form of grants483 or loans.484 This, consequently, could assist the market performance of a 
state-controlled company to remain at a high level, even without effective monitoring. In 
other words, although directors/managers exploit the company’s resources due to the 
engagement in conflicted transactions or the lack of due diligence in the company’s 
management, such behaviours are unlikely to be strong enough to undermine the overall 
performance of a state-controlled company. In such conditions, there might be insufficient 
incentives for officials in government funds to increase monitoring to reach a standard that 
would otherwise be achieved with little effort. It should be also taken into account that the 
state adopts a long-term investment strategy in the market and its shares of ownership have 
not been sold for a long time.485 Put differently, it can be argued that the threat of takeover, 
as a mechanism of disciplining incumbent directors or managers, tends not to be available 
to state-controlled companies.486  
 
The final issue to consider is that state-owned enterprises, whether listed or not, are likely 
to be managed by unqualified and inexperienced officials.487 In Saudi Arabia this view 
seems to be sometimes true in relation to listed companies with governmental 
blockholders. Government bureaucrats selected as board members are generally viewed as 
                                                        
479 M Shirley and P Walsh, ‘Public versus Private Ownership: The Current State of the Debate’ (Policy 
Reserch Working Paper 2420, The World Bank, August 2000) 23 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/08/693336/public-versus-private-ownership-current-state-
debate> accessed 2 May 2016.  
480 OECD Proceedings (n 474) 41. 
481 See Shirley and Walsh (n 479) 32. 
482 Piesse, Strange and Toonsi (n 433) 659.     
483 For example, the Ministry of Agriculture grants two land plots to the Saudi Fisheries Company whose 
40% of its equity capital is owned by the PIF; see the announcement of the Company published publicly, 
<http://www.argaam.com/ar/article/articledetail/id/385670> accessed 13 May 2016. 
484 See OECD, State-owned Enterprises in the Middle East and North Africa, (Paris, OECD Publishing 2013) 
67 <http://www.oicexchanges.org/docs/third-meeting-istanbul/mena-soes-eng.pdf> accessed 
22 September 2017. 
485 See newspaper article by R Al-fozan, ‘The State Is Investor, and a Seller’ Alriyadh Newspaper (edn 
17226, 23 August 2015)<http://www.alriyadh.com/1075718> accessed 22 May 2016. 
486 Shirley and Walsh (n 479) 33–34; OECD Proceedings (n 474) 39. 
487 A Arrobbio, Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises: A Toolkit (Washington, DC, World Bank 
Group 2014) 14–15 <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/10/20286791/corporate-governance-
state-owned-enterprises-toolkit> accessed 23 March 2016. 
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lacking sufficient qualifications488 and appropriate expertise in the company’s fields of 
business.489 They are also seen as not devoting sufficient time and effort to the work of the 
board.490 One possible explanation for this dilemma is that the selection of officials onto 
the board is usually based upon favouritism and political connection rather than 
competence and meritocracy.491 Indeed, like other governments in the region, the Saudi 
government does not follow a structured nomination process when nominating their 
representatives for a company’s board of directors, and this opens the door for the selection 
of board members who do not possess the capability to actively supervise and positively 
affect the performance of companies.492  
 
It can be concluded that the absence of an ultimate owner (weak owner) in state-controlled 
companies is likely to produce a situation where the company is under the control of 
management without any effective monitoring. 
 
2.6 Shareholders and Exercising Accountability at the General Meeting 
 
As discussed above in relation to Saudi law,493 the decision-making powers allocated to the 
board of directors and shareholders through the general meeting can only be used in 
matters that fall within the competence of the AGM or EGM, as set out in the statute or the 
articles of association. The importance of the general meeting can be inferred from the fact 
that it is the mechanism by which shareholders can hold directors accountable and restrict 
the board’s power.494 Given the limited range of powers that can be exercised by the 
shareholder body,495 doubt can be cast upon the role of the general meeting as an effective 
mechanism of board accountability. Legal obstacles, reinforced by other non-legal 
factors,496 have contributed to weakening the monitoring role of shareholders through the 
general meetings, opening the door for the board of directors, in some circumstances, to 
accrue more powers. As one commentator states, the legal rules determine whether or not 
                                                        
488 Piesse, Strange and Toonsi (n 433) 659.     
489 Falgi (n 208) 151; see also M Alamri, ‘Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors in Saudi-listed 
Companies’ (PhD Thesis, University of Dundee 2014) 147–148 who reveals that most government 
independent directors do not have the necessary expertise to provide a beneficial input to boards.  
490 Falgi (n 208) 137. 
491 Piesse, Strange and Toonsi (n 433) 659. 
492 OECD, Towards New Arrangements for State Ownership in the Middle East and North Africa (Paris, 
OECD Publishing 2012) 40–41 <http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-
ownedenterprises/50087769.pdf> accessed 22 September 2017. 
493 See section (2.2) in this Chapter. 
494 MacNeil (n 412) 311. 
495 See section (2.2) in this Chapter.  
496 The decision-making by shareholders at the general meeting is usually associated with the collective 
action problem, see Easterbrook and Fischel (n 301) 66–67. 
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shareholder voting is a perfect constraint on directors or managers in which the effects of 
shareholder size should be considered as being of secondary importance.497 The following 
subsection shows the internal mechanisms that are available to shareholders at the general 
meeting to monitor and discipline directors. The limits and drawbacks of such mechanisms 
are emphasised, and the effectiveness of the general meeting of shareholders as a watchdog 
of activities carried out by directors (who may also be blockholders) is questioned. 
 
2.6.1 Directors’ removal 
 
One of the main powers available to shareholders to discipline directors is the removal of 
errant directors.498 The question here is how secure the position of the director is against 
dismissal. According to Saudi law, directors will be selected to serve for the period 
mentioned in the company’s bylaw, provided that the directorial term does not exceed 
three years.499 The length of the membership term is important in this regard because a 
longer term would secure the position of directors from temporary shareholder 
majorities.500 Another aspect of the dismissal right is the power to dismiss directors before 
the end of their membership. Saudi law makes it clear that shareholders, through the 
general meeting, can remove directors at any time and without cause even if the company’s 
bylaw states otherwise.501 Although the removal right appears to be powerful, some 
underlying factors should be taken into account, which could weaken its exercise in 
practice.  
 
The first point to consider is that the cost of removing and replacing an errant director may 
not serve the collective interest of shareholders. This is because the removal of a director 
does not deprive him/her of compensation from the company.502 In addition, since 
shareholders can only exercise the removal right through a general meeting, this rule 
securing a director against dismissal tends to ‘dilute the power of shareholders to remove 
directors’.503 This consequently suggests that the easily exercisable power to convene the 
                                                        
497 See B Black, ‘Shareholder Passivity Reexamined’ (1990) 89 Michigan Law Review 520, 522. 
498 See L Enriques, H Hansmann and R Kraakman, ‘The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of 
Shareholders as a Class’ in R Kraakman et al. (ed), The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and 
Functional Approach (2nd edn, Oxford, OUP 2009) 60. 
499 See article 68(3) of the CL 2015. 
500 Enriques, Hansmann and Kraakman (n 498) 60.    
501Article 68(3) of the CL 2015. This was also the position of Saudi law under the pre-exiting corporate 
statute; see article 66 of the CL 1965. 
502 Article 68(3) of the CL 2015. 
503 P Davies, The Board of Directors: Composition, Structure, Duties and Powers, (Paper on Company Law 
Reform in OECD Countries, OECD 2000) 7, 
<https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/1857291.pdf> accessed 15 September 2017.  
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general meeting to remove directors does matter in determining the strength of the removal 
right.504 According to Saudi law, the call to convene a general meeting requested by 
shareholders (representing at least 5% of equity capital) shall be addressed to the 
company’s board of directors505 and shareholders are not entitled to convene the general 
meeting by themselves. Under any circumstances, it is a matter for the board of directors to 
assess the reasons for requesting the meeting and determine accordingly. As has been 
pointed out, the Saudi CL 1965 remained silent about the legal effect of a board’s refusal 
of the application and the possibility of appeal against the board’s decision.506 Therefore, 
the legal uncertainty around such issues, together with many others, created a situation 
where there was a high potential for the board to abuse its power at the expense of 
shareholders.507 As a response to this issue, the new CL 2015 has given the competent 
authority (the MOCI for unlisted companies and the CMA for listed companies) the 
discretionary power to call for the convening of a general meeting if the board has not done 
so after one has been requested by the shareholders.508 Nevertheless, by requiring the 
minimum shareholding ownership of 5%, it suggests that the right to request the board to 
call for a general meeting seems to be only available for wealthy shareholders. In listed 
companies, the threshold of 5% or even 2% of the company’s equity would represent 
hundreds or even millions of Saudi riyals in market value of shareholding.509 This will 
perhaps make it practically difficult to call a general meeting for dismissing errant 
directors.  
 
Furthermore, even if it is assumed that shareholders have sufficient power to dismiss 
directors, this cannot be seen as a sufficient accountability mechanism because 
accountability is about holding directors responsible while they still hold their position. 
Unlike the private enforcement by way of civil litigation (e.g., derivative action), the 
mechanism of removal does not, for instance, compensate the company and its 
shareholders for damage resulting from the director’s breach of his/her duties or oblige 
wrongdoers to disgorge profit made out of unauthorised activities. Such remedies can only 
                                                        
504 Ibid. 
505 Article 90(1) of the CL 2015; see also article 87 of the previous CL 1965.    
506 Y Alzahrani, ‘Critical Evaluation of Minority Shareholders’ Rights in General Shareholders Meeting 
Underthe Saudi Company Law No.1965’ (2014) 14 Global Journal of Human Social Science 37, 38-39. 
507 Ibid. 
508 See article 90(2)(d) of the CL 2015. It is worth mentioning that the new CL 2015 has referred to other 
circumstances where the competent authority may call for a general meeting, see sub-articles 90(2)(a), (b) 
and (c).  
509 See Annual Statistical Report 2015 issued by Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), which shows the market 
capitalisation of listed companies as on 31 December 2015 
<https://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/tadawul/markets/reports-%26-publications/periodical-publications> 
accessed 15 September 2017. 
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be sought through the initiation of a lawsuit.510 Furthermore, as an ex post mechanism of 
accountability, removal is unlikely to minimise directors’ incentives to become involved in 
one-shot misappropriation of corporate assets (called steal-and-run transactions511) in the 
first place. In addition, the law of directors’ duties will retain its important role in 
determining what constitutes misconduct on the part of directors in which the exercise of 
removal, at least in theory, may not be related to poor performance. Moreover, it is very 
rare in practice that shareholders call for a general meeting in order to dismiss a director, 
which suggests that the option of removal is not frequently used and many directors remain 
in their positions despite corporate losses.512 
 
2.6.2 Nomination and election of directors 
 
Under Saudi law, shareholders, through general meetings, are given the right to appoint 
directors by passing an ordinary resolution.513 Nevertheless, at least in relation to listed 
companies in Tadawul, the appointment of directors is indirectly affected by the board 
because one of the responsibilities of the board’s committee of nomination is to 
recommend nominees for the board at the next general meeting of shareholders.514 Before 
the introduction of the CGRs 2017, the boards of directors in many listed companies did 
not disclose the names and backgrounds of candidates before elections.515 This might be 
seen as a part of the directors’ advantage in controlling how shareholders vote, weakening 
the shareholders’ positon to challenge the directors’ control over elections. Although the 
new CGRs 2017 require the company to disclose detailed information about the nominees 
for the board membership on the websites of Tadawul and the relevant company,516 this 
does not change the fact that directors (who could be blockholders) control the voting at 
the general meeting. For example, while every shareholder has the right to nominate a 
board member and to inform the board during the nomination period,517 it appears that 
shareholders during the meeting cannot choose candidates other than those recommended 
                                                        
510 See, for example, article 71(2) of the CL 2015; article 80 of the CL 2015. 
511 Enriques, Hertige and Kanda (n 364) 155. 
512 See R Al-fozan, ‘Board Member: From where did you get this?’ Alriyadh Newspaper (edn 15519, 20 
December 2010) <http://www.alriyadh.com/587034> accessed 20 May 2016, which reported the first 
incidence of removing a director in the Saudi stock market.  
513 Article 68(3) of the CL 2015; see also article 66 of the CL 1965. 
514 Article 65(2) of the CGRs 2017. This procedural rule was also stated in the previous Regulations, see 
article 15(c)(1) of the CGRs 2006. 
515 See the General Meeting Announcements of the following companies: Wafrah for Industry and 
Development Company (Wafrah) (19 April 2016); Tabuk Agriculture Development Company (TADCO) 24 
April 2016); Arabian Shield Cooperative Insurance Company (16 June 2016); Electrical Industries Co. (EIC) 
(28 April 2016) on the Tadwaul website <https://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/tadawul/home> accessed 
20 July 2016. 
516 Article 8(a) of the CGRs 2017. 
517 Article 68(2) of the CL 2015.  
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and filed by the board.518 Given the fact that there is nothing compelling the nomination 
committee to nominate more candidates than the number of available seats on the board of 
directors, this significantly restricts the power of the shareholders.519  
 
With all this in mind, doubts could be raised concerning the influence of shareholders upon 
the decision not to re-elect directors following their poor performance. If the method of re-
election could be regarded as a mechanism of accountability,520 the board’s control over the 
process of nomination for its membership weakens the enforcement mechanism. This, in 
turn, could undermine the accountability of directors, especially towards non-controlling 
shareholders.  
 
2.6.3 The shareholders’ right to question 
 
Saudi law makes it clear that every member of the company has a statutory right to discuss 
any matter listed on the agenda of the meeting and to seek explanation from the board of 
directors or auditor about such matters.521 However, a director has the choice of whether or 
not to answer the question as the law confers on him/her the right to refuse to answer an 
enquiry that may harm the interests of the company.522  
 
The problem that exists here lies in the uncertainty around circumstances that pose harm to 
the company if the director answers the question. The Saudi corporate statute does not 
offer any guidance in relation to this issue, leaving this matter completely to the court to 
decide on a case-by-case basis. In contrast to Saudi law, the UK CA 2006 is more certain 
in regulating this issue by specifying certain circumstances where the company may refuse 
to answer the question.523 In contrast, it has been argued that some directors in Saudi 
companies may show a ‘lack of seriousness’ in addressing shareholders’ inquiries in which 
the refusal to answer or an inadequate explanation is based on unconvincing 
justifications.524 In this regard, the law would indirectly weaken shareholders’ participation 
(especially non-controlling shareholders) in ensuring the accountability of directors due to 
                                                        
518 See article 8(c) of the CGRs 2017.  
519 See sub-article 66(b) of the CGRs 2017, which recommends that the number of nominees for the board 
membership, whose names are presented to a general meeting, should be more than the number of available 
seats on the board. This sub-article (b) is one of the provisions that is referred to as a non-binding provision.  
520 See Keay (n 304) 211.   
521 See article 96 of the CL 2015 and its immediate ancestor article 94 of the CL 1965. 
522 Article 96 of the CL 2015. This was also the case under the provision of article 94 of the CL 1965. 
523 See section 319A of the CA 2006. 
524 Alzahrani (n 506) 45. 
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the lack of clear rules governing the functioning of the general meeting. This again allows 
directors to capture control from shareholders.  
 
2.7 Board Structure and Composition: The Independent Member System 
 
One of the primary features of the Anglo-American corporate governance model (e.g., the 
UK) is the one-tier structure of the board of directors; in this model, the board consists of 
executive members and non-executive members who collaborate in a single organisational 
tier and who are elected by shareholders.525 Like the Anglo-American model, all Saudi 
joint stock companies, at least companies listed on Tadawul have, as a matter of fact, a 
single-tier board.526 Presumably, the board has two functions: (i) a management one which 
involves the decision-making phases of ‘initiation’ and ‘implementation’, and (ii) the 
function of supervising decisions, which comprises the stages of ‘ratification’ and 
‘monitoring’ of delegated tasks.527 Since Saudi companies tend to have a single-tier board 
of directors, there is a possibility of conflicts between the management and monitoring 
functions of single-tier boards, because the concept of delegation of power presumes that 
the delegator, who is required to supervise the use of delegated powers, is not the same 
person who is delegated to.528 The two roles must be separate, otherwise there is a 
likelihood that directors will perform in their own interests.529 As a response to this issue, 
the board is expected to be composed of a combination of different types of members, 
namely executive directors and non-executive directors (who could be independent 
directors).530 
 
The literature on corporate governance assigns a central task to independent non-executive 
directors. Since supervision and oversight are some of the board’s functions, independent 
directors are expected to monitor and oversee the executive management,531 a task that 
                                                        
525 See, for example, C Jungmann, ‘The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in One-Tier and Two-Tier 
Board Systems: Evidence from the UK and Germany’ (2006) 4 ECFR 426, 435–437. This theoretically 
differs from the two-tier model that prevails in continental European jurisdictions (e.g., Germany), where 
there are two governing bodies: the management board and the supervisory board, see 432–433. 
526 See the profiles of listed companies on the Tadawul website which shows the structure of the boards of 
directors <www.tadawul.com.sa> accessed 20 December 2015.  
527 MacNeil (n 412) 338; see Article 75(1) of the CL 2015 which permits the board to delegate any of its 
powers any person.  
528 See Kershaw (n 310) 234. 
529 MacNeil (n 412) 338.     
530 Ibid.  
531 W Ringe, ‘Independent Directors: After the Crisis’ (2013) 14 European Business Organization Law 
Review 401,408.  
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cannot be performed effectively without independence.532 The dimension of the conflict of 
interests within management emphasises the significance of independence which is 
considered a prerequisite for ‘ensuring ex ante that board decisions are not tainted by 
arbitrary considerations’.533 Independent members of the board are regarded as trustees for 
shareholders to alleviate managerial agency problems through controlling conflicted 
transactions entered into by executive directors.534 Arguably, the standards strategy 
(i.e., duty of loyalty) often ‘operates in conjunction with trusteeship strategy’535 in which 
independent directors are employed to ensure compliance with the duty of loyalty.536 It has 
been further argued that independent directors could be seen as a tool to deal with 
shareholder conflicts of interests in the concentrated ownership system.537 Some advocates 
of the stakeholder model even go as far as claiming that independent directors can be 
employed to further the interests not only of shareholders, but of all non-shareholder 
constituencies (e.g., creditors and employees).538 Consequently, it is true to say that the 
independence of the board is a crucial theme in the modern philosophy of corporate 
governance.  
 
The subsequent question that might be asked is how Saudi company law regulates the 
composition of the board. Similar to the UK CA 2006,539 the Saudi corporate statute does 
not distinguish between executive and non-executive directors, and the statute remains 
silent on how many non-executive directors should be on the board and what the functions 
of different types of directors are. This suggests that it is the task of each company’s 
articles of association to deal with these matters. With regard to companies listed on the 
Saudi stock exchange, the CGRs 2017, as with the CGRs 2006,540 explicitly recognise three 
types of board members, namely (i) executive directors, (ii) non-executive directors and 
(iii) independent directors.541 All companies listed in the market are obliged to appoint non-
executive members who must account for the majority of the board’s members.542 
According to sub-article 16(3) of CGRs 2017, there must be at least two independent 
                                                        
532 D Clarke, ‘Three Concepts of Independent Directors’(2007) 32 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 73, 
84.  
533 Ringe (n 531) 408. 
534 Armour, Hansmann and Kraakman (227) 43; Enriques, Hansmann and Kraakman (n 498) 64. 
535 Enriques, Hertige and Kanda (n 364) 174. 
536 Ibid; R. Nolan, ‘The Legal Control of Directors' Conflicts of Interest in the United Kingdom: Non-
Executive Directors Following the Higgs Report’ (2005) 6 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 413, 415 & 443–444.  
537 Ringe (n 531) 413; Clarke (n 532) 80. 
538 Beleya et al., ‘Independent Directors and Stakeholders Protection: A Case of Sime Darby’(2012) 2 
International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 422, 424. 
539 In contrast, the UK CGC 2016 expressly recognises different types of directors, see footnote 545 and 
accompany text in this Chapter.   
540 Article 2 of the CGRs 2006. 
541 Article 1 of the CGRs 2017.  
542 See article 16(2) of the CGRs 2017. 
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directors among members of the board or they must account for ‘one-third of the board 
members, whichever is greater’. Like their predecessor,543 the CGRs 2017 make it clear 
that committees must be formed of an adequate number of non-executive directors 
(regardless of whether they meet the independence requirement or not) if such committees 
deal with actions that possibly comprise conflict of interest, for example ‘ensuring the 
integrity of the financial and non-financial reports, reviewing related party transactions, 
nomination to membership of the board, appointment of senior executives, and 
determining the remuneration’.544 In the UK the board of a public company listed on the 
London Stock Exchange should consist of executive and non-executive directors 
(particularly independent directors) in which ‘half’ of the board members, except for 
smaller companies, must be independent non-executive directors.545 
 
According to the CGRs 2017, the description of executive director refers to those who are 
responsible for the day-to-day management of the company.546 The difference between 
non-executive directors and independent directors is that while the former is defined as a 
director who is not engaged in the day-to-day management of the company,547 the latter is 
referred to as a member who ‘enjoys complete independence’ in his status and 
judgement.548 The question that may be then raised is: On what criteria is the independence 
of directors to be determined? Both the Saudi and the UK laws provide a non-exhaustive 
catalogue of criteria that formally disqualify a person from being an ‘independent board 
member’. As with the situation in the UK,549 the independence standards set forth in the 
CGRs 2017 are ongoing requirements in which the board through ‘the nomination 
committee’ is annually required to ensure the independence of each independent 
director.550  
 
According to the Saudi definition of independence, a member of the board will not meet 
the independence standards if he/she owns or represents a legal person who owns 5% or 
more of the stock of company or any of its group.551 This means that the CGRs 2017 do not 
consider share ownership as a bar to independent judgement, but they do regard significant 
ownership of shares (i.e., holding 5% or more) as an infringement of independence. It can 
                                                        
543 See article 13(c) of the CGRs 2006. 
544 Article 51(a) of the CGRs 2017. 
545 See paras (B.1) and (B.1.2) of the CGC 2016. 
546 Article 1 of the CGRs 2017. 
547 Article 1 of the CGRs 2017. 
548 Article 1 of the CGRs 2017. 
549 Para (B.1.1) of the CGC 2016. 
550 Article 65(7) of the CGRs 2017; article 20(b) of the CGRs 2017.  
551 Article 20(c)(1) and (2) of the CGRs 2017. 
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be inferred from this fact that the main function of independent directors should be to 
ensure that there is no management abuse damaging the interests of the minority 
shareholders. Similarly, the UK CGC 2016 regards the representation of a ‘significant 
shareholder’ on the board as a reason for disqualifying a director from being independent. 
However, it can be clearly noticed that the director’s ownership of a significant 
shareholding per se is not a barrier to being selected as an independent board member.552 In 
addition, the independent status cannot be granted if the person is a director of another 
company within the company’s group.553 This is also the case if the board member is or has 
been an employee, or is or has been a controller (i.e., owns at least 30% of the voting 
power)554 ‘of the company, of any party dealing with the company or [group]’ within the 
past two years.556 The independence requirement will not be met if the director receives 
additional financial remuneration apart from the membership fees,557 or has engaged in 
self-dealing transactions or in businesses that are in competition with the company.558 As a 
non-binding condition, a director may not be considered independent if he/she ‘served for 
more than nine years’ as a director of the company.559 Since a family relationship is likely 
to influence the independent judgement of any person, the CGRs 2017, like the 2006 
version of the Regulations,560 expressly provide that the independence criteria will not be 
met if a board member is a relative of any director or senior executive of the company or 
group.561 In the same way, but in broader terms, ‘close family ties with any of the 
company’s advisers, directors, or senior employees’ is considered in the UK as a bar to 
independence.562 As a matter of fact, the phrase ‘close family ties’ is not defined in the UK 
CGC 2016 but is left to the board to determine whether or not a particular family 
relationship can influence the independent judgement of a board member. In contrast to the 
UK, the term ‘relative’ has been defined in the CGRs 2017 to include the director’s spouse, 
children, grandchildren, parents, grandparents, siblings, nephews or nieces.563  
 
Nevertheless, the question that arises concerns the effectiveness of an independent director 
in checking and monitoring the company’s management and in protecting shareholders’ 
interests (especially minority shareholders). Although this thesis can only provide limited 
                                                        
552 See para (B.1.1) of the CGC 2016. 
553 Article 20(c)(5) of the CGRs 2017. 
554 See article 1 of the CGRs 2017. 
556 Article 20(c)(6) of the CGRs 2017. 
557 Article 20(c)(8) of the CGRs 2017; for the UK, see para (B.1.1) of the CGC 2016. 
558 Article 20(c)(7) and (9) of the CGRs 2017  
559 Article 20(c)(10) of the CGRs 2017; for the UK, see para (B.1.1) of the CGC 2016.  
560 See article 2(b), (4)(5) of the CGRs 2006. 
561 Article 20(c)(3)(4) of the CGRs 2017.  
562 Para (B.1.1) of the CGC 2016. 
563 See article 1 of the CGRs 2017. 
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detail, it appears that since the adoption of the independent director institution in the CGRs 
2006, there have been doubts about its effectiveness within the Saudi corporate governance 
system.564  
 
First, there are questions over the ‘true independence’ of board members appointed as 
independent directors. While the meaning of ‘relative’ has been expanded compared with 
its definition under the CGRs 2006,565 the Saudi regulation omits the potential influence of 
other family connections such as uncles, aunts, cousins or family members by marriage 
(e.g., parents-in-law) on the independence of directors. This is a valid consideration given 
the fact that Saudi society is characterised by strong family and tribal ties.566 Furthermore, 
the possible influence of long-standing friendship on the independence of directors is not 
recognised by the CGRs 2017. An empirical study reported that it is common in Saudi 
Arabia to appoint family members or friends to sit on the board as non-executive directors, 
particularly independent members, in companies controlled by families.567 The second 
point to consider is that the mechanism of nomination of independent directors, under 
Saudi law, could have an impact on their independent judgements regarding corporate 
matters.568 Concerning Saudi listed companies, they are required to set up a board 
committee (nomination committee)569 which is, inter alia, responsible for presenting its 
recommendations to the board of directors regarding the nomination of its members.570 
While the new CGRs 2017 clearly prevent an executive director from being a member of 
such a committee, there is nothing in the Regulations preventing a non-executive director, 
who could be also a controlling shareholder, or a person connected to the controlling 
shareholder, from being a member of the nomination committee.571 This means that 
independent members of the board are likely to be nominated by co-directors and 
controlling shareholders and this might undermine their independence.572 Generally, any 
director, irrespective of whether he/she is independent in the legal sense, would tend to act 
in the interest of those who select him/her.573 Third, it should be further noted that the 
                                                        
564 See, for example, Falgi (n 208); Alamri (n 489). 
565 See article 2(b) of the CGRs 2006. 
566 Falgi (n 208) 128–129.  
567 Piesse, Strange and Toonsi (n 433) 663. 
568 See, for example, M Gutierrez and M Saez, ‘Deconstructing Independent Directors’ (2013) 13 Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 63, 85–86. 
569 Article 64(a) of the CGRs 2017. It is noteworthy that the nomination committee and remuneration 
committee can be combined into a single committee, see article 50(7) of the CGRs 2017. 
570 Article 65(2) of the CGRs 2017. 
571 See articles 51(b) and 64(a) of the CGRs 2017.   
572 As has been reported, it is a common practice that controlling shareholders and executive directors ‘bring 
in familiar faces’ to sit on the board as independent directors, see Piesse, Strange and Toonsi (n 433) 663.  
573 See J Coles, N Daniel and L Naveen, ‘Co-opted Boards’ (September 2013) 4–5 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1699272> accessed 7 September 2017 who argue that 
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effectiveness of the independent director system depends on the quality of the liability 
rules, of which well-formulated standards for directors’ duties and effective mechanisms of 
private enforcement are important elements. Indeed, in the absence of a strong system of 
legal liability, independent directors cannot effectively carry out their monitoring 
obligations.574 As one study suggests, independent non-executive directors are likely to 
play a limited role in disciplining poorly-performing managers in a setting where directors’ 
duties are not effectively and adequately enforced.575 Therefore, the independent director 
system can be regarded as complementary to effective legal regulation where the law 
creates incentives for independent directors to behave effectively by imposing legal 
liability on those who do not.576 
 
2.8 The Limited Role of Market Mechanism 
 
It is generally accepted that the institution of the market is one of the accountability 
mechanisms that works as a check on directors’ exercise of discretionary powers.577 The 
market-based accountability mechanisms that monitor and discipline directors include the 
product market, labour market, the capital markets (e.g., the stock market) and the market 
for corporate control.578 Simply, the role of markets as a corporate governance institution is 
mainly based upon disciplining low-performing companies and simultaneously rewarding 
high-performing companies.579 For the purposes of the present research it suffices to 
explain briefly the nature of each market mechanism.  
 
The idea of product market discipline is that if the company performs poorly due to bad 
management, it will be unable to sell its products and this will result in the loss of its 
market and sooner or later the directors will be replaced.580 The directors’ poor 
performance will damage their reputation, making it difficult to secure further employment 
                                                                                                                                                                        
not all independent directors effectively perform their task. ‘Those who are co-opted by the CEO [i.e., 
directors who joined the board after the CEO assumed office] are associated with weaker monitoring, while 
the independent directors who join the board before the CEO assumes office, that is, the directors who hired 
the CEO, are associated with stronger monitoring’. 
574 For similar argument about the role of law, see  Gutierrez and Saez (n 568) 91.  
575 J Franks, C Mayer and L Renneboog, ‘Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?’ 
(2001) 10 Journal of Financial Intermediation 209, 241 and 245. 
576 See Gutierrez and Saez (n 568) 87.  
577 See for instance Jones (n 305) 118;  Brennan and Solomon (n 305) 887–888.  
578 Keay (n 304) 232. 
579 M Roe, ‘The Institutions of Corporate Governance’ (The Harvard John M Olin Discussion Paper Series 
No 488, 8/2004) 6 <http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Roe_488.pdf> accessed 
22 September 2017. 
580 Ibid 6 and 7; B McDonnell, ‘Professor Bainbridge and The Arrowian Moment: A Review of The New 
Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice’ (2009) 34 Del J Corp L 139, 172. 
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(labour market discipline).581 With regard to the role of capital markets, such as the stock 
market mechanism, the philosophy behind this mechanism is that if the company performs 
badly and the share price decreases, it will be difficult for the company to raise capital and 
develop its business.582 For this market mechanism to operate effectively, the market 
should be ‘semi-strong efficient’,583 that is, it can incorporate ‘all publically available 
information’ into the price of the company’s shares. Further, there must be enough 
sophisticated and wealthy investors willing to buy and sell their shares in response to the 
available information in order to adjust the share price appropriately.584 As far as the 
market for corporate control (i.e., the takeover market mechanism) is concerned, with poor 
corporate performance the company’s value and share price will presumably decrease. 
This, in theory, creates a profit-making opportunity for any individual to purchase shares, 
take control of the company and elect new directors.585 
 
One common argument is that the availability of effective non-legal, market-based 
accountability mechanisms would lead to shareholders relying less on legal accountability 
mechanisms.586 This raises the question of whether markets are effective enough to provide 
sufficient protection for shareholders in Saudi Arabia, as there would then be only a very 
limited need for legal intervention to ensure the accountability of directors. The main 
argument presented below is that there are limits and obstacles associated with market-
based accountability mechanisms that render markets ineffective in holding directors 
accountable. This then suggests that the enhancement of a liability rules system, 
accompanied by effective enforcement mechanisms, is crucial for providing sufficient 
protection for the company and its shareholders. This suggestion is supported by the 
following arguments: 
 
First, while some studies in several developed economies point out that shareholders are 
primarily protected from managerial abuse by non-legal market mechanisms of 
accountability that are all expected to place pressures upon directors and managers to run 
                                                        
581 D Kershaw, ‘Web Chapter A: The Market for Corporate Control’ in D Kershaw (ed), Company Law in 
Context: Text and Materials (OUP 2010) 2 <http://global.oup.com/uk/orc/law/company/> accessed 
14 October 2014. 
582 Roe (n 579) 7–8. 
583 This concept of efficiency is well-known as ‘efficient capital markets hypothesis’, a theory suggested by 
Eugene Fama. Besides the semi-strong form, there are the strong-form efficiency, where prices reflect all 
public and private information, and the weak form efficiency, where prices change instantaneously to new 
information; see E Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’ (1970) 25 
Journal of Finance 383. 
584 Kershaw (n 581) 3.  
585 Ibid 7.   
586 A general observation made by McDonnell (n 580) 171. 
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the business in the best interests of shareholders,587 this might not be the case in developing 
economies.588 Market institutions in emerging markets such as Saudi Arabia, can be 
characterised as incomplete or incompetent and doubts can be cast upon the contribution of 
market institutions to the development of corporate governance systems. This has been 
pointed out by one commentator, who found in his study that ‘the Saudi Arabian market is 
not mature yet’.589 Bukhari adds that in emerging economies such as Saudi Arabia where 
corporate governance is still in its infancy, the influence of markets in promoting the 
system of corporate governance tends to be weak and ineffective.590 For example, Piesse et 
al. have specifically stressed that there is no active market for corporate control in Saudi 
Arabia.591 With regard to the capital market discipline, although there is no agreement 
among economists about the efficiency of a particular market,592 an empirical study 
conducted by Awan and Subayyal concluded that all Gulf stock markets (including the 
Saudi stock exchange) are inefficient.593 This would largely undermine the operation of the 
capital market as a device for disciplining directors of low-performing companies. From 
the empirical evidence above, it can be submitted that market institutions in Saudi Arabia 
are still some way away from being capable of constraining the actions of insiders (e.g., 
directors).  
 
Second, market-based accountability mechanisms have some inherent flaws.594 Consider, 
for example, the labour market. McDonnell emphasises the limits to this market by saying 
that it is not often possible to ‘disentangle the contributions of individual managers to firm 
success’.595 Furthermore, the negative outcomes of one director’s conducts may not come 
to light until he has already secured a very well-paid position elsewhere.596 In the corporate 
governance literature, the limits to the market for corporate control (i.e., the market of 
takeover) in disciplining managers have also been highlighted. As has been pointed out, 
most instances of managerial misconduct do not normally result in a large enough 
                                                        
587 T Paredes, ‘A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law 
Isn't the Answer’ (2004) 45 William & Mary Law Review 1055, 1074 and 1085; Roe (n 579) 6–8. 
588 Paredes (n 587) 1142–1143. 
589 Bukhari’s interview with the Head of Compliance Division in one of the Saudi banks, see M Bukhari,‘The 
Impact of Institutions on the Development of Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia’ (PhD thesis, University 
of Nottingham 2014) 228–229. 
590 Ibid.   
591 Piesse, Strange and Toonsi (n 433) 656. 
592 U Awan and M Subayyal, ‘Weak Form Efficient Market Hypothesis Study: Evidence from Gulf Stock 
Markets’ (June 2016) 6 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2787816> accessed 
21 September 2017. 
593 Ibid 12.  
594 McDonnell (n 580), 171–174; Roe (n 579) 7-8. 




reduction in the company’s shares to justify a hostile takeover.597 Even if the misconduct 
led to a significant reduction in the company’s share price, Coffee opines that internal 
mechanisms of accountability will be employed before any intervention by a hostile 
bidder.598 Frank and Mayer, in their empirical study, question the function of the takeover 
market, as a disciplinary device in the UK, finding no notable relationship between the 
hostile bid and poor management.599 Moreover, since there is no evidence that the 
improvement of corporate governance will necessary occur following takeovers, Singh et 
al. argue that the underlying motivation behind takeovers is to build business empires 
rather than discipline poor-performing managers.600 It should be further borne in mind that 
for the takeover market to operate efficiently, there must be a large amount of information 
broadly available to market participants and this is not easy to obtain; an issue that tends to 
be more significant in developing countries.601  
 
Third, even in the presence of effective markets, the role of law is still important in 
controlling directors’ behaviour while managing the company. In this regard, Roe gives an 
example of how market institutions may be more effective in combating shirking on the 
part of directors, but tend to be poor at reducing directorial stealing;602 for example, the 
market does not deter a director from exploiting a corporate opportunity, and even if he/she 
lost his/her job as a result of such behaviour, he/she ‘will leave rich’.603 In relation to 
stealing, the law is likely to play a more significant role in deterring directors from acting 
opportunistically.604 This means that legal mechanisms might be better at dealing with one-
off instances of misappropriation, which can negatively affect the company’s growth. 
Furthermore, unlike legal accountability, market mechanisms have no role in punishing 
directors through, for instance, paying compensation for loss and damage caused by their 
misconduct, disgorging unauthorised profits, nullifying illegal actions,605 and paying 
financial penalty for the violation of law.606 
 
                                                        
597 J Coffee, ‘Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role 
in Corporate Governance’ (1984) 84 Columbia Law Review 1145, 1200. 
598 Ibid 1202–1203.  
599 J Franks and C Mayer, ‘Hostile Takeovers and the Correction of Managerial Failure’ (1996) 40 Journal of 
Financiai Economics 163, 180. 
600 A Singh, A Singh and B Weisse, ‘Corporate Governance, Competition, the New International Financial 
Architecture and Large Corporations in Emerging Markets’ (MPRA Paper No. 53665, August/ 2002) 23, 
<https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53665/1/MPRA_paper_53665.pdf> accessed 21 September 2017. 
601 Ibid 22. 
602 Roe (n 579) 7. 
603 Ibid.   
604 Ibid.  
605 For Saudi law, see article 71(2) of the CL 2015; article 80 of the CL 2015. 
606 For Saudi law, see, for example, article 211 of the CL 2015. 
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From the discussion above, it can be argued that the lack of mature markets in Saudi 
Arabia requires the corporate law, accompanied by legal mechanisms of enforcement, to 
play a much greater role in protecting shareholders from a directors’ abuse of managerial 
power. In this regard, Paredes suggests that for the promotion of capital markets in 
developing countries, there is considerable need to design a sound legal system that offers 
strong legal protection for shareholders (including minority shareholders) and places tight 
constraints on directorial discretion.607 This is simply because markets in developing 
countries are unable to fill the regulatory gaps created by the absence of robust legal 
protection.608 Even if a country is in the process of moving towards the privatisation or the 
adoption of market-based corporate governance, it does not immediately follow that 
markets will function properly in terms of controlling agency costs because the 
development of the necessary institutions takes a long time.609  
 
In Saudi Arabia the government has begun to offer part of its shareholding in several 
companies to the IPO with the aim of gradually transferring more equity shares to the 
public.610 Since the government is aiming to make the Saudi stock market more attractive 
to domestic and foreign investors under its 2030 Vision plan,611 there is also a pressing 
need to reform the legal and institutional pillars of the stock market. Nonetheless, since the 
preparation of good corporate law is a time-saving task compared with the creation of 
complex non-legal institutions, it is easy to see the logic behind the policymakers’ choice 
to reinforce the legal protection given to shareholders as a priority in their reform agenda. 
The main point to make here is that like other developing countries, the design of a sound 
corporate law system that relates to creating and enforcing mechanisms of accountability, 
is important in the Saudi context in order to provide the company and its shareholders with 
greater legal protection against abusive practices by directors.  
 
2.9  Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter presented an assessment of current corporate governance mechanisms 
designed to monitor director’s discretion and ensure accountability for misuse of those 
                                                        
607 Paredes (n 587) 1125–1126. 
608 Paredes, ‘Importance of Corporate Law: Some Thoughts on Developing Equity Markets in Developing 
Economies’ (2006) 19 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev LJ 401, 407. 
609 Paredes (n 587) 1124–1125.   
610 See Report on the Development of Private Sector and the Privatisation Policy, Achievements of the 
Development Plans: Facts and Figures (2013)  76–77 <http://www.mep.gov.sa>  accessed 12 April 2015. 
611 See Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Vision 2030, ‘An Overview of Strategic Objectives and Vision Realisation 
Programs’, available in the website of Saudi 2030 Vision <http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/node> accessed 
22 September 2017. 
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powers. The Saudi law noticeably tilts the balance of decision-making power between the 
general meeting and the board of directors in favour of the latter. Consequently, 
mechanisms of board accountability should be put in place. The chapter has highlighted the 
fact that legal uncertainty is the main problem associated with the law of directors’ duties 
and their enforcement, which undermines the effectiveness of the legal liability system as a 
mode of accountability. As the analysis has shown, the argument for the need to address 
this legal uncertainty is borne out by the limits and drawbacks associated with other 
mechanisms of monitoring and accountability in the Saudi context. 
 
Within the accountability framework for directors, the chapter questioned whether 
blockholders’ monitoring (the shareholders’ internal mechanisms at the general meeting) 
of the board’s composition of independent non-executive directors and markets can replace 
the need for a sound legal system of directors’ duties in Saudi Arabia. It is clear that there 
are flaws in the four mechanisms that have been discussed above. It might be true to say 
that reliance on these mechanisms will not ensure that directors are subject to an adequate 
level of control and accountability. A sound corporate governance system cannot be 
established without a robust regulation of liability standards and rules that deal effectively 
with stealing and shirking by directors, who may simultaneously be blockholders. This 
must be accompanied by an accessible private enforcement action that enables the 
company and its shareholders, especially the minority shareholders, to enforce breaches of 
duties. The final point to emphasise is that this chapter is not intended to marginalise the 
importance of building up non-legal institutions or other legal institutions as part of the 
Saudi corporate governance reform. It is rather an attempt to emphasise the centrality of a 
strong corporate law regime that establishes well-designed duties, reinforced by accessible 











The director’s conduct concerns either decision making or action taking. While a decision 
will usually be made collectively through the board of directors at the meeting, an 
individual director will often take an action.612 Within the context of corporate governance, 
a mechanism must be employed to deal with the issue of ensuring that those responsible 
for the company’s management show appropriate levels of diligence and care, act only on 
an informed basis, and consider prudently the probable outcome of their decisions and 
actions.613 The directors’ failure to make the required effort in taking a decision or action, 
which is referred to as shirking, is one of the primary forms of directorial wrongdoing.614 
To limit directors’ engagement in shirking, the law places them under a legal obligation to 
exercise a certain degree of care while managing the company’s affairs.  
 
The main concern associated with the duty of due care is that the directors’ duty of care is 
a standard, a type of regulatory strategy, that ‘leave[s] the precise determination of 
compliance to adjudicators after the fact’.615 However, the law has to play a central role in 
reducing uncertainty about the substantive content of the duty so that it does not undermine 
overall accountability. While discussing Saudi law, questions about the precise behavioural 
expectation that the duty of care imposes upon directors and the availability of additional 
standards of the director’s liability remain unanswered, bringing about a state of 
uncertainty in the law. Furthermore, directors can perform different kinds of roles and 
functions depending upon the type of directorship, and the type and the size of the 
company.616 The central point here is this: since directors perform various functions, the 
court should take into account such diversity of roles and functions when applying the 
standard of care.617 Another source of concern is that the duty of care should not be overly 
                                                        
612 A typical example of actions taken by directors includes the purchase or sale of company assets. 
613 C Gerner-Beuerle, P Paech and E Schuster, ‘Study on Directors’ Duties and Liability’ (A paper prepared 
by LSE for the EC, Apirl 2013) 74 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/board/2013-study-
analysis_en.pdf> accessed 16 July 2016. 
614 See footnotes 361–362 and accompanying text, Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
615 See Armour, Hansmann and Kraakman (n 227) 39. 
616 This remark was made in the reform discussion of directors’ duty of care in the UK, see The Law 
Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interests and 
Formulating and Statement of Duties (Law Com No. 261 and Scot Law Com No. 173, September 1999) para 
5.15 <http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/lc261_Company_Directors.pdf> accessed 
23 July 2016.   
617 This concern was expressed in relation to UK law, which must be taken into account when examining the 
duty of care in the context of Saudi law, see Riley (n 376) 699. 
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onerous so the liability risk faced by directors is too high;618 in the meantime, the standard 
for the duty should not be too low, encouraging directors to act unreasonably because of 
low risk of liability.  
 
In this chapter directors’ duty of care under the Saudi law is evaluated, and deficiencies 
and uncertainties in the law are identified. Saudi law is critically analysed mainly in 
comparison with UK law. Regarding the structure, the chapter is divided into four main 
sections. First, the legal recognition of the duty of care in the UK and Saudi law is 
explored. The second section concerns an investigation into the standard of care 
requirement. Then factors affecting the court’s determination of what constitutes a breach 
of an objective standard of care is analysed. In this section the main underlying obligations 
of directors, namely monitoring, keeping themselves informed and avoiding undue reliance 
on others will be considered in order to define the components of the duty of care 
obligation. The fourth section deals with possible responses to the issue of a single high 
standard of care. 
 
3.2 The Legal Recognition of Directors’ Duty of Care 
 
The breach of duty of due care in almost every jurisdiction renders directors responsible to 
the company and its shareholders.619 In this section the recognition of the directors’ duty of 
care is examined in the UK and Saudi Arabia. 
 
3.2.1 The codification of the duty of care in the United Kingdom  
 
Directors’ duty of care is codified under section 174(1) of the CA 2006, which places 
directors under the obligation to act with ‘reasonable care, skill and diligence’. It had been 
well established that directors owed such an obligation to the company even before the 
enactment of the CA 2006 and the common law played an important role in recognising 
and framing directors’ duty of care and skill. In Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co.620 the 
court asserted that for directors to avoid the liability for breaching their duties they were 
expected to ‘exercise some degree of both skill and diligence’ besides acting bona fide.621 
It is important to say that the duty of care and the duty of loyalty generated independent 
                                                        
618 Ibid.  
619 Enriques, Hansmann and Kraakman (n 498) 79. 
620 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company Ltd. (1925) Ch 407  (CA) 
621 Ibid 408, see particularly Romer J at 427. The directors’ duty to act bona fide along with the duty to avoid 




bodies of case law. Historically, while duties of loyalty622 were developed in accordance 
with fiduciary rules and principles, the duty of care is based on common law principles of 
negligence.623 At present this division between fiduciary obligations and the duty of care 
does not exist in the CA 2006. The duty of care is one of the seven general duties set out in 
the CA 2006. Nevertheless, in relation to remedies for the breach of the duty, the CA 2006 
makes it clear that the duty of care is not a fiduciary obligation since the Act provides that 
the fiduciary remedies applying to statutory duties set out in Chapter 2 of Part 10 of the 
Act do not apply to the duty of care, which is governed by the relevant common law 
rules.624 
 
It is worth noting that despite the codification of directors’ duties, the common law 
remains relevant in the interpretation and application of general duties set forth in the 
Act.625 There might also be situations where the obligation of care overlaps with other 
general statutory directors’ duties;626 in other words, the potential of breaches occurring in 
more than one duty is expressly recognised in section 179 of the CA 2006. 
 
3.2.2 The recognition of the duty of care in Saudi law 
 
While the directors’ duty of care in the UK is codified in the CA 2006, neither the CL 1965 
nor the CL 2015 includes a single provision that explicitly requires directors to manage the 
company with care and due diligence. Nevertheless, the duty can be said to have derived 
from two sources.  
 
First, shareholders may insert an express clause in the company’s articles of association 
requiring directors to act diligently, which derives its binding force upon directors from the 
Saudi corporate statute.627 It is important to note that the Saudi Model Articles of 
Association for Joint Stock Companies lacks any reference to the directors’ duty of care.628 
                                                        
622 Traditionally, company law textbooks discussed fiduciary duties as a main component of the duty of 
loyalty; see, for example, L C B Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law (3rd edn, Stevens and Sons 
1969). 
623 Davies and Worthington (n 2) 478.  
624 See section 178 of the CA 2006. The compensatory remedy is the one given to the company in the case of 
a breach of duty of care in which fiduciary remedies (e.g., rescission or restitution) are not available; see, for 
example, Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew (1997) Ch 1 , 17–18. 
625 See section 170(4) of the CA 2006. 
626 See the Explanatory Notes to the Companies Act 2006, para 311  
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/pdfs/ukpgaen_20060046_en.pdf> accessed 1 August 2016.  
627 Article 78(1) of the CL 2015.  
628 This observation is true in relation to the Model Articles of Association issued pursuant to the CL 1965 as 
well as its successor, the CL 2015. The new version of the Saudi Model Articles of Association has recently 
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The question raised here concerns the extent to which such an obligation can be implied 
even in the absence of clear recognition in the Saudi statute and in the company’s articles 
of association. At the outset, statutory companies, including joint stock companies, are 
established by contract.629 Given the role of state legislation in regulating corporate 
governance, this means that Saudi contract law, drawing on rules of Sharia, would 
influence the regulation of companies.630 According to some Arab writers, directors are 
seen as agents of the company (i.e., technically shareholders)631 and their responsibility 
towards the company is governed by rules similar to the agent’s responsibility towards its 
principal.632 This legal description of the director–company relationship is also consistent 
with the view of many Islamic law writers who regard a company director as an example 
of an agent who acts on behalf of the company.633 Having said that, the body of Sharia 
rules governing the agent–principal relationship may be relevant in filling the gap in the 
current law and in a company’s articles.  
 
In the Islamic legal literature agents (in this case directors) are not responsible for damage 
to entrusted property unless they have been negligent or transgressed.634 This means that 
the exercise of a certain degree of care, while managing the company on behalf of the 
directors, is needed to avoid liability. Nonetheless, in order to draw a clear picture as to the 
position of Saudi law regarding the recognition of directors’ duty of care, it is important to 
explore whether the court will imply such a duty into the company’s articles of association. 
As a matter of fact, it must be acknowledged that liability cases brought by joint stock 
companies against directors are not reported in Saudi law.635 Furthermore reported cases on 
the liability of directors of joint stock companies are few and far between.636 However, 
from the few available cases on liability brought against those responsible for managing 
                                                                                                                                                                        
been issued and published in the website of the Ministry of Commerce and Investment (in Arabic only) at 
<http://mci.gov.sa/cl2015/Documents/06.pdf> accessed 6 August 2016.  
629 See article 2 of the CL 2015. 
630 See footnotes 154–157 and accompanying texts, Chapter 1 in this thesis.  
631 When it comes to the issue of remedies, shareholders act on behalf of the company to enforce the breach 
of the duty of care.  
632 See S Jobran, The Board of Directors of Joint Stoke Company in Saudi law (Arabic) (Beirut, Librairie 
Juridique Al-Halabi 2006) 324–325; A Yunus, Commercial Companies (Arabic) (Cairo, 1991) 245. It is 
worth noting that there are some discrepancies between the general provisions of agency law and rules 
governing the relationship between the company and its directors, such as those in relation to rules governing 
delegations and the appointment of agents, see Al-Jaber (n 71) 212. This means that the agency law is 
modified in such a way that makes it applicable to directors.  
633 Saleem (n 95) 70; A Al-Kyat, Companies in Islamic Sharia and Positive Law (vol 2 4th edn, Beirut, Al-
Ressalh Publishers 1994) 184. 
634 M AlBahuti, Explanation of Muntaha al-Iradat (A Al-Turki ed, 3rd vol, Al-Resalah, 2000)  535. 
635 The researcher examined judicial rulings in the field of company law published on the website of the 
Board of Grievance and did not find a reported case in this regard.  
636 For example, in the three volumes of selected judgments and judicial principles in corporate matters for 
the years 1987– 2003 there are only a handful of cases on matters relating to joint stock companies.  
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limited liability companies, the court’s approach to recognising the duty of care for 
directors of joint stock companies can be gleaned.  
 
The reference to judicial decisions on limited liability company disputes is useful to the 
analysis of joint stock companies for the following reasons: (i) the close resemblance in 
fundamental characteristics between the two companies;637 and (ii) the directors of joint 
stock companies and the managers of limited liability companies all perform their duties in 
accordance with a standard agency relationship638 and presumably are subject to the same 
legal basis for conduct and review. Thus, returning to the question of whether Saudi courts 
can extrapolate the directors’ duty of care in the absence of express terms in the company’s 
articles, it appears that directors have no option other than to manage the company 
diligently in order to avoid legal accountability. In the reported case (number 1129/3/Q)639 
the court addressed the question of whether a manager of a limited liability company in 
fact mismanaged the company’s affairs. In its reasons for judgment, the court recalled the 
principle that those appointed in the company’s memorandum of association are 
responsible for the management of the company and so are liable for compensating the 
company for any damage that results from their negligence.640 This means that any 
negligence on the part of managers is one of the grounds for liability towards the company. 
Put differently, from the court’s point of view the exercise of a certain degree of care while 
managing the company is an implied duty placed upon managers even in the absence of 
express reference to that duty in the company contract. Accordingly, the same conclusion 
can be drawn in relation to joint stock companies. If the company’s articles of association 
do not explicitly require the director to act diligently, the court will expect the director to 
do so because the mismanagement of the company arising from negligence will expose the 
director to the legal risk of being liable towards the company and its shareholders.    
 
Second, although there is no explicit mention of the directors’ duty of care in the Saudi 
corporate statute, it can be argued that the duty has been statutorily established in a rather 
vague and abstract way where the corporate statute implicitly requires directors to take due 
care while managing the company. It is indisputable that directors will not be immune 
from being sued in cases of a fault in the management of the company because the 
                                                        
637 See footnote 162, Chapter 1 in this thesis. 
638 See Saleem (n 95) 70. 
639 The Board of Grievances, Case No. 1129/3/Q, Appeal Division Decision No. 7/AS/838, 2010 (1431H) 
638. 
640 Ibid 661. 
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presence of fault on the part of directors, as the CL 2015 affirms,641 is a cause of action for 
the company and its shareholders against directors.642 The directors’ fault, which is one of 
the central grounds of the legal liability of directors,643 results mainly from the following 
three scenarios:644 (i) a violation of the corporate statute, (ii) a breach of the company’s 
articles of association or (iii) the ‘mismanagement of the company’s affairs’.645 It is the 
last-mentioned (i.e., the mismanagement of the company’s business or a managerial fault) 
that is likely to attract significant attention due to some judicial difficulties in assessing this 
type of ‘fault’ in the absence of a violation of the law or of a company’s bylaws. 
Noticeably, the meaning of fault is not specified in the Saudi corporate statute, and is left 
to scholars and judges to define.  
 
It is important here to recall that the development of Saudi corporate law has historically 
been affected by French law.646 The importation of the concept of fault, as a requirement of 
civil liability, is a case in point. In this regard, it seems that the notion of ‘fault’ in French 
law denotes the failure to conform to a rule of conduct imposed by, for instance, legislation 
or contractual agreement, or to observe the general duty to exercise due diligence.647 
Interestingly, with reference to Islamic law commentators, it appears that the concept of 
fault (khata in Arabic) as technically understood by civil law lawyers does not exist in 
Sharia law.648 Nevertheless, as some point out, jurists have developed the notion of ta’adi 
in Islamic jurisprudence, as almost the equivalent of the concept of fault as defined by civil 
law lawyers.649 As has been noted, that development has reached the level where some 
                                                        
641 This was also the case prior to the new CL 2015, see article 77 of the CL 1965. 
642 Article 79 of the CL 2015.   
643 See, for example, Al-Jaber (n 71) 339. The fault is one of the main elements of civil liability (i.e., tort or 
contractual); for a general discussion of the concept of fault, see A Amkhan, ‘The Concept of Fault in Arab 
Law of Contract’ (1994) 9 Arab Law Quarterly 171; A Al-Sanhuri, Al-Wasit: Commentary on the New Civil 
Code: Sources of Obligation (Arabic) (vol 1, Beirut, Dar Alturah Arabi). 
644 In addition, members of the board could be exposed to the risk of being liable where a fraudulent and 
deceptive act is committed while managing the company. Directors’ liability for fraudulent acts are not 
expressly mentioned in the Saudi corporate statute. However, it has been said the concept of fault is wide 
enough to capture such illegal acts, see S Jobran (n 632) 326. This view is borne out by the fact that 
article 229(6) of the CL 1965 (article 211(a) of the CL 2015), for example, imposes sanctions on directors in 
the case of deliberate provision of false information in the company’s financial reports which can be regarded 
as a fraudulent act. 
645 See article 78 of the CL 2015, which is identical to article 76 of the CL 1965 in this regard. There are 
circumstances where the directors’ fault might be considered a violation of the company’s articles of 
association and mismanagement of the company, such as a director entering into a contract that does not fall 
within the object clause. 
646 See footnotes 141–145 and accompanying texts, Chapter 1 in this thesis. 
647 G Bermann and E Picard, Introduction to French law (Alphen on the Rhine, Kluwer Law International 
2008) 247–248. 
648 See, for example, A Al-Qasem, ‘The Injurious Acts under the Jordanian Civil Code’ (1989) 4 Arab Law 
Quarterly 183, 191.  
649 Ibid 191–192; see, for instance, W A-Zuhayli, Theory of Reparation (9th edn, Damascus, Dar Al-Fikr 
2012) 24–26, 49. 
 84 
 
scholars have referred to the notion of ta’adi by using the term ‘fault’.650 In the literature 
ta’adi can be described as exceeding the limits that should be adhered to by ‘[Sharia] law, 
custom and practice’,651 and as the failure to exercise due care in the conduct of certain 
actions.652 Returning to the meaning of fault in the context of directors’ liability in  
corporate law, since directors are seen as being in an agency relationship with the 
company, many suggest that ta’adi (fault in the technical sense), inter alia, denotes 
negligence on the part of agents (in this case directors).653 Having said that, directors as 
agents will be liable for ta’adi (i.e., negligence) as long as they have fallen short of due 
care whilst managing the company.654 According to the writings of many company law 
commentators, it is generally accepted that the term fault, in the context of directors’ civil 
liability, includes negligence or a breach of the obligation to act with care.655 Thus, it can 
be asserted that the CL 2015, as with its predecessor of 1965, tacitly recognises the 
demand for managing the company with due care and diligence in order to avoid being 
sued for fault in the narrow sense (i.e., negligence). 
 
While the Saudi corporate statute does not explicitly recognise directors’ duty of care, the 
situation is completely different in relation to companies listed on the Saudi stock market. 
The CCRs 2017 require in article 30(17) that each director act diligently and in 
article 21(a) that the board manage the company with care.656 Article 21(a) refers to the 
‘board’ instead of ‘individual directors’ while imposing the duty of diligence. Accordingly, 
there is a disconnect between the decision making by the board and the liability set out in 
article 21(a). While a decision is usually made collectively by directors (at the board 
meeting), the liability for relevant decisions should be imposed individually, meaning each 
director is under an obligation of care and the failure to meet the care requirement may 
expose him/her to liability for breach. Therefore, it might be true to say that the wording of 
article 21(a) perhaps gives rise to a state of uncertainty about the nature of liability because 
collective decision making by the board does not reflect the idea that article 21(a) supports 
the individual liability of directors. 
                                                        
650 Al-Qasem (n 648) 192. 
651 Ibid (n 648) 192; A-Zuhayli (n 649) 24, 26; Al-Haboob, ‘The Contractual Liability (Arabic)’ (2011) 3 Al-
Qadhaiyah Journal 278, 286.   
652 Al-Qasem (n 648) 192. 
653 See Al-Sanhuri, Sources of Right Under the Law and Islamic Jurisprudence (Arabic) (vol 6 Beirut, Dar 
Alturah Arabi 1954)105; Al-Haboob (n 651) 292–293. 
654 Al-Sanhuri (n 653) 105–116. 
655 See, for example, Al-Jaber (n 71) 339; Jobran (n 632) 338. 
656 This was also the case in relation to their predecessors of 2006, where article 11(c) of the CGRs 2006 
requires only the board to manage the company diligently. 
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It is important to mention that the Saudi corporate statute does not require a special skillset 
or long-standing experience for a person to be elected as a member of a board, but leaves 
this matter to the company’s articles of association to determine. For listed companies, 
there is a recommendation to appoint a board member who has experience, financial 
knowledge and competency.657 Concerning the board’s committees, article 54(a) of the 
CGRs 2017 requires the appointment to the audit committee of a specialist in finance and 
accounting matters. 
 
3.3 The Standard of Care: State of the Company Law  
 
One of primary contributions of the legal regulation of the directors’ duty of care is to 
design a standard of liability by which directors failure to perform their required functions 
can be judged. The law, as will be illustrated in the Saudi and UK contexts, includes a 
choice between either a purely objective or a dual subjective/objective standard. Before 
embarking upon the analysis of Saudi and UK law, it is important to bear in mind that 
directors’ own behaviour, rather than the outcomes produced, should be the focus of the 
judicial inquiry. A convincing explanation for this has been offered by Riley who correctly 
points out that poor results (e.g., a decrease in the company’s share price) could also be 
attributable to other exogenous factors (e.g., stock market crashes) rather than the quality 
of the directors’ behaviour.658 Thus, the main reason why the court in determining the 
director’s compliance with duty of care will assess the directors’ conduct, regardless of the 
outcome of that conduct, is to ‘avoid . . . allocating . . . exogenous risks to the director’.659 
Put differently, the liability of directors for the breach of their duty of care should be based 
on the way in which they act, not on the results of that action. 
 
3.3.1 The United Kingdom law: Dual subjective/objective standards 
 
Directors’ conduct will be reviewed in accordance with a test set out in section 174(2) of 
the CA 2006, which provides that a reasonably diligent director is supposed to have both of 
the following: 
 
(a)  the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a 
person carrying out the functions carried out by the director in relation to the company, 
and 
                                                        
657 Article 18 of the CGRs 2017.  
658 Riley (n 376) 706.  
659 Ibid 707. Riley explains that ‘exogenous risks’ is a type of risk that occurs ‘beyond directors’ control’, and 
argues that such risks should be ‘assigned to the company [rather] than to directors’, see ibid 705. 
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(b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has. 
 
This section introduces both objective and subjective standards of care.660 While section 
174(2)(a) contains an objective standard of a reasonable person acting to fulfil the function 
of a director, section 174(2)(b) refers to a subjective standard of the general knowledge, 
skill and experience of the director concerned. For directors to avoid liability for a breach 
of duty, they seemingly have to pass both tests. This means that directors must perform as 
a reasonable person might when carrying out their directorial functions (the objective 
requirement) and act in a way that one would reasonably expect of someone with the 
appropriate skills and knowledge (the subjective requirement). To clarify this point, the 
statutory standards, by implication, do not remove liability from highly skilled directors if 
they only meet the objective requirement of a reasonable person performing corporate 
functions assigned to them, but fail to act as a reasonably diligent person with their skill.661 
Similarly, very unskilled and inexperienced directors cannot avoid liability by merely 
acting as a reasonable person with their skill and experience would have done, if they fail 
to do as a reasonable person would in their position.662 It should be noted here that 
directors appointed to a specialist position such as finance director would have their 
behaviour judged against the standard of proficiency expected of a person with the 
appropriate skills and qualification.663  
 
It is noteworthy that section 174(2) is a codification of the common law standards of care 
and skills expressed in the leading cases of Norman v Theodore Goddard664 and of Re 
D’Jan of London Ltd.665 In the aforementioned cases, Hoffmann noted that the common 
law test of directors’ duty of care ‘was accurately stated in sec. 214(4) of the Insolvency 
Act 1986’, which contained a dual objective/standard test666 using the objective standard in 
consideration of the ‘subjective circumstances’ of the directors concerned.667 Before the 
cases of Norman v Theodore Goddard and of Re D’Jan of London Ltd, it seems that early 
company law cases provided both an objective standard when asserting that reasonable 
                                                        
660 Keay (n 6) 212. 
661 Ibid 212–213.  
662 Ibid. 
663 See, for example, Re Brian D Pierson Ltd. (1999) BCC 26 , 55. 
664 Norman & Anor v Theodore Goddard & Ors (1992) BCC 14 . 
665 Re D’Jan of London Ltd (1993) BCC 646 . 
666 See Norman & Anor v Theodore Goddard & Ors (n 664) 15; Re D’Jan of London Ltd (n 665) 646. It is 
worth saying that the purpose of section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 is to oblige the director to take into 
account the benefits to creditors; for more details, see D Arsalidou, ‘The impact of Section 214(4) of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 on Directors’ Duties’ (2000) 22 Company Lawyer 19.  
667 J Ipp, ‘The Diligent Director’ (1997) 18 Co Law 162, 166. It is worth mentioning that the wording of 
section 174(2) (a) and (b) of the CA 2006 is almost the same as the wording of section 214(4)(a) and (b) of 
the Insolvency Act 1986. 
 87 
 
care would be measured in accordance with what ‘an ordinary man might be expected to 
take in the same circumstances in his own behalf’, as well as a subjective standard when 
reference was made to the director’s knowledge and experience.668 However, the way that 
the law was applied by courts suggested that the early common law adopted a considerably 
low standard of care,669 resulting in the fact that directors could only breach their duty of 
care when there was evidence of ‘gross negligence’670 or, as one commentator argued, ‘the 
grossest negligence’.671 This lenient approach towards directors used by the courts in early 
cases was illustrated by the ruling in Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd, 
which stated that directors were not required to engage in any role in relation to the 
conduct of the company’s dealings;672 it was also not necessary to have particular 
qualifications or knowledge about the subject matter of the company’s activity in order to 
occupy a director’s position;673 and, that directors would not be responsible for errors of 
judgement under any circumstance.674  
 
The early case law was criticised on the basis that it imposed a relatively undemanding 
duty of care on directors who were not obliged to show continuous attention to the 
company’s business and who were not subject to the objective standard of skill675 (i.e., ‘no 
general professional standard of expertise were required of directors’).676 The prevalent 
belief was that ‘no floor or baseline of care’ was imposed on unskilled and 
unknowledgeable directors; if they had no competence or experience, the standard of care 
was most likely to be low.677 In addition, in the past, the court usually considered directors, 
particularly non-executive directors, as ‘amateurs’678 who solely worked part time,679 who 
were not obliged to attend meetings680 and whose duties were seen as intermittent.681 
Indeed, the old case law required non-executive directors to play a limited role in the 
                                                        
668 See, for example, Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd (1911) 1 Ch 425, 437; Re City 
Equitable Fire Insurance Company Ltd (n 620) 427–428.  
669 Davies and Worthington (n 2) 478. 
670 See Charitable Corporation v Sutton (n 17) 403; Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd (n 668) 
425. 
671 V Finch, ‘Company Directors: Who Cares About Skill and Care?’ (1992) 55 The Modern Law Review 
179, 179. 
672 Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd (n 668) 437.   
673 Ibid. 
674 Ibid. 
675 Riley (n 376) 697–698. 
676 A Hicks, ‘Directors’ Liabilities for Management Errors’ (1994) 110 LQR 390, 390.  
677 See Kershaw (n 310) 425 when the author said that the subjective standard may be described as the 
standard of ‘amiable lunatic’. 
678 B Clark, ‘The Director’s Duty of Skill and Care: Subjective, Objective or Both?’ (1999) 27 SLT 239, 239.  
679 Keay (n 6) 206. 
680 Re Cardiff Savings Bank (Marquis of Bute's Case) (1892) 2 Ch 100 , 108–109. 
681 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company Ltd (n 620) 429. 
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management of the company,682 and that the judicial approach is not consistent with the 
importance of his role in the corporate governance codes.683 Before the noticeable change 
brought about by Norman v Theodore Goddard and of Re D’Jan of London Ltd, it had 
been claimed that the lenient way that duty of care was applied had led to the assumption 
that the standard of care was only subjective, although there was a clear objective aspect to 
the standard.684 As Hicks pointed out, the development in the case law in the early 1990s 
arguably did not bring about a major change in the law, but pushed the court to not use the 
‘minimalistic standard of competence’.685 
 
Having said that, this leads to an important question as to the value of the codification of 
the common law duty of care in the context of company law. With reference to the Final 
Report of the Company Law Review Steering Group (CLRSG)686 in 2001 (the Final Report 
2001), the main justification for the legislative intervention was to achieve greater clarity 
on ‘the nature of the standards of care and skill demanded of directors’ which has 
contributed to the enhancement of the standards of corporate governance.687 It also 
rationalises the state’s promulgation of duty of care by saying that it will provide ‘[a] clear, 
accessible and authoritative guidance for directors on which they may safely rely . . . on 
the basis that it will bind the courts and thus be constantly applied’.688 Following the 
statutory codification of the standards of care and skill, there is no dispute about the nature 
of the standard, leaving no room for judicial discretion to depart from the law stated in the 
CA2006.689 However, it should be borne in mind that the question of what degree of care 
must be shown cannot be statutorily articulated; in other words, each case concerning a 




                                                        
682 Davies and Worthington (n 2) 478.  
683 See, for example,  The Cadbury Report (n 3) paras 4.10–4.17. 
684 Hicks (n 676) 393. 
685 Ibid. 
686 The CLRSG was established in 1998 to review the UK company law; see CLRSG, Modern Company Law 
for a Competitive Economy, Final Report (vol 1, June 2001) paras 1.1 and 1.3. 
687 Ibid para 3.7.  
688 Ibid para 3.9.  
689 See Richmond Pharmacology Ltd v Chester Overseas Ltd (2014) Bus LR 1110, 1124 where the court 
stressed the lack of necessity to refer to ‘any authority on the scope of this duty [of care]’ because ‘it seems 
clear that . . . the test [in section 174] is an objective one’.  
690 Keay (n 6) 215. 
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3.3.2 The Saudi law: Purely objective standard 
 
Since the Saudi corporate statute omits explicit recognition of the directors’ duty of care, 
the inevitable outcome is the lack of legislative guidance on how the directors’ behaviour 
will be assessed. This is in contrast with the UK law where the standard of due care is 
defined in the CA 2006 in rather detailed terms. The role of Saudi case law is also modest, 
if not absent, in developing a clear standard of care.691 In such a legislative and judicial 
vacuum reference to general rules of civil liability is therefore necessary. Unlike other 
Arab states, there is no civil law code that can be resorted to in order to fill the legislative 
void. Alternative guidelines can be found in the non-codified rules of Sharia to reduce the 
uncertainty in this area of law. In Sharia law the failure to take due care, as mentioned 
above, falls within the concept of ta’adi. However, the criterion on which ta’adi is 
established is not defined in traditional Islamic jurisprudence.692 In this case reference 
should be made to customary rules generally practised by members in society as a source 
of Islamic law.693  
 
In general, the benchmark of care that an agent is required to fulfil is the standard of the 
ordinary reasonable man. Failure to act accordingly will trigger the liability of the agent on 
the ground of a breach of his/her duty of care.694 Clearly, this standard of care is an 
objective one.695 In relation to the duties of directors, Al-Jaber points out that directors’ 
behaviour will be assessed pursuant to the ordinary reasonable man test,696 in which the 
directors have to take the reasonable care that an ordinary careful director would in order 
to satisfy the due care requirement.  
 
Having adopted a purely objective test, two observations can be made. First, the purely 
objective standard suggests that the lack of knowledge or skill on the part of a defendant 
director cannot be considered as an excuse for not meeting the objective standard of an 
ordinary careful person.697 Second, it also indicates that a highly experienced director 
would be able to avoid liability by simply acting as an ordinary prudent person would have 
                                                        
691 Al-Jaber (n 71) 339–340. 
692 Al-Haboob (n 651) 288.    
693 M C Bassiouni and G M Badr, ‘The Shari’ah: Sources, Interpretation, and Rule-Making’ (2001) 1 UCLA 
J Islamic & Near E L 135, 157–158. 
694 Al-Sanhuri (n 653) 105.  
695 Ibid.  
696 Al-Jaber (n 71) 339. 
697 See Al-Sanhuri (n 653) 781–782, who points out the attributes of an objective standard of care in civil 
liability.   
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done, even if he/she did not act as a reasonable person with his/her experience.698 This 
second statement is inconsistent with the UK law on duty of care and skill where a 
director, as mentioned above, will be judged by two tests (i.e., an objective and subjective 
standard). Under Saudi law, since the CL 1965 and 2015 do not require any qualification 
or long-standing experience for a person to be elected as a member of a board, it is not 
clear whether the court would take into account directors’ skill and knowledge in 
determining their compliance with the due care requirement. The omission of ‘knowledge, 
skill and experience’ of directors as a factor to be considered by the court does not keep 
pace with the changing practice in the corporate community. With regard to listed 
companies, it is common to witness a corporate governance code of a listed company 
requiring a certain level of qualification and experience for a person to be appointed as a 
board member.699 Indeed, given the fact that directors are usually selected for certain skills 
and experience that they can bring to the board, it seems fair to suggest that they should be 
judged against the degree of skill and experience reasonably expected of a person with 
their expertise and knowledge.700  
 
Negligence, as a cause of action against directors, can be ordinary or gross, where gross 
negligence involves a much greater absence of care than ordinary negligence. In the old 
UK case law there was a tendency to distinguish between the two degrees of negligence 
and it was assumed that a breach of the director’s duty of care was based solely upon gross 
negligence.701 However, the court did not define the term ‘gross negligence’ as a basis of 
directors’ liability for the breach of duty of care. This distinction, which courts have 
acknowledged as being difficult to define,702 is no longer a part of the current law.703 This is 
borne out by the fact that the current regulation of derivative actions states that mere 
negligence on its own is a cause of action.704 In Saudi law it has been claimed that directors 
are liable for the breach of their obligation of due care if they are grossly negligent.705 
From the foregoing statement, two issues can be raised. First, there is no clear line between 
                                                        
698 See Clark (n 678) 242, who opines that with the purely objective standard a director will not be held liable 
for the additional skills and experience. 
699 See, for example, the Corporate Governance Code of SAPTCO: section 19. 
<https://www.saptco.com.sa/About-Us/Government-Regulation/saptco2-CV01.aspx> accessed 
30 August 2016; the Corporate Governance Code of Taiba: sections 24 and 25 
<http://www.taiba.com.sa/pdf/gov.pdf> accessed 30 August 2016. 
700 A similar argument is put forward in relation to the UK law, see R Reed, ‘Company Directors: Collective 
or functional Responsibility’ (2006) 27 Company Lawyer 170, 172. 
701 See, for example, Lagunas Nitrate Company v Lagunas Syndicate (1899) 2 Ch 392 , 418 and 435; Re 
Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd (n 668) 425 and 431.  
702 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company Ltd (n 620) 427–428;  
703 Keay (n 6) 217.  
704 Section 260 (3) of the CA 2006. For more details about the statutory regulation of derivative actions in the 
UK, see section (5.5), Chapter 5 in this thesis.  
705 Jobran (n 632) 339.  
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what constitutes gross negligence and negligence. Given the vagueness of the concept of 
gross negligence, the scarcity, if not the absence, of reported cases on directors’ duty of 
care contributes to the uncertainty and ambiguity of this area of law. Second, having said 
that directors’ liability is based upon gross negligence, perhaps indicates that directors 
could fall considerably short of the standard of an ordinary prudent person and may 
nevertheless escape liability. This is another source of confusion that undermines the legal 
accountability of directors. The primary observation derived from the said issues is the 
great degree of uncertainty concerning the substantive content of the directors’ duty of 
care.  
 
3.4 Circumstances Affecting the Determination of What Constitutes a Breach of 
the Objective Standard of Care 
 
As has been seen, there is an element of objectivity in the duty of care in the UK as 
section 174 provides both a subjective and objective standard. This is, to a larger degree, 
the case in Saudi Arabia where directors’ behaviour tends to be assessed by a purely 
objective test. One may question what the objective standard of care entails. Put 
differently, what kinds of factors would be considered a guide for the court when 
determining whether a director satisfies the duty’s requirements? 
 
Given the scarcity of reported cases in Saudi Arabia on the breach of directors’ duty of 
care in joint stock companies, the answer as to whether the court considers particular 
circumstances, such as the specific function of each director, when it comes to determining 
the directors’ liability, will be uncertain. In spite of the absence of legislative and judicial 
guidance, it could be argued that in determining what reasonable conduct is expected from 
directors, Saudi courts should take into consideration, where appropriate, what the 
CL 2015 and the CGRs 2017 provide regarding directors’ roles and responsibilities. 
Undoubtedly, a possible limitation to this proposition is that recourse to the provisions of 
the CGRs 2017 is limited to issues concerning companies listed in the Saudi stock market, 
and non-listed companies are not subject to the legally binding Regulations of 2017. 
 
Concerning UK law, this is not the case, as the law tends to be more certain on this issue 
than its Saudi counterpart. The UK courts are required by section 174 of the CA 2006 to 
take into account ‘functions carried out by the director in relation to the company’.706 In 
this regard, the recognition that the extent of care obligation may vary depending upon the 
                                                        
 706 Section 174 of the CA 2006. 
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function of the director in question has been well established in the case law;707 for 
example, in the case of Re Barings plc,708 Jonathan Parker rightly asserted that the extent of 
the duty cannot possibly be designed in a way that ‘will apply to every situation, since 
differing situations will call for differing levels of action or reaction’.709 As has generally 
been accepted, the functions of directors tend to vary according to a number of factors, 
such as the size and nature of the company710 and the type of directors (executive or non-
executive).711  
 
Having taken the functions and roles of directors into consideration, it is necessary, as a 
starting point, to move away from the supposition that all directors bear equal 
responsibility for corporate failure (i.e., collective board responsibility), towards the notion 
of functional responsibility of individual directors, in which the behaviour of directors will 
be evaluated according to the functions given to them and the experience or skill that they 
have.712 This means that the meeting of the due care requirement should be examined at the 
level of the individual director despite the collective nature of the board’s acts and 
decisions. In the UK literature on the mode of responsibility concerning directors’ 
obligations it has been pointed out that the judicial shift towards the functional 
responsibility of individual directors enables the court ‘to distinguish between directors 
according to their job descriptions’, such as a finance director and non-executive 
director.713 Reed emphasises the importance of functional responsibility by saying that if 
the court assesses the behaviour of non-executive directors on the basis of collective 
responsibility, in which the skill and experience jointly held as well as the degree of care 
necessarily exercised for effectively collective supervision are to be taken into account, the 
standard is likely to be ‘unfeasibly high’.714 In the view of Hoffman, the application of an 
over-demanding standard to non-executive directors ‘pitted against the executives with 
their superior access to information and the familiarity with the corporate culture’, coupled 
with increasing the vulnerability of non-executives to the risk of legal action, are liable to 
                                                        
707 As long as section 174 the Companies Act 2006 supports the development brought by the Norman v 
Theodore Goddard and Re’D Jan cases and submits that the standard of the common law duty of care is that 
mentioned in section 214(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986, it means that it has been clearly established since 
the aforementioned cases that the objective assessment has to reference the directors’ roles and 
responsibilities.  
708 Re Barings plc and others Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Baker (1998) All ER (D) 659 . The 
facts of the case are set out in section (3.4.1) in this Chapter.  
709 Ibid section IV (Part 2).  
710 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company Ltd. (n 620) 426–427.  
711 Riley (n 376) 708. 
712 This argument has been raised in the UK law of directors’ duty of care which is also valid in relation to 
the Saudi law, see generally Reed (n 700). 
713 A Walters, ‘Directors’ Duties: The Impact of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986’ (2000) 
Company Lawyer 110, 113.  
714 Reed (n 700) 176.  
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deter truly independent persons from accepting a company directorship.715 Given the 
important role of non-executive directors in corporate governance,716 it can be concluded 
from the above arguments that there is an essential need for moving away from collective 
board responsibility and allowing the functional responsibility of individual directors to be 
the basis of cases brought against directors for corporate failure.  
 
Returning to Saudi law, it is the board of directors, as a collective entity, that is responsible 
for the management of the company. In theory, the decisions and actions of the board are 
to be carried out collectively. However, this principle is subject to exceptions in which 
responsibility is allocated to individual directors. This model of responsibility can be found 
in company law, which frequently refers to ‘members of the board of directors’ in relation 
to some provisions of the Saudi corporate statute. The clear example of individual 
responsibility is the legislative permission for the board to delegate certain actions to any 
member of the board.717 This indicates that individuals bear responsibility for performing 
delegated tasks. Another significant source of individual responsibility is the possibility of 
enforcement against directors. The Saudi CL 2015 grants the company and shareholders 
the right to sue any member of the board for a fault committed whilst managing the 
company.718 It also involves criminal sanctions that can be imposed on individual directors 
in the case of violations of the CL 2015.719 From the above examples it can be implied that 
the Saudi courts could apply the duty of care at the level of individual regardless of the 
collective nature of the board’s conduct.  
 
The directors’ need to monitor the company’s business, keeping themselves informed and 
avoiding complete reliance on others are important factors affecting the courts’ 
determination of whether or not there has been a breach of the duty of care. This will be 
discussed below. 
 
3.4.1 The duty of monitoring 
 
It is important to begin by saying that from a practical point of view, the board would not 
be able to manage the company on a daily basis and usually leaves this task to executive 
                                                        
715 L Hoffmann, ‘The Fourth Annual Leonard Sainer Lecture: The Rt Hon Lord Hoffmann’ (1997) 18 
Company Lawyer 194, 196.  
716 For more discussion, see section (2.7), Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
717 Article 75(1) of the CL 2015. 
718 See articles 79 and 80 of the CL 2015. 
719 See, for example, article 213 of the CL 2015.  
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directors and employees.720 Therefore, the board’s delegation of its managerial 
responsibilities has been recognised in both jurisdictions (the UK and Saudi Arabia).721 It 
should be noted here that the nature of that delegation in Saudi Arabia can concern 
particular powers and functions, but cannot be the task of management itself,722 for 
instance, the board may delegate its power to purchase and sell property or to take a loan to 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or another member of the board.723 Furthermore, 
shareholders, through the company’s articles of association, might give the board chairman 
the right to delegate certain tasks or responsibilities to any person.724 Similarly, in the UK, 
while directors are allowed to delegate some functions to managers below board level,725 
they cannot delegate the management function itself completely absolving themselves from 
the responsibility.726 
 
Thus, it is one of the essential functions of the board to monitor the management of the 
company.727 As has been stated in Chapter 2,728 in one-tier systems such as Saudi Arabia 
and the UK, the board of directors consists of executives and non-executives (independent 
directors). The prevailing trend to appoint more non-executive and independent members 
to the board of directors in order to enhance the monitoring function of the board is 
apparent in both the Saudi CGRs 2017 and UK CGC 2016. Non-executive and independent 
directors have been considered an essential monitoring tool for ensuring that there is no 
management abuse.729 The obligation of monitoring, as a fundamental element of the 
directors’ duty of care,730 involves the responsibility of overseeing business risk in which 
directors, particularly independent non-executives are expected to limit companies’ 
excessive risk taking.731 In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007–08, the 
                                                        
720 Hoffmann (n 715) 194.  
721 For more details, see footnotes 307–317 and accompanying texts, Chapter 2 in this thesis.  
722 See M Al-Jaber (n 71) 335. 
723 See the Saudi Electricity Company’s articles of association, section 16(2) <https://www.se.com.sa/en-
us/Pages/ArticlesOfAssociation.aspx> accessed 9 September 2016. 
724 See the SIDC’s articles of association section 21 <http://sidc.com.sa/site13/wp-content/uploads/ 
2013/06/ اﻟﻧظﺎم - اﻷﺳﺎﺳﻲ .pdf> accessed 9 September 2016. 
725 This has been well recognised in the UK case law; see, for example, Re City Equitable Fire Insurance 
Company Ltd (n 620) 408, where the court asserted that the management of a large company required matters 
to ‘be left to the managers, the accountants and the rest of the staff’. 
726 See Re Barings plc and others Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Baker (n 708) 569. The Court 
of Appeal has also agreed with Jonathan’s ruling in this regard; see Re Barings plc and others (No 5), 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Baker (2000) 1 BCLC 523 , 536. 
727 P Davies and K Hopt, ‘Corporate Boards in Europe-Accountability and Convergencet’ (2013) 61 Am J 
Comp L 301, 311.  
728 See footnotes 525–545 and accompanying texts, Chapter 2 in this thesis.  
729 See particularly footnotes 531–538 and accompanying texts, Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
730 J Loughrey, ‘The Directors' Duty of Care and Skill and the Financial Crisis’ in J Loughrey (ed), 
Directors’ Duties and Shareholder Litigation in the Wake of the Financial Crisis (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited 2013) 21. 
731Ringe (n 531) 402–404; Loughrey (n 730) 25.    
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effectiveness of the monitoring role of company directors (especially independent 
directors) has been questioned since the directors’ failure to conduct effective risk 
monitoring within the companies contributed, or worsened, the financial crisis.732 It seems 
clear that it is in the interest of the company to ensure that directors monitor the risk 
management of the company,733 question the co-director, and seek information from the 
executives or accountants’734 in other words, the monitoring duty requires that directors do 
not remain passive in dealing with the company’s affairs and issues.  
 
In terms of the position of UK law, it can confidently be said that the court will examine 
the extent of reasonableness when determining whether or not there is a breach of the duty 
of care. In Re Westmid Packing Services Ltd735 the court provided that the director was 
under the obligation to engage with co-directors in monitoring the company.736 It also 
asserted that the director should not allow his co-director to have control over the operation 
of the company.737 The director is required to not give other directors or senior managers 
the opportunity to manage the company as if it is their own.738 In the leading case of Re 
Barings plc,739 the bank of Barings collapsed due to unauthorised trading activities 
conducted by a trader called Leeson. This disqualification case was brought against three 
directors on the basis that they were not fit to be in the company directorship because of 
their failure to show the due degree of competence in managing the company.740 To be 
specific, the three directors were taken to court for the failure to monitor the work of 
Leeson. Jonathan Parker found741 that the three directors were unfit to be in the company’s 
management because they had breached their duty of care by failing to monitor Leeson’s 
trading activities reasonably.742The range of files submitted to the court highlighted no 
imposition or enforcement of risk limits on Leeson’s trading,743 no proper examination of 
the way that Leeson’s dealings had produced high profitability744 and the failure to respond 
to avoid obvious risks.745 In summary, directors are held liable for a breach of the duty of 
                                                        
732 Ringe (n 531) 403–404. 
733 Ibid 404–405. 
734 Keay (n 6) 219.  
735 Re Westmid Packing Services Ltd (No. 3) (1998) BCC 836 . 
736 Ibid 842. 
737 Ibid. 
738 Ibid 841–842. 
739 Re Barings plc and others (No 5), Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Baker (n 726); Re Barings 
plc and others Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Baker (n 708). 
740 The facts of the case of Re Barings plc are written down as mentioned in the headnote of the case. 
741 The Court of Appeal upheld the ruling of Jonathan, see Re Barings plc and others (No 5), Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry v Baker (n 726) 524–525.  
742 Re Barings plc and others Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Baker (n 708 ) 569. 





care if they completely absolve themselves from the responsibility to monitor the 
company’s affairs, and do not take the necessary steps to avoid obvious risks.746 As Keay 
observes, the elementary mistakes on the part of directors in the process of monitoring, 
make it much easier to establish their negligence.747 This means that passive directors are 
likely to be held liable.748 Thus, in order to protect themselves from liability, directors 
should make the necessary effort to monitor, and raise questions and concerns about 
certain matters relating the management of the company. 
  
A closer look at Saudi company law reveals that the CL 2015, as with its predecessor of 
1965, does not contain clear demands on an individual director to monitor the management 
of the company’s business reasonably. Nevertheless, from articles 101 and 103 of the new 
CL 2015, it can be inferred that there is a legislative recognition of the monitoring task as 
an important element in a sound corporate governance system. The new CL 2015, unlike 
the CL 1965, requires the formation of an ‘audit committee’ in a joint stock company, with 
the primary responsibility of supervising the company’s affairs.749 For listed companies, 
the monitoring of managers and employees is clearly relevant to the board’s duty to 
establish and supervise the implementation of risk management systems,750 and internal 
control systems.751 The CGRs 2017 clearly establish the board’s duty to monitor the 
performance of senior managers below board level.752 Importantly, it requires each board 
member to monitor the performance of senior management,753 review performance-related 
reports,754 and ensure the integrity of financial and non-financial statements.755 As with the 
CGRs 2006,756 the important monitoring role of non-executive directors has also been 
confirmed as the new CGRs 2017 require the board’s audit committee to be formed of non-
executives.757 According to article 55 of the CGRs 2017, the board’s audit committee is 
responsible for ‘monitoring the company’s activities and ensuring the integrity and 
effectiveness of the reports, financial statements and internal control systems’. 
 
                                                        
746 Loughrey (n 730) 25–26. 
747 Keay (n 6) 221. 
748 As Ipp said, directors should not ‘shut their eyes to what is going on around them’; see Ipp (n 667) 164.  
749 See articles 101 and 103 of the CL 2015. The law makes it clear that the committee should be formed 
from shareholders or others rather than executive directors. This indicates that non-executive directors 
(including independent directors) could be members of the committee. 
750 Article 22(1)(a) of the CGRs 2017. 
751 Article 22(2) of the CGRs 2017. 
752 See article 25 of the CGRs 2017. 
753 Article 30(2) of the CGRs 2017.  
754 Article 30(3) of the CGRs 2017.  
755 Article 30(4) of the CGRs 2017.  
756 See article 14(a) of the CGRs 2006  
757 Articles 51(a) and 54(a) of the CGRs 2017 
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Some concerns could be raised in relation to directors’ duty of monitoring as a component 
of duty of care in Saudi law. First, the Saudi CL 2015 remains silent about requiring each 
director to monitor the company’s affairs and his/her colleagues’ activities in order to 
avoid liability for the breach of his/her duty of care. For companies that are not subject to 
the provisions of the CGRs 2017, this would create legal uncertainty about whether courts 
will have regard to the fulfilment of monitoring obligations when assessing directors’ 
compliance with the duty of care. Second, although the CGRs 2017, as mentioned above, 
establish the board members’ duty of monitoring, it restricts this to the monitoring of 
senior managers below board level. It does not suggest that the obligation should include 
the need for each director to monitor the conduct of their co-director or ensure the proper 
performance of delegated tasks by co-directors. The failure to establish a wider scope for 
the monitoring obligation may encourage directors not to commit to effective 
monitoring,758 but to accept the conduct of their colleagues, an issue that will be discussed 
below.759 Third, in spite of the absence of judicial guidance, it is presumed that if directors 
fail to discharge their duty of monitoring, as an ordinary prudent person would, they could 
be liable for a breach of the duty to exercise reasonable monitoring. In this regard it should 
be stressed that even if the board was collectively responsible for the monitoring of the 
senior management, the liability for the board’s failure to monitor should be imposed 
individually, not collectively.  
 
3.4.2 Directors’ duty to keep themselves informed 
 
One of primary issues faced by non-executive directors in particular is that their ability to 
monitor might be limited by the lack of availability of sufficient information on the 
company’s business.760 This is perhaps a result of executive directors’ control over the flow 
of information transmitted to non-executive directors in which they might provide the 
board with ‘selective, scanty, outdated and distorted information’.761 In its response to the 
lack of adequate data, the CGRs 2017 make it clear that executive managers are required to 
provide all board members, particularly non-executive directors and committees ‘with all 
of necessary information . . . provided that they shall be complete, clear, correct, and non-
                                                        
758 See, for example,  Falgi (n 208)151, who conduct empirical research showing that government 
representatives appointed as board members are generally viewed as not giving sufficient time and effort to 
the board’s tasks. 
759 See section (3.4.3) in this Chapter. 
760 See R Esen, ‘Managing and Monitoring: The Dual Role of Non-Executive Directors on U.K. and U.S. 
Boards’ (2000) 11 International Company and Commercial Law Review 202, 204; Easterbrook and  Fischel 
(n 301) 92. 
761 Esen (n 760) 204.  
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misleading, in due course’.762 Similarly, in the UK the recent CGC 2016 also provides that 
‘accurate, timely and clear information’ should be given to directors to enable them to 
discharge their obligations.763  
 
In contrast, directors, especially non-executives, need to ensure that they keep themselves 
informed and aware of the company’ business. According to Keay, for the monitoring task 
to be performed effectively, directors have to fully understand the nature of the company’s 
business and methods of managing its affairs, along with keeping themselves continuously 
informed of the current developments of the business.764 While this view was expressed in 
relation to UK law, it should also be valid in relation to the directors’ duty under the Saudi 
law. This means that the court should take into account the extent to which directors have 
made themselves aware of the company’s affairs in order to affirm compliance with the 
duty of care.  
 
As far as the position of UK case law is concerned, the Court of Appeal in Re Westmid 
Packing Services Ltd stressed the fact that each director, regardless of whether he/she is an 
executive or non-executive,765 is under the obligation to inform himself/herself of the 
company’s business, especially concerning its financial position.766 In the case of Re 
Barings plc,767 the Court of Appeal clearly agreed that directors were under a continuing 
obligation ‘to acquire and maintain a sufficient knowledge and understanding of the 
company’s business to enable them properly to discharge their duties as directors’.768 For 
directors to understand the current financial position of their company, they would usually 
need to be aware of the company’s accounting policies. This might raise the question of 
whether directors are required to possess specialist accounting expertise. The court, in Re 
Continental Assurance Company of London plc (in liquidation) (No. 4), absolved directors, 
even executives, from the requirement to possess specialist knowledge of accountancy.769 
Instead, they were only required to exercise the skill of ‘intelligent laymen’ with 
‘knowledge of what the basic accounting principles’ relevant to their business are and 
                                                        
762 Article 40 of the CGRs 2017; see also article 27(1) of the CGRs 2017, which places the chairman of the 
board under the obligation to ensure the flow of information within the board of directors. 
763 See para B.5 of the CGC 2016.  
764 Keay (n 6) 223. 
765 The absence of distinction between executives and non-executives can be inferred from the court 
statement although it was not explicitly mentioned in the court’s judgment.  
766 Re Westmid Packing Services Ltd (No. 3) (n 735) 836, 842. 
767 Re Barings plc and others (No 5), Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Baker (n 726). 
768 Ibid 536. 




should be able to inform themselves of the company’s accounts with guidance.770 The court 
also opined that only a specialist director (i.e., finance director) should exercise a higher 
degree of skill and knowledge than other directors, and so the former might have been 
found liable for a breach of his/her duty of care even if the other directors had not.771 
 
Concerning Saudi law, there is nothing in the CL 2015 requiring directors to keep 
themselves informed of the company’s business. For Saudi listed companies, it is 
recommended that training and preparation should be given to newly appointed directors 
explaining the company’s business, particularly its financial and legal aspects.772 It is one 
of the responsibilities of directors to develop their knowledge of the company’s business.773 
This suggests that directors are expected to act with diligence and care in acquiring and 
maintaining adequate information about the company’s business. Importantly, the 
CGRs 2017 make it clear that directors’ conduct should rely on ‘complete information’.774 
It seems that the reference to ‘complete information’ involves a significant degree of 
uncertainty as it is unclear what constitutes ‘complete’ information. Also, given executive 
directors’ control over the flow of information, there is no option for non-executive 
directors (including independent members) but to make their decisions based on the 
available information, which might not be complete from the CGRs 2017 perspective. 
Indeed, such a requirement does not reflect reality, in which doubts could be thrown on the 
enforceability of the director’s need to base their decision on ‘complete’ information. 
Hence, the wording of article 11(c) of the previous CGRs 2006, which requires a decision 
to be based upon ‘sufficient information’, 775 is more realistic and applicable in practice. In 
any event, from the above provisions of the CGRs 2017, there is an emphasis on the 
importance of a business decision being informed, and so requires directors to inform 
themselves of all necessary information available to them, prior to taking action.  
 
3.4.3 The issue of reliance on directors and professionals 
 
One may question whether the board, particularly non-executive and independent 
members, can solely rely on professional advice or information given to them by the 
executive management without any inquiry or verification; in other words, will an absolute 
                                                        
770 Ibid 402–403. 
771 Ibid 402, 444. 
772 See article 39 of the CGRs 2017, which is not a legally binding provision.  
773 Article 30(19) of the CGRs 2017. 
774 Article 30(17) of the CGRs 2017. 
775 See article 11(c) of the CGRs 2006. 
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reliance on information by non-executives absolve them from the duty to act with due care 
in relation to the quality or correctness of information received from executives? 
 
In an early UK case law, the duty of care tended to be undemanding. In Re City 
Equitable776 it was said that it was reasonable in a practical sense to leave some duties to 
other officials. The directors then were ‘in the absence of grounds for suspicion, justified in 
trusting that official to perform such duties honestly’ and in relying on them and their 
reasonable judgement.777 As has been observed, in the old case law if non-executive 
directors had no doubts about the trustworthiness of an executive manager, they could rely 
upon the delegate’s performance of his/her functions without any monitoring.778 However, 
the ruling of Re City Equitable probably, as has been said in Equitable Life Assurance 
Society v Bowley,779 does not represent the modern law of duty of care, at least if it is read 
as meaning ‘unquestioning reliance upon others to do their job‘.780 This is because non-
executives are expected to make independent judgements and monitor the work of 
executives.781 Meanwhile, the court, in the case of Re Sherborne Associates Ltd,782 accepted 
that non-executives might rely upon highly skilled executive directors.783 Thus, this area of 
UK law of directors’ duty of care remains uncertain as there is no clear line between what 
constitutes a reasonable reliance and what leads to holding directors liable for the reliance 
on others.  
 
The problem of reliance is ‘a matter of degree’,784 in which the court’s determination of 
whether or not there is a reasonable reliance upon executives and other professionals 
depends on the facts of the case concerned.785 One further point to bear in mind is that 
directors should, if necessary, seek professional advice (e.g., solicitors or accountants).786 
However, as the court asserted in the Re Bradcrown Ltd case, complete reliance on 
                                                        
776 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company Ltd. (n 620). 
777 Ibid. 429–430. 
778 Kershaw (n 310) 434–435.  
779 Equitable Life Assurance Society v Bowley (2003) BCC 829 . 
780 Ibid 830, 837. 
781 Ibid.  
782 Re Sherborne Associates Ltd. (1995) BCC 40 . 
783 Ibid 55.  
784 Keay (n 6) 236. 
785 See Equitable Life Assurance Society v Bowley (n 779) 837 in which it was said that the issue of reliance 
was ‘fact-sensitive’.  
786 See Re D’Jan of London Ltd (n 665) 648 when the court said that ‘[i]f [the director] signs an agreement 
running to 60 pages of turgid legal prose on the assurance of his solicitor that it accurately reflects the 
board’s instructions, he may well be excused from reading it all himself’. 
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professional advice, without raising reasonable questions, does not prevent directors from 
being held liable.787   
 
In the Saudi jurisdiction the position of corporate law with respect to this matter is highly 
unclear since there is no judicial guidance about whether the court should follow a lenient 
or strict approach to the issue of reliance. Nevertheless, since the board of directors, as 
mentioned earlier, is entitled to delegate functions to directors or manages, this indicates 
that the board can rely on them to carry out delegated tasks; for example, the audit 
committee is responsible for studying and reviewing the financial statements and 
accounting policies before submitting their recommendations to the board of directors.788 In 
such circumstances, it is sensible for the board to rely on the committee’s 
recommendations when discharging its duties. However, this should not mean that the 
board should be absolutely reliant on the committee’s work; in other words, reasonable 
inquiries should be made to verify information about the company’s financial position, 
which has been provided by the audit committee.  
 
Another example of directors’ liability, which might result from the reliance on others, is 
provided in article 78(1) of the CL 2015.789 The article states that in cases where a decision 
is taken by a majority of votes, objectors at the board meeting shall not be liable for the 
decision when they explicitly expressed their objection in the minutes of the meeting. It 
can be inferred from this statutory provision that an individual director could be exposed to 
liability if he/she acted passively, relying upon co-directors without making any reasonable 
enquires or questioning the company’s affairs at the board meeting. Directors should 
ensure that their concerns are expressed and recorded in the minutes of the board meeting.  
 
The final example to consider in relation to the issue of reliance concerns the extent to 
which directors can rely on professionals to perform their duties. As article 54(a) of the 
CGRs 2017 provides,790 a specialist in finance and accountancy must be appointed to the 
board’s audit committee. Although a high degree of uncertainty revolves around the 
court’s position, it seems that members of the committee could rely on information 
presented by a specialist financial member whose task is limited to ensuring the integrity of 
                                                        
787 Re Bradcrown Ltd, Official Receiver v Ireland (2001) 1 BCLC 547 , 547–548.  
788 Article 55 of the CGRs 2017.  
789 This sub-article of the new CL 2015 and article 76 of the previous CL 1965 are exactly the same in 
content.  
790 The same requirement was also mentioned in article 14(a) of the CGRs 2006. 
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the financial and non-financial reports, especially from the technical perspective.791 In this 
regard, if the court were to take the report of a specialist member, non-specialist members 
would only be responsible for evaluating the information and check the extent of its 
precision.  
 
Given the legislative and judicial vacuum in Saudi, questions remain unanswered as to the 
judicial approach to the issue of directors’ reliance on others. The duty of care will 
necessarily be less demanding if the court is reluctant to question whether directors’ 
reliance on professionals and co-directors is reasonable or not. Therefore, the court should 
not exempt directors from liability for breach of the duty of care if these directors, while 
making a decision, solely relied on information that an ordinary careful director, in the 
same circumstances, would not have relied on. This is justified on the basis that the 
directors, as mentioned above,792 will be liable for damage caused by their fault (i.e., 
negligence), if they do not take reasonable care while performing their responsibilities.  
 
3.5 The High Standard of Care: Problems and Responses  
 
One of serious concerns faced by directors is the risk of being personally liable for their 
conduct in the course of business. One frequent argument in Anglo-American literature is 
that if the standard of care is low, this will probably lead, as a criticised above,793 to the 
imposition of an undemanding duty of care upon directors. In contrast, in a situation where 
the law provides a single high standard of care, it is likely to produce an effect of impelling 
directors to make low risk decisions in order to avoid the liability or of discouraging 
individuals from accepting a directorship due to the greater likelihood of being liable for 
the breach.794 Directors’ concerns perhaps result from the court’s review of business 
decisions with the benefit of hindsight,795 a problem that the will be considered in 
Chapter 4.796 The main point of such an argument is that directors are better positioned to 
make business judgements compared to judges, who are often less experienced and less 
                                                        
791 This is one of the main responsibilities of the board’s audit committee, see article 55(a) of the CGRs 2017.  
792 See section (3.2.2) in this thesis.  
793 See the discussion above in relation to the common law approach prior to the legal change brought by the 
cases of Norman v Theodore Goddard and of Re D’Jan of London Ltd, see footnotes 669–685 and 
accompanying text in this Chapter.  
794 W T Allen, J B Jacobs and L E Strine, ‘Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with 
Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem’ 
(2002) 96 North Western University Review 449, 449, 452–454; M A Eisenberg, ‘The Divergence of 
Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law’ (1993) 62 Fordham L Rev 437, 444–445. 
795 S Bainbridge, Corporate Law (2nd edn, New York, Foundation Press 2009)106–107.  
796 The problem of hindsight bias associated with the court’s review of managerial decisions will be further 
considered while examining the standard for the duty of loyalty to act in good faith in the general interests of 
the company, see footnotes 952–956 and accompanying text, Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
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familiar with the complexities of commercial and financial operations.797 Therefore, there 
is a need to reduce the possibility of judicial review of business decisions. In this regard 
Kershaw clarifies the relationship between duty of care and the judicial review of business 
decisions. He suggests that directors must take due care in the decision-making process, 
which is at the centre of the duty of care. If the court finds directors liable for breaching 
their duty of care, this would necessarily lead to the court’s review of the decision itself to 
determine whether damage has occurred and whether the directors were liable for that 
damage.798 Kershaw further argues that the nature of the standard of care is significant 
because it operates as a gatekeeper to the business decision review.799 To be specific, if the 
standard of care is high, there would be a greater possibility of directors’ decisions being 
reviewed by the court. In contrast, if the duty of care is less demanding (a low standard of 
care), the duty of care is expected to operate as a much more combative gatekeeper, 
blocking the judicial review of business decisions.800 
 
Therefore, one possible solution to reduce the possibility of directors’ decisions to be 
reviewed by the court is to design a duty of care that performs two roles, namely (i) to 
establish a standard of behavioural expectation of care (standard of conduct) that has to be 
adopted by directors and (ii) a standard of liability for the breach of duty, ‘the standard of 
review’.801 While the former should be of a high standard, the latter is presumed to be a 
‘less stringent’ standard of liability,802 and only the failure to comply with the liability 
standard will have a legal effect on directors.803 The obvious example of this approach is 
US corporate law, in particular Delaware corporate law, where the divergence between the 
standard of conduct and the standard of review in relation to the issue of compliance with 
duty of care has been recognised.804 Since it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss US 
law in depth, it suffices to say that while the Delaware case law refers to the standard of 
conduct expected of directors as the objective standard of an ordinarily prudent person,805 
                                                        
797 C Paz-Ares, Directors’ Duties and Directors’ Liabilities: A Framework for the Law Reform in Latin 
America, (OECD, The Third Meeting of the Latin American Corporate Governance Roundtable, April 2002) 
37 <http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/2085788.> accessed 
22 September 2016). 
798 Kershaw (n 310) 474.  
799 Ibid 475. 
800 Ibid.  
801 See Eisenberg (n 794). 
802 Ibid 441. 
803 Allen, Jacobs and Strine (n 794) 449. 
804 In US Delaware law, compliance with the duty of care will be assessed through the judicial application of 
the business judgement rule of which acting on an informed basis is one of its preconditions to apply, see 
S Bainbridge, ‘Smith v. Van Gorkom’ (Law-Econ Research Paper No. 08-13, May 2008) 16, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1130972##> accessed 23 September 2016. 
805 Re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation (2005) 907 A2d 693, 748. 
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the standard by which directors’ actions are reviewed is the gross negligence standard.806 It 
is indisputable that the gross negligence standard employed by Delaware courts to 
determine the breach of duty of care is less stringent than the standard of the ordinary 
prudent person.807 This means that under the gross negligence standard, the directors will 
be less vulnerable to the risk of being held liable for the breach of duty of care. 
 
The US approach to regulating duty of care was not adopted in the UK and Saudi Arabia in 
the sense that both jurisdictions, as the foregoing discussion demonstrated, have not 
recognised this divergence between the standard of conduct and the standard of review. 
This means that there is only one standard of care that will be applied to assess the care 
taken and to enforce liability upon directors. The conflation of the two standards to the one 
standard of the reasonable person may expose the directors more greatly to liability for the 
breach of the duty of care808 because of the difficulty in meeting the standard of ordinary 
negligence compared with the gross negligence standard. The core problem, as mentioned 
earlier, is the much higher review standard of care used by the court, leading to the much 
higher possibility of directors’ decisions being subject to court scrutiny. Nevertheless, it 
seems that given the fact that other mechanisms (e.g., markets) tend to fall short of offering 
strong constraints on directors’ behaviour,809 in jurisdictions such as Saudi Arabia there is a 
greater need to prevent shirking by directors through the formulation of well-suited 
standards of liability, which creates incentives for directors to act competently.810 Indeed, 
the lower standard of liability for breach of duty of care may encourage directors to act 
incompetently and therefore undermines their accountability. Even in the UK any concerns 
over the higher possibility of judicial review because of a high standard of care can be 
challenged by the fact that UK courts tend to be reluctant to engage in second-guessing 
what directors have decided or acted upon while managing the company.811  
 
In any event, the following sub-sections will highlight methods that the law can introduce 
to reduce the effects of a single standard of the reasonable man.  
                                                        
806 See, for example, Aronson v Lewis (1984) 473 A2d 805 , 812; Smith v Van Gorkom (1985) 488 A2d 858 , 
873.  
807 Allen, Jacobs and Strine (n 794) 449. 
808 Ibid 454. 
809 See generally sections (2.5), (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8), Chapter 2 in this thesis.  
810 This is in line with the argument presented earlier in this thesis concerning the need for stronger legal 
protection for shareholders in developing economies; see particularly footnote 607–608 and accompanying 
text, Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
811 Riley (n 376) 710. 
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3.5.1 Non-judicial methods of indemnifying directors 
 
In the UK directors’ duties (including the duty of care) under the CA 200, are regarded as 
mandatory rules that cannot be departed from.812 This is clearly expressed in sections 
232(1) and (2) of CA 2006 which state, as a general principle, that any provision that 
intends to either exempt directors from, or indemnify them against, any liability (including 
breach of statutory duty) ‘is void’. This means that directors cannot be indemnified or 
benefit from exculpatory clauses for breaches of due care.813  
 
Nevertheless, this general rule is subject to statutory exceptions. One of those is s 233 of 
CA 2006, which states that the company may enter into a contract with an insurer in order 
to provide insurance cover to protect directors from personal liability while managing the 
company. This type of insurance contract is called ‘directors and officers insurance (D&O 
insurance)’.814 Given the fact that directors are likely to be asked to take more 
responsibility for corporate failure, D&O insurance cover is potentially highly valuable.  
 
The main concern with the recourse to D&O insurance is the potential for minimising the 
deterrent effects of the law on directors’ obligations.815 A connected criticism, often 
repeated, concerns the influence of D&O insurance on directors’ conduct in which insured 
directors could ‘become less careful’.816 In this regard, Davies and Worthington suggest 
that the level of insurance cover, which the insurers are generally able to offer, would 
identify the effect of s 233.817 The director’s liability is usually insured against a claim 
based on ‘breach of duty, breach of trust or neglect, plus errors [and] omissions’,818 but 
inevitably there will be a range of claims excluded from the insurance coverage.819 It is 
most likely that the insurers will not cover the breach of duty relating to dishonesty, fraud 
or intentional misconduct.820 In addition, the insurer can insert a provision in the D&O 
                                                        
812 Davies and Worthington (n 2) 576. 
813 Kershaw (n 310) 452.  
814 C Baxter, ‘Demystifying D&O Insurance’ (1995) 15 Oxford J Legal Stud 537. 
815 Evidence from the US shows that D&O insurance indirectly weakens the deterrent effects of corporate 
and securities law liability; see, for example, T Baker and S Griffith, ‘The Missing Monitor in Corporate 
Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer’ (2007) 95 Geo LJ 1795.  
816 C Parsons, ‘Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance: A Target or  Shield?’ (2000) 21 Company 
Lawyer 77, 84.  
817 Davies and Worthington (n 2) 579. 
818 Baxter (n 814) 549–550. 
819 Ibid 550–554. 
820 This is a fundamental rule in the English law of insurance, see J Birds, B Lynch and S Milnes, 
MacGillivray on Insurance Law: Relating to All Risks Other Than Marine (13th edn, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 2015) paras 14–29; particularly, see Baxter (n 814) 551; Parsons (n 816) 81. 
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policy as a means of monetarily limiting its liability for claims for damages.821 Such 
considerations can be seen as a means of retaining the deterrent effect.822 It is worth 
mentioning that this type of insurance is not ‘as common in the UK as in the US’ and not 
all companies purchase D&O insurance for directors despite the high risks surrounding the 
company’s management.823    
 
Concerning Saudi law, similar to section 232 (1) and (2) of CA 2006, the company law 
clearly makes the potential directors’ liability for damages non-voidable. According to the 
CL 2015, any provision in the articles of association that purport to exempt directors from 
any liability824 or to prevent a shareholder from bringing a legal action against them, is null 
and avoid.825 This indicates that the Saudi law bans an exculpatory clause and obviates the 
potential for securing directors from the legal responsibility for a breach of their duties 
towards the company and shareholders. Unlike UK law, neither the CL 1965, nor the 
CL 2015 expressly provides exceptions to the general rule preventing indemnification by 
the company. This is not to suggest, however, that it is not a possible mode of 
indemnification available to the company,826 but it has not yet been developed in the Saudi 
business community.827 
 
3.5.2 Judicial relief from liability 
 
This refers to a situation where the court has granted the discretionary power to release 
directors from their liability for breach of their duty towards the company. This form of 
liability waiver has not been recognised under Saudi law in which the court has no 
authority to grant such relief. In the UK the situation is completely different since 
section 1157 the CA 2006 permits the court discretion to grant relief to directors found 
                                                        
821 Under the D&O insurance, there are many examples of excluded risks such as payment of fines, penalties 
and punitive damages. There might also be limited cover for certain claims in which the liability, to some 
extent, remains personally with the directors, see Parsons (n 816) 82, 84.  
822 Davies and Worthington (n 2) 580.  
823 See A Felsted, ‘The Danger of Being an Executive’, Financial Times (16 October 2006), 
<https://www.ft.com/content/2fc9618a-5d13-11db-9d15-0000779e2340> accessed 23 September 2016. 
824 Article 78(1) of the CL 2015.  
825 Article 88(1)(a)(5) of the CL 2015. 
826 The D&O insurance is one of insurance products provided by the CHUBB Arabia Cooperative Insurance 
Co. in Saudi Arabia, see the company’s website at <https://www2.chubb.com/sa-en/> accessed 
1 October 2017.  
827 A Blom, I Shah and R Wynn, ‘Personal Risks Facing Board Members in the Middle East’, Financier 
Worldwide (November 2011) <http://www.financierworldwide.com/personal-risks-facing-board-members-
in-the-middle-east/#.V_Ds0mO9h0c> 28 September 2016. 
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accountable for the breach of their general duties, as well as other breaches and defaults.828 
It is worth mentioning that although the scope of section 1175 is wide enough to include 
cases other than negligence, it has been noted that this provision will usually be taken into 
account in the case of a breach of the duty of care.829  
 
For the court to provide liability relief in the case of a directors’ breach of their duty, the 
court must ensure that certain requirements are satisfied. First is that the directors acted 
honestly; second is that they acted reasonably; finally, in consideration of all 
circumstances of the case concerned, the court must exercise its discretion to decide 
whether the directors ought to, as matter of fairness, be relieved of their liability.830 
Directors carry the responsibility for proving that they acted reasonably and that they ought 
to be excused.831 Concerning the honesty requirement, directors are presumed to have 
performed honestly unless evidence provided suggests otherwise.832 It is worth mentioning 
here in relation to the breach of the duty of care that there is no dispute about whether the 
honesty factor has been established. The court will further devote its focus to address the 
question of whether the directors had acted reasonably.833 
 
In Re D’ Jan of London Ltd case,834 the court was required to decide whether the directors’ 
liability for the breach of the duty of care could be relieved in accordance with the 
predecessor of section 1157 (section 727 of the Companies Act 1985). In his judgment, 
Hoffmann accepted that it appeared to be ‘odd that a person found to have been guilty of 
negligence, which involves failing to take reasonable care, can ever satisfy a court that he 
acted reasonably.’835 However, the judge asserted that the directors’ behaviour might be 
reasonable despite the failure to pass the reasonable care test in the common law.836 In this 
case Hoffmann found the directors liable for the breach, but held that they ought to be 
relieved of liability pursuant to the predecessor of section 1157.837 The court decided that 
the directors had acted reasonably despite the fact that they were found negligent, as the 
                                                        
828 The exception brought by section 1157 was established by its immediate ancestor section 727 of the CA 
1985. This means that the case law prior to the introduction of CA 2006 is relevant to the analysis of section 
1157. 
829 Keay (n 6) 529. 
830 Section 1157 (1) of the CA 2006. 
831 See Re Kirby Coaches Ltd (1991) BCC 130, 131.  
832 Ibid. 
833 Keay (n 6) 542. 
834 Re D’Jan of London Ltd (n 665). 
835 Ibid 649. 
836 Ibid. 
837 Ibid 648–649. 
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directors’ negligence was not considered ‘gross’ and ‘it was the kind of thing which could 
happen to any busy man’.838  
 
It can be noted, as mentioned in the Re Brian D Pierson Ltd case, that for the purpose of 
the predecessor of section 1157 the condition of reasonableness was at a lower standard 
than the common law standard for the obligation of care.839 Although it is strange that the 
director who had been found accountable for the breach of the duty of care was relieved 
according to the reasonableness standard of section 1157, the way that the case law 
interprets the term ‘reasonableness’ is justifiable because if the court used the statutory 
standard of care for the purpose of section 1157, all directors in breach of the duty would 
be excluded from being qualified to apply for judicial relief from liability.840     
 
In relation to the court’s discretion in determining whether it is fair to relieve directors, the 
court may take into account ‘economic realities’ of the case;841 for example, in Re D’ Jan 
of London Ltd Hoffmann asserted that the fact that the director had 99% of the company’s 
issued shares is relevant to the court’s exercise of the discretion under the predecessor of 
section 1157.842 In addition, whether the director who sought professional advice (e.g., 
solicitors or accountants) prior to the conduct that gave rise to the breach of duty, seems to 
be important in granting liability relief under section 1157.843 In the Re Paycheck Services 
case the Court of Appeal considered the failure to seek professional advice before 
performing the act that led to the breach of duty as a reason for refusing relief under the 
predecessor of section 1157.844  
 
It is noteworthy that the court has the discretion to grant directors either whole or partial 
relief of liability for the breach.845 Although the court cannot exercise its discretion to grant 
relief without satisfying the conditions of honesty and reasonableness,846 it has been 
granted a wide discretionary power in the sense that it may believe that the directors ought 
not to be relieved despite the fact that the honesty and reasonableness tests were 
satisfied.847 Having said that, there is a high degree of legal uncertainty in terms of the 
                                                        
838 Ibid 649. 
839 Re Brian D Pierson Ltd. (n 663) 48–49. 
840 R Edmunds and J Lowry, ‘The Continuing Value of Relief for Directors’ Breach of Duty’ (2003) 66 Mod 
L Rev 195, 210. 
841 Re D’Jan of London Ltd (n 665) 649. 
842 Ibid. 
843 Edmunds and Lowry (n 840) 213. 
844 Re Paycheck Services 3 Ltd (2009) STC 1639 , 1665. 
845 Re D‘Jan of London Ltd (n 665) 648–649; see section 1157(1) of CA2006. 
846 Bairstow & Ors v Queens Moat Houses plc (2002) BCC 91 , 92.  
847 See Keay (n 6) 527.  
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judicial approach to relieving directors of the liability. This high unpredictability 
associated with the court’s discretion would hinder many from seeking a judicial relief of 
liability. It should be also borne in mind that the court, as has been noted,848 rarely applies 
the rule under section 1175 in reported cases coupled with the fact that there not many 
cases considering the application for judicial relief of liability.849  
 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter evaluated the effectiveness of the Saudi law of directors’ duty of care 
compared with the UK and identified certain areas of deficiency and uncertainty. The 
elimination of uncertainty in this area of law is a difficult task because in order to answer 
the question of how much a degree of care must be shown cannot be set down statutorily 
and largely depends on the facts of each case. However, the law has to play a central role 
in reducing such uncertainty so that it does not undermine the accountability of directors. 
  
The absence of codification of the duty, coupled with the modest, if not absent, role of the 
courts in filling the legislative vacuum have fuelled speculation concerning the precisely 
substantive content of duty of care. One area of uncertainty concerns the standard by which 
the directors’ actions are reviewed. While it is said that directors will only be liable for 
gross negligence, others assert that directors are expected to meet the objective standard of 
the ordinary prudent person. The core problem exists in the absence of a clear line between 
what constitutes gross negligence and what it is considered negligence. In addition, the 
assumption that gross negligence is the standard of care, especially where the standard of 
conduct and of review are combined, would give rise to an undemanding duty of care.  
 
Another area of deficiency is that unlike the UK, the failure to recognise the subjective 
standard of skill, as an addition to the objective standard, does not accommodate the 
development of business practice where directors are appointed for the experience and 
skills that can they bring to the board. The possible outcome is that highly experienced 
directors would be able to avoid liability by simply acting as an ordinary prudent person 
would have done, even if they did not act as a reasonable person with his/her equivalent 
experience and skill.  
 
                                                        
848 Ibid 527.  
849 For a work that evaluates the judicial relief of liability under section 1157’s predecessor, see Edmunds and 
Lowry (n 840). 
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Although the UK case law has always been active in filling the gaps in law, legislative 
intervention has achieved greater clarity and ensured the steady application of the law. This 
is not the case in Saudi Arabia where case law plays a modest role in shaping the law.  
 
Nevertheless, the Saudi legislator refrains from intervening to clarify the law and the 
corporate community will pay the costs of its inaction; for example, neither the CL 1965 or 
2015, unlike the CA 2006 with the aid of case law, clearly refers to the functions of 
directors as a factor that should be taken into account in assessing compliance with the 
duty of care. As has been pointed out, the extent of care obligation depends upon the 
function and the role assigned to directors. Since the Saudi corporate statute fails to 
recognise ‘functions conducted by a director’ as a factor affecting the application of law, it 
is uncertain whether the court will distinguish between executives and non-executives in 
terms of the degree of care they have to exercise; a distinction that is necessary for the 
consideration of fairness. 
 
The emphasis must be placed upon designing the duty of care in such a way that expresses 
the high expectation placed on directors, and uses the liability for breaching that 
expectation as a tool to push directors to act appropriately. However, it is valid to consider 
not making the duty overly onerous and thereby exposing directors to an unnecessarily 
high risk of legal liability. This chapter has shown that the UK law, unlike the Saudi law, 
contains a mechanism, namely judicial relief of liability, to address directors’ concern 
about a single high standard of care. Nevertheless, whether the UK’s allowance of judicial 
relief of liability is a good law has been questioned in terms of legal certainty because of 
the wide discretion given to the court. The infrequent cases where the court has granted or 
even considered relief of liability would raise questions about the value of such a rule 
within the legal liability system.  
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Chapter 4: An Evaluation of Directors’ Duties of Loyalty 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
While the duty of care as a mechanism to deal with directors’ negligence in managing the 
company was considered in Chapter 3, the focus of this chapter is on the duty of loyalty. 
This obligation can be described as the duty to ‘maximise the investors’ wealth rather than 
one’s own’.850 Being in a loyal relation with the firm simply means that directors are 
required to exercise their powers in a way that maximises the value of the firm851 and to 
avoid any act that diverts the firm’s wealth for their personal benefit.852 
 
One possible breach of the duty of loyalty occurs when directors act (in bad faith) against 
the general interest of the company. Directors’ liability might also be triggered by 
engagement in conflict of interest situations such as the exploitation of a corporate 
opportunity and a self-dealing transaction, which are examples of detrimental diversion of 
corporate wealth.853 In this regard, the law has to play an essential role in establishing and 
clarifying the substantive content of duty of loyalty because this does matter in terms of 
enhancing directors’ accountability, which is essential in establishing a robust system of 
corporate governance. The law that does not properly establish a legal standard for conduct 
and review in relation to the decision and action taken, lacks clarity and fails to regulate 
the directors’ exercise of discretion for the benefit of shareholders. Equally important, if 
the boundaries of the duty to avoid conflict of interests are ill-defined, a law may not 
succeed in capturing various situations where directors utilise corporate resources and 
assets to benefit themselves at shareholders’ expense. It may also suggest that the law does 
not sufficiently protect the company and its shareholders from the opportunism of 
directors. Indeed, the deficiencies in the law governing the duty of loyalty could encourage 
directors to engage in more self-interest activities, allowing them to escape liability in 
cases where they should have been liable for a breach.  
 
In this chapter, the UK law will be compared with the Saudi law on directors’ duty of 
loyalty, and the serious areas of uncertainty and deficiency in the law, which require 
pressing responses, will be explored. It is important to note that this chapter will focus on 
                                                        
850 Easterbrook and Fischel (n 301)103. 
851 Ibid.  
852 Pacces (n 361) 96. 
853 Enriques, Hertige and Kanda (n 364) 153. 
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analysing three forms of directors’ breach of the duty of loyalty, namely (i) non-
compliance with the obligation to act in good faith in the interests of the company; (ii) the 
exploitation of a corporate opportunity and (iii) the engagement in a self-dealing 
transaction. The last two forms constitute breaches of the directors’ duty to avoid conflicts 
of interest.  
 
Regarding the structure of this chapter, it is divided into four main sections. First, the 
affirmative duty to act in good faith in the general interests of the company is explored. 
Then, the focus of the analysis moves to the underlying principles that shape the features of 
duty to avoid conflict of interests, which are no-conflict and no-profit rules. After that, the 
legal regulation of corporate opportunities, and of corporate self-dealings will be analysed 
under the UK and Saudi laws. 
 
4.2 The Affirmative Duty to Act in Good Faith in the Company’s Interests  
 
One of the aspects of the duty of loyalty is to ensure that those responsible for the 
management of a company exercise their powers to further the firm’s interests.854 While 
this is the main job of directors appointed by shareholders, the formulation and definition 
of the affirmative duty of loyalty differs among jurisdictions. In the following sub-sections,  
the development of the statutory duty found in section 172(1) of the CA 2006 and its 
relevance to the previous case law (section 4.2.1)  will be considered. The extent to which 
the main components of the duty of loyalty is established in Saudi law (section 4.2.2) is 
then explored. In the third part (section 4.2.3) the interpretation and application of the main 
elements of the duty of loyalty are analysed in both the UK and Saudi law. 
 
4.2.1 Section 172 of the Company Act 2006: The codification of the duty to act in 
good faith 
 
One of new provisions introduced by the CA 2006 is the duty found in section 172. It 
provides, in sub-section (1), that ‘[a] director of a company must act in the way he[/she] 
considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for 
the benefit of its members as a whole’; the sub-section goes on to assert that the director is 
to do so while having regard for, inter alia, a non-exhaustive list of factors,855 such as the 
                                                        
854 See O Hart, ‘An Economist’s View of Fiduciary Duty’ (1993) 43 The University of Toronto Law Journal 
299, 303–303. 
855 Section 172(1), sets out six factors in paragraphs (a)–(f) to be considered by company directors.  
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long-term consequences of his/her conduct856 and the interests of the company’s 
employees.857 It is useful to mention that the general duty laid down in sub-section 172 (1) 
upon which the analysis focuses, is subject to two statutory exceptions. The first one refers 
to a situation where a company has purposes other than to benefit its shareholders and the 
directors are required to run the company in a way that achieves that purpose858 (e.g., 
charitable companies).859 The second exception is found in section 172(3), which clearly 
recognises that directors, in certain circumstances, are expected to take into account the 
interest of the company’s creditors in the course of their decision-making.860  
 
While it is not possible here to detail the background of the enactment of sub-section 
172(1), it is useful to say a few words about this matter in order to understand why it is 
drafted in such a way. The Company Law Review Steering Group (CLRSG) developed 
section 172 in the course of a review of directors’ duties.861 One of the issues addressed by 
the CLRSG was to consider in whose interests a company’s business is managed.862 The 
CLRSG assumed that the shareholder value (also known as ‘shareholder wealth 
maximisation’863) was the approach adopted by UK company law.864 The shareholder value 
approach simply proposes that the company should ultimately be run in the interest of the 
shareholders.865 The CLRSG’s criticism to such an approach centred on the failure of the 
law to sufficiently recognise that the wealth of firms will generally be maximised if all 
participants in the enterprise (not only shareholders) work harmoniously as groups, and 
that directors should act according to ‘the wider interests of the community’.866  
 
In its deliberations on for whose benefit a company should be managed, the CLRSG 
considered whether it was feasible to adopt a pluralist approach867 (also known as the 
stakeholder theory),868 which basically holds that directors should run the company for the 
benefit of all stakeholders (including non-shareholder constituencies), giving priority to 
                                                        
856 See section 172(1)(a) of the CA 2006.  
857 See section 172(1)(b) of the CA 2006.  
858 Section 172(2) of the CA 2006.  
859 See para 330 of the Explanatory Notes to the CA 2006. 
860 For further discussion on section 172(3) and how it relates to section 172(1), see generally A Keay, The 
Enlightened Shareholder Value Principle and Corporate Governance (London, Routledge 2013) 218–230.   
861 Ibid 67. 
862 See CLRSG, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework (February 
1999) para 5.1.1.  
863 See, for example, S Bainbridge, ‘In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to 
Professor Green’ (1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law Review 1423, 1423–1425. 
864 The Strategic Framework (n 862) para 5.1.3.  
865 See, for example, Bainbridge (n 863). 
866 The Strategic Framework (n 862) para 5.1.9. 
867 Ibid paras 5.1.11 and 5.1.24–5.1.33.  
868 See, for example, A Keay, ‘Stakeholder Theory In Corporate Law: Has It Got What It Takes?’ (2010) 9 
Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 249. 
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none.869 Put differently, it is the ultimate aim of directors to operate the company for the 
benefit of all stakeholders by striking a balance between their interests.870  
 
In the view of the CLRSG, the adoption of the pluralist approach was not the best way 
forward.871 Given the fact that not many respondents to the CLRSG’s report supported the 
pluralist approach,872 for such a model to apply would require a substantial reform of the 
law on directors’ duties.873 To be specific, the CLRSG was not in favour of extending the 
current concept of loyalty to cover broader interests, as required by the pluralist model.874 
In addition, the application of the pluralist model would require a major change to the 
institutional structure of UK corporate governance and such a change did not receive any 
support and was not favoured by the CLRSG.875 In fact, the pluralist approach was viewed 
as unworkable and undesirable in the UK.876  
 
The CLRSG was in favour of the adoption of what is called the ‘enlightened shareholder 
value’877 approach, to guide directors running the company.878 This approach was explained 
by saying that in order to promote the success of the company for the benefit of all 
shareholders, company directors are expected to have regard for ‘all the relevant 
considerations for that purpose’ such as ‘the need to sustain effective ongoing relationships 
with employees . . . and others’, and the necessity to ‘consider the impact of [the 
company’s] operations on the community and the environment’.879 This means that the 
consideration of a wider range of factors (e.g., employees and customers) is a means 
towards the success of the company for the benefit of all shareholders. Indeed, section 
172(1) of the CA 2006 can be seen as an application of the enlightened shareholder value 
approach.880 
 
                                                        
869 Ibid. 256. 
870 Ibid. 257 
871 CLRSG, Modern Company Law For a Competitive Economy, Developing the Framework, (March 2000) 
para 3.20. 
872 Ibid para 3.22.  
873 The Strategic Framework (n 862) para 5.1.30. 
874 Developing the Framework (n 871) para 3.27.  
875 Particularly, a radical change in the director–shareholder relationship (e.g., board composition and rules of 
dismissal and appointment of directors), see ibid para 3.29; The Strategic Framework (n 862) paras 5.1.31 
and 5.1.32. 
876 CLRSG, Modern Company Law For a Competitive Economy, Completing the Structure (November 2000) 
para 3.5. 
877 See The Strategic Framework (n 862) para 5.1.12 where the CLRSG refers to it in such a way.  
878 Developing the Framework (n 871) paras 2.19, 2.21, 2.22, 3.21; Final Report (n 686) para 3.8. 
879 Developing the Framework (n 871) para 2.19.  
880 See the Explanatory Notes to the CA 2006, para 325. 
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It is worth saying that the duty contained in section 172 was introduced as a replacement of 
the classic duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company,881 which had been an 
element of UK company law prior to codification and was set out by Lord Greene in Re 
Smith & Fawcett Ltd. case.882 Whether or not the duty in section 172(1) merely reflects the 
pre-existing duty is an important issue in determining the extent to which the previous case 
law is relevant to the interpretation of section 172(1). It seems that this statutory duty 
reflects the previous one at least from the judicial perspective. In Cobden Investments Ltd v 
RWM Langport Ltd,883 Warren stated that the common law duty to act bona fide in the 
interests of the company was ‘reflected’ in the terms of section 172.884 He also added that 
the previous duty and the one found in section 172 came ‘to the same thing with modern 
formulation giving a more readily understood definition of the scope of the duty’.885 
Notably, although the wording of section 172 suggests that it is somewhat different from 
the common law duty, the good faith requirement is embedded in both old and new 
versions of the duty. It should be noted further that the previous case law was referred to in 
relation to the interpretation of section 172886 and will perhaps remain relevant to the 
consideration of how to apply the section in practice.887  
 
4.2.2 The absence of a clear formulation of directors’ duty to act in good faith in 
Saudi law 
 
In some common law jurisdictions, directors’ duty of loyalty is intended to oblige directors 
to act in the general interest of the company.888 Within its structure, the duty of good faith 
has been viewed as an integral component of the duty of loyalty.889 To illustrate this point: 
the affirmative duty of loyalty is traditionally formulated in UK company law to reflect 
two components: (i) the duty to act in good faith and (ii) in the interest of the company.890 
                                                        
881 Kershaw (n 310) 381.  
882 His Lordship ruled that company directors were under an obligation to act ‘bona fide in what they 
consider – not what a court may consider – is in the interests of a company’; see Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd. 
(1942) Ch 304, 306.  
883 Cobden Investments Limited v RWM Langport Ltd (2008) EWHC 2810 . 
884 Ibid para [52]. This position was recently affirmed by Popplewell in the Madoff Securities International 
Ltd case; see Madoff Securities International Limited (In Liq.) v Raven (2013) EWHC 3147, para [188]. 
885 Cobden Investments Limited v RWM Langport Ltd (n 883) para [52]. 
886 See, for example, Madoff Securities International Limited (In Liq.) v Raven (n 884) paras. [188]–[194]. 
887 Keay (n 6) 125. 
888 R Langford, ‘The Duty of Directors to Act Bona Fide in the Interests of the Company: A Positive 
Fiduciary Duty? Australia and the UK Compared‘ (2011) 11 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 215, 215 – 
218. 
889 Ibid. 
890 Ibid; see also R Grantham, ‘The Content of the Director’s Duty of Loyalty’ (1993) Journal of Business 




This remains the case even following the enactment of section 172(1) of the CA 2006.891 In 
this regard, the question that might be raised here concerns whether the Saudi law 
expressly or implicitly recognises the affirmative duty of loyalty, as a formulated in the 
UK law.  
 
This area of Saudi law suffers from ambiguity. Arguably, directors’ need to act in the 
company’s interests and the good faith requirement can be, in an implicit way, established 
separately in Saudi law, but this does not necessarily mean that they can be brought 
together into a single duty, as formulated in the UK. The absence of a legislative statement 
clarifying the content of the duty of loyalty, coupled with the lack of judicial guidance, has 
raised questions as to whether the duty of good faith is a freestanding duty, distinct from 
the duty of loyalty.892 Given the fact that the standard to meet the requirement of loyalty is 
not legislatively or judicially defined, the identification of such a standard depends upon 
whether or not the duty of good faith is part of the broad duty of loyalty directors have to 
the company. In general, as in other legal systems influenced by the civil law tradition,893 
there is no clear formulation of the affirmative duty of loyalty in the Saudi corporate 
statute.  
 
In terms of the requirement to act in the interest of the company or its shareholders, neither 
the CL 1965 nor the new CL 2015 contains an explicit provision obliging directors to 
exercise their authority to achieve such a goal. Unlike the common law jurisdictions where 
judges have established and developed the duty of loyalty prior to codification,894 Saudi 
judges have contributed very little to filling the legislative gap, creating a state of 
uncertainty in the area of law governing the affirmative duty of loyalty.  
 
Nonetheless, from the position that directors hold and powers conferred on them, it can be 
argued that the duty to act in the general interest of the company is presumed to be one of 
their obligations. The starting point in establishing such a duty is to emphasise that the 
granting of discretionary powers to a person in order to act on behalf of another is an 
                                                        
891 See footnotes 883–887 and accompanying texts in this Chapter. 
892 This issue has been the subject of considerable debate among US academics and legal specialists. For the 
argument of a freestanding duty of good faith, see, for example, M Eisenberg, ‘The Duty of Good Faith in 
Corporate Law’ (2006) 31 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 1; for the view supporting the idea that the 
duty of good faith is not separate duty, see, for example L Strine et al., ‘Loyalty’s Core Demand: The 
Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law’ (2010) 98 Geo LJ 629.  
893 C Gerner-Beuerle and E Schuster, ‘The Evolving Structure of Directors’ Duties in Europe’ (2014) 15 
European Business Organization Law Review 191, 206. 
894 See footnote 882 and accompanying text in this Chapter.  
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important element in determining the existence of a loyal relationship.895 In terms of joint 
stock companies in Saudi Arabia, the management of such companies is vested in a board 
of directors with broad delegated powers,896 which can be used both for good and bad 
ends;897 in other words, the way in which managerial powers are exercised is likely to 
affect the company’s interest. Therefore, to ensure that such powers are employed to 
advance the company’s interests rather than pursuing their own interests, directors should 
owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty towards the company requiring them to run the company 
solely for its interest.898 This analysis is consistent with the judicial view that regards a 
company manager as one who is entrusted with the management of the company’s 
affairs.899 Since directors can be considered to occupy a position of trust and confidence in 
relation to the exercising of their managerial powers, they are expected to conduct 
themselves in a manner that promotes the general interest of the company. Furthermore, 
the Saudi corporate legislation, as will be explored later, recognises an important aspect of 
loyalty, namely the avoidance of conflicts of interest,900 which is expected to preclude 
directors from advancing their own interests at the expense of those of the company.901 
Since the Saudi law has recognised, to some extent, the aspect of loyalty, it follows that 
there should be an indirect recognition of the affirmative duty of loyalty, which must be 
observed in every decision, including situations where there is a conflict of interests. This 
is because the focus of this duty is to ensure that directors use their managerial powers for 
the benefit of the company rather than for another’s benefit.902  
 
In terms of the good faith requirement, it is clear that CL 2015 imposes no such obligation 
upon directors. Yet, if a director has been seen as standing in an agency relationship with 
the company (i.e., shareholders as a class), it can be said that this director perhaps owes a 
duty of good faith, which can be derived from Sharia principles governing contracts.903 It is 
generally believed that Sharia law recognises the principle of good faith in the contractual 
                                                        
895 See, for example, R Grantham (n 890) 150–151. 
896 See particularly footnotes 315–317 and accompanying text, Chapter 2 in this thesis.  
897 Hart (n 854) 303.  
898 Ibid. It is worth noting that Hart views the fiduciary duty of loyalty as one that should be owed towards 
shareholders. 
899 See Saudi Case No. 1129/3/Q (n 639) 661.  
900 See the discussion in section (4.3) in this Chapter. 
901 This is what the common law literature submits and it also tends to be valid in the Saudi context; see 
Langford (n 888) 217.  
902 Ibid. 
903 As argued in relation to the recognition of the director’s duty of care, the statutory joint stock company is 
set up by a contract and this could justify drawing on contract law principles as an acceptable mode of 
analogy, see section (3.2.2), Chapter 3 in this thesis. 
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context.904 This view is based on some Qur’anic verses905 and the Sunnah,906 which 
signifies that contracting parties must act towards one another with good faith, honesty, 
and trust.907 In practice, from one of few cases reported in the area of contracts, the Saudi 
court affirmed that the principle of good faith, which is well established in Sharia, must be 
observed in all contracts and dealings.908 Presumably, since directors are in an agency 
relationship with the company, they are expected to observe the principle of good faith in 
their managerial conduct.  
 
In this regard, it should be noted here that the reference to contract law in establishing 
directors’ duty of good faith is not very helpful. It might be true to say that the application 
of good faith in the contractual context differs from its application in the fiduciary context, 
an observation that can be found in Anglo-American legal literature and could be equally 
valid in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.909 The main difference is that good faith requires 
more of those in a fiduciary relationship (in this case directors) than it does of those in a 
contractual context.910 Unlike other areas of law, good faith is ‘more goal-specific’ in the 
fiduciary context, as it requires directors to act in the best interest of the company.911 To 
illustrate this point, Coffee explains this difference by saying that while a contracting party 
is allowed to advance its own interest in good faith; this is not the case with respect to a 
fiduciary duty912 because the latter, as a principle, should be a selfless act.913  
 
The main issue here is that the duty of good faith based upon contract law is not consistent 
with the good faith expected from a person in a director’s position, namely acting in the 
best interests of the company. This problem would be better dealt with if the Saudi 
corporate legislation clearly recognised the directors’ duty to act in the company’s 
interests, to which the good faith requirement is tied. The absence of legislative 
recognition, by implication, creates a state of uncertainty as to whether the good faith is a 
                                                        
904 Rayner (n 156) 80; S Al-Theabi, ‘The Principle Of Good Faith In Saudi Law Compared with Other Laws’ 
- in Arabic (2014) 23 Journal of Sharia, Law and Islamic Studies 15, 22–23.  
905 See, for example, Qur’an 4:58. 
906 The Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) says ‘the truthful, trustworthy merchant is with the Prophets, the 
truthful, and the martyrs’, see Jami’ At-Tirmidhi (Book of Business, Hadith 1209).  
907 Al-theabi (n 904) 22–23.  
908 The Board of Grievances, Case No. 6504/1/Q, Appeal Division Decision No. 1/AS/331, 2010 (1431H), 
1875.  
909 See, for example, E Nowicki, ‘A Director’s Good Faith’ (2007) 55 Buffalo Law Review 457. 
910 Ibid 484–485 and 508–512. 
911 Ibid 484–485.  
912 J Coffee, ‘The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role’ (1989) 89 
Columbia Law Review 1618, 1658. 
913 Ibid.  
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freestanding duty distinct from the broad duty of loyalty. The effects of such an issue are 
considered in section (4.2.3.2). 
 
While the Saudi CL 2015 does not contain any mention of duties to promote the 
company’s interests and to act in good faith, the situation is noticeably different with 
regard to companies listed in the Saudi stock market. The CGRs 2017, as did their 
predecessor of 2006,914 clearly recognise the director’s obligation to act for the benefit of 
the company.915 This is also the case in relation to the good faith requirement, where 
article 30(17) requires a director to act in good faith. It should be asserted, however, that 
provisions of the CGRs 2017 are only applicable to listed companies and do not rule on 
matters concerning the governance of unlisted companies. This may raise a question about 
whether fiduciary duties, in the first place, were designed and introduced in company law 
to address issues exclusively related to the securities market. The answer to this question is 
definitely not. This is because the duty of loyalty, as explained above, is one of the 
elements of fiduciary obligation owed by a person who is in a fiduciary relationship with 
another; it should be observed by directors in every decision made, regardless of the nature 
of company (private or public, listed or unlisted). This suggests that it is inappropriate to 
establish the duty of loyalty independent of legislation. 
 
4.2.3 Main components of the duty to act in good faith: Interpretation and 
application 
 
As has been discussed, essential elements of the affirmative duty of loyalty (the duty to act 
in good faith and in the company’s interests) can be established implicitly in 
Saudi CL 2015, whereas the position of the UK CA 2006 is much clearer with regard to the 
formulation of the elements of the duty. The implied recognition of the duty has limits and 
inevitably makes room for uncertainty as to the interpretation of the duty of loyalty, 
including the legal standard for judicial review of decisions. Through comparison with the 
UK law, the following sub-sections will examine some areas of deficiency in the Saudi law 
governing the duty of loyalty. 
  
                                                        
914 Article 11(c) and (d) of the CGRs 2006. 
915 Article 30(17) of the CGRs 2017.  
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4.2.3.1 Good faith: A standard for assessing directors’ behaviour in the United 
Kingdom law 
 
Legally speaking, the concept of good faith or bona fides can be understood either as 
performing ‘honestly, with the best of intentions’ or as a ‘genuine’ act.916 While the former 
is likely to be subjectively applied, the latter requires a consideration of objective 
factors.917As far as the UK judicial approach is concerned, the traditional statement as to 
the affirmative duty of loyalty was delivered in Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd by Lord Greene 
who ruled that it was a matter for directors’ bona fides, not the court, to decide which 
decisions serve the company’s interests.918 The test applied here is a subjective one, namely 
the directors’ state of mind.919 Many judicial rulings have been in favour of subjective good 
faith such as the one found in Regentcrest Plc (in liq.).920 In this case Lord Jonathan 
explained that the good faith standard was not about whether a director’s action, after 
being objectively reviewed by the court, ‘was in fact in the interests of the company’ or 
‘whether the court, had it been in the position of the director at a relevant time, might have 
acted differently’.921 More precisely, the directors’ duty to act bona fidely in the company’s 
interest is ‘a subjective one’ in which if the director ‘honestly believed that he[/she] was 
acting in the best interests of the company he[/she] was not in breach’.922 
 
In line with the common law duty, section 172(1) of the CA 2006 expressly places 
directors under the obligation to act in good faith. Given the similarity between the 
statement of the pre-2006 duty and the wording of section 172(1), the subjective approach 
is likely to be the one taken by the court in determining compliance with section 172(1).923 
In practice, just as the common law duty was regarded as subjective, so the duty found in 
section 172(1) is a subjective one, as affirmed by the case of Cobden Investments Ltd,924 
and seemingly by the case of Madoff Securities International Ltd. (in liq.).925 Hence, it 
                                                        
916 L Sealy, ‘Bona Fide and Proper Purpose in Corporate Decisions’ (1989) 15 Monash U L Rev 265, 269. 
917 Ibid. 
918 Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd. (n 882) 306. 
919 R Langford And I Ramsay, ‘Directors’ Duty to Act in the Interests of the Company: Subjective or 
Objective?’ (2015) 2 Journal Of Business Law 173, 175–176. 
920 Regentcrest plc (in liq.) v Cohen & Anor (2001) BCC 494 . 
921 Ibid 513. 
922 Ibid. 
923 See A Keay, ‘Good Faith and Directors’ Duty to Promote the Success of their Company’ (2011) 32 
Company Lawyer 138, 139 – 140. 
924 Cobden Investments Limited v RWM Langport Ltd (n 883) para [53]. 
925 Madoff Securities International Limited (In Liq.) v Raven (n 884) paras [188]–[190]. Although this case 
did not discuss section 172 in details, it clearly states that the section codified the common law.  
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might be true to say that directors are in breach of their duty to promote the success of the 
company if they were to fail to satisfy the subjective standard of good faith.926  
 
Nonetheless, it seems that there are instances where the court can take objective factors 
into consideration. For example, in the case of Charterbridge Corp Ltd,927 it was said that 
where a director fails to consider whether an action is in the company’s interest, the court, 
in such an instance, can question whether ‘an intelligent and honest man in the position of 
a director of the company concerned, could, in the whole of the existing circumstances, 
have reasonably believed that [the actions] were for the benefit of the company’.928 The test 
applied in such an instance is an objective one and has been adopted in some cases929 and 
appears to be a part of the UK law governing directors’ affirmative duty of loyalty.930 It is 
noteworthy that even in situations where the court applies the subjective test, it seems 
difficult for directors to convince the court that they honestly considered that they were 
acting for the benefits of the company, if the directors’ act results in a serious harm to the 
company.931 
 
To sum up, it is clear that the duty found in section 172(1) is a standard of good faith 
concerned with the directors’ intention,932 in which the concept of good faith has 
traditionally been defined as the directors’ ‘state of mind’ that needs to be observed while 
exercising managerial discretion.933 Without the good faith requirement, the core duty of 
loyalty will be left without a definition934 and, more importantly, without an appropriate 
standard of liability. Indeed, it is broadly accepted in the UK that the need to act in good 
faith is part of the directors’ duty of loyalty to work for the company’s benefit, as 
illustrated by section 172 of the CA 2006 and its predecessor (the common law duty to act 
in good faith in the interests of the company).935 
  
                                                        
926 Keay (n 6) 128. 
927 Charterbridge Corporation Ltd. v Lloyds Bank Ltd (1970) Ch 62 . 
928 Ibid 74. 
929 See Keay (n 923) 141; Langford and Ramsay (n 919) 179. 
930 See Madoff Securities International Limited (In Liq.) v Raven (n 884) para [194].  
931 See Regentcrest plc (in liq.) v Cohen & Anor (n 920) 513 & 514. 
932 Keay (n 6) 131, 132. 
933 This argument is made in relation to the US Delaware corporate law and it also pertains to other common 
law jurisdictions (e.g., the UK and Canada), see Strine et al. (n 892) 633 and 663–665. For the UK, see 
Grantham (n 890) 151, 154, 156. 
934 Strine et al. (n 892) 644. 
935 See, for example, Keay (n 860) 98. 
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4.2.3.2 The standard of liability: Does the Saudi law make it right and clear? 
 
While the position of the UK law is quite clear, that is, that compliance with the statutory 
duty found in section 172(1) is determined by referring to directors’ good faith, the Saudi 
law is not as clear in relation to the standard of liability for the breach of duty of loyalty. 
As has been argued above,936 the necessity to act in the company’s interests and the good 
faith requirement can be, in an implicit way, established individually in Saudi law, 
particularly the CL 2015, but this does not necessarily combine them into a single duty. It 
is difficult to conclude that compliance with the duty of loyalty is determined by meeting 
the standard of good faith in Saudi law without a clear legislative or judicial grounding for 
such a statement. Further, even with the clear reference to the duty of good faith and the 
need to act in the company’s interests in both the CGRs 2017 and their predecessors of 
2006,937 there is nothing in the wording of the both Regulations suggesting that the good 
faith requirement is a part of the broader duty of loyalty to act for the benefit of the 
company. This legal uncertainty supports the argument for the freestanding duty of good 
faith. It is indeed one of deficiencies in the law governing the duty of loyalty if the good 
faith requirement is separated from the loyalty obligation. The following points explain the 
reasons behind such an argument:  
 
First, the close linguistic relationship between the principle of good faith and the duty of 
loyalty, as some argue, supports the argument that good faith should not be separate from 
the broad duty of loyalty.938 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the terms of 
‘fidelity’, ‘loyalty’ and ‘faithfulness’ are linguistic synonyms for ‘faith’.939 The concept of 
good faith, which comes from the Latin bona fides, is defined as meaning: ‘loyalty’, 
‘truthfulness’ and specifically ‘honesty or sincerity of intention’.940 This broadly means 
that action taken in good faith or bona fides is often understood as one taken with faithful 
and loyal intention and purpose.941 Similarly, in Arabic, the term ‘faith’ or ‘fides’ (niyah)942 
is described in the leading Arabic dictionary of Le-san AL-Arab, as ‘intention’, ‘purpose’ 
and ‘determination towards something’.943 Putting ‘good’ and ‘faith’ together, the phrase 
‘good faith’ (husn al-niyah in Arabic) can be defined as the intention of honesty and 
                                                        
936 See generally the discussion in section (4.2.2) in this Chapter.  
937 See particularly footnotes 914–915 and accompanying text in this Chapter.  
938 Strine et al. (n 892) 644–648. 
939 Oxford English Dictionary, ‘faith, n. and int.’ (OED 3rd edn, Oxford University Press June 2014) 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/67760> accessed 12 October 2017. 
940 Oxford English Dictionary, ‘good faith, n., int., and adj.’ (OED 3rd edn, Oxford University Press June 
2014) <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/363783> accessed 12 October 2017. 
941 Strine et al. (n 892) 646, 647. 
942 H Faruqi, Faruqi’s Law Dictionary (5th edn, Beirut, Librairie du liban 2006) 279, 289. 
943 A Kabeer et al. (eds), The Arabic Tongue for I’bn Mandoor (Cairo, Dar Al-Ma’ref). 
 123 
 
integrity in which the lack of good faith in Sharia is evidenced by acting dishonestly, 
unfaithfully and disloyally.944 Thus, from such a linguistic argument, there is no sense to 
divorce the term ‘good faith’ from its synonymous concepts of loyalty and trustfulness. In 
other words, in linguistic terms, there is no justification for divorcing the good faith 
requirement from the directors duty of loyalty in the corporate context.  
 
Second, one of effects of separating the principle of good faith from the duty of loyalty is 
to leave the latter with an inappropriate and rigid standard of liability. As has been shown 
in the UK, good faith is used to define the state of mind that must be adhered to by loyal 
directors; otherwise directors would be liable for the breach of the duty mentioned in 
section 172(1) of the CA 2006. To clarify this point, regardless of the nature of the 
standard used, the UK courts’ analysis is apparently limited to a consideration of whether 
directors acted in good faith and does not involve the question of whether a decision made 
advanced the company’s success.945 As a result, the UK court is prevented from examining 
directors’ judgement in relation to the company’s success.946 Returning to the Saudi law, 
neither the CL of 2015 and of 1965 nor the case law specifies the standard of liability for 
the breach of duty to act in the company’s interests. A closer look at the nature of Sharia 
law uncovers the tendency of Sharia towards objectivity in which standards of assessing 
behaviour in Islamic jurisprudence are likely to be objective, not subjective.947 Having 
borne in mind that if the good faith requirement is separate from the loyalty duty, the court, 
by implication, would be permitted to engage in the objective consideration of whether the 
directors in fact acted in the general interests of the company. Directors’ state of mind, as a 
consequence, is completely irrelevant in deciding where the interests of the company lie. 
This suggests that the court would be allowed to place itself in the directors’ position, 
deciding what is good and bad for the company.948 With this approach, directors tend to be 
subject to a high possibility of being liable for the breach of their duty of loyalty. Indeed, 
in a situation where the court follows a strict approach to assessing directors’ business 
decisions, it is likely, as some argue, to reduce the shareholders’ wealth949 because 
directors would inevitably make low risk decisions in order to avoid personal liability.950 
With a greater concern for personal liability, gifted persons might also avoid accepting a 
                                                        
944 Al-theabi (n 904) 21–23. 
945 See generally Keay (n 923); Grantham (n 890) 156–158.  
946 Keay (n 923) 143. 
947 Al-Sanhuri (n 653) 105.  
948 This is the most likely scenario of objectiveness in the context of the duty to act in the company’s interests 
where the good faith principle is distinct from the duty of loyalty, see Langford and Ramsay (n 919) 174.  
949 Easterbrook and Fischel (n 301) 93–94.  
950 Ibid 94. 
 124 
 
directorship.951 This issue will likely be worsened by the fact that the court’s ex post view 
about whether a decision had in fact served the interests of the company will be reached 
with the benefit of hindsight. The problem with hindsight bias952 is that the court reviews 
the business decision with the knowledge of the result of the decision that was taken by the 
directors with uncertain knowledge of the outcome.953 This would increase the possibility 
of failure at the time of making the decision, on the one hand, and decrease the probability 
of decisions’ validity, on the other hand, making directors liable for the breach when they 
were not.954 While some business decisions will, in fact, lead to a successful outcome, 
others will appear wrong with hindsight.955 If directors can be held liable for decisions that 
look wrong with hindsight, they will, as a result, be reluctant to take high-risk decisions 
due to the greater possibility of being held legally liable.956 Thus, the directors’ state of 
mind, rather than whether a decision in fact serves the general interests of the company, 
should be the subject of the court’s analysis when determining compliance with the 
affirmative duty of loyalty. This cannot be accomplished by treating good faith as a 
freestanding obligation, distinct from the broad duty of loyalty. 
  
4.2.3.3 Interests that directors are required to consider: An area of uncertainty in 
Saudi law 
 
For the court to determine whether there has been a breach of the duty of loyalty, it is 
expected to engage in the question of whose interests directors should serve. The answer to 
such a question is necessary in order for directors to discharge their loyalty obligation 
successfully. Considering the Saudi law first, the CL 2015 lacks a general statement 
establishing the duty of loyalty and therefore it is hard to ascertain the exact position of the 
CL 2015. For listed companies, the need for directors to act in the general interests of the 
company was expressly included in article 11(d) of the previous CGRs 2006. Although 
such a sub-article occupied the realm of ‘soft law’ in that it was not enforceable under the 
general law, it was assumed that it was followed in practice because investors expected this 
from the company’s management. With the new CGRs 2017, the duty to act for the benefit 
of the company is also recognised, as set forth in article 30(17). As with many legal 
provisions found in the Saudi company law, both provisions have been drafted in an 
                                                        
951 Ibid.  
952 Regentcrest plc (in liq.) v Cohen & Anor (n 920) 515, where the court expressed its awareness of the 
danger of hindsight bias.  
953 Kershaw (n 310) 345. 
954 Ibid. 
955 G Avilov et al., ‘General Principles of Company Law for Transition Economies’(1999) 24 Journal of 




obscure fashion, providing wide room for interpretation. This is because in both 
Regulations the reference was made to the concept of the company’s interests, which is an 
elusive one.  
 
It is true to assert that directors’ duty is owed to the company that solely has, by 
implication, the right to decide whether or not an errant director should be sued for a 
breach of his duty.957 However, in relation to the content of the duty of loyalty (i.e., the 
requirement to act in the general interests of the company), it is reasonable to argue that the 
company should be understood as recognising various interest groups who are invested in 
the success of the company, such as shareholders, creditors and employees.958 Hence, it 
might be correct to describe the company, in the context of whose interests should be 
served, as ‘different things in different contexts’.959  
 
On the one hand, the phrase ‘the interests of the company’ can be interpreted as being 
synonymous with the interests of its shareholders. This is consistent with the narrow 
meaning of the duty of loyalty to the firm as referring to the interests of shareholders.960 In 
spite of the lack of judicial guidance, it can be argued from some legal provisions of the 
company law system that the board of directors is likely to use its powers in furthering the 
shareholders’ interests; for example, the idea that statutory companies exist solely to 
maximise profits for shareholders can be said to be the basis of company law in Saudi 
Arabia.961 Company directors are primarily accountable to shareholders who, through the 
general meeting, can initiate a company’s legal proceeding against directors.962 
Furthermore, shareholders, who are only entitled to have a say on directors’ appointments 
and removals, may influence directors’ decisions.963 Moreover, in some cases, directors are 
under a legal obligation to act in the interests of shareholders.964 Such factors would 
therefore place directors under pressure to consider the interests of shareholders while 
making decisions. 
 
On the other hand, an understanding of the company’s interests may include the need to 
take into account the interests of non-shareholder constituencies. For example, a proposed 
                                                        
957 See article 79 of the CL 2015. The issue of enforcement of breaches of directors’ duties by way of private 
action are discussed in detail in Chapter 5 in this thesis.  
958 E Ferran, Company Law and Corporate Finance (Oxford, OUP 1999) 124.  
959 Sealy (n 916) 269. 
960 Hart (n 854) 302.  
961 See the definition of statutory company set out in article 2 of the CL 2015. 
962 Article 79 of the CL 2015. 
963 See footnotes 436–448 and accompanying text, Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
964 Article 3(a) of the MARs 2007. 
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decision to reduce the equity capital may adversely affect the interests of creditors, and that 
should be, in some circumstances, taken into consideration when making the decision.965 
For listed companies, it is clear that the purpose of CGRs 2017 is to protect the interests of 
shareholders and non-shareholder constituencies,966 and put a general framework for the 
rights of non-shareholder constituencies in place.967 In addition, in a takeover, the board of 
directors of both companies is required to consider the interests of employees and 
creditors.968  
 
It appears from the discussion above that the phrase ‘the interests of the company’ is an 
open-ended one that can embrace the interests of many corporate constituencies. The main 
point to make is that while there can be decisions where the interests of various groups 
coincide with one another, this is not the case in other decisions made by directors. An 
example of conflict between the interests of different constituencies might be the decision 
to relocate production to a country with cheaper labour costs; this may be beneficial for 
shareholders and creditors but not for employees who would become redundant.969 Even if 
the company’s interests are viewed as separate from those of its constituencies,970 there is a 
possibility of conflicts between the interests of the company as an entity and the interests 
of shareholders.971 This is also the case even with a certain category of corporate 
constituency, for example, a proposed decision to change the company’s capital structure, 
which may not have the same effect on all classes of shareholder.972 Having acknowledged 
the possibility of conflicting interests, while it is crucial to design a duty for directors that 
protects them, it is more important to define the extent to which potentially competing 
interests are to be considered. As Ferran suggests, it is a matter of ‘prioritising’ various 
conflicting interests.973 Indeed, the reference to ‘the interests of the company’ within the 
legal formulation of the duty of loyalty is likely to confer on directors a very wide 
discretion to determine what the interests of the company are. Therefore, in the absence of 
clear rules governing the priority of relevant interests, it might be true to say that company 
                                                        
965 Article 145 of CL 2015.  
966 Article 2(a) of the CGRs 2017. 
967 Article 3(7) of the CGRs 2017. 
968 Article 3(k) of the MARs 2007. 
969 Ferran (n 958) 125. 
970 A perception that is generally accepted more in continental Europe (e.g., France) compared with the 
common law jurisdictions; see The Boards of Directors of Listed Companies in France, Vienot I Report, 
(CNPF and AFEP, July 1995) 7 <http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/vienot1_en.pdf> accessed 
1 December 2016. 
971 For example, the takeover bid may benefit present shareholders if they have been offered a high price, but 






directors would be given the opportunity to ‘play off competing interests against each other 
and to use them to mask [their] own failings’.974 This would arguably render the 
shareholders’ monitoring of the director’s conduct challenging and, consequently, weaken 
the accountability of the directors (who could be controlling shareholders). 
 
4.2.3.4 The priority for shareholder constituency in section 172(1) of the CA 2006 
 
The UK company law has departed from any potential ambiguity connected to the phrase 
‘company’s interests’ and has formulated a more precise meaning of interests that is to 
benefit the shareholder constituency.975 Before section172 was enacted, there had been no 
legislative compulsion for directors to act in the best interests of shareholders. This is 
compounded by the fact that the judicial rulings, as has been noticed,976 have been divided 
between those suggesting directors should be guided by the shareholder value approach,977 
and others that emphasise the interests of company entity, which involves more than the 
interests of the shareholders.978 From the legal perspective, the phrase ‘the interests of the 
company’, articulated as part of the old common law duty of loyalty, did not indicate 
preference for shareholders over other corporate constituencies979 in which it appears that it 
was left to the discretion of directors to determine the company’s interests.980  
 
Therefore, it can be said that section 172(1) in part upholds the shareholder-centred 
approach.981 However, the section includes a reservation on the shareholder value principle, 
which is the need for due consideration to be paid to a number of factors including non-
shareholder interests.982 Notably, what makes section 172(1) different from the previous 
case law is not allowing directors to consider the interests of non-shareholders,983 but 
                                                        
974 Ibid. 
975 A Keay, ‘Moving Towards Stakeholderism? Constituency Statutes, Enlightened Shareholder Value, and 
More: Much Ado About Little?’ (2011) 22 EBLR 1, 22 and 26. 
976 See, for example, A Keay, ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value, The Reform of the Duties of Company 
Directors and the Corporate Objective’ (2006) Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 335, 341–
346.  
977 See, for example, Parke v Daily News Ltd. (1961) Ch 927, 963; Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas (1951) 
Ch 286, 291. 
978 See, for example, Fulham Football Club Ltd & Ors v Cabra Estates plc (1992) BCC 836 , 876 where the 
court said that directors owe their duties to the company and the latter ‘is more than just the sum total of its 
members’. 
979 Keay (n 975) 26. 
980 J Lowry, ‘The Duty of Loyalty of Company Directors: Bridging the Accountability Gap Through Efficient 
Disclosure’ (2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal 607, 614. 
981 See section (4.2.1) in this Chapter. 
982 Section 172(1)(a)–(f) of the CA 2006. 
983 This is because the UK law prior to the CA 2006 had not prevented directors from considering the 
interests of stakeholders while acting for the benefit of the company. This is exemplified by the lack of any 
restriction on directors’ discretion with regard to the employees’ interests. See, for example, Hutton v West 
Cork Railway Co (1883) 23 ChD 654, 672, 673. 
 128 
 
obliging directors to consider stakeholder interests when promoting the company’s success 
for the benefit of all shareholders.984 As explained above in the discussion on the 
background to section 172, the enlightened shareholder value adopted by the section 
includes the idea that the consideration of stakeholders’ interests is a means of achieving 
the success of the company for the benefit of all shareholders.985 This clearly means that 
the duty to promote the company’s success for the benefit of all shareholders is prioritised 
over the due consideration for the interests of non-shareholder constituencies.986 
 
While the enlightened shareholder value embedded in section 172 has perhaps put an end 
to any uncertainty concerning what the interests of the company are,987 the new legislative 
provision has brought to the UK legal landscape a number of unresolved questions. The 
main problem minimising the effectiveness of section 172 in practice is that non-
shareholder constituencies mentioned in the section are left without legal remedy988 and 
indeed ‘a right without a remedy is worthless’.989 Although directors are required to have 
regard to the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, there is no right for any 
stakeholder, other than a shareholder,990 to bring a derivative action against directors in the 
case of the latter’s failure to consider their interests.991 This means that one can envisage 
legal action being brought by a shareholder on the basis of directors’ failure to consider the 
long-term matters while making decisions992 or to act fairly between company’s 
shareholders.993 However, in relation to the directors’ duty towards non-shareholders, the 
                                                        
984 Keay (n 975) 26. 
985 See footnotes 877–880 and accompanying text in this Chapter. 
986 Keay (n 976) 350. 
987 See the statement of Lord Goldsmith before the Grand Committee, the House of Lords (6 February 2006 
col GC255) <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldhansrd/vo060206/text/60206-29.htm> 
accessed 13 December 2016. 
988 This section has attracted a negative response from the beginning in relation to many issues, including the 
lack of legal remedy for non-shareholder constituencies in company law; see, for instance, D Arsalidou, 
‘Shareholder Primacy in Cl.173 of the Company Law Bill 2006’ (2007) 28 Company Lawyer 67, 68; A 
Keay, ‘Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006: An Interpretation and Assessment’ (2007) 28 Company 
Lawyer 106, 109. 
989 See M McDaniel, ‘Bondholders and Stockholders’ (1988) 13 Journal of Corporation Law 205, 309. 
990 Shareholders are the only stakeholders who are entitled to sue directors for breach of their duty found in 
section 172 through the initiation of a derivative proceeding. For more details, see section (5.5), Chapter 5 in 
this thesis. 
991 E Lynch, ‘Section 172: A Ground-breaking Reform f Director’s Duties, or the Emperor’s New Clothes?’ 
(2012) 33 Company Lawyer 196, 200. 
992 See section 172(1)(a) of the CA 2006. However, according to an empirical study that examined how 
lawyers’ advice may affect directors’ and shareholders’ response to section 172, it seems that lawyers 
perhaps advise their shareholder clients that there are a very few situations where derivative actions could be 
brought successfully against directors based upon section 172(1)(a); see J Loughrey, A Keay and L Cerioni, 
‘Legal Practitioners, Enlightened Shareholder Value and the Shaping of Corporate Governance’  (2008) 8 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 79, 106–107. 
993 See section 172(1)(f) of the CA 2006. As one commentator opined, it is, however, ‘unlikely for individual 
members to bring an action based upon sub-section (f), unless he could demonstrate that unfairness caused by 
the director’s breach of his duty had damaged the company itself’; see A Alcock, ‘An Accidental Change to 
Directors’ Duties?’ (2009) 30 Company Lawyer 362, 367. 
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section is left ineffectual in a practical sense. On the one hand, directors might generally 
utilise section 172 to protect themselves against any legal actions brought by shareholders 
if they have regard to one of factors (a)–(f) listed in the statutory provision.994 On the other 
hand, directors fail to do so, there is nothing in the CA 2006 that suggests any real threat of 
legal consequence at the hand of non-shareholder groups.995 Hence, whether the wording of 
section 172 enhances the accountability of directors is doubtful.996 
 
To sum up the UK company law position in relation to non-shareholder rights, it appears 
that the legal protection of stakeholders, other than shareholders ‘is left not to any specific 
rights . . . but wholly to the discretion of directors’.997 To be precise, the legal protection of 
non-shareholder constituencies seemingly falls beyond the scope of company law.998 
Shareholder constituency is the only stakeholder that can enforce the statutory duty found 
in s 172(1). Therefore, it can be said that the questionable element of section 172(1) is that 
the due consideration to non-shareholders’ interests is practically ineffective, a perception 
that leads some commentators to opine that section 172(1) is no more than a codification of 
the shareholder value approach.999 Given the above discussions, it is appropriate to suggest 
that section 172(1), by implication, does not go further than a tool for educating directors 
as to the need to have regard to non-shareholder interests and is unlikely to expose 
directors to an increased level of legal liability than under the previous law.1000 
 
                                                        
994 Lynch (n 991) 200. 
995 Ibid. 
996 Ibid. 
997 Keay (n 6) 169. 
998 Lynch (n 991) 202–203. 
999 See, for example, ibid 201. 
1000 Alcock (n 993) 368, referring to J Bird’s statement in A Alcock, The Rt Hon the Lord Millett, M Todd 
QC, Gore-Browne on Companies (45th edn, Bristol Jordans 2009) Ch 15 [10A]. It is noteworthy that the UK 
CA 2006 was reformed in 2013 to include a strategic report (Chapter 4A of the CA 2006), which inter alia 
intends to promote non-shareholders’ interests through the disclosure requirement. The objective of the 
strategic report, as section 414C (1) provides, is ‘to inform members of the company and help them to assess 
how the directors have performed their duty under section 172’. According to sections 414C (2) and (3), the 
report needs to include a fair and balanced analysis of the development, performance and status of the 
company in addition to an account of the main risks the company faces. What is relevant to our discussion 
here is that section 414C (4) requires directors to incorporate in the review, where appropriate, non-financial 
key performance indictors including data on environmental and employee issues. For quoted companies, the 
report should, as section 414C (7) (b) provides, contain information about environmental and social matters, 
‘the company’s employees’ and ‘the community and human rights issues’. The CA 2006 makes it clear in 
section 414C (7) that a report that omits any of the non-financial information mentioned in sub-section (7) (b) 
must declare which of them has been omitted. It is worth mentioning that there has been a reform proposal 
suggested by the UK government for strengthening, among other things, the engagement of non-shareholder 
constituencies and for requiring companies to explain how directors can effectively discharge their duty with 
regard to stakeholders’ interests under section 172. For more detailed background on the strategic report and 
the recent reform proposal by the UK government , see K Chalaczkiewicz-Ladna, I Esser and I MacNeil, 
‘Engaging Stakeholders in The UK in Corporate Decision-making Through Strategic Reporting: An 
Empirical Study’ (October 2017) < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3049203> accessed 
17 January 2018. 
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4.3 The duty to avoid conflicts of interest: The underlying principles that shape 
the framework of the duty 
 
One of the fundamental aspects of the duty of loyalty is to prevent directors from engaging 
in self-interest activities. In common law jurisdictions such as the UK, the law imposes a 
widely understood requirement upon directors to avoid any form of conflict of interests.1001 
This is illustrated, as will be shown below, by the development of equity rules of no-
conflict and no-profit that govern the relationship between a director as a fiduciary and a 
person in a position of trust, and the company. This introductory section will highlight the 
two rules of no-conflict and no-profit in the UK with examining the extent to which the 
Saudi corporate statute has recognised the rules in the corporate context. 
 
4.3.1 No-conflict rule 
 
In the UK, the duty to prevent conflicts of interest is the critical essence of the fiduciary 
relationship.1002 If directors do not conform to this obligation, they might be regarded as 
performing their fiduciary duties disloyally and unfaithfully.1003 The no-conflict rule in the 
context of conflicts involving directors was clearly stated in the case law before the 
CA 2006; for example, in the case of Aberdeen Rly Co v Blaikie Bros,1004 the House of 
Lords ruled that a director cannot ‘enter into engagements in which he has or can have a 
personal interest conflicting or which possibly may conflict with the interests of those 
whom he is bound to protect’.1005 Following the introduction of the CA 2006, it is one of 
directors’ obligation, under section 175, to ‘avoid a situation in which he has, or can have, 
direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interests of the 
company’.1006The scope of section 175 is wide enough to include all conflicts between the 
company’s interests and directors’ interests,1007 such as those arising from the directors’ 
exploitation of any company’s ‘property, information, or opportunity’.1008 Section 175 does 
not, however, apply to a conflict of interests resulting from a situation where a director 
                                                        
1001 Gerner-Beuerle and Schuster (n 893) 212.  
1002 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew (n 624) 18. 
1003 Ibid. 
1004 Aberdeen Rail Co v Blaikie Brothers (1843-1860) All ER Rep 249. This case is about a self-dealing 
transaction, but the no-conflict rule applies to self-dealing and to corporate opportunities.  
1005 Ibid 252. 
1006 Section 175(1) of the CA 2006. 
1007 See Explanatory Notes to the CA 2006, para 339. 
1008 Section 175(2) of the CA 2006. 
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enters into a contract with the company (self-dealing transactions),1009 because such a 
situation is governed by section 177 or section 182 of the CA 2006. 
 
With regard to the Saudi law, there is no statutory provision placing directors under a 
general obligation to avoid conflict of interests. Instead, the statutory approach is to 
regulate a particular director’s conduct involving a conflict of interests in a separate article. 
Hence, it can be asserted that the no-conflict rule is recognised in both the 1965 version 
and the 2015 version of the CL. The rule underlies more specific provisions governing 
directors, such as the regulation of self-dealing transactions set out in article 71(1) of the 
CL 2015 (article 69 of the CL 1965), and the regulation of directors’ competition with the 
company in article 72 of the CL 2015 (article 70 of the CL 1965). Recently, Saudi law has 
recognised the obligation imposed upon directors to avoid exploiting the company’s 
secrets for their own benefit;1010 the no-conflict rule underlies such an obligation.  
 
4.3.2 No-profit rule 
 
In addition to the no-conflict rule, the UK law includes another principle in regulating the 
issue of conflicts of interest that prevents a fiduciary from making a profit.1011 In the 
context of company law, the no-profit principle is mentioned in Regal (Hasting) v 
Gulliver.1012 In this case Regal (Hastings) Ltd (Regal) owned a cinema and was interested 
in obtaining long-term leases on two cinemas. Regal formed a subsidiary company, 
Amalgamated Ltd, to buy the two cinema leases. However, Regal did not have adequate 
funds to provide Amalgamated Ltd with £5,000 of equity capital and was only able to raise 
£2,000. The company’s directors and its solicitor agreed to provide £2,500 of equity capital 
(£500 each), and the chairman found outside subscribers to provide £500; thus, the capital 
required by Amalgamated Ltd. was met. The directors made a profit on the subsequent sale 
of the whole company including Amalgamated Ltd. The new owners of Regal appointed a 
new board which brought legal action against the former directors to recover the profit they 
received from purchasing and selling their shares in Amalgamated Ltd.1013 The House of 
Lords held that the directors were liable to the company for the profit that had been made 
from the exploitation of an opportunity that had become available ‘by reason’ and ‘in the 
                                                        
1009 Section 175(3) of the CA 2006. 
1010 Article 74 of the CL 2015.  
1011 George Bray v John Rawlinson Ford (1896) AC 44 , 51. 
1012 Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v Gulliver (1967) 2 AC 134. This case sits in the context of corporate 
opportunities. 
1013 Ibid 135–137. The facts of this case are written down as mentioned by Viscount Sankey. 
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course’ of their directorship.1014 It is important to say that the Regal (Hastings) case, as has 
been noted,1015 is an example of a case decided on the no-profit rule without reference to 
the no-conflict rule.1016 This supported the view that believes that the no-profit rule is 
stand-alone and independent from the no-conflict rule.1017 As Koh claims, it may be more 
accurate to treat the rules as separate as it is probable in certain circumstances that it will 
only be possible to hold directors accountable for the breach of his fiduciary duty in 
accordance with one of these rules.1018 
 
Interestingly, there is disagreement as to whether the CA 2006 clearly recognises the no-
profit rule or not. While some assume that the no-profit rule is codified in section 176,1019 
others suggest that the CA 2006 lacks clear mention of the no-profit rule.1020 It appears that 
the no-profit rule is not directly stated in the CA 2006 and section 176 cannot be viewed as 
codifying the no-profit rule. While section 176 concerns benefit received by a director 
from a third party because of his/her being a director or doing something as a director,1021 
this is different from the no-profit rule. As one commentator correctly explains, it is true 
that the directors in the Regal (Hastings) case, for instance, made a profit by reason of their 
directorship, the benefit resulted from selling the shares to a third party. However, the 
directors did not receive this benefit because of their position in the company, but because 
they owned shares.1022 Kershaw perceives that s 176 was simply introduced to ban the 
receipt of benefits such as bribes that result from their occupying the position of 
director.1023 Nevertheless, this does not mean that the position of common law will be 
overruled, enabling directors to keep the profit made because of and in the course of their 
directorship.1024 It rather means that the obligation to avoid conflict of interests requires 
directors, as a general rule, not to make a profit as a result of their directorship.1025 Put 
differently, the director is only accountable under the no-profit principle once the breach of 
the no-conflict rule has been established. 
 
                                                        
1014 Ibid 147–149.  
1015 See A McClean, ‘The Theoretical Basis of the Trustee’s Duty of Loyalty’ (1969) 7 Alta L Rev 218, 224.  
1016 See Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v Gulliver (n 1012) 139.  
1017 See Quarter Master UK Ltd v Pyke (2004) EWHC 1815, para [55]. For recent cases viewing the no-profit 
rule as an application of no-conflict rule, see Towers v Premier Waster Management Ltd (2012) BCC 72 ,73.  
1018 P Koh ‘Once a Director, Always a Fiduciary’ (2003) 62 Cambridge Law Journal 403, 406.  
1019 See, for example, J Lowry, ‘Codifying the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: The (UK) Companies Act 
2006’ (2012) 5 International Review of Law 1,7. 
1020 See, for example, Davies and Worthington (n 2) 543. 
1021 See section 176(1) of the CA 2006. 
1022 D Kershaw (n 310) 574. 
1023 Ibid.  
1024 Ibid.  
1025 See Explanatory Notes to the CA 2006, para 338. 
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Under Saudi law, neither the CL 1965 nor the CL 2015 involves any provision requiring 
directors to avoid making profit because of and in the course of their tenure. The effect of 
this non-recognition is evident when the issue of exploitation of corporate opportunities is 
discussed below.1026 Further, the CL 2015, as its predecessor of 1965, remains silent about 
whether the disgorging of profits is available for the company as a remedy for the breach in 
situations involving conflicts of interest. The only exception to this is found in article 71(2) 
of the CL 2015. It clearly states that the directors’ engagement in self-dealing transactions 
without meeting the disclosure/approval requirement could trigger their liability to account 
to the company for profits made, as one of remedies for the breach of no-self-dealing 
rule.1027 The wording of article 71(2) suggests that the fact that a director has made a profit 
is not sufficient to impose a liability as the company needs to establish first that the 
director has engaged in an unauthorised self-dealing transaction. 
 
Having considered the underlying rules shaping the framework of the duty to avoid 
conflict of interests, the subsequent task is to discuss the application of the two rules in 
practice. The following two sections will analyse directors’ exploitation and self-dealing 
transactions under the UK and Saudi laws respectively. 
 
4.4 Conflict of Interests: Exploitation of Corporate Opportunity 
 
One of the forms of the breach of the duty of loyalty is directors’ exploitation of an 
investment opportunity or information for their personal benefit at the expense of the 
company’s benefit because such behaviour would constitute a breach of the no-conflict 
rule. In this regard, in order to determine the liability of directors, the question of how the 
law identifies an opportunity or information that then gives rise to a conflict situation must 
be answered.1028 The regulatory approach to the determination of liability should ensure 
that the company and its shareholders are adequately protected from the directors’ self-
interest behaviour. It is also important to specify mechanisms that allow the company to 
authorise any exploitation of business opportunities, such as a regulatory strategy (i.e., 
authorisation) that strikes the balance between control and discretion.1029 The regulation of 
corporate opportunity, which comprises the elements of liability determination and of the 
authorisation mechanisms, is poorly developed in Saudi law. Even with the new 
                                                        
1026 See section (4.4.2) in this Chapter.  
1027 Article 71(2) of the CL 2015. 
1028 The exploitation of an opportunity and information will hereafter simply be referred to as ‘opportunity’, 
unless otherwise stated.  
1029 A Keay, ‘The Authorising of Directors’ Conflicts of Interest: Getting a Balance?’ (2012) 12 Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 129, 136. 
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development brought by the CGRs 2017,1030 there is still room for improvement in terms of 
legal uncertainty and deficiency in this area of law. The following sub-sections will discuss 
the issue of appropriation of corporate opportunities in order to demonstrate the absence of 
sufficient restrictions on directors to engage in such actions in the Saudi law as compared 
to the UK law. 
 
4.4.1 The United Kingdom approach to regulating directors’ exploitation  
 
Section 175(2) of the CA 2006 clearly provides that the directors’ duty to avoid conflict of 
interests applies to the exploitation of corporate opportunities and information. This 
indicates that if directors have personally exploited a corporate opportunity or information 
that would be of interest to the company, they may be held liable for breach of the statutory 
duty found in section 175, due to a conflict between the personal interests of directors and 
those of the company.1031 Usually, such exploitation involves the making of a profit by the 
directors; therefore, the company is entitled to require directors to account for any profit 
made out of unlawful exploitation.1032 
 
The no-conflicts approach to corporate opportunities places its focus on the extent to which 
and the ways in which directors’ personal and company interests conflict.1033 In order to 
determine whether or not there is conflict of interests in connection with corporate 
opportunities depends upon whether the following factors have been taken into 
consideration: does the scope of the company’s interest include any profit-making 
opportunity or only an opportunity that falls within the company’s area of business? Does 
the no-conflict rule only cover the actual conflicts or also possible conflicts?1034 Is it 
relevant for determining the directors’ liability to examine the facts of a case that led to the 
alleged breach of duty to avoid possible conflicts or to consider the equity of the situation? 
The response to these questions may depend on whether the no-conflict rule in its 
application is strict or flexible in regulating corporate opportunities. To explain this point, 
the strict approach assumes the law adopts a broad definition of company’s interests, with 
                                                        
1030 The Saudi law through the CGRs 2017 for the first time treats the director’s exploitation of a business 
opportunity as a form of conflict of interest. 
1031 The UK law’s understanding of this issue of directors’ exploitation of corporate opportunities is known 
as the ‘no-conflicts approach’, see D Kershaw, ‘Lost in Translation: Corporate Opportunities in Comparative 
Perspective’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 603, 605. 
1032 See Cook v Deeks (1916) 1 AC 554, 554, 564, where three directors were found liable because they 
obtained contracts for themselves to the exclusion of the company and had made profit from their position as 
directors. 
1033 D Kershaw, ‘Does It Matter How the Law Thinks About Corporate Opportunities?’ (2005) 25 Legal Stud 




the rule involving the possibility of conflicts irrespective of the reality of those conflicts; 
whereas the flexible approach assumes a limited definition of the company’s interests and 
the allowance of personal exploitation of corporate opportunities so long as there is not 
actual conflict.1035  
 
On the whole, the case law as it developed before codification is seemingly relevant to the 
question of how section 175 of the CA 2006 will be interpreted and applied in practice.1036 
The no-conflicts approach to the directors’ exploitation has been viewed as a strict and 
inflexible one1037 and this is clear from the case law dealing with such opportunistic 
conduct. In Boardman v Phipps,1038 the House of Lords ruled that it was sufficient to prove 
the possibility of conflicts to require a trustee to account for profit even when there was no 
actual conflict.1039 Lord Cohen stated ‘whether or not the trust or the beneficiaries in their 
stead could have taken advantage of the information is immaterial’.1040 As has been pointed 
out,1041 the strict no-conflicts approach was also affirmed in Re Bhullar Bros Ltd,1042 where 
the court found that directors, by personally taking a commercial opportunity to purchase 
real estate that would have been ‘worthwhile’ and ‘commercially attractive’ to the 
company, had placed themselves in ‘a real possibility of conflict’ situation1043 even though 
the directors had obtained the information in their spare time1044 and the company lacked 
the commercial ability to exploit the opportunity.1045 
 
The case of Regal (Hasting),1046 the facts of which were set out earlier,1047 might be 
considered as a clear instance of a case where the strict approach was implemented. In this 
case, directors were held liable for the breach of their fiduciary duty and accountable for 
the profit made, regardless of the fact that the directors were considered to have performed 
bona fide;1048 the company (Regal) was not in a position to take up the opportunity 
because it lacked the financial capability to capitalise on the subsidiary company 
                                                        
1035 Ibid. 
1036 Section 170 (4) of the CA 2006. 
1037 See, for example, Davies and Worthington (n 2) 541, 551. 
1038 Boardman v Phipps (1967) 2 AC 46 . This is a trust law case which also applies to fiduciaries such as 
directors.  
1039 Ibid 69, 94, 103,112, 124. 
1040 Ibid 111. This was the view of the majority in the House of Lords, see ibid 94. 
1041 D Prentice and J Payne, ‘The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine’ (2004) 120 Law Quarterly Review 198, 
200–201. 
1042 Re Bhullar Bros Ltd (2003) BCC 711 . 
1043 Ibid 712. 
1044 Ibid 723. 
1045 Ibid. 
1046 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver (n 1012). 
1047 See footnotes 1012–1013 and accompanying text in this Chapter.  
1048 Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v Gulliver (n 1012) 136. 
 136 
 
(Amalgamated Ltd);1049 the company would not have acquired the lease of cinemas without 
the directors’ assistance,1050 and the company had not suffered any loss, but it rather 
received a profit from the directors’ engagement in making profit for their own benefit.1051  
 
Another instance of inflexibility can be seen in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in 
O’Donnell v Shanahan,1052 which rejected the idea that the director’s liability was reduced 
when exploiting opportunities that fall within the company’s scope of business.1053 Rimer 
stated that directors were subject to the duty of ‘undivided loyalty’ to their company and 
one aspect of that duty was to disclose all opportunities to the company, and it was not for 
directors to decide whether or not the company would be interested in a particular 
opportunity.1054  
 
The strict approach followed by the case law in relation to the regulation of corporate 
opportunities is reaffirmed by section 175(1) of the CA 2006, where the directors’ 
obligation covers not only the actual conflict but also the possibility of conflicts.1055 Section 
175(1) goes further – unlike the common law no-conflict rule – broadening the scope of 
the obligation to cover the avoidance of indirect interest as well as direct ones.1056 Looking 
to section 175(2), the CA 2006 also follows the strict approach by adopting the majority 
view in Boardman v Phipps;1057 the sub-section provides that ‘it is immaterial whether the 
company could take advantage of the property, information or opportunity’. This means 
that a director would be liable for the breach even in the case of the company’s inability to 
exploit a business opportunity.  
 
Importantly, the UK company legislation has, however, contained an important strategy 
that intends to circumvent the inflexibility of the regulation of corporate opportunities, that 
is, the authorisation strategy set forth in sub-section 175(4)(b) of the CA 2006. It provides 
that there is no breach of the duty found in section 175 if the conflict has been authorised 
by the board of directors. In its deliberations on whether the authorisation of directors’ 
                                                        
1049 Ibid 142.  
1050 Ibid 139. 
1051 Ibid 144–145. 
1052 O’Donnell v Shanahan (2009) BCC 822; for the analysis of this case, see D Ahernn, ‘Guiding Principles 
for Directorial Conflicts of Interest: Re Allied Business and Financial Consultants Ltd; O’Donnell v 
Shanahan’ (2011) 74 The Modern Law Review 596.  
1053 O’Donnell v Shanahan (n 1052) 824 and 843. 
1054 Ibid. 
1055 See Richmond Pharmacology Ltd v Chester Overseas Ltd (n 689) 1124. 
1056 An example of indirect interest would perhaps be where a director represents a controlling shareholder in 
a company whose interests conflict with those of the company, see Keay (n 1029) 133. 
1057 See footnote 1040 and accompanying text in this Chapter.  
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exploitation should be granted by the general meeting of shareholders or the board of 
directors, the CLRSG was in favour of the requirement of board approval because of 
impracticability and high costs associated with the authorisation by shareholders.1058 The 
CLRSG adds that independent board approval is more effective in dealing with the issue of 
the general meeting being dominated by a few directors (who are also controlling 
shareholders), particularly in private companies.1059 Thus, the Act, in setting the 
mechanism for board approval, differentiates between the public and private company. For 
the former the constitution must expressly provide the board with the power to authorise 
the exploitation of an opportunity1060 and for the private company the board may give the 
approval unless the constitution expressly involves a provision ‘invalidating’ such 
approval.1061 It should be borne in mind that the company’s articles of association may 
specify a certain requirement for approval, such as the need to obtain authorisation from 
shareholders.1062 The CA 2006 also preserves the current ability of shareholders to approve 
conflicts that would otherwise be a violation of section 175.1063 One point to consider is 
that for the board approval to produce its effects of releasing directors from liability, the 
required quorum in the meeting must be satisfied1064 and such approval must be given by 
the votes of disinterested directors without counting the votes of interested directors.1065 
Section 175 remains silent about what is meant by ‘interested directors’ and whether 
persons connected to directors (e.g., family members) are also captured by the statutory 
provision. Thus, it is the court’s task to decide which of the directors are categorised as 
interested directors.1066 
 
4.4.2 The directors’ exploitation in Saudi law: An area of deficiency 
 
As has been shown, the UK law has reacted appropriately to the issue of directors’ 
exploitation and developed a regulation protecting the rights of companies and, 
accordingly, its shareholders from opportunistic conduct by directors. This is not 
seemingly the case under Saudi law where both the CL 1965 and its successor the CL of 
2015 lack any provision expressly preventing directors from exploiting corporate 
opportunities. Though there was a concern about diluting the strict approach to directors’ 
                                                        
1058 Final Report (n 686) para 3.23. 
1059 Ibid. 
1060 Section 175(5)(b) of the CA 2006. 
1061 Section 175(5)(a) of the CA 2006. 
1062 Section 180(1) of the CA 2006. 
1063 Section 180(4) of the CA 2006; the Explanatory Notes to the CA 2006, para 340. 
1064 Section 175(6)(a) of the CA 2006.  
1065 Section 175(6)(a) and (b) of the CA 2006. 
1066 Davies and Worthington (n 2) 556.  
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exploitation of opportunities in the UK, as this may tempt directors to benefit themselves at 
the expense of the company by taking up an opportunity,1067 equally, if not more, 
concerning is the situation where the corporate statute (such as in the case of Saudi Arabia) 
does not expressly regulate the issue at all. It is clear that the absence of sufficient and 
well-defined regulation in the corporate statute could undermine directors’ accountability, 
and leave the company and its shareholders unprotected. The main problem is that in the 
absence of legislative intervention, the court is unlikely to fill the legislative vacuum and 
develops effective regulation controlling the directors’ discretion to exploit an opportunity 
or information. Equally, if the shareholders’ protection against the directors’ exploitation is 
left to the company’s articles of association, this would not provide them with sufficient 
legal protection, increasing the incentives of directors to utilise their position to benefit 
themselves at the expense of shareholders. The following case concerning the limited 
liability of companies illustrates this point: 
 
In the reported case number 725/1/Q,1068 the action was brought by a member of 
company (A) against a former director (who was also a member of the company) to 
recover sums of money amounting to more than USD 8 million, which were profits made 
by him following the conclusion of some agreements with the third party in the course of 
his directorship, which were not disclosed to the board of company (A), as was required by 
the articles of association. The action was based upon the allegation that the director of 
company (A), in his negotiations with company (B) to hire a ship with an option to 
purchase it during the term of the lease, and after it had come to his knowledge that the 
company would purchase the ship, secretly made an agreement with company (B), 
whereby the latter was to sell to him a part of the ship at cost price, after the director had 
ensured that company (A) would sign the lease. The director, by using information 
obtained in his capacity of a director for his benefit, made a profit of about USD 3 million 
as a result of the company’s purchase of the ship. As a representative of company (A) 
empowered to conclude other agreements with third party companies, the director also 
made profits (i.e., commissions) amounting to (more than USD 5 million).1069 As a matter 
of fact, the articles of association of company (A) permitted directors to contract with the 
company and to make profit by reason and in the course of their directorship without any 
legal consequences.1070 The court ruled that the director was not liable to account to the 
                                                        
1067 Keay (n 6) 323. 
1068 The Board of Grievances, Case No. 725/1/Q, Appeal Division Decision No. 4/T/85, 1996 (1415H). 
1069 Ibid  54–55, 58. 
1070 Ibid 62. 
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company for the profits made during the course of his tenure.1071 The court based its 
judgments on the following: the articles of association allow directors to obtain profits 
from agreements made for the company or by reason of their directorship; there is nothing 
in Sharia law or the corporate legislation preventing directors from making profits; the 
company did not suffer any losses as a result of unauthorised profits made from the 
director’s agreements with third party companies.1072  
 
The effect of an absence of a legislative ban on directors’ exploitation of information to 
make unauthorised profits is made clear in the above case. Furthermore, if there were at 
least a recognition of the no-profit rule under the Saudi law, the director would not have 
evaded the liability to pay back unauthorised profits to the company. The court was 
unwilling to consider the director’s personal gain as constituting a conflict of interests, 
thereby implicitly refusing the company’s argument based on the director’s breach of his 
fiduciary and trust duty.1073 The contractual term set forth in the articles of association 
protected the director from any liability resulting from making profits and of failing to 
disclose his interest.1074 Importantly, the court would perhaps have reached the same 
conclusion even in the absence of such a contractual term because the court clearly said 
that there was nothing in the law preventing directors from making profits during the 
course of their directorship.1075 In the context of joint stock companies, it can be submitted 
that since the CL is devoid of a clear statutory provision addressing the issue of 
exploitation, the court is unlikely to develop the corporate opportunity rule. This 
diminishes restrictions on the directors’ capability personally to taking up a business 
opportunity. If this case were brought under UK law, the defendant would most probably 
be found liable for the breach of the duty to avoid conflicts of interest.  
 
While it is true that the Saudi law through the corporate statute does not expressly regulate 
the exploitation of corporate opportunities, one may think that the law indirectly addresses 
the issue through the no-compete rule and the new article 74 of the CL 2015. This 
argument will be discussed below in the context of Saudi law, demonstrating that the 
deficiency and uncertainty of the law places very limited, or no, restrictions on the extent 
to which a director can personally exploit an opportunity encountered during the course of 
his directorship.  
                                                        
1071 Ibid 64. 
1072 Ibid 63. 
1073 Ibid 55, 60. 
1074 Ibid 63–64. 




4.4.2.1 The no-compete rule  
 
Some jurisdictions adopt the narrow approach, which relies upon the duty not to compete 
with the company and prevents directors from engaging in economic opportunities that fall 
within the company’s scope of business.1076 In the context of Saudi law the ‘no-competing 
rule’ set out in article 72 of the CL 2015 (article 70 of its predecessor of 1965) requires 
directors not to ‘participate in any business competitive with that of the company or 
compete in any commercial activities carried on by the company’ [emphasis added].1077 
However, whether or not this article will be broadly interpreted by the court to include the 
exploitation of corporate opportunities is a difficult question to answer due to the lack of 
any judicial guidance. Given the fact that the wording of article 72 does not suggest 
extending its application beyond the issue of competition with companies, makes it appear 
unlikely that the court will go further in its interpretation and widen the scope of the no-
compete rule to include directors’ exploitation of corporate opportunities.  
 
Importantly, from the legal perspective, the approach that relies on the no-compete rule to 
address the issue of exploitation is flawed. Although the exploitation of corporate 
opportunity and competition with companies sometimes overlaps,1078 each focuses on a 
different aspect of the duty of loyalty and therefore should be dealt with separately. 
According to article 72 of the CL 2015, directors are expected not to compete in activities 
similar to those carried out by their company. The court inquiry into whether or not there is 
a breach of the no-compete rule tends to focus on whether or not actions taken by directors 
placed them in competition with the company; in other words, for the purpose of article 72, 
the court analyses competition as a basis of liability. This means that the court’s use of 
competition inquiry confines the appropriation of corporate opportunity as a basis of 
liability where the exploitation only amounts to competition with the company.1079 The 
corollary of that approach is that directors might not be liable for a breach of article 72 in a 
situation where they take up an opportunity in keeping with the company’s business that 
does not involve competitive actions.  
 
                                                        
1076 Gerner-Beuerle, Paech and Schuster (n 613) 21. 
1077 However, with prior authorisation from shareholders, directors may compete with their company. 
1078 For example, directors may be aware of information or commercial opportunity and then use it to 
compete with their company. 
1079 In US law, competition with the company is usually viewed as involving questions of the exploitation of 
corporate opportunities, see J Popofsky, ‘Corporate Opportunity and Corporate Competition: A Double-
barreled Theory of Fiduciary Liability’ (1982) 10 Hofstra Law Review 1193, 1205 
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To clarify this point, consider the following hypothetical example: suppose that a director 
of company (A) selling fashion clothes for women in a particular city or region (e.g., 
Riyadh) had, by virtue of his directorship, learnt of a business opportunity to join and 
establish company (B), which is the same kind of business as company (A), but in another 
city or region (e.g. Makkah). Since the business of companies (A) and (B) cover different 
geographic areas, the director’s use of the business opportunity might not amount to 
competition with his company (A), from the viewpoint of competition analysis and 
therefore the director would not be in breach of article 72 (no-compete rule). However, 
applying the corporate opportunity inquiry which should focus on the relationship between 
the opportunity and the company’s commercial activity, it is likely that the director would 
be liable for exploiting an opportunity that falls within company A’s line of business, 
regardless of whether or not the exploitation leads him to be in competition with the 
company. Furthermore, another drawback of the approach that relies upon the no-compete 
rule is that the scope of a company’s interest does not cover every profit-making 
opportunity1080 in which directors are subject to very limited restrictions on their ability to 
personally exploit an opportunity encountered while serving as directors.    
 
Another problem associated with the application of article 72 of the CL 2015 to the 
conflict of interests is what remedy is available for the company. The company is 
statutorily entitled to seek compensation for losses caused by directors’ competition with 
the company.1081 It is incumbent upon the company claimant to prove losses in order for the 
compensation to be awarded.1082 While this remedy might be appropriate for the breach of 
the no-compete rule, this is not the case in connection with cases of corporate 
opportunities. In the UK and elsewhere, the law of corporate opportunities ‘has developed 
as a specific application of the no-profit rule’ because the main rationale for taking an 
opportunity is to make profit.1083 This means that once a director has been found liable for 
usurping an opportunity, the company should be entitled to recover any profit from the 
director without the need to prove the loss.1084 Indeed, if the remedy available for the 
company is compensation, as set forth in article 72 of the CL 2015, the burden of proof of 
loss would be the main challenge faced by the company claimant, and this tends to make it 
difficult to hold a director defendant to account for the exploitation of corporate 
opportunities.   
                                                        
1080 For example, profit-making information exploited by the director in the case mentioned above, see 
footnotes 1068–1072 and the accompanying text in this Chapter.  
1081 See article 72 of the CL 2015. 
1082 See, for example, Case No. 725/1/Q (n 1068) 60. 
1083 Keay (n 6) 312–313. 




To sum up, it can be suggested that the reliance upon article 72 of the CL 2015 (no-
competing rule) to prevent directors from taking corporate opportunities is, in legal terms, 
wrong and does not provide the company and its shareholders with sufficient protection 
against directors’ exploitation of business opportunities.  
 
4.4.2.2 Article 74 of the Company Law 2015: The company’s secrets 
 
One of the elements presented by the new CL 2015 is to state clearly in article 74 that 
directors must refrain from exploiting the company’s trade secrets obtained by reason of 
their directorship to benefit themselves or others.1085 This category of information can be 
regarded as confidential information that belongs to, or is about, the company itself.1086 It is 
clear from article 74 that the restriction is only limited to information that can be 
characterised as company secrets.1087 It is therefore beyond the scope of the application of 
article 74 to cover both information that is not confidential (a trade secret) and information 
about an opportunity; in other words, the legal protection given to the company and its 
shareholders under article 74 is inadequate as the ban on exploiting trade secrets only 
applies to a very small category of information. 
 
It should also be noted that article 74 of the CL 2015 adopts a total prohibition strategy in 
relation to the exploitation of confidential information. Such a conflict situation cannot be 
subject to authorisation by shareholders or the board of directors. This overly strict 
approach could be accepted in the context of confidential information, but not in relation to 
information about an opportunity.1088 
 
4.4.2.3 The new development brought by the CGRs 2017 for listed companies 
 
One of the main contributions of the new CGRs 2017 is to deal with the issue of the 
directors’ exploitation of an investment opportunity or information. According to 
article 44(b)(2), directors are prohibited from personally taking up an opportunity or 
information presented to them in their capacity as director or to the company. The sub-
article also adds that directors are required to avoid exploiting opportunities that ‘are 
                                                        
1085 It should be noted that the old version of article 74 of the CL 2015 (article 72 of the CL 1965) only 
prohibited disclosure of the company’s secrets and did not provide a ban on exploitation.  
1086 Jobran (n 632) 288. 
1087 Ibid 278. 
1088 The disadvantages of a total prohibition strategy without an authorisation process will be highlighted in 
the section (4.4.2.3) in this Chapter. 
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within the activities of the company, or which the company wishes to make use of’. From 
the wording of article 44(b)(2), some critical remarks can be made concerning the 
regulation of corporate opportunities in the CGRs 2017. 
 
First, it is clear that the CGRs 2017 have adopted the total prohibition approach to the issue 
of corporate opportunities without the adoption of authorisation process. While this 
approach has the benefit of being easy to apply and of creating a sufficient degree of 
clarity,1089 it is simultaneously associated with some drawbacks. The total prohibition will 
produce a total state of inflexibility in which it broadly biases the balance between the 
control/accountability and discretion/authority towards the former.1090 By contrast, the 
authorisation process under article 175 of the CA 2006, as has been noted, is expected to 
move the balance towards authority/discretion1091 and to lessen the inflexibility of the 
regulation of corporate opportunities, by permitting directors’ exploitation after obtaining 
the company’s approval. Given the fact that the CGRs 2017 do not expressly involve a 
disclosure requirement in relation to the issue of corporate opportunities, the total 
prohibition strategy might largely encourage directors to divert investment opportunities 
secretly to themselves, a practice that ‘is not good for board transparency and 
accountability’.1092  
 
Second, the scope of what constitutes a corporate opportunity, under article 44(b)(2) of the 
CGRs 2017, lacks clarity and sufficient control over directors’ exploitation, which could 
undermine the deterrent effect of the prohibition rule. Although it is hard to give 
conclusive answers due to the vague drafting of the article and the absence of judicial 
guidance, the wording of article 44(b)(2) may suggest that the prohibition includes only 
investment opportunities that fall within the business activities of the company and, if so, 
the question remains unresolved about whether the line of business test is limited to the 
present activities or allow for future development or expansion of the company. If this was 
the case, this means that the prohibition rule may not capture a wide range of profit-making 
opportunities and there is therefore a large possibility for directors to take an opportunity 
for themselves rather than for the company without being liable for the breach. 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the incapability of the company or other considerations 
(e.g., the directors’ good faith) are relevant to the court’s inquiry about the directors’ 
                                                        
1089 Keay (n 1029) 154.  
1090 Ibid 136. 
1091 Ibid.  
1092 A similar argument has been presented in relation to the use of a prohibition strategy in a conflict 
situation, see ibid 154.  
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liability for breach of their duty. This lack of detailed rules and guidance has an 
undesirable effect that is widening the scope for judicial discretion, which would largely 
expand the legal uncertainty in this area of law.1093 
 
Third, it is clear that directors can take up an opportunity where the company does not 
wish to exploit it. However, the CGRs 2017 do not specify which company organ (the 
board of directors or the general meeting of shareholders) should have the power to express 
the company’s wish. The fourth point to consider is that, as has been said earlier, the CMA 
is responsible for ensuring compliance with the CGRs 2017 and is expected to enforce 
mandatory provisions on the basis of comply or be penalised.1094 The question is what if the 
company or the minority shareholder decided to sue directors for the breach of their duty 
set forth in article 44(b)(2). The role of private enforcement action in relation to provisions 
of the CGRs 2017 is still unclear, although it might be available for the company, 
especially that the company is required to prepare its own corporate governance in 
accordance with the CGRs 2017.1095 The problem with article 44(b)(2) is that it does not 
involve a legal remedy for the company, the party that is directly affected by the 
appropriation of corporate opportunities.1096 To be specific, doubts could be cast on 
whether the company is entitled to disgorge profits made out of the exploitation without 
the need to prove loss. Indeed, the company will be left with inappropriate remedy (i.e., 
compensation) if the disgorgement of profits, as a remedy for breach, is not available to the 
company.1097   
 
4.5 Conflict of Interest: Self-dealing Transactions  
 
The concept of self-dealing in the context of company law may be described as a situation 
where a director, who might be also a controlling shareholder, is on both sides of an 
agreement with the company;1098 for example, in the purchase or sale of company property. 
This type of transaction clearly involves a conflict of interests. In this regard, it might be 
true to say that mandatory disclosure, board approval and/or shareholder approval are legal 
strategies employed to control directors’ exercise of powers. Failure to comply with those 
                                                        
1093 The appropriate approach to the issue of corporate opportunities for Saudi jurisdiction will be further 
discussed while examining the transplantability of the UK model to the Saudi context; see section (6.4.2.3.1), 
Chapter 6 in this thesis. 
1094 See section (1.4.3), Chapter 1 in this thesis.  
1095 Article 94 of the CGRs 2017.  
1096 In fact, this is related to a wider problem that is associated with the public enforcement of breaches of 
directors’ duties; see generally section (5.2), Chapter 5 in this thesis.  
1097 See the discussion in section (4.4.2.1) in this Chapter.  
1098 Pacces (n 361) 233–234. This definition also applies to the situation where the corporate controller is a 
shareholder. However, this type of self-dealing transaction is beyond the scope of this study.  
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strategies then constitutes a breach of the duty of loyalty.1099 This seems to be the case, as 
will be shown, in the company legislation of both the UK and Saudi Arabia. The main 
concern of the following sub-sections is to evaluate rules governing disclosure and 
authorisation mechanisms found primarily in the Saudi CL 2015 as compared with the UK 
CA 2006 in relation to corporate self-dealing.  
 
4.5.1 The development of the law of self-dealing in the United Kingdom 
 
When discussing the law’s response to the issue of corporate self-dealing, it should be 
borne in mind that in developed jurisdictions such as the UK, the law had gone through a 
process of evolution until it reached its current form expressed in the CA 2006. Before the 
recent Act was passed, in the self-dealing case of Aberdeen Rly Co v Blaikie Bros, the 
House of Lords emphasised the strictness of a judicial approach to conflict of interest 
transactions (including self-dealings) by saying that it was irrelevant to review whether or 
not the terms of the directors’ contract were fair in determining a breach of the no-conflict 
rule.1100 The rejection of the fairness test was rationalised on the basis that wat is 
‘impossible’, at least in most cases, for the court to undertake a fairness review to decide 
whether the directors’ contracts represented ‘the best’ agreement for the company.1101 
While the purpose of the fairness approach is to make sure that terms of the self-dealing 
transaction were fair for the company, the focus of the ‘self-dealing rule’ is to ensure the 
directors’ adherence to the duty of loyalty,1102 of which the avoidance of conflicts is an 
essential element. As one commentator further explained, if the fairness review approach 
to regulating self-dealing transactions were adopted, this would place directors under a 
lower standard of loyalty.1103 
 
The judgment in the case of Aberdeen Railway tends to be read as following the total 
prohibition approach to self-dealing transactions.1104 This regulatory strategy has been 
criticised on the basis that it prevents the company from entering into self-dealing 
transactions that are efficient,1105 and involve ‘more favourable terms’ than those with a 
                                                        
1099 Enriques, Hertige and Kanda (n 364) 155. 
1100 Aberdeen Rail Co v Blaikie Brothers (n 1004) 252 (per lord Cranworth LC). 
1101 Ibid. 252–253 (per lord Cranworth LC). 
1102 J Farrar and S Watson, ‘Self-Dealing, Fair Dealing and Related Party Transactions: History, Policy and 
Reform’ (2011) 11 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 495, 505. 
1103 Kershaw (n 310) 482.  
1104 D Kershaw, ‘The Path of Fiduciary Law’ (LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers, 6/2011) 28  
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2011-06_Kershaw.pdf> accessed 10 January 2017. 
1105 L Enriques, ‘The Law on Company’s Directors’ Self-Dealing: A Comparative Analysis’ (2000) 2 
International And Comparative Corporate Law Journal 297, 303. 
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third party.1106 This argument goes on to say that self-dealing transactions perhaps have 
positive effects on the company since they are likely to lower transaction costs and might 
provide the company with the only available way to access necessary products.1107 
 
As a result, the strictness of no-conflict can be minimised in the context of corporate self-
dealings by resorting to two methods. First, the shareholders’ approval could be sought to 
allow or ratify the interested directors’ agreement with the company.1108 Second, the 
equitable rule of no-conflict was to be treated as a default one, which is subject to 
contractual alterations through the company’s articles of association.1109 The second 
method was adopted by the court in Imperial Mercantile Credit Association v Coleman, 1110 
when it allowed a director to keep the profit made from a self-dealing contract, because he 
had complied with the authorisation process set out in the company’s articles of 
association.1111 As the court asserted, it was left to shareholders to determine whether or not 
the permission for directors to enter into self-dealing transactions was useful to the 
company and the role of the court was limited to enforcing the process set out in the 
articles.1112 Therefore, under the common law, it seems that the company is free to stipulate 
through its articles any mechanism of authorisation, such as disclosure to the board with 
disinterested directors’ approval,1113 or simple disclosure.1114 This freedom for the company 
to derogate from the equity rules reached its height under the common law, where articles 
of association could allow interested directors to engage in self-dealing contracts without 
even declaring their interest.1115 
 
The combination of fiduciary law rules and contractual alteration can be regarded as a 
reasonable reaction to the commercial need to make the equitable rule less strict.1116 
Nevertheless, this flexible approach to corporate self-dealings was not without critics. As 
Kershaw said, the flexible approach based upon contractibility does not provide 
shareholders with sufficient protection and undermines the accountability of directors.1117 
Therefore, it might be important to shift towards making substantive rules governing self-
                                                        
1106 Enriques, Hertige and Kanda (n 364) 154. 
1107 Enriques (n 1105) 305 referring to R C Clark, Corporate Law (Little Brown & Co., 1986) 184–187. 
1108 Kershaw (n 1104) 28.  
1109 Ibid 30.  
1110 Imperial Mercantile Credit Association v Coleman (1871) L.R. 6 Ch App 558.  
1111 Ibid. 558, 569–570. 
1112 Ibid. 568.  
1113 Ibid. 560. 
1114 Boulting v Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians (1963) 2 QB 606 , 636.  
1115 Davies and Worthington (n 2) 518. 




dealings mandatory.1118 The necessity of mandatory rules is illustrated by legislative 
intervention where directors are obliged to disclose their interest to the board regardless of 
any provision in the company’s bylaw.1119  
 
The CA 2006 affirms the adoption of this approach to corporate self-dealings, which are 
mainly regulated under two provisions. While section 177 is concerned with directors’ 
duty to disclose interest in proposed transactions, section 182 relates to the disclosure of 
interest in the case of any current dealings. According to the CA 2006, in principle, 
directors are only obliged to disclose their interest to the board1120 without statutory 
requirement for any approval, except in certain situations set out in Chapter (4) of Part (10) 
of the CA 2006 where the approval of shareholders is required. It should be noted that 
section 177, as other statutory general duties of directors, are mandatory provisions that 
cannot be departed from.1121 This means that the company’s bylaw can adjust the 
mandatory rule upwards (by demanding approval by shareholders), but cannot adjust it 
downwards (by derogating the disclosure requirement in section 177).1122  
 
4.5.2 Article 71 of the Company Law 2015: Important changes in the law 
 
In Saudi law directors’ engagement in self-dealing is currently regulated under article 71 of 
the CL 2015 (article 69 of its predecessor of 1965). Sub-article (1), states as follows:  
 
A Board member shall not have any direct or indirect interest in the businesses and 
contracts that are made for the company’s account, except with a prior authorisation from 
the Ordinary General Assembly to be renewed each year. A Board member shall inform 
the Board of Directors of any personal interest he may have in businesses and contracts 
made for the account of the company. Such declaration shall be recorded in the minutes 
of the meeting. The interested member shall not participate in voting on the resolution to 
be adopted in relation to this matter in the board of directors or shareholders’ assemblies. 
The chairman of the board of directors shall inform the Ordinary General Assembly, 
when it convenes, of the activities and contracts in which any member has a direct or 
indirect and shall attach to such notification a special report prepared by the external 
company’s auditor. [Emphasis added.] 
 
                                                        
1118 Ibid.  
1119 See Davies and Worthington (n 2) 518, who give an example of a provision presented in 1929 that 
became section 317 of the CA 1985.  
1120 Sections 177 and 182 of the CA 2006. Note the scope of section 177 of the CA2006 is subject to statutory 
limitations in which certain interests are excluded from the obligation of declaration, see section 177(5) and 
(6) of the CA 2006. 
1121 Section 232(1) and (2) of the CA 2006. 
1122 Section 180(1) of the CA 2006.  
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It is clear that director are not absolutely banned from entering into transactions or business 
with the company. Instead, they are expected to follow the authorisation procedures set out 
in article 71(1) if they wished to avoid liability for breach of the self-dealing regulation. 
 
At the outset, it is important to highlight some important contributions made by article 71 
of the CL 2015 in terms of certainty and the reform of law. Compared with the CL 1965, 
directors are no longer exempted from disclosure in relation to self-dealing transactions 
entered into via general biddings where they are ‘the best bidder’.1123 This new legislative 
change has been a response to justifiable criticisms directed at the old version of the 
statutory provision.1124 It therefore seems that the new provision offers more protection to 
the company and its shareholders against any attempt to derogate from the disclosure 
requirement. In addition, the new statutory provision has brought an end to the uncertainty 
concerning whether or not an interested director (who is also shareholder) is able to vote 
on self-dealing transactions at the general meeting. It is now expressly stated in 
article 71(1) of the CL 2015 that the interested director is not allowed to vote at the general 
meeting. Another development brought by the new provision is the requirement to seek 
shareholders’ authorisation before engaging in any transaction or business with the 
company, an issue that will be discussed more fully later.1125 Furthermore, unlike the 
CL 1965, the new legislation provides remedies for the company in the case of the 
directors’ failure to disclose their interest; that is, the right to file suit for the rescission of 
contract or for giving up any profit made from corporate self-dealings.1126  
 
Having considered the main developments in the regulation of self-dealing, the extent to 
which the new CL 2015 makes any improvement in terms of certainty and directors’ 
accountability will be examined in the following sub-sections in comparison with the UK 
CA 2006. The analysis below will also consider, where necessary, the development 
brought by the new CGRs 2017 in the area of directors’ engagement in self-dealing 
transactions. 
 
4.5.3 The duty of disclosure to the board of directors 
 
Disclosure is one of the most crucial tools to legally constrain the diversion of corporate 
assets at the expense of the company. The importance of this legal strategy lies in its role to 
                                                        
1123 See article 69 of the CL 1965.  
1124 See, for example, Jobran (n 632) 276.  
1125 See section (4.5.5) in this thesis.  
1126 See article 71(2) of the CL 2015.  
 149 
 
caution market participants against corporate self-dealing1127 in order to deter the 
occurrence of unfair self-dealing transactions.1128 It is important at this stage to bear in 
mind that the disclosure of self-dealing transactions, as Enriques notes, is included in the 
law in two ways. 1129 Generally, the first approach of disclosure does not have an impact on 
‘the validity of the transaction or on directors’ liability for [the] unfair [transaction]’1130 
because the disclosure here is required for the purpose of giving the market necessary 
information to keep the stock ‘efficiently’ valued.1131 This manner of disclosure is beyond 
the scope of this research. The second type, which is dealt with here, is where the law 
places directors under the obligation to disclose their interest as a ‘procedural’ condition 
for the validity of self-dealing transactions.1132 This disclosure requirement is the one that 
relates to section 177 and 182 of the UK CA 2006 and article 71 of the Saudi CL 2015. 
 
In both jurisdictions, directors are not only required to disclose their direct interest, but also 
their indirect interest in a proposed transaction with the company.1133 The phrase ‘indirect 
interest’ embraces situations where directors are shareholders in a business who are 
proposing to enter into a contract with the company.1134 In the Saudi market where the 
majority of companies, including those listed in Tadawul are controlled by 
blockholders,1135 the statutory requirement to declare an ‘indirect interest’ is highly 
necessary if the court interprets it as including transactions between the company and 
persons connected to members of the board. As Al-Jaber argues, the statutory rule of self-
dealing should include dealings between the company and the third party in which the 
latter is either a family member of the director1136 (e.g., spouse and parents) or any person 
who enters into a contract with a company on the directors’ behalf.1137 Furthermore, the 
phrase ‘indirect interest’ could additionally include circumstances where the controlling 
shareholder has an interest in the corporate transaction and the directors are linked to 
them.1138 Nevertheless, it must be noted that while it might be possible to apply article 
71(1) of the CL 2015 to a transaction between the company and a third party connected to 
                                                        
1127 Enriques, Hertige and Kanda (n 364) 155. 
1128 Pacces (n 361) 241–242. 
1129 Enriques (n 1105) 307. 
1130 Ibid. 
1131 Pacces (n 361) 243. 
1132 Enriques (n 1105) 307, 311.  
1133 See section 177(1) of the UK CA 2006 and article 71(1) of the Saudi CL 2015.  
1134 For the UK, see Kershaw (n 310) 493; for Saudi Arabia, see Al-Jaber (n 71) 331. 
1135 See generally section (2.5.2), Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
1136 Al-Jaber (n 71) 331. 
1137 Ibid. 
1138 For listed companies, this scenario could be captured by the definition of ‘related parties’ in article 1 of 
the CGRs 2017.  
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the director, the text of article 71(1) from the legal viewpoint explicitly imposes the 
obligation of disclosure upon directors and only they are subject to the statutory provision.  
 
In respect of the scope of disclosure, directors under section 177 of the UK CA 2006 are 
obliged to disclose the nature and the extent of interest, whereas article 71 of the Saudi 
CL 2015 lacks the detailed regulation that one would expect from the director in relation to 
the disclosure requirement. This issue has been addressed by the CGRs 2017 through 
article 30(14), which requires an interested director to disclose ‘the nature and the extent of 
[the] interest, the names of concerned persons, and the expected benefit to be obtained 
directly or indirectly from interest whether financial or non-financial’. Another point to 
consider is that the CA 2006, through s 182(1), makes it clear that if the interest has not 
already been disclosed in accordance with s 177, directors1139 are obliged to disclose 
personal interest in existing transactions or arrangements. The ex post disclosure 
mentioned in s 182 will be made, for instance, in relation to ‘interests of a newly appointed 
director’ in the company’s current transaction or in situations where directors have become 
interested after a transaction has been entered into.1140 Mechanisms governing the 
declaration in existing transactions (section 182) are identical to those applying to 
proposed transactions (section 177) with a few exceptions,1141 such as that regarding the 
consequences of a director’s failure to disclose properly.1142 In Saudi CL 2015, no such 
distinction has been made between a proposed or exiting transaction in terms of the 
disclosure requirement. Nevertheless, the duty found in article 71(1) of the CL 2015 should 
be seen as a continuing duty in which directors are always required to disclose their 
interest once they have become aware of a conflict situation; and this should at least be 
expected from a director of a listed company.1143 
 
4.5.4 Approval by disinterested directors 
 
As explained above, the CA 2006 only requires interested directors to disclose their 
personal interests with regard to self-dealing transactions. On top of that requirement, it is 
left to a company through its articles of association to stipulate that the approval by the 
                                                        
1139 As secion 187(1) of the CA 2006 provides, section 182 applies to a shadow director, but with certain 
adaptations stated in subsections 187(2)(3) and (4).  
1140 Davies and Worthington (n 2) 523.  
1141 See generally ibid 524. 
1142 Non-compliance with the duty mentioned in section 182 only gives rise to criminal sanctions, whereas 
civil remedies are available for the breach of duty found in section 177; see section 183 of the CA 2006. See 
also section 178(1), which provides that civil sanctions are available for the breach of directors’ duties in 
sections 171 to 177. 
1143 See article 43(4) of the CGRs 2017.  
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board of directors is required as a condition in the case of a self-dealing transaction.1144 
Once the company’s bylaw demands such an authorisation mechanism, directors need to 
comply with it since adherence to provisions of the company’s bylaw is a statutory duty 
imposed upon directors by section 171 of the CA 2006. It should be noted that the 
directors’ failure to follow the approval mechanism mentioned in the bylaw would result in 
a breach of section 171(a), not section 177 because only the failure to disclose will 
constitute a breach of the duty found in section 177. In Saudi Arabia the law does not 
explicitly state that the board must approve a self-dealing transaction; in other words, the 
board’s approval is not mandatory as a procedural requirement for the validity of the 
transaction unless otherwise stipulated. Nevertheless, it can be implied from the wording of 
article 71(1)1145 that the board’s recommendation can be sought by the interested director 
prior to notifying the general meeting of a self-dealing transaction.  
 
When the discussion focuses on the approval of the board of directors, it becomes 
important to address the issue of impartiality on the part of directors who approve a self-
dealing transaction. In the UK, it is a matter for the company’s articles of association to 
determine whether or not there must be approval by only disinterested directors. For 
instance, companies that still apply Table A articles, or that are shaped by Model Articles 
issued pursuant to the CA 2006 will include in their articles of association a provision that 
disallows approval by interested directors.1146 Unlike the UK, the Saudi legislation makes it 
clear that an interested director is not allowed to vote on a transaction in which he/she has 
a personal interest.1147  
 
The central problem resulting from the approval by the board members is that disinterested 
directors may not have the genuine capacity to act as ‘disinterested trustees’.1148 For 
example, the CL 2015 does not explicitly prevent members of directors’ families (who are 
also board members) from voting on self-dealing transactions. Nevertheless, given the 
concept of indirect interest, the rule requiring approval by disinterested directors should be 
narrowly interpreted to exclude members of directors’ families although they may have no 
specific interest in the conflict situation. More importantly, the broader the concept of 
‘family member’ is interpreted, the more legal protection for shareholders (especially 
                                                        
1144 See above texts accompanying footnotes 1120–1122 in this Chapter. 
1145 See the text of article 71(1) in section (4.5.2) in this Chapter.  
1146 See section 94 of the Table A articles issues according to the CA 1985. Under the CA 2006, see section 
16 of the Model Articles for Public Companies. Note that section 16(3) provides an exception to this general 
rule. 
1147 Article 71(1) of the CL 2015. 
1148 Enriques, Hertige and Kanda (n 364) 162.  
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minority shareholders) is provided. In Saudi law neither the CL 2015 nor the CGRs 2017 
involve a provision disallowing a friend or a family member of directors to be seated on 
the board or on one of its committees. Given the fact that the Saudi society is characterised 
by strong family and tribal ties,1149 the ability of a person connected to an interested 
director to make an independent judgement will be questionable in respect of challenging 
unfair self-dealings.1150 Another problem is that article 71(1) discounts the possible 
influence of interested directors in decisions concerning the approval of self-dealing 
transactions, since the statutory provision does not preclude directors from participating in 
discussions relating to authorisation.1151  
 
As has been noted, the Saudi corporate statute and the UK Model Articles focus on the 
approval of disinterested directors. Apparently, the identity of disinterested directors 
cannot be determined until a transaction is brought to the table for authorisation; in other 
words, disinterested directors will not always be the same person.1152 It should be noted 
here that the corporate governance literature always hinges upon independent directors 
playing a fundamental role in challenging conflicts of interest transactions.1153 This is 
because those elected as independent directors are more likely to be ‘less conflicted’ than 
executive directors when ‘representing shareholder interests’.1154 However, as discussed 
earlier in Chapter 2,1155 the ability of independent directors to make truly independent 
judgements is in doubt because they may be influenced by family connections or long-
standing friendships with other directors and controlling shareholders, coupled with the 
fact that the mechanism of their nomination and appointment under Saudi law, would lead 
them to act in the interest of those who select them.  
 
4.5.5 Approval by general meeting of shareholders 
 
Under the CA 2006, Chapter (4) of Part (10) of the Act highlights situations where 
shareholders’ approval is obligatory in cases of a company’s transactions with directors. 
Without going into details, it suffices to mention that the CA 2006 in sections 188–225 
                                                        
1149 Falgi (n 208)128–129.  
1150 It is common to find in some companies (especially family companies) more than one family member 
sitting on the board of directors. See, for example, the profiles of the following companies: Zamil Industrial 
(building and construction sector) and Dar Al Arkan (real estate development sector) on the Tadawul website 
at <http://www.tadawul.com.sa> accessed 21 January 2017. 
1151 Keay (n 1029) 140. It should be noted that the Saudi CGRs 2017 prevent interested director from taking 
part in its deliberations at the board meeting and the general meeting, see article 44(2) of the CGRs 2017.  
1152 See Clarke (n 532) 105 who describe it as a transaction-by-transaction approach.  
1153 See particularly footnotes 531– 538 and accompanying text, Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
1154 D Clarke (n 532) 106.  
1155 See footnotes 565–573 and accompanying text, Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
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specifies and regulates four categories of transactions that require the consent of company 
members; they are: (i) substantial property transactions,1156 (ii) loans to directors and 
similar transactions, (iii) matters related to directors’ service of contracts, and (iv) matters 
related to payments to directors for loss of their office. 
 
In Saudi law article 71(1) of CL 2015, unlike the CL 1965,1157 makes it clear that company 
directors shall not have an interest in the company’s transactions except with prior 
authorisation from the general meeting of shareholders to be renewed each year. The 
disclosure process provides that the board’s chairman is responsible for declaring to the 
general meeting of proposed transactions in which a director may be personally interested. 
Such notification has to be accompanied by a report of the company’s external auditor.1158 
To ensure the proper investigation of a situation involving conflicts of interest, each self-
dealing transaction should be listed in the agenda of general meeting ‘as an independent 
item’ without combining them under a single item for the purpose of voting.1159  
 
It should be considered that the approval by shareholders might be associated with some 
problems. First, for jurisdictions where their laws require the prior approval for corporate 
self-dealings, the convening of general meeting could be costly and impractical.1160 Second, 
it should be more concerned with those who receive the information.1161 Doubts can be cast 
on the incentives, skills and knowledge of shareholders, especially minority shareholders, 
who are expected to inspect self-dealing transactions.1162 Third and more importantly, it has 
been said that unless the law effectively prevents interested shareholders from taking part 
in voting, this strategy will be ‘tainted by conflict of interest’.1163 In Saudi law interested 
directors, who are also a shareholder, are excluded from voting on a transaction in which 
they have personal interest.1164 However, the Saudi corporate statute overlooks the need to 
prevent interested shareholders (other than interested directors) or persons connected to 
                                                        
1156 This category of transaction refers to arrangements in which a director acquires from the company, or 
vice versa, a substantial non-cash asset that is valued at more than either GBP 100,000 or 10% of the 
company’s net assets, on the condition that the latter price exceeds GBP 5,000, see sections 190(1) and 191 
of the CA 2006. 
1157 The previous legislation of 1965 through article 69 provides that a director shall not have interest in a 
contract with the company ‘except with authorisation from the Ordinary General Assembly’. It did not 
specify whether it must be obtained ex ante or ex post entering into the contract. In the legal sense, the timing 
of approval might be insignificant as it often carries ‘the same legal effects’, see Enriques, Hertige and  
Kanda (n 364) 168–169.  
1158 Article 71(1) of the CL 2015.  
1159 Article 14(b) of the CGRs 2017. 
1160 See the CLRSG’s reasoning for being in favour of the board’s approval in relation to the authorisation 
process in the context of corporate opportunities; see footnote 1058 and accompanying text in this thesis. 
1161 Pacces (n 361) 246.  
1162 Ibid. 
1163 Enriques (n 1105) 325. 
1164 Articles 71(1) and 95(1) of the CL 2015.  
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interested directors from voting. There is nothing in the CL 2015 or the CGRs 2017 
excluding, for instance, the directors’ family members from participating in the voting at 
the general meeting. By contrast, although the UK CA 2006 remains silent on this issue, 
for companies with premium listing, directors’ associates are expected not to participate in 
a vote at the general meeting.1165 Indeed, since the Saudi law does not expressly prevent 
interested shareholders, especially interested directors’ family members from voting, the 
obtaining of shareholders’ approval, for the directors, is unlikely to be a significant issue. 
In spite of the absence of empirical studies, there are two compelling instances that 
illustrate this point. First, it is very rare to find a resolution by the general meeting of 
companies listed in Tadawul disapproving a self-dealing transaction.1166 This low 
possibility of disapproval by shareholders increases self-dealers’ incentives to enter self-
dealing transactions. Second, the approval rates of the proposed resolutions in relation to 
self-dealing transactions were often not less than 98%;1167 in other words, the opposition of 
shareholders was very modest when they are asked to authorise a transaction at general 
meeting.  
 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
The main research activity in this chapter was to evaluate the effectiveness of the Saudi 
law on the following forms of the directors’ duty of loyalty: the obligation to act in good 
faith in the company’s interests and the obligation to avoid conflicts of interest, with 
particular focus on the application of this duty in the area of corporate opportunities and 
self-dealing transactions. The comparative analysis with the UK law reveals significant 
aspects of uncertainty and deficiency in the duties of loyalty in Saudi Arabia. 
 
There are two main issues associated with the affirmative duty of loyalty in Saudi law. 
First, the components of the obligation (the duty to act in good faith and in the interest of 
the company) are not understood as a single obligation. This means that there is no duty to 
act in the company’s interests to which the good faith requirement is tied. The corollary of 
                                                        
1165 See LR 11.1.8 <https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/LR.pdf> accessed 30 July 2017. 
1166 See the results of the general meeting of Saudi Industrial Services Co (02 May 2016) where the general 
meeting refused authorisation for most self-dealing transactions. Other than a very few cases, the large 
number of requests for the authorisation of self-dealing transactions were granted; see, for example, the 
results of the general meetings of the following companies: Jouf Cement Co. (14 June 2016), National 
Petrochemical Co. (05 April 2016) and Untied Wire Factories Co. (30 Marc 2016). The above information 
was found on the Tadawul website at <https://www.tadawul.com.sa>.  
1167 See, for example, the minutes of the general meeting of Herfy Food Services Co. (28 April 2015, 
<http://www.herfy.com/mubasher/run_con/GenAssemblyMinutes28042015.pdf> accessed 12 January 2017. 
See, for example, the minutes of the general meeting of Zamil Industrial Co., 09 April 2015, 
<http://www.zamilindustrial.com/pdf/ZI-OGA-09Apr2015.pdf> accessed 12 January 2017. 
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the absence of legislative and judicial recognition is that the duty of loyalty is left with an 
inappropriate standard of liability, which exposes directors to a high risk of accountability. 
Unlike the UK law, the Saudi law seemingly treats good faith as a freestanding obligation 
distinct from the broad duty of loyalty, with the effect that the court will be permitted to 
engage in an objective consideration of whether directors, in fact, acted in the general 
interests of the company. Second, when it comes to the question of in whose interests the 
company is to be managed, the Saudi law has failed to introduce clear rules governing the 
priority of competing interests. With reference to the elusive concept of ‘the interests of the 
company’, directors have been given wide discretion to determine what the interests of the 
company are and this weakens the shareholders’ monitoring capability.  
 
With regard to the requirement of avoiding the exploitation of corporate opportunities, the 
boundaries of the duty to avoid conflicts of interest are not clearly defined, and the law 
governing directors’ exploitation is uncertain. In comparison with the UK law, the 
regulation of corporate opportunity, which comprises the clearly defining elements of 
liability determination and the authorisation mechanisms, is not sufficiently developed in 
the Saudi jurisdiction. This legislative and judicial vacuum would provide fertile ground 
for directors to divert the company’s wealth to themselves. The chapter has shown that 
even with the new regulation of corporate opportunities under article 44(b)(2) of the 
CGRs 2017, some drawbacks and limits were identified above that could raise valid doubts 
about the effectiveness and clarity of the current state of law.  
 
It is clear from the analysis of the law governing self-dealing transactions that the legal 
strategy of disclosure and/or approval is employed in both jurisdictions to control such 
self-interest activities. In this regard it should be acknowledged that the recent reform 
introduced by the CL 2015 and the new CGRs 2017 has put an end to some areas of 
uncertainty and deficiency. The comparative analysis reveals that the Saudi law places 
more constraints on the directors’ engagement in self-dealing transactions than the UK law 
in the sense that both disclosure to the board1168 and the prior approval by shareholders are 
mandatory in every transaction in which directors have a direct and indirect interest. While 
the UK CA 2006 contains more detailed rules governing the disclosure strategy than the 
CL 2015, the new Saudi CGRs 2017 have filled in the statutory gaps in relation to the 
disclosure strategy for listed companies. Nevertheless, there is still concern about the 
                                                        
1168 It should be borne in mind that the board’s approval can also be sought prior to the authorisation process 
at the general meeting.  
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effectiveness of approval by shareholders in the absence of express rules excluding 





Chapter 5: An Evaluation of Private Formal Enforcement of 
Breaches of Directors’ Duties 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The importance of enforcement in the context of corporate governance has been stressed 
by saying that besides the role of laws and regulations, the effectiveness of enforcement is 
the major factor in the degree of protection given to corporate investors;1169 in other words, 
good law and effective enforcement are prerequisites to the enhancement of investor 
protection.1170 An improvement in this regard would, in turn, increase the motivation of 
outside investors to finance firms1171 and minimise the expropriation of corporate wealth by 
insiders.1172 In the context of directors’ duties, the law of enforcement is expected to be a 
crucial element in the regulation of directors’ duties. This is simply because the general 
obligations of care and loyalty are functionally meaningless without enabling those to 
whom directorial obligations are owed to ‘hold’ directors liable for violations of their 
obligations.1173 Indeed, it has been rightly noted that the deterrent effects of directors’ 
duties on their behaviour depend on the availability of an effective enforcement 
mechanism.1174 
 
Generally speaking, the concept of enforcement can be divided into two broad categories: 
(i) formal and (ii) informal enforcement according to whether or not there is judicial 
intervention in the process of enforcement of directors’ duties.1175 While the formal 
enforcement takes the form of legal action brought before the court,1176 non-judicial 
mechanisms of enforcement are known as ‘informal enforcement’.1177Within each category 
the distinction can generally be recognised between private and public enforcement on the 
basis of whether the judicial and non-judicial intervention is made by a private party or 
                                                        
1169 La Porta et al. (n 13) 15.  
1170 Ibid 15, 20.  
1171 Ibid 15.  
1172 Ibid 16. 
1173 Millstein et al. (n 373) 6. 
1174 Keay (n 7) 76. 
1175 J Armour, ‘Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and Empirical 
Assessment’ (2008) ECGI Law Working Paper 106, 3  
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1133542&rec=1&srcabs=1105355&alg=1&pos=3> 





government body;1178 for instance, private formal enforcement involves a situation where a 
derivative suit is filed by a shareholder on behalf of the company against members of the 
board of directors.1179  
 
In this regard, as has been shown in Chapter 2, ex post private non-judicial mechanisms 
such as the removal of directors at the general meeting and markets suffers from flaws and 
limits, which suggest that such mechanisms cannot substitute the need to put sound private 
judicial mechanisms for enforcement of breaches of duties in place. Indeed, the private 
enforcement action, of which a derivative claim is an important component, is one of the 
corporate governance mechanisms introduced to ensure the accountability of directors to 
the company and its shareholders.1180 It is therefore indisputable that inaccessibility, 
deficiency and vagueness of the mechanisms of formal private enforcement in the context 
of directors’ duties weaken the accountability of directors. This need for dealing with 
failings in the law governing the private enforcement action, particularly a derivative suit 
in Saudi Arabia, will be further supported by the limits to the role of formal public 
enforcement, as will be discussed below. 
 
As far as the effectiveness of private formal enforcement is concerned, key questions have 
to be addressed in connection with which of the company’s organs has the right to make 
the decision to litigate against directors, whether there are issues resulting from giving the 
board or the general meeting such right and, if so, which regulatory strategy is appropriate 
for addressing such problems. What if the company decides not to commence the 
litigation, on what conditions does the law entitle the shareholder to initiate the derivative 
action? Arguably, the inaccessible and vague mechanism of derivative litigation would 
undermine the legal accountability of directors for the breach of their duties. In addition, 
the costs of litigation could be a disincentive for the minority to rely on the judicial 
mechanism of accountability, a valid consideration while assessing the effectiveness of 
private enforcement action by a shareholder.  
 
This chapter evaluates the Saudi law of private enforcement action with special 
consideration given to the issues raised above. The UK and Saudi laws will be critically 
analysed, exploring some areas of inaccessibility and deficiency in their private formal 
enforcement of breaches of directors’ duties. As regards the structure, this chapter is 
                                                        
1178 Ibid 3–5. 
1179 Reisberg (n 8) 18.   
1180 Keay (n 304) 219.  
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divided into five main sections. First, the extent to which public enforcement can play a 
role in the enforcement of directors’ duties and whether there is a role for private 
enforcement action to play in complementing the public enforcement are considered. This 
is followed by a discussion of the different regulatory approaches to the question of who 
should have the power to initiate the litigation against directors, followed by a 
consideration of the UK and Saudi laws as far as the power of private litigation decisions is 
concerned. The focus then shifts to an analytical review of the UK derivative action 
system. The question of whether the derivative action is in fact clearly regulated in Saudi 
law is also explored. In the final part, the problem of funding in the context of derivative 
actions is considered, examining the position of the law in both jurisdictions. 
 
5.2 The Respective Roles of Public and Private Enforcement 
 
The public formal enforcement of breaches of directors’ duties can either take the form of 
criminal sanctions (e.g., fines and imprisonment) or civil penalties (e.g., disqualifications 
and pecuniary penalties). Compared with private enforcement, public enforcement is 
expected to have greater deterrent effect on wrongdoing directors as it involves harsher 
penalties.1181 In Saudi law one of main contributions of the new CL 2015 has been to 
introduce harsher penalties for violating its legislative provisions, compared with the 
CL 1965;1182 for example, a director commits a criminal offence if he/she benefits 
himself/herself or any third party by intentionally using corporate assets, his/her 
managerial powers, or voting against the company’s interests.1183 These contraventions 
would give rise to the imposition of a sanction in the form of maximum five years’ 
imprisonment and/or a fine not exceeding SAR 5 million (over USD 1.3 million).1184 In the 
UK, unless the misconduct is clearly criminal activity (i.e., theft or fraud),1185 the law does 
not allow criminal liability1186 and the breaches of directors’ duties are usually enforced by 
means of private enforcement.1187 
 
While the criminal prosecution of individual directors would lead to greater deterrence 
compared with other enforcement mechanisms, its effectiveness does not only rely on the 
                                                        
1181 A Keay And M Welsh, ‘Enforcing Breaches of Directors’ Duties by a Public Body and Antipodean 
Experiences’ (2015) 15 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 255 , 260. 
1182 See articles 211–213 of the CL 2015. 
1183 Article 211(b) and (c) of the CL 2015.  
1184 Article 211 of the CL 2015. The regulator is required to refer to the public prosecutor who will have the 
right to initiate a legal action against those who are suspected of committing one of the contraventions set out 
in articles 211 and 212 of the CL 2015, see article 215 of the CL 2015. 
1185 See, for example, section 993 of the CA 2006 (fraudulent trading).  
1186 See Keay and Welsh (n 1181) 269.  
1187 Ibid 256.  
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harshness of the penalty, but it does also on the extent to which the wrongdoers would be 
detected and convicted;1188 in other words, the effectiveness of the criminal enforcement 
regime will be undermined if the cost of finding wrongdoers guilty is too high.1189 One of 
the issues associated with public formal enforcement is that a criminal conviction would be 
more difficult to obtain compared with proving the breach of a director’s duties under the 
private enforcement system.1190 The bar for evidence is also much higher in criminal cases 
than in civil cases, and courts in criminal proceedings are expected to be stricter in 
excluding evidence obtained unlawfully.1191 The high costs of detecting, investigating and 
convicting wrongdoing directors under the criminal enforcement regime could be one of 
underlying reasons for the lax attitude of the Saudi MOCI towards enforcing criminal 
offences under corporate legislation.1192 Indeed, the severity of penalties mentioned in the 
CL 2015 will have little effect on deterring directors if the statutory penalties are not 
enforced in practice.1193 In the Saudi market there are some instances where harsh sanctions 
have been imposed for directorial misconduct, especially in relation to criminal activity 
that is deemed to be extremely serious and harmful to the market.1194 
 
As a result of the above difficulties associated with criminal sanctions, one may rightly 
argue that the imposition of civil penalties by the public body can be a good alternative to 
criminal sanctions.1195 In the Saudi CL 2015, although the public regulator is empowered to 
impose a fine without referral to the public prosecutor on those guilty of any violations set 
out in article 213,1196 the scope of civil penalty provisions does not include the basic duties 
of directors.1197 Similarly, UK law does not allow for criminal liability following the breach 
of general directors’ duties, except for non-compliance with the disclosure duty mentioned 
                                                        
1188 G Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’ (1968) 76 Journal of Political Economy 
169, 170. 
1189 Ibid.  
1190 As a principle, an accused is considered innocent until proven guilty (the presumption of innocence 
principle); thus, judgments of criminal conviction must be based only on conclusive and clear evidence that 
convince the judge that a suspect is certainly guilty beyond doubt; see, generally, M Hosni, Jurisdiction and 
Proof in the Criminal Procedure Law (Arabic), (Cairo, Dar Al Nahda 1992) 58–73.  
1191 Ibid 54, 77. 
1192 M Albrahim, ‘The Enforcement of Directors’ Duties in the Context of Shareholders’ Rights Protection: A 
Comparative Study Between UK and Saudi Law’ (PhD thesis, Lancaster University 2016) 274; here the 
absence of reported prosecution against directors under the previous CL 1965 is noted.  
1193 Ibid. 
1194 For example, for cases related to insider trading violations, see the CRSD’s resolution on insider trading 
in shares of the Bishah Agriculture Development Company reported in Alriyadh Newspaper (15031 edn 
19 August 2009) (Arabic) <http://www.alriyadh.com/453290> accessed 25 July 2017. 
1195 See Keay and Welsh (n 1181) 263. 
1196 See article 216 of the CL 2015 which, in turn, allows those on whom the fine has been imposed to 
challenge the regulator’s decision before the court.  
1197 For example, the duties to act in good faith, to act with reasonable care or to avoid directors’ exploitation 
of corporate opportunities or engagement in unauthorised self-dealing transactions. 
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in section 182 of the CA 2006.1198 For companies listed in the Saudi market, the CMA, 
unlike MOCI, is more active in ensuring compliance with the securities law and 
regulations by, for example, imposing fines on wrongdoers.1199 This is illustrated by the 
CMA’s imposition of a financial penalty of SAR 50,000 (USD 13,000) on each board 
member of the Saudi Chemical Company, following the board’s failure to comply with the 
approval requirement in relation to the engagement in self-dealing transactions.1200 It is 
noteworthy that the CMA’s imposition of such fines was based on the violation of the 
Listing Rules 2004 and not on a violation of the previous CGRs 2006. There are also some 
cases where errant directors have been fined and disqualified as a result of judicial 
decisions following legal actions brought by the CMA because of their breaches of 
securities law and regulations.1201Another point to consider is that under the new CGRs 
2017, directors are obligated to act with reasonable care and in good faith, to advance the 
company’s interests1202 and to avoid exploiting investment opportunities.1203 It is 
indisputable that the company has no option other than to include the mandatory rules of 
the CGRs 2017 into its own corporate governance code.1204 Given the CMA’s approach to 
enforcing mandatory rules in the previous CGRs 2006, it is presumed that sanctions will be 
imposed on directors in the case of their breaches of directors’ duties. However, at this 
stage, it is too early to determine whether or not the CMA will effectively discharge its 
duties in terms of ensuring compliance with the CGRs 2017 not only by the companies, but 
also by directors and managers.  
 
In any event, when assessing the characteristics of the public enforcement regime, some 
additional difficulties and issues arise. For public enforcement to be effective, the public 
regulator needs to be armed with sufficient resources and expertise to detect, investigate 
and penalise wrongdoing directors; a logical consideration that may affect the effectiveness 
of public enforcement.1205 Even if a regulator is well funded, the resources of the regulator 
                                                        
1198 Section 183 of the CA 2006. 
1199 Compared with its counterparts in the region, the CMA is regarded as one of most active regulators in 
ensuring compliance with securities laws, see A Amico, Corporate Governance Enforcement in the Middle 
East and North Africa: Evidence and Priorities (OECD, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers 
No. 15 2014) 27 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jxws6scxg7c-en> accessed 25 July 2017. 
1200 The penalty was imposed because of a violation of the LRs 2004; see the CMA’s announcement 
published on its website on 18 October 2009 <https://www.cma.org.sa/market/news/pages/cma_n536.aspx> 
accessed 20 July 2016. 
1201 See the announcement of the CMA regarding the decision made by the CRSD (AC) in relation to a 
violation on the part of former board members of the Saudi Transport and Investment Co. 
<https://cma.org.sa/en/market/news/pages/cma_n_1966.aspx> accessed 26 August 2017.  
1202 Article 30(17) of the CGRs 2017.  
1203 Article 44(b)(2) of the CGRs 2017. 
1204 See article 94 of the CGRs 2017. 
1205 See A Keay, ‘The Public Enforcement of Directors’ Duties: A Normative Inquiry’ (2014) 43 Common 
Law World Review 89, 101–102. 
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responsible for the enforcement tend be limited in the sense that it is difficult to discover 
and investigate every contravention that comes to its attention.1206 Under such a condition, 
the regulator would have to select carefully which breaches can be pursued.1207 Ramsay 
correctly notes that the enforcement priorities chosen by the regulator might not be 
appropriate and effective, and this underlines the important role of private enforcement 
within the overall system of enforcement.1208 Given the austerity policy pursued by the 
Saudi government as a means of reducing the fiscal deficit,1209 public enforcement of 
directors’ duties could be indirectly affected.1210 In the same line of analysis, the role of 
MOCI in enforcing breaches of company law, as mentioned above, is questionable and 
there have been no reported penalties imposed to date. Even regarding the CMA’s 
approach, some argue that there has been a failing in imposing adequate sanctions and 
penalties upon wrongdoers1211 and there is still much work to be done in terms of 
monitoring the companies and encouraging investment in the market.1212  
 
Importantly, as a matter of policy, the enforcement of directors’ duties should strike a 
balance between two competing goals: encouraging legitimate risk-taking, on the one 
hand, and increasing the level of liability, on the other hand. The law that provides 
especially criminal penalties for the breach of directors’ duties of care and loyalty would 
tilt the balance too far in favour of increasing the level of liability. The scope of liability 
should not be greatly expanded as directors will be under increased threat from actions 
from the public regulator.1213 Furthermore, one of the drawbacks of public enforcement is 
that any financial relief will flow to the public regulator rather than the company and its 
shareholders, whereas this is not the case in relation to private enforcement actions. 
 
                                                        
1206 Reisberg (n 8) 31.  
1207 Keay (n 1205) 102. 
1208 I Ramsay, ‘Corporate Governance, Shareholder Litigation and the Prospects for a Statutory Derivative 
Action’ (1992) 15 UNSW Law Journal 149, 152.  
1209 This has mainly been because of the reduction in oil prices from USD 110 a barrel in 2014 to below 
USD 50 a barrel. According to the Saudi Ministry of Finance, the deficit for the 2017 national budget was 
projected to be (SAR 198 billion), about USD 53 billion, see the Ministry’s statement for the 2017 national 
budget  <https://www.mof.gov.sa/docslibrary/Budget/Documents/2017.pdf> accessed 22 July 2017.    
1210 Albrahim (n 1192) 307.  
1211 See A Alkahtani, ‘The Influence of Corporate Governance on Protecting Minority Shareholders’ Rights 
in the Saudi Stock Market: A Comparative Study’ (PhD thesis, University of Westminster 2015) 89–90.  
1212 See A Jammal, Al-Madina Newspaper (23 July 2017) <http://www.al-madina.com/article/533239/> 
accessed 2 August 2017.  
1213 See Bernard S. Black et al.,  Report to Russian Center for Capital Market Development: Comparative 
Analysis on Legal Regulation of the Liability of Members of the Board of Directors and Executive Organs of 
Companies (English Language Version) (ECGI Law Working Paper Series 103/2008 University of Texas 
Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 110, February 2008) 287 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1001990> 
accessed 1 August 2017. 
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What can be taken from the above discussion is that there are some limits to the role of 
formal public enforcement. This highlights the necessity for the private enforcement action 
to complement enforcement by the public regulator. In any legal framework of directors’ 
duties, both enforcement regimes should be effectively present as neither regime can 
adequately deter mismanagement by directors. 
 
5.3 The Theoretical Viewpoint: Which Corporate Organ Should Make the 
Decision to Litigate Privately? 
 
At the outset, it is important to say that the company’s decision to initiate proceedings can 
be seen as a ‘commercial judgement’ involving an evaluation of all viewpoints related to 
the commencement of legal action through a consideration of factors such as ‘risks’, 
‘expenses’ and potential gains from the litigation.1214 This means that although directors 
have breached their duties towards the company, there are situations where bringing legal 
proceedings against the director is not in the best interests of the company, for example, 
when there is a low possibility of success,1215 or of a good financial return1216 when 
compared with the incurrence of high legal fees,1217 and the expense of management time 
and effort.1218 Having said that, it can be argued from the theoretical perspective that the 
board of directors would be the most appropriate organ to bring a lawsuit because the 
board, compared to the general meeting, is expected to ‘have a more informed 
understanding’ of potential impacts of litigation on the company’s business and managerial 
resources.1219 However, when the board has the power to take legal action against errant 
directors, it is more likely to give rise to the issue of conflict of interests within the board 
of directors.1220 
 
This heightened possibility of conflicts of interests results from wrongdoing directors 
engaging in the voting process at the board meeting in relation to the litigation decision 
against them.1221 Even if erring directors are not part of the decision-making process, doubt 
could be cast upon the independence of disinterested directors from the influence of 
                                                        
1214 H Hirt, ‘The company’s Decision to Litigate Against Its Directors: Legal Strategies to Deal with the 
Board of Directors’ Conflict of Interest’ (2005) JBL 159, 165–166.  
1215 S Kalss, ‘Shareholder Suits: Common Problems, Different Solutions and First Steps Towards a Possible 
Harmonisation by Means of a European Model Code’ (2009) 2–3 European Company and Financial Law 
Review 324, 331.  
1216 Hirt (n 1214) 165.  
1217 Kalss (n 1215) 331.  
1218 Hirt (n 1214)165.  
1219 Kershaw (n 310) 590. 




directors who have purportedly infringed their duties;1222 for example, the close friendship 
and family and social ties between disinterested members of the board and wrongdoing 
directors could influence the independent judgment of the former in this regard. 
Furthermore, disinterested directors may feel that if they decide not to bring an action 
against other directors because of the breach of their duties, in return those errant directors 
will not sue them if they fail to comply with their obligations in future.1223 In the scenario 
that the entire board has breached their duties, it is extremely unlikely that it will decide to 
litigate.1224 This means that the board’s decision to sue one of its members is fraught with 
difficulties, making the commencement of litigation unlikely. 
 
One potential response to leaving the litigation decision making exclusively to the board is 
to enable the general meeting of shareholders to initiate the proceeding or instruct the 
board to do so.1225 Nevertheless, this approach, which leaves the litigation decision to a 
vote of shareholders as a whole, may suffer from a practical drawback, that is, the presence 
of ‘wrongdoer control’,1226 which is mainly found in small or medium companies with a 
low number of shareholders,1227 or in companies with concentrated share ownership. The 
‘wrongdoer control’ occurs in circumstances where, for example, directors who do wrong 
hold the majority of shares and use their vote at the general meeting to disallow the 
proceeding, or where they have ‘influence’ over the majority of shareholders, persuading 
them to reject litigation.1228 The meaning of ‘wrongdoer control’ not only captures the de 
jure control over the company but also the de facto control that can be gained without 
holding the majority of the company’s shares.1229 This problem is exacerbated when 
interested shareholders are not precluded from voting on the general meeting’s decision to 
litigate.1230 
  
The second issue associated with decision making at the general meeting is known as the 
‘collective action’ problem, which is seen at its most extreme in companies with widely 
dispersed share ownership.1231 The source of this dilemma is that the decision-making by 
                                                        
1222 Ibid. 
1223 Keay (n 6) 412.  
1224 Ibid. 
1225 See, for example, F A Gevurtz, ‘Who Represent the Corporation? In Search of a Better Method for 
Determining the Corporate Interest in Derivative Suits’ (1985) 46 U Pitt L Rev 265, 268.  
1226 Hirt (n 1214) 169 and 171. 
1227 Ibid 171. 
1228 Ibid.  
1229 Gevurtz (n 1225) 313;  
1230 Hirt (n 1214) 171. 
1231 Ibid 170. 
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the shareholder body tends to be ill informed.1232 As Gevurtz explains, shareholders at the 
general meeting will face difficulty in making an ‘intelligent decision’, determining 
whether or not taking a legal action serves the interests of the company because such a 
decision requires the assessment of potential losses and benefits from the litigation; such 
an assessment requires information that is likely not to be automatically available for 
shareholders.1233 Even if such information was made available to shareholders, they are 
likely to lack the necessary time and effort to make an informed decision.1234 
 
As a result of problems associated with both the decision-making at the board meeting and 
at the general meeting of shareholders, the law may respond by enabling an individual 
shareholder or a group of shareholders to bring an action against wrongdoing directors on 
behalf of the company in order to enforce the company’s rights.1235 This action, as 
mentioned earlier, is referred to as a derivative claim because the shareholder’s right to 
initiate litigation ‘is derived from the right of the company’.1236 Concerns over the 
independence of a subset of shareholders from an errant directors’ influence seems not to 
come up in this regulatory approach.1237 While the availability of derivative action is likely 
to tackle the problem of ‘wrongdoer control’, the individual shareholder or a group of 
shareholders will, to some degree, continue to face the collective action problem.1238 The 
minority shareholder will perhaps lack the necessary ‘time, effort and resources’ to make 
an informed decision in relation to initiating derivative litigation, or to examine the 
company’s possible costs and gains from litigation against directors who have purportedly 
breached their duties.1239 It should be pointed out that derivative action litigation is 
associated with serious challenges on the part of the individual shareholder (particularly 
the non-controlling shareholder) in terms of having access to necessary information and 
acquiring financial aid.1240 
 
To address the problems resulting from the mechanism of derivative litigation, the 
‘external trusteeship strategy’ could be seen as an alternative solution.1241 This refers to 
situations where bodies or persons ‘external to the [company] may be called upon to serve 
                                                        
1232 Gevurtz (n 1225) 315. 
1233 Ibid 317. 
1234 Ibid. 
1235 Ibid 267 and 287. This action, as mentioned earlier, is referred to as a derivative claim; see Reisberg (n 8) 
18.  
1236 Keay (n 6) 413.  
1237 Kershaw (n 310) 593. 
1238 Hirt (n 1214) 173. 
1239 Ibid 174. 
1240 Reisberg (n 8) 85–88. 
1241 Hirt (n 1214) 179. 
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as trustees’ (e.g., court and government body);1242 in other words, the determination of 
whether a derivative claim serves the best interest of the company will be left to the 
judicial or government body. Although the option of external trustees, such as courts, can 
be regarded as the best approach ‘for a neutral judgment’ regarding the litigation 
decision,1243 doubt could be cast on the court’s ability to make a ‘commercial judgment’.1244 
This difficulty probably results from the fact that the court lacks the necessary experience 
and knowledge of the company’s policies and objectives.1245  
 
To sum up, as regards the question of who should have the power to initiate litigation, it 
has been shown that each regulatory approach has benefits and problems, and the selection 
of one without the other seemingly differs between jurisdictions according to the 
legislator’s considerations concerning which problems resulting from the regulatory 
strategies are less important;1246 for example, the significance of derivative actions as an 
enforcement mechanism will be noticeable in jurisdictions where the legislators regard the 
wrongdoer control problem resulting from giving the decision to litigate to shareholders, 
and the problem of independence in disinterested directors’ decisions, as important and 
serious issues that must be avoided.1247  
 
5.4 Litigation Decisions and the Position of Company Law 
 
The primary issue that will be focused on here concerns the position of company law in 
relation to the question of who has the power to make the decision to litigate in the name of 
the company. To be specific, does such power fall within the remit of the board of directors 
or the general meeting of shareholders? And if one of the corporate organs was given the 
exclusive power to litigate, to what extent would the other organ have the power to 
intervene? To answers such questions, the laws of the UK and Saudi Arabia will be 
referred to in the following sub-sections. 
 
  
                                                        
1242 Armour, Hansmann and Kraakman (n 227) 44. 
1243 Gevurtz (n 1225) 268. 
1244 Hirt (n 1214) 180. 
1245 Ibid. 
1246 A similar observation has presented in relation to the possible important role of derivative actions among 




5.4.1 The state of the law in the United Kingdom 
 
As a stated earlier,1248 the UK law provides a default rule on the general division of 
decision-making powers between the board of directors and the shareholder body, and it is 
left to a company’s articles of association to determine the matter. Most companies’ 
articles of association vest all powers of management in directors1249 and the decision to 
bring legal action falls within their general authority in managing the company’s affairs.1250 
This means that in the UK the board is granted the power to initiate litigation against 
directors who do wrong and enforce the company’s rights. However, as stated above,1251 it 
would be a flawed policy to leave the litigation decision totally in the hands of the board of 
directors; a policy that would undermine the accountability of directors and offer very 
limited protection to the company and its shareholders.  
 
In the UK it appears that there is no dispute over the right of shareholders to initiate 
litigation where the company’s bylaw explicitly reserves such power for the general 
meeting of shareholders. In a company with Model Articles, shareholders at the general 
meeting by special resolution may direct the board to bring legal action or to cease 
litigation that has already been initiated against a director. 1252 This is also the case in 
relation to a company with the 1985 version of Table A.1253 This is in line with the 
mainstream body of authorities, of which Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co v 
Cuninghame1254 is a clear example.1255 In this case, the Court of Appeal held the view that 
when the powers of management are conferred on directors, the general meeting does not 
have the power to intervene in the company’s management or to compel directors to obey 
its instruction by simply passing an ordinary resolution.1256 In the context of the 
commencement of litigation, the court, in the case of Breckland Group Holdings Ltd v 
London & Suffolk Properties Ltd,1257 adopted the Automatic Self-Cleansing line of 
authorities.1258 In this case, the court addressed the question of whether the general meeting 
had the power to instigate ‘a material litigation’ where the company’s articles of 
                                                        
1248 See particularly footnotes 307 and 314, Chapter 2 in this thesis.  
1249 See, for example, section 70 of Table A and article 3 of the Model Articles. 
1250 K. Wedderburn, ‘Control of Corporate Litigation’ (1976) 39 Modern Law Review 327, 327. 
1251 See footnotes 1220–1224 and accompanying text in this Chapter. 
1252 Article 4 of the Models Articles on public companies.  
1253 Article 70 of Table A issued pursuant to the CA 1985. 
1254 Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd v Cuninghame (n 314). 
1255 See C Z Qu, ‘Some Reflections on the General Meeting’s Power to Control Corporate Proceedings’ 
(2007) 36 Common Law World Review 231, 242. 
1256 See Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd. v Cuninghame (n 314) 38, 40, 43, 44. 
1257 Breckland Group Holdings Ltd. v London & Suffolk Properties Ltd (1988) 4 BCC 542. 
1258 See Qu (n 1255) 242; Wedderburn (n 1250) 406. 
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association (article 80 of the 1948 version of Table A) provided that ‘such a matter is 
within the remit of the board’.1259 In the view of Harman, the law stipulates that as long as 
the company’s articles have given directors the power to manage the company’s business 
‘it is not a matter where the general meeting can intervene’.1260 The hallmark of this 
approach is to comply with the literal construction of the company’s articles, which vest 
the decision-making power in the board, and the general meeting does not have the power 
to initiate legal proceedings by an ordinary resolution even if the board cannot or does not 
act.1261 
 
It is also important to bear in mind that the directors’ accountability would not be 
substantially enhanced if the UK law only relied on the involvement of the general meeting 
in the litigation decision, as a response to the conflicts of interest of the board. This is 
because the role of the general meeting of shareholders in jurisdictions such as the UK, 
where the share ownership of most public companies is highly diffused,1262 would be 
reduced due to the collective action problem.1263 This requires a legislative intervention to 
find an alternative means to facilitate access to the judiciary, and so enable an individual 
shareholder to bring a legal action on behalf of the company against wrongdoing 
directors.1264 
 
5.4.2 The state of Saudi law 
 
A company’s right to sue errant directors is clearly articulated in article 79 of the CL 2015 
(article 77 of its predecessor of 1965), which literally states that ‘the company may initiate 
a liability proceeding against the members of the board of directors for wrongful acts that 
cause harms to all shareholders’. In this regard, some key observations need to be made. 
As can be seen from the wording of article 79, the scope of the statutory company 
proceeding is rather vague regarding the question of against whom the legal action can be 
brought because it is unclear whether or not this statutory provision includes a situation 
                                                        
1259 Breckland Group Holdings Ltd v London & Suffolk Properties Ltd (n 1257) 545. 
1260 Ibid 546. It is worth mentioning that there was also a shareholder agreement in effect requiring the board 
nominations of two shareholders to support the initiation of material proceedings, see pp. 542, 547.  
1261 A Dignam, Hicks & Goo’s Cases and Materials on Company Law (7th edn, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press 2011) 240. It is worth mentioning that there was a line of authority in the UK case law that reserved for 
the general meeting the power to bring the action against directors by an ordinary resolution in certain 
circumstances (i.e., ‘non-functioning board’), regardless of what the company’s articles said about directors 
having general powers of management, see Wedderburn (n 1250) 404–405. For more discussion on the 
position of UK case law, see Qu (n 1255). 
1262 See footnotes 413–415 and accompanying texts, Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
1263 See footnotes 1231–1234 and accompanying texts in this Chapter. 
1264 The derivative action under the UK law will be discussed in section (5.5) in this Chapter.  
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where the breach is committed by a person such as a senior manager who is not a member 
of the board. It seems that the statutory action set out in article 79 can only be initiated 
when a board member has breached one of his/her duties towards the company; in other 
words, the company can sue those responsible for the company’s management apart from 
board members, but without the necessity to commence such proceeding in accordance 
with the statutory requirement set out in article 79 of the CL 2015.1265 
 
It is also important to stress that the company should only bring legal action against 
miscreant directors in relation to a wrongful act leading to an injury to the shareholders as 
a group (i.e., the company).1266 There are various types of misconduct that cause harm to 
the company; for example, the corporate injury could result from directors’ violations of 
the company’s rights set out in the CL 2015 and in the company’s articles of association; 
breaches of their loyalty duties; negligence; or any misconduct causing harm to the 
company’s interests while managing the company.1267 In this regard, a wrongful act 
committed against an individual shareholder causing personal loss is not considered a 
cause of action under article 79 of the CL 2015; for example, the direct injury to 
shareholder rights, such as the right to inspect the corporate records and books,1268 is not a 
cause of action against the board members under article 79 of the CL 2015.1269  
 
The final observation is that even if the general meeting discharges members of the board 
of directors from liability concerning occurrences from the previous fiscal year, this does 
not prevent the hearing of a company action against board members.1270 It is noteworthy 
that proposals to release board members of liabilities routinely appear on the agendas of 
annual shareholders meetings in Saudi Arabia,1271 and since a granted discharge will not 
bar any claim made by the company against board members, it appears that this can be 
                                                        
1265 This action could be probably brought by the board of directors on behalf of the company without prior 
approval of the general meeting of shareholders.  
1266 The phrase ‘harms to all shareholders’ set forth in article 79 of the CL 2015 (article 77 of its predecessor 
of 1965) will be interpreted as ‘harms suffered by the company’, see Al-Jaber (n 71) 341. 
1267 Indeed, any conduct that minimises the value of the company and damages its general interests can be a 
cause of action under article 79 of the CL 2015 because directors are responsible for maximising the 
company’s wealth; see article 21(a) of the CGRs 2017. See generally article 78 of the CL 2015.   
1268 This group of rights attached to shareholders’ ownership of shares is recognised by the Saudi law; see 
article 88(1)(a) of the CL 2015. 
1269 It should be noted that injured shareholders have, however, the right to sue the company to compel its 
directors to permit them to exercise their right; see article 88(1)(a)(5) of the CL 2015; Jobran (n 632) 392–
393.  
1270 See article 78(2) of the CL 2015. 
1271 See, for example, the announcements of the following companies listed on Tadawul: The agenda of the 
general meeting of Tourism Enterprise Co. (held on 04 May 2016) and the agenda of the general meeting of 
Saudi Industrial Services Co. (held on 02 May 2016). The above information was taken from the website of 




regarded as a declaration of trust and is unlikely to carry legal implications. In Saudi 
Arabia, failure to obtain such a pardon does not appear to have an immediate effect on 
directors’ liability, but simply leaves the door open for being sued by the company. Under 
the Saudi law, company directors, appearing as shareholders in the general meeting, shall 
be precluded from voting on the resolution regarding their discharge of liability for 
occurrences from the previous fiscal year.1272 However, there is nothing in the CL 2015 
suggesting that at least wrongdoing directors (who are also shareholders) must abstain 
from voting on the resolution regarding the brining of legal action under article 79 of the 
CL 2015. 
 
Saudi company law clearly reserves the power to bring legal action against wrongdoing 
directors to the general meeting of shareholders.1273 It might be true to say that the Saudi 
legislator, by giving shareholders the power to make the decision to litigate, intends to 
avoid problems associated with this decision being exclusively in the remit of the board of 
directors.1274 However, the Saudi approach could give rise to the possibility of wrongdoer 
control, which results from the fact that interested shareholders at the general meeting have 
not been barred from voting on the resolution regarding the commencement of 
litigation.1275 In the Saudi market, the issue of wrongdoer control could be considered as 
one of the main deficiencies in the enforcement of directors’ duties for the following 
reasons: First, since concentrated ownership is the norm in most companies listed in the 
Saudi stock market,1276 this offers sufficient explanation as to why the issue of wrongdoer 
control is present within the general meeting of shareholders.1277 The involvement in the 
general meeting of shareholders in the litigation decision may give a shareholder (who 
could be a member of the board)1278 sufficient control to abuse his/her voting power by 
                                                        
1272 See article 95(2) of the CL 2015.  
1273 It is worth noting that the decision to bring a legal action against the third party falls exclusively within 
the board’s general power to manage the company’s affairs because the Saudi corporate statute remains silent 
on this issue, leaving the matter entirely to a company’s articles of association to determine whether or not 
the board is required to seek the approval of shareholders ex ante in order to bring a legal action against the 
third-party.  
1274 See footnotes 1220–1224 and accompanying text in this Chapter. 
1275 See footnotes 1226–1230 and accompanying text in this Chapter. In this regard, interested shareholders 
could be directors acting as shareholders at the general meeting or other shareholders who are under the 
directors’ influence; H Hirt (n 1214) 171. 
1276 See generally section (2.5.2), Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
1277 As could be argued, the structure of corporate ownership ‘determines what decisions are and how these 
decisions are brought about in a given organization’, see M Sáez and D Riaño, ‘Corporate Governance and 
the Shareholders’ Meeting: Voting and Litigation’ (2013) 14 European Business Organization Law Review 
343, 350. 
1278 See, for example, the composition of the board of directors for the following listed companies: Al-Rajhi 
Company for Cooperative Insurance and Anaam International Holding Group. This information was taken 
from the company’s overview page on the Tadawul website at <https://www.tadawul.com.sa accessed> 
22 June 2016. 
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disallowing the lawsuit, the main reason for which will be the protection of minority 
shareholders.1279 It should be further noted that the presence of multiple blockholders (who 
are perhaps directors) at the general meeting may lead to the problem of conflicts of 
interest,1280  similar to those discussed in the context of the board of directors. Second, the 
Saudi corporate statute is also devoid of a provision to ban persons connected to, or under 
the influence of, wrongdoing directors from engaging in the voting process at the general 
meeting in relation to the litigation decision. Accordingly, the issue of wrongdoer control 
could minimise the possibility of a company action against directors. This could be one of 
primary reasons for what it is noticed as the limited number of such lawsuits in the Saudi 
legal system.1281  
 
Another issue to consider is that shareholders can only bring the legal action through the 
general meeting and the process of convening the general meeting tends to be costly and 
difficult; for example, as Reisberg noted in relation to the UK law and equally valid in 
Saudi Arabia, not every shareholder meets the statutory requirement for summoning a 
meeting of the shareholders.1282 Under the Saudi law, shareholders (representing at least 
5% of equity capital) are eligible for calling a general meeting and such call should be 
addressed to the company’s board of directors.1283 The threshold of 5% may represent 
thousands or even millions of Saudi riyals in market value of shareholding, especially for 
companies listed in the market.1284 This is a significant limit to the minority shareholders’ 
right to summon a general meeting, which consequently weaken the ability of disinterested 
shareholders to litigate against directors who do wrong through the general meeting. 
 
What can be inferred from the above analysis is that legal proceedings under article 79 of 
the CL 2015, which cannot be initiated without the approval by the general meeting, 
appears to be an inadequate mechanism for private formal enforcement of directors’ duties. 
                                                        
1279 Sáez and Riaño (n 1277) 351. 
1280 See footnote 460 and accompanying text, Chapter 2 in this thesis.  
1281 As has been reported, no lawsuit had been brought against directors under the corporate statute until 
2009; see Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), ‘Corporate Governance Country 
Assessment: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ (February 2009) 32  
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/838731468106752813/Kingdom-of-Saudi-Arabia-Report-on-
the-Observance-of-Standards-and-Codes-ROSC-corporate-governance-country-assessment> accessed 
12 March 2016.  
1282 Reisberg (n 8) 81. 
1283 Article 90(1) of the CL 2015. 
1284 Among companies listed on Tadawul until the end of December 2015, consider, for example the listed 
company of Al-Baha which had the lowest market capitalisation (SAR 202,500,000.00), whereas the listed 
company of STC had the largest market capitalisation (SAR 136,860,000,000.00). The aforementioned 
values were reported as at 31 December 2015; see Annual Statistical Report 2015 on Saudi Stock Market 
(Tadawul), available on the Tadawul website at <https://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/wcm/connect/a24165eb-
08f8-4988-a8ec-6ee48eba6c6b/Yearly_2015_1.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID 
=a24165eb-08f8-4988-a8ec-6ee48eba6c6b> accessed 22 September 2017. 
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This leads one to examine whether the Saudi law introduces an alternative mode to enforce 
the rights of the company in cases of a breach of directors’ obligations through the 
commencement of litigation. The derivative action, under the Saudi law, will be considered 
later in section (5.6). 
 
5.5 Conferring a Right on a Shareholder to Litigate: A Statutory Derivative 
Action in the United Kingdom 
 
Before the CA 2006, it appears that the initiation of derivative litigation posed a significant 
challenge for a minority shareholder. This is because the common law rule, known 
alternatively as the rule in Foss v Harbottle, essentially provided that the proper claimant 
to bring an action against wrongdoing directors was not the minority shareholder, but the 
company itself.1285 Since the absolute application of the rule in Foss might damage the 
minority’s interests due to an abuse by the controlling majority who may ratify the 
wrongdoing1286 or the board’s reluctance to bring the action, the common law allowed a 
derivative claim to be made in very limited circumstances, as exceptions1287 to the rule in 
Foss. It was ruled that once the appropriate majority had ratified the wrong done to a 
company, a minority shareholder would be bound by the decision of the majority and 
cannot sue in relation to this wrongdoing1288 unless the claimant could prove the wrongdoer 
was in control of the company.1289 In addition, a minority shareholder had to demonstrate 
that there was a ‘fraud on the minority’1290 or ‘self-serving negligence’1291 on the part of 
directors.1292 In principle, mere negligence, under the common law, was not sufficient to 
allow the claim under the fraud exception.1293 Furthermore, not all breaches of directors’ 
duties fall within the meaning of ‘fraud’ for the purpose of starting derivative litigation.1294 
A claimant also had to prove, for example, that a derivative action had been brought in 
                                                        
1285 Foss v Harbottle (n 19) 202; see K Wedderburn, ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ 
(1957) Cambridge LJ 194, 196 who pointed out that this ‘proper plaintiff rule’ originated from the company 
law principle which considers the company as a separate ‘person’ from its members. 
1286 E Mujih, ‘The New Statutory Derivative Claim: A Delicate Balancing Act: Part 1’ (2012) 33 Company 
Lawyer 76, 76. 
1287 Ibid 76–77.  
1288 Foss v Harbottle (n19) 203–204; see also Edwards and Another v Halliwell (1950) 2 All ER 1064 , 1066.  
1289 Edwards and Another v Halliwell (n 1288) 1067. 
1290 Ibid 1067. 
1291 E Mujih (n 1286) 77.  
1292 This occurs where directors have considerable benefits at the expense of the company; see Daniels v 
Daniels (1978) Ch 406 , 406. 
1293 K. Wedderburn, ‘Derivative Actions and Foss v. Harbottle’ (1981) 44 Modern Law Review 202, 205.  
1294 Ibid. 206.  
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good faith for the benefit of the company1295 and the ratification of wrongdoing was 
consequently not possible.1296  
 
In its deliberation on the state of the derivative claim, the Law Commission described the 
law as ‘rigid [and] complex’,1297 ‘outmoded’1298 and ‘inaccessible’.1299 Most of the 
difficulties and complexities faced by claimants in bringing derivative proceedings had 
been recognised by the Law Commission in its report,1300 which proposed the replacement 
of common law rules with a statutory derivative mechanism.1301 Many of recommendations 
presented by the Law Commission and reaffirmed by the CLRSG in their Final Report1302 
were eventually enacted in Part 11 of the CA2006, sections 260–264 for England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland and sections 265–269 for Scotland.1303  
 
5.5.1 Main reforms under the statutory derivative action 
 
Lord Goldsmith, speaking in the debates in the House of Lords, asserted that the 
requirements for bringing derivative claims should be ‘more modern, flexible and 
accessible’, arguing that the Act would provide ‘greater clarity’ concerning how the 
minority can make a derivative claim.1304 A closer look at the statutory provisions 
governing derivative litigation reveals distinct characteristics of legal action under the 
CA 2006 of which the following are the most important:  
 
First, the CA 2006 introduced judicial control of a derivative action in which the court is 
granted the power to decide whether such litigation should be able to continue.1305 While a 
claimant in Scotland must obtain the permission (leave) of the court before initiating 
                                                        
1295 Barrett v Duckett (1995) 1 BCLC 243, 243.  
1296 Smith v Croft (No.2) (1988) Ch 144, 122.  
1297 The Law Commission, Shareholders Remedies: Consultation Paper (No.142, 1995) para 1.6  
<http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/cp142_Shareholder_Remedies_Consultation.pdf>  
accessed 20 February 2017.  
1298 Ibid para 14.1.  
1299 Ibid para 4.35.  
1300 See The Law Commission, Shareholders Remedies: Report (1997) Part 6,  
<http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/lc246_Shareholder_Remedies.pdf> accessed 
20 February 2017.  
1301 Ibid paras 8.10 and 8.11. 
1302 See Final Report (686) para 7.46. 
1303 See, for example, M Almadani, ‘Derivative Actions: Does the Companies Act 2006 Offer a Way 
Forward?’ (2009) 30 Comp Law 131, 140–141. It is worth noting that provisions for Scotland largely 
replicate those applying elsewhere in the UK. For the purpose of this thesis, the reference will be made to 
provisions applying to England, Wales and Northern Ireland, expect when discussing Scottish cases.  
1304 See the statement of Lord Goldsmith before the Grand Committee, the House of Lords (27 February 
2006, col. GC4–5)  <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldhansrd/vo060227/text/60227-
36.htm> accessed 25 February 2017. 
1305 Section 261(1) of the CA 2006, which is equivalent to section 266(1) for Scotland. 
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derivative litigation, this is not the case elsewhere in the UK as the permission must be 
sought once a claimant has brought the derivative proceeding.1306 The CA 2006 provides a 
two-stage procedure for obtaining the court’s permission to continue with the action.1307 In 
the first stage, the court must dismiss the application if the applicant fails to establish a 
‘prima facie case’ ‘for giving permission’.1308 In the second stage, the court in exercising 
its discretion to grant the permission takes into considerations a set of factors, including 
those mentioned in section 263(3) and (4).1309 The UK approach to controlling derivative 
actions, which is based on placing the litigation decision power in the hands of a body 
external to the company (i.e., courts) might be criticised by questioning whether the court 
should be allowed to get involved in the company’s internal management since the 
litigation decision involves a commercial judgment determining whether the derivative 
action is in the company’s interests.1310 On the other hand, the introduction of judicial 
control of derivative actions indicates how problematic the UK legislator considers the 
problems associated with placing the litigation decision in the hands of the board of 
directors or the shareholder body; in other words, it might be true to say that the law 
assumes that an independent decision is more likely to be reached with judicial 
intervention in the derivative litigation process.1311 Furthermore, Reisberg believes that the 
judicial control of derivative actions tends to ‘provide an important check that should 
contribute positively to the view of the derivative action being seen as an important social 
mechanism’.1312 This argument goes on to say that the higher the public support the 
derivative action, the higher ‘its deterrent value’ will be.1313 In the view of Reisberg, the 
court’s early examination of allegations and facts supporting the derivative claim is 
basically a beneficial ‘pre-trial screening mechanism’, which should result in the early 
‘dismissal of baseless suits’, allowing only meritorious actions to progress through the pre-
trial procedures.1314  
 
Second, it is clear that the scope of the provision, which constitutes a derivative claim, is 
wider than previously seen under the common law. The statutory derivative claim might be 
made in respect of a director’s ‘actual and proposed act or omission involving negligence, 
                                                        
1306 Re Wishart (2009) CSOH 20 , at [25] (per Lord Glennie, at first instance). 
1307 Section 261 of the CA 2006.  
1308 Section 261(2) of the CA 2006.  
1309 The judicial approach will be considered in section (5.5.2) in this Chapter.  
1310 Hirt (n 1214) 180.  
1311 Ibid 179.  
1312 A Reisberg, ‘Judicial Control of Derivative Actions’ (2005) 16 ICCLR 335, 338.  
1313 Ibid referring to J. Cox, ‘The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits’ (1999) 65 Brooklyn Law Review 3, 
4.  
1314 Reisberg (n 1312) 338. 
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default, breach of duty, or breach of trust’.1315 Thus, one of the main differences between 
the common law and the CA 2006 is that under the former negligence on its own could not 
be considered as a cause of action because a claimant had to show the presence of fraud to 
bring the claim,1316 whereas under the CA 2006 proving the existence of mere negligence 
would be sufficient grounds to establish a derivative claim. Mujih observes that a 
claimant’s burden to prove breach or negligence is easier than demonstrating fraud, and 
this probably gives greater protection for company’s interests compared with the situation 
under the common law.1317 
 
Third, what constitutes wrongdoer control of the general meeting was not clear under the 
common law.1318 With the advent of the CA 2006, there is a general belief among many 
scholars,1319 and even judges,1320 that the claimant’s proof of wrongdoer control is no longer 
a requirement for bringing a derivative claim. Instead, the court, as mentioned above, is 
given the discretionary power to decide whether or not the applicant has met the criteria set 
forth in the CA 2006. This general view as to the abolition of the wrongdoer control 
requirement is borne out by that fact that the CA 2006 does not mention wrongdoer control 
as a consideration or a prerequisite for the initiation of a derivative action.1321 
 
Fourth, the scope of derivative claims under the CA 2006 has become wider in relation to 
the questions of against whom a derivative action can be brought. Section 260(3) provides 
that derivative litigation can be initiated against a ‘director or another person or (both)’. 
Regarding the phrase ‘another person’, it seems to refer to any third party. The court in 
Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd stressed that when the derivative action is brought against the 
third party, it must rely on a cause of action linked to wrongdoing or omission by a 
director.1322 Another point to consider is that the CA 2006, in section 260(4), widens the 
scope of the statutory derivative claim by providing a broader category of possible 
                                                        
1315 Section 260(3) of the CA 2006.  
1316 See footnotes 1290–1294 and accompanying text in this Chapter. 
1317 Mujih (n 1286) 79.  
1318 Shareholders Remedies: Report (n 1300) para 6.4.  
1319 See, for example A Keay and J Loughrey, ‘Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed: An 
Analysis of the New Derivative Action Under the Companies Act 2006’ (2008) 124 Law Quarterly Review 
469, 477; J P Sykes, ‘The Continuing Paradox: A Critique of Minority Shareholder and Derivative Claims 
Under The Companies Act 2006’ (2010) 29 CJQ 205, 215. 
1320 See, for example, Bamford v Harvey (2013) Bus LR 589, 597 where the court agreed that ‘wrongdoer 
control is not an absolute condition for a derivative claim’.  
1321 See D Kershaw, ‘The Rule in Foss v Harbottle is Dead; Long Live the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (LSE 
Law, Society and Economy Working Papers, 5/2013) 13,  
<https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2013-05_Kershaw.pdf> accessed 22 February 2017. In this 
article, Kershaw argued that one of possible readings of Part 11 of the CA 2006 suggests that the wrongdoer 
control requirement could be relevant in determining the continuation of a derivative claim. 
1322 Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd (2010) BCC 420 , 439.  
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claimants than the common law.1323 The shareholder can make a claim in relation to a cause 
of action that occurred before he/she became a member of the company.1324 It should, 
however, be borne in mind that the UK law limits the initiation of derivative actions to the 
company’s members, disallowing a broader range of persons from bringing the action 
(e.g., directors).1325 
 
It appears that some legal uncertainties and difficulties in the previous common law of 
derivative actions have been resolved with the introduction of the CA 2006. The removal 
of the requirement of fraud and of wrongdoer’s control, and the broadening of the scope of 
the claim by including new conducts and providing additional categories of possible 
claimants are regarded as steps forward in giving more protection to the minority and 
making the law clearer. However, some concerns were raised before the statutory system 
of derivative action came into force; for example, there was a fear that Part 11 of the 
CA 2006 might result in an increase in litigation against directors, and that such an 
increase might deter people from becoming directors in a company.1326 As Lord Hodgson 
during the Grand Committee Stage described, directors could be subject to a ‘double 
whammy’.1327 His lordship went on to say that while the scope of directors’ duties set forth 
in Part 10 of the CA 2006 was widened, the statutory scheme of derivative actions makes it 
easier for shareholders to bring legal action against directors.1328 Loughrey et al. in their 
empirical study, reported that lawyers predicted an increase in derivative litigation 
following the enactment of the CA 2006.1329 The source of the concern comes from the 
wide scope of the derivative claim and the expected simplicity to meet the requirement for 
bringing the claim.1330  
 
However, as a matter of fact, any worry that Part 11 of the CA 2006 would lead to an 
increase in derivative litigation has not yet been shown to be correct. This is because only 
22 derivative actions, as Keay notes, have been initiated since the CA 2006 took effect up 
                                                        
1323 Mujih (n 1286) 80.  
1324 Section 260(4) of the CA 2006.  
1325 The UK approach is more limited in terms of the range of applicants compared with other common law 
jurisdictions such as Australia and Canada. See A Keay, ‘Assessing and Rethinking the Statutory Scheme for 
Derivative Actions under the Companies Act 2006’ (2016) 16 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 39, 45.  
1326 D Arsalidou, ‘Litigation Culture and the New Statutory Derivative Claim’ (2009) 30 Company Lawyer 
205, 207. 
1327 See the statement of Lord Hodgson before the Grand Committee, the House of Lords (27 February 2006, 
col. GC2) <https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldhansrd/vo060227/text/60227-35.htm> 
accessed 28 February 2017. 
1328 Ibid.  
1329 Loughrey, Keay and Cerioni (n 992) 96–97.  
1330 Arsalidou (n 1326) 206–207, 209.  
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to 1 September 2015.1331 The small numbers of cases are clear evidence that any concern 
that had been raised following the enactment of the CA 2006 about a possible increase in 
derivative litigation is unjustifiable. The curious paradox is that although the statutory 
provisions seemingly facilitate a shareholder starting derivative litigation, fewer actions 
have been reported under the umbrella of the CA 2006. This may give rise to a question 
about whether statutory provisions coupled with the judicial approach to grant permission 
to continue the derivative action have played a significant role in controlling the flood of 
activist shareholder actions. In the section that follows the judicial approach to the 
application for permission will be discussed.  
 
5.5.2 The judicial approach to grant permission (leave): the two-stage procedure 
 
As stated above,1332 the CA 2006 provides a two-stage process for obtaining permission to 
continue a derivative claim. With the legislative guidance, it is, however, left to the court’s 
discretion to control the derivative claim and determine whether or not the claim should be 
allowed. The section will review the judicial approach to the application for permission, 
identifying some areas of deficiencies as well as areas of strength. 
 
5.5.2.1 The first stage: Prima facie question 
 
In the first stage, the court has to be satisfied that an application and evidence submitted by 
the claimant discloses a ‘prima facie case’.1333 If the court concludes that no prima facie 
case has been established, the application for permission will be dismissed.1334 In common 
law, there was not much guidance as to the meaning of prima facie and how to establish 
such a case.1335 It has been noted that an applicant, at this stage, is required to show that 
there is ‘a substantial chance of success at the final hearing’,1336 and this implies that there 
will inevitably be some considerations of the basic merits of the case.1337 A closer look at 
the case law reveals that the court has taken different approaches to the prima facie 
question.  
 
                                                        
1331 See Keay (n 1325) 41. It is worth mentioning here that the research conducted by Keay was aimed at 
detecting applications for permission (leave) to continue with derivative claims.  
1332 See footnotes 1307–1309 and accompanying text in this Chapter.  
1333 See section 261(2) of the CA 2006.  
1334 See section 261(2) (a) of the CA 2006. 
1335 A Keay and J Loughrey, ‘Derivative Proceedings in a Brave New World for Company Management and 
Shareholders’ (2010) 3 Journal of Business Law 151, 154.  
1336 Ibid 154, referring to J Heydon and P Loughlan, Cases and Materials on Equity and Trusts (5th edn, 
1997) 978. 
1337 Keay and Loughrey (n 1335) 154.  
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For example, in the Scottish case of Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd,1338 the court 
asserted that at this stage it should only consider the application and the supporting 
evidence presented by an applicant and ‘no onus is placed on the applicant to satisfy the 
court that there is a prima facie case; rather, the court is to refuse the application if it is 
satisfied that there is no prima facie case’.1339 While the court’s opinion is arguably seen as 
placing a low threshold on the applicant,1340 doubts might arise about what this would, in 
fact, mean for the applicant.1341 As one commentator opines, since the refusal of an 
application will be based on the absence of a prima facie case regardless of whether there 
is an initial burden of proof on the applicant, this ultimately implies that the applicant is, in 
fact, expected to satisfy the court that there is a prima facie case in order to obtain 
permission to continue, as the court was unclear whether or not proving a prima facie case 
is part of an initial burden.1342 In order to determine the presence of a prima facie case, it 
was said in the Wishart case that the court should check compliance with basic 
requirements such as whether or not the applicant is a shareholder and whether or not the 
application relates to an act or omission falling within the meaning of section 265(3) of the 
CA 2006 (equivalent to section 260(3) applying elsewhere in the UK).1343 The court also 
added that a set of considerations set forth in sections 268(1), (2) and (3)1344 will be 
relevant in exercising its discretion to grant leave (permission in elsewhere in the UK) at 
this stage.1345 Keay and Loughery, in their comment on the Wishart case, believed that the 
court, by considering factors mentioned in section 268 in the first stage, ‘set a far higher 
bar’ than the CA 2006 seems to provide, and that it will be more difficult for the applicant 
to prove that he/she has a prima facie case.1346 At the very least, this could lead to 
shareholders being discouraged from initiating derivative litigation.1347  
 
In contrast to the case of Wishart, another line of authorities, of which Iesini1348 is a clear 
example, follows a different approach to the prima facie question. In this case, it was said 
that the application would be dismissed if the applicant failed to establish a prima facie 
case;1349 in other words, the initial burden of proof was on the applicant to satisfy the court 
                                                        
1338 Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd (2009) CSIH 65 (on appeal). 
1339 Ibid [31].  
1340 Keay and Loughrey (n 1335) 155.  
1341 Mujih (n 1286) 80.  
1342 Ibid.  
1343 Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd (n 1338) [31]. 
1344 Section 263(2), (3) and (4) of the CA 2006 for the rest of the UK.  
1345 Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd (n 1338) [31].  
1346 Keay and Loughrey (n 1335) 155–156. 
1347 Ibid 157.  
1348 Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd (n 1322).  
1349 Ibid 440. 
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of the existence of prima facie case. The court, in the Iesini case, stated that in order to 
meet the prima facie requirement, the applicant had to show that the company had a ‘good’ 
cause of action that involved any wrongful conduct mentioned in section 260(3) of the CA 
2006.1350 Unlike the Wishart case, the court in Iesini did not need to take the statutory 
factors set forth in section 263 (section 268 in the Scottish provisions) into consideration in 
the first stage. It is important to say that while Iesini, for instance, followed the prescribed 
two-stage procedure,1351 this is not always the case since the practical reality reveals that 
the court in some cases has decided to conflate the two-stage process into one. For 
example, in the case of Stimpson v Southern Private Landlords Association,1352 the court 
skipped the first stage involving the prima facie inquiry and preferred to start with section 
263 of the CA 2006, as the judge believed that it would be ‘unduly elaborate’ to address 
the prima facie question.1353 
 
Although the courts have taken different approaches to applications for permission at the 
initial stage, the test for proving the prima facie case, as one commentator illustrates, 
seems to be low and the court approach is to ease the shareholders’ task to obtain the 
court’s permission to reach the second stage1354 where applications can always be 
dismissed.1355 With this in mind, it might be true to say that the first stage is likely to result 
in increased costs and time-wasting since the second stage could itself achieve the purpose 
of judicial control of derivative claims.1356  
 
5.5.2.2 The second stage: Section 263 of the CA 20061357 
 
If the court reaches the conclusion that a prima facie case has been established, the 
application will then continue as a full hearing and the court may order the company to 
submit evidence.1358 In the second stage, the CA 2006 enumerates specific situations where 
the court must deny permission and where the court does not have discretion to permit the 
                                                        
1350 Ibid 440.  
1351 Ibid 437. 
1352 Stimpson v Southern Private Landlords Association (2010) BCC 387 .  
1353 Ibid 391. 
1354 D Gibbs, ‘Has the Statutory Derivative Claim Fulfilled Its Objectives? A Prima Facie Case and the 
Mandatory Bar: Part 1’ (2011) 32 Company Lawyer 41, 43. Since the first stage under the CA 2006 is 
decided upon the supporting evidence submitted by the applicant only, this could explain the lenient 
approach adopted by the court regarding the prima facie question, see Keay (n 6) 428. 
1355 Keay (n 6) 432. 
1356 Ibid 432; see also Gibbs (n 1354) 44–45 who supports skipping the stage requiring the proof of a prima 
facie case.  
1357 Section 268 of the CA 2006 for Scotland.  
1358 Section 261(3) (a) of the CA 2006.  
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claim to continue if it is satisfied that any one of the followings applies.1359 The mandatory 
refusal of permission will be made where ‘a person acting in accordance with section 172’ 
would decide that continuing the claim would not promote the success of the company1360 
and where the actual or proposed wrongdoing (e.g., breach of the directors’ duty of care or 
of loyalty) has been authorised or ratified.1361  
 
If none of the above situations applies, the court is given the discretionary power under 
sections 263(3) and (4) to determine whether or not permission to continue the claim 
should be granted. To enhance the certainty of the law,1362 the CA 2006 requires the court 
to take a set of specific factors into account while exercising its discretion. The non-
exhaustive considerations include1363 whether a shareholder is acting in good faith; the 
importance that a person in performing the duty found in s 172 ‘would attach to continuing 
the action’; whether the wrongdoing could be ratified or authorised; whether the company 
has decided not to bring a claim; the availability of an alternative remedy;1364 and the 
viewpoints of the independent shareholders of the company.1365 It should be borne in mind 
that depending on the facts of the case, some of the above factors may not be relevant to 
the case in question.1366 In addition, when considering sections 263(3) and (4) of the CA 
2006, there should not be a particular test that has to be satisfied; but rather, the court is 
expected to reach an overall decision at its discretion about whether to grant the permission 
based upon a set of considerations.1367 Following the court’s assessment of relevant factors, 
if the court decides to permit the derivative claim to continue, the shareholder will then be 
able to continue the litigation on behalf of the company1368 on the possible condition that 
the claim will not be discontinued, settled or compromised without the court’s 
permission.1369 
 
                                                        
1359 Section 263(2) of the CA 2006.  
1360 Section 263(2)(a) of the CA 2006.  
1361 Section 263(2), (b) and (c) of the CA 2006. 
1362 Prior to the introduction of the CA 2006, R.19.9 (3) of the Civil Procedure Rules, the claimant was 
allowed to apply to the court for permission to continue the derivative claim, but there was no two-stage 
process or certain factors that needed to be considered by the court in its decision; for details see Reisberg 
(n 1312).  
1363 See, for example, Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd (n 1338) [36]; Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd 
(n 1322) 436. 
1364 Section 263(3) (a)–(f) of the CA 2006. 
1365 Section 263(4) of the CA 2006.  
1366 See, for example, Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel (2008) BCC 885, 894 where factors mentioned in 
subsections 263(3)(c) and (4) are irrelevant to the case. 
1367 See Stainer v Lee (2011) BCC 134 , 142  
1368 G Pendell, ‘Derivative Claims: A Practical Guide’ (2007) 20 Company Law Newsletter 1,4.  
1369 Rule 19.9F of the Civil Procedure Rules, <https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/ 
part19#Back-to-top> accessed 1 March 2017. 
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It is important in the following subsections to consider, albeit briefly due to space 
constraints, the judicial approach for assessing relevant factors in determining whether to 
grant permission in the second stage. This task is necessary to reveal a clear picture of how 
the court can control a derivative action. More importantly, the identification of problems 
and concerns associated with the judicial approach is crucial so as to avoid them in the 
legal reform proposed for the Saudi law.  
 
5.5.2.2.1 The view of the hypothetical person under section 172 to which the court must 
have regard 
 
UK corporate legislation instructs the court in sections 263(2)(a) and 263(3)(b) to take into 
account the view of ‘a person acting in accordance with section 172’ when considering 
whether continuing to seek the court’s permission would promote the company’s success. 
In the second stage, the court is required to have regard to this hypothetical person’s view 
in two sub-stages: (i) at the mandatory dismissal stage and (ii) again at the permissive 
stage. The question here is about how the court interprets sections 263(2)(a) and 263(3)(b), 
and whether the court follows a different approach for each statutory provision.  
 
As stated above, if the court is satisfied that section 263(2)(a) should apply, it has no 
option other than to refuse permission to continue the derivative claim. The CA 2006 does 
not explain what is meant by this hypothetical person. Nonetheless, the case law does offer 
guidance that reduces uncertainty about how section 263(2)(a) will be assessed; for 
example, in the Iesini case, it was ruled that the statutory provision would only apply 
where ‘no director acting in accordance with section 172 would seek to continue the 
claim’.1370 In determining whether the hypothetical director would seek to continue the 
claim, the court acknowledged that there may be a set of commercial factors (e.g., the size, 
strength, cost of the claim and the impact of litigation on the company’s activities) to take 
into consideration.1371 Yet, the court refused to engage with this because it was ‘ill-
equipped’ to make commercial decisions, ‘except in a clear case’.1372 As Gibbs points out, 
this judicial approach followed in the Iesini case was in favour of staying within the limits 
of the law to determine whether a director would seek to continue the claim.1373 The test 
used by the court in Iesini to determine whether the application should be dismissed 
pursuant to section 263(2)(a) has also been adopted by other courts such as in the case of 
                                                        
1370 Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd (n 1322) 441.  
1371 Ibid.  
1372 Ibid.  
1373 Gibbs (n 1354) 45. The court in Iesini concluded that the legal basis for the claim was so weak and 
therefore the claim should be discontinued; see Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd (n 1322) 445.  
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Singh v Singh,1374 and of Cullen Investment Ltd v Brown.1375 It has been noted that this is a 
relatively low threshold suggested by the mainstream judicial line of authorities in which it 
appears fairly easy for a shareholder applicant to prove that no hypothetical director would 
refuse the bringing of the claim.1376 It is worth mentioning that the court, besides assessing 
the legal basis for the claim, may take into account other considerations, such as the 
modest value of the claim compared with its costs, to determine whether or not 
section 263(2)(a) should apply to the case in question.1377  
 
With regard to section 263(3)(b), the court, in the permissive stage, is also expected to take 
into account whether a hypothetical director acting under the duty found in section 172 
would attach importance to pursuing the derivative claim.1378 In this regard, the court will 
determine ‘how important it is to continue the claim’ in the view of a hypothetical director 
who would take into account under section 172 whether the commencement of litigation 
would be likely to promote the company’s success for the benefit of all shareholders, with 
possible reference to matters set forth in sub-sections 172(1), (a)–(f), where relevant.1379 To 
explain this point, if the hypothetical director were to attach little importance to the 
continuation of the derivative action, this could result in the refusal of permission, and the 
converse is true if he/she were to attach considerable importance to the continuation of the 
action.1380 
 
While section 263(2)(a) has been seen as an undemanding test that is relatively easy to 
pass, the applicant is likely to face more challenges when the duty found in section 172 is 
assessed by the court under the requirement set down in section 263(3)(b).1381 Unlike 
section 263(2)(a) where the court resisted engagement with business considerations, this, 
as has been submitted, should not be the case in relation to section 263(3)(b).1382 As one 
commentator suggested, in section 263(2)(a) the court’s business judgment involving the 
weighing of commercial factors could result in the mandatory refusal of permission and the 
court’s engagement in the consideration of commercial factors would be the reason for 
dismissal.1383 However, in the context of section 263(3)(b), the court’s business judgment 
                                                        
1374 Singh v Singh (2013) EWHC 2138 , at [18].  
1375 Cullen Investments Ltd v Brown (2015) BCC 539, 540.  
1376 Keay (n 6) 435.  
1377 Stimpson v Southern Private Landlords Association (n 1352) 403.  
1378 Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel (n 1366) 895.  
1379 Cullen Investments Ltd v Brown (n 1375) 551. 
1380 Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel (n 1366) 895. 
1381 Keay (n 6) 447.  
1382 Kershaw (n 310) 621.  
1383 Ibid.  
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court and the consideration of commercial matters is ‘a part of a discretionary mix of 
factors’ that enables the court to prioritise other factors mentioned in section 263 over the 
court’s commercial judgment.1384 Hence, while a literal reading of section 263(2)(a) 
suggests that judges will be led to make a definitive commercial decision, the wording of 
section 263(3)(b) indicates that the judicial assessment will focus on ‘the importance’ that 
a director would attach to that decision.1385 
 
A close look at the case law reveals that the court in some cases, for instance, in Franbar 
Holdings Ltd v Patel,1386 believed that a hypothetical director would take into consideration 
a set of business factors such as the prospects of success of the claim; the ability of the 
company to make a recovery on any award of damages; the disruption that would be 
caused to the development of the company's business by having to concentrate on the 
proceedings; the costs of the proceedings; and any damage to the company’s reputation 
and business if the proceedings were to fail.1387 Other matters, such as keeping experienced 
directors within the company,1388 ‘the amount at stake’,1389 and whether the applicant will 
entirely incur the cost of a claim and be liable for adverse costs that result in the case of 
failure,1390 might be relevant to assessing section 263(3)(b).  
 
Nevertheless, there are some indications that the court would resist engaging in the 
business judgment, preferring to rely on the decisions of those responsible for the 
company’s management; for instance, in Franbar Holdings Ltd, although the court 
enumerated a set of business considerations that should be taken into account in relation to 
section 263(3)(b), as Kershaw noted, the court did not consider any business concerns,1391 
and the same was true in the Iesini case.1392 In the view of Keay, the general approach of 
the court can be seen as a strict one in the sense that when considering the application for 
permission under the derivative claim scheme, the court usually relies on the view of 
directors when it comes to the question of where the company’s interests lie because the 
court, as Keay  points out, thinks that directors are in a better position to determine what is 
in the best interests of the company.1393 It might be true to say that the approach of the 
                                                        
1384 Ibid.  
1385 Ibid.  
1386 Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel (n 1366). 
1387 Ibid 895. 
1388 Kleanthous v Paphitis (2012) BCC 676, 696. 
1389 Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd (n 1338) at [37]. 
1390 Cullen Investments Ltd v Brown (n 1375) 551–552. 
1391 Kershaw (n 310) 622.  
1392 Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd (n 1322) 441. 
1393 See Keay (n 1325) 53 where the author comments on the case of Kleanthous v Paphitis, referring to it as 
an example of the court’s resistance to engage in assessing commercial considerations. 
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court usually tends to step back from the objective assessment of commercial factors, being 
in favour of staying within the limits of the law.1394 In his comments on whether or not the 
statutory system of derivative claims would result in significant numbers of derivative 
litigation, Reisberg seems to be right when he asserted that the traditional suspicion of 
courts towards derivative actions would continue, especially following the introduction of 
CA 2006 because they were currently’ ‘armed’ with a very restrictive legislation to 
‘justify’ their attitudes’.1395 
 
5.5.2.2.2 Ratification (authorisation) 
 
In the second stage, the ratification of wrongdoing is still relevant to the question of 
whether permission will be granted to continue the derivative action. The court has no 
option other than to dismiss the claim if the act complained of was ratified or authorised by 
the company (mandatory dismissal stage).1396 If the ratification or authorisation did not 
occur, the court proceeds to the permissive stage where it, at its discretion, decides whether 
the act is likely to be ratified or authorised.1397 It is noteworthy that while ratification 
simply refers to the ‘retrospective approval’ of acts (breaches), authorisation (via the board 
or the general meeting) is a ‘requisite approval’ obtained prior to the act.1398  
 
When examining the issue of ratification,1399 it seems true to say that ratification under the 
common law is still relevant to the regulation of this area of law because the CA 2006 does 
not change many rules on ratification of breaches of directors’ duties that were developed 
by the case law.1400 In the context of derivative claims, the central question encountered by 
the court concerns whether or not a purported ratification of wrongdoing is effective. In 
this regard, the common law rule that allows the wrongdoer to vote as a shareholder in 
                                                        
1394 See D Gibbs, ‘Has the Statutory Derivative Claim Fulfilled Its Objectives? The Hypothetical Director 
And CSR: Part 2’ (2011) 32 Company Lawyer 76, 79. 
1395 A Reisberg, ‘Shadows of the Past and Back to the Future: Part 11 of the UK Companies Act 2006 
(in)action’ (2009) 2–3 European Company and Financial Law Review 219, 225. 
1396 Section 263 (2)(c) of the CA 2006. In relation to authorisation, the court must also dismiss the claim if an 
act has not yet occurred, but has been authorised by the company, see section 263(2)(b) of the CA 2006. 
1397 See section 263(3)(c) of the CA 2006 which relates to the cause of action resulting from an act yet to 
occur, whereas section 263(3)(d) is concerned with that an act that has occurred and is likely to ratified. 
1398 See Kershaw (n 310) 612–613.    
1399 Because of limited space within which to discuss the authorisation, which is certainly relevant to the 
discussion of this section, reference will be made here to the issue of ratification, assuming that statutory 
rules in the context of derivative claims applying to ratification largely apply to authorisation. However, any 
discrepancy between rules will be highlighted.  
1400 C Riley, ‘Derivative Claims and Ratification: Time to Ditch Some Baggage’ (2014) 34 Legal Studies 
582, 583.  
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relation to the ratification resolution1401 is no longer valid under the CA 2006.1402 
Section 239(4) clearly excludes the votes of an errant  director, or any person ‘connected 
with him[/her]’1403 from being counted in relation to any ratification resolution at the 
general meeting. Furthermore, a wrongdoer or any connected person, as section 239(3) 
provides, will not count as a member for the purposes of written resolutions.1404  
 
Nevertheless, the law on ratification has been seen by many as involving areas of 
complexity and ambiguity.1405 In cases where the wrongdoing in question has been ratified, 
the court, as required by section 239, is expected to ensure the effectiveness of purported 
ratification by analysing the nature of the votes of shareholders at the general meeting and 
whether a voter could be regarded as being connected to the defendant, thereby 
invalidating their vote.1406 This would result in hearings becoming dominated by arguments 
over whether or not the ratification is effective and therefore no change is likely to occur in 
favour of a wide judicial discretion.1407 Since the validity of the ratification requires 
excluding the votes of those connected with wrongdoers, this implicitly means that the 
court will take into account wrongdoer control over the voting process. Accordingly, the 
uncertainty associated with what amounts to wrongdoer control of the general meeting 
might continue to be used to determine whether or not particular shareholders are 
connected.1408 This task, namely to identify the purported wrongdoer control, is likely to be 
a difficult one in companies with large numbers of shareholders.1409 Furthermore, the Act 
has been criticised for opening up more possibility for the ratification to be relied on to 
undermine the accessibility to derivative actions, because not only will the fact that the 
wrongdoing has been ratified be considered as a ground for the denial of a derivative 
action, but the likelihood of ratification might also be taken into account to dismiss the 
application for the continuation of a claim.1410 The case of Franbar Holdings Ltd is an 
                                                        
1401 See North-west Transportation v Beatty (1887) 12 AppCas 589 , 589, 591–592, 596 and 600, where it 
was held that the director who was in breach of his duty ‘was entitled to exercise his voting powers as a 
shareholder in general meeting to ratify’; his wrong was done to the company because shareholders, unlike 
directors, do not owe fiduciary duties and their votes were considered proprietary rights; shareholders are 
entitled to use them to serve their own interests even if these conflicted with the company’s interests.  
1402 See Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel (n 1366) 897.  
1403 The definition of ‘connected person’ is set out in section 252 of the CA 2006.  
1404 It is worth noting that requirements set forth in section 239 of the CA 2006 are seemingly limited to 
ratification and do not apply to authorisation; D Kershaw (n 310) 613. 
1405 See generally Riley (n 1400); Reisberg (n 1395) 230; Keay (n 1325) 51–53. 
1406 This is called a voting-based approach and is designed to determine the validity of ratification; see Riley 
(n 1400) 583. 
1407 Reisberg (n 1395) 230–231. 
1408 Riley (n 1400) 608. 
1409 Shareholders Remedies: Consultation Paper (n 1297) para 4.13.  
1410 Keay (n 1325) 52. 
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example of an application being refused, inter alia, because of the likelihood of ratification 
taking place in future.1411 
 
Further problems might exist in relation to section 239(7), which provides that ‘any rule of 
law as to acts that are incapable of being ratified by the company’ and remains unaltered 
by the statutory framework for ratification. Riley points out that the CA 2006 in 
section 239(7) preserves the common law position as to certain wrongs (e.g., acts 
amounting to fraud) that cannot be ratified and that also unsurprisingly preserves ‘all the 
uncertainties’ associated with the law on what constitutes an unratifiable wrong.1412 The 
lack of clarity in the law could undermine the accessibility of derivative claims, forcing a 
minority shareholder to ponder whether the derivative litigation is a remedy worth 
pursuing. The importance of the problem associated with section 239(7) is best illustrated 
by the judgment delivered by William Trower QC in the case of Franbar Holdings Ltd. In 
brief, this was an application for permission brought by a minority shareholder to continue 
an action on behalf of Medicentres (UK) Ltd against the defendants who were two 
directors appointed by the majority shareholder (Casualty Plus Ltd) and Casualty Plus Ltd 
itself. The applicant, inter alia, alleged that the directors, by diverting businesses from 
Medicentres Ltd to Casualty Plus Ltd, had breached their fiduciary duties.1413 The court, in 
deciding whether to grant the permission, took into its account the likelihood of 
ratification,1414 especially as it was indicated to the court that Casualty Plus Ltd (which 
owned 75% of the company’s shares) was likely to ratify the wrongdoing.1415 Since 
Casualty Plus Ltd was a shareholder, the court had to consider whether Casualty Plus Ltd 
was a connected person within the meaning of section 254 of the CA 2006.1416 The court 
found no evidence supporting the idea that Casualty Plus Ltd was a person connected to 
the wrongdoers within the meaning of the statutory provisions and therefore the vote of 
Casualty Plus Ltd could not be excluded in relation to the ratification resolution.1417 One of 
the allegations the applicant submitted was that the wrongs in question could be ratified in 
the common law.1418 While the deputy judge confirmed in interpreting section 239(7) that 
the CA 2006 did not change the common law position that specific wrongdoings were not 
                                                        
1411 Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel (n 1366) 898.  
1412 Riley (n 1400) 603. 
1413 Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel (n 1366) 885–886.  
1414 Section 263 (3)(c) (ii) of the CA 2006. 
1415 Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel (n 1366) 895. 
1416 What is relevant to the facts of this case is section 252(2)(b), which is concerned with ‘a body corporate 
with which the director is connected’, which is defined in section 254 of the CA 2006. 
1417 Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel (n 1366) 896–897. 
1418 Ibid 897. 
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ratifiable,1419 such unratifiable wrongs could effectively be ratified on condition that the 
vote to ratify did not involve the wrongdoers using their control of the company to 
‘improperly’ prevent the applicant from initiating a derivative claim, which would be the 
case ‘where the new connected person provisions are not satisfied but there is still actual 
wrongdoer control’ of the company.1420 The court here required more than a merely 
unconnected vote to ratify effectively unratifiable acts (e.g., fraud); in other words, the 
ratification could only be valid without the vote of Casualty Plus Ltd. If Casualty Plus Ltd 
were to vote, this would constitute an actual wrongdoer control.1421 
 
It might be true to say that this judicial approach involves some aspects of uncertainty; for 
example, the law on what could be considered as a ratifiable wrong, as some argue, is still 
unclear.1422 In addition, it is obvious that breaches that are categorised as unratifiable 
wrongs (e.g., fraud) cannot be ratified by merely an unconnected vote, as ‘beyond that 
uncertainty prevails’.1423 Indeed, given the fact that a ratification is only one (and perhaps 
not the weightiest)1424 factor considered by the court in its discretion to grant permission, 
arguments over what amounts to a valid ratification would in many instances dominate the 
permission hearing,1425 and this is regarded as a complex and contentious issue.1426  
 
5.5.2.2.3 Applicant’s good faith 
 
Under section 263(3)(a) the court is required to take into account whether an applicant ‘is 
acting in good faith in seeking to continue the claim’. To ensure that the good faith 
requirement is met, the court tends to question whether the shareholder applicant has a 
collateral purpose or motive for bringing the derivative action.1427 In this regard, the case 
law seems to suggest that the court is unlikely to refuse permission based upon the absence 
of good faith simply because the applicant has other secondary motives for bringing the 
claim, provided the claim has also been brought in the interests of the company.1428 This is 
expressed, for instance, by Lord Glennie in the case of Wishart, saying, in his own words, 
that ‘why should an applicant be prevented from bringing the action simply because it may 
be asserted against him that he has other less creditable motives than a desire to see the 
                                                        
1419 Ibid. 
1420 Ibid 897–898. 
1421 Riley (n 1400) 606. 
1422 Ibid 603 and 606. 
1423 Ibid 607. 
1424 Ibid 606.  
1425 Keay (n 1325) 52.  
1426 Reisberg (n 1395) 230. 
1427 See, for example, Singh v Singh (n 1374) [22]; Hook v Sumner (2016) BCC 220 , 235. 
1428 Keay and Loughrey (n 1335) 165–166. 
 188 
 
company put back into funds?’.1429 Furthermore, the court, in the Iesini case, disregarded 
allegations that shareholder applicants had brought the claim for the benefit of a third party 
and not the company,1430 asserting that since the claim was initiated for the benefit of the 
company, the application for permission could not be refused because ‘there are other 
benefits which [the claimant] will derive from the claim’.1431 It seems clear that as long as 
the company will benefit from the bringing of derivative actions, the lack of good faith on 
the part of a shareholder claimant is likely to be disregarded.1432 
 
In considering section 263(3)(a) the question of whether the claimant ‘has clean hands’ can 
be addressed by the court.1433 In the common law the court would not allow the minority 
shareholder to bring a derivative action, as an exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle, if 
the shareholder’s behaviour, from the standpoint of equity, disqualified him/her from being 
a plaintiff on behalf of the company. This would be the case, for instance, ‘if he[/she] 
participated in the wrong of which he[/she] complains’.1434 The judicial approach to 
ensuring compliance with the equitable doctrine of clean hands has remained even after the 
introduction of the statutory derivative scheme, as illustrated in the Iesini case1435 where the 
claimant’s prior involvement in the company’s management had contributed to the losses 
in the company, which would have constituted bad faith for the purposes of 
section 263(3)(a) of the CA 2006.1436 
 
5.5.2.2.4 The availability of alternative remedies 
 
It should be borne in mind that a derivative action is brought in relation to directors’ breach 
of their duty towards the company and not individual shareholders.1437 However, in some 
situations directors’ conduct may amount to a breach of their duty towards the company 
and simultaneously a violation of shareholders’ personal rights.1438 Thus, in exercising its 
discretion as to whether to allow the continuation of derivative claim, the court is expected 
under section 263(3)(f) to consider whether the shareholder claimant can pursue the action 
in his/her own name instead of on the company’s behalf. A petition for unfair prejudice 
                                                        
1429 Re Wishart (n 1338) [33]. 
1430 Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd (n 1322)114 120 
1431 Ibid 448. 
1432 Keay and Loughrey (n 1335) 167. 
1433 E Mujih, ‘The New Statutory Derivative Claim: A Paradox of Minority Shareholder Protection: Part 2’ 
(2012) 33 Company Lawyer 99, 101–102.  
1434 Nurcombe v Nurcombe (1985) 1 WLR 370 , 376. The court cited the quoted statement, with approval 
from L Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law (4th edn, 1979) 652.  
1435 See Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd (n 1322) 448–449. 
1436 Ibid 448.  
1437 Section 260(1) of the CA 2006.  
1438 For example, a breach of the company’s articles of association, see Kershaw (n 310) 625. 
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under section 994 of the CA 2006 is an example of an alternative remedy that can be 
brought by shareholders in their own name and the availability of the petition is usually 
considered by the court to determine whether or not section 263(3)(f) applies.1439 
 
In brief, the petition under section 994 is typically ‘a personal action potentially producing 
personal benefits for the petitioning shareholder’, whereas the derivative action is brought 
to seek a corporate relief.1440 The unfair prejudice petition is wider in scope than the 
derivative action.1441 While a derivative action can only be brought in respect of a wrong 
done to the company within the meaning of section 260(3) of the CA 2006 (e.g., breaches 
of directors’ duties),1442 the unfair prejudice petition can be submitted in respect of any act 
of the company to protect not only the rights of shareholders, but also their interests.1443 
Having said that, section 994 petitions can be founded on a wrongful act perpetrated 
against the company by directors because this remedy intends to protect members’ 
interests.1444 In such situations, where unfair prejudice petitions are based on grounds such 
as breaches of directors’ duties, if the shareholder petitions successfully under section 994, 
the court may grant relief under section 996, under which it can ‘authorise civil 
proceedings to be brought in the name and on behalf of the company’.1445 It should be 
noted that unlike the derivative action, there is no requirement to submit an application for 
permission under the unfair prejudice remedy.1446  
 
Turning to the court’s consideration of section 263(3)(f), the court in the Iesini case makes 
it clear that the availability of an alternative remedy is not considered as a compelling 
reason for the discontinuation of derivative action because ‘if it were then it would have 
been a mandatory ground for refusing permission under s. 263(2) rather than a 
discretionary consideration under s. 263(3)(f)’.1447 Indeed, the availability of alternative 
remedies is one among many factors that the court should take onto account to reach its 
overall decision. Whether or not the court will permit the application is fact-sensitive. The 
few cases heard since the CA 2006 do offer some guidance; for example, in a situation 
where a shareholder brings a derivative claim and has also initiated an unfair prejudice 
petition, the court is likely to refuse the continuation of the derivative claim, as illustrated 
                                                        
1439 See, for example, Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel (n 1366) 898–900. 
1440 Keay (n 1325) 60. 
1441 Reisberg (n 8) 278. 
1442 See Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd (n 1322) 441.  
1443 Reisberg (n 8) 278. 
1444 Ibid 278. 
1445 Section 996(2)(c) of the CA 2006.  
1446 Reisberg (n 8) 274. 
1447 Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd (n 1322) 449. 
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by the judgment of William Trower QC in the case of Franbar Holdings Ltd.1448 However, 
the mere availability of unfair prejudice proceedings does not necessarily lead to the 
dismissal of the application for permission from the viewpoint of the court in Stainer v 
Lee.1449 In addition, the more favourable claimant costs applying to derivative claims 
compared to unfair prejudice petitions1450 could, as in Kleanthous v Paphitis, be a relevant 
consideration for dismissing the permission because of the availability of a more 
appropriate remedy in the form of a section 994 petition.1451 However, the claimant’s 
motivations to benefit from the indemnity costs should not prevent the court from 
permitting the claim if other considerations, especially the nature of wrongdoing purported 
and the relief pursued, indicate that the derivative action was the suitable remedy.1452  
 
5.5.2.2.5 Other statutory factors that the court must consider 
 
Under section 263(3)(e) the court must take into consideration ‘whether the company has 
decided not to pursue the claim’. This discretionary factor was one of the grounds for 
refusing permission in the Kleanthous case.1453 In Kleanthous the court attached 
considerable importance to the viewpoint of a committee of two disinterested directors 
who were empowered to offer professional advice and to make decisions on litigation. The 
court rationalised its position by saying that the committee concerned was better placed to 
determine what served the commercial interests of the company.1454  
 
Under section 263(4), judges are required to take into account the evidence before them 
concerning ‘the views of members of the company who have no personal interest, direct or 
indirect, in the matter’. The relevance of subsection (4) might be questionable because it is 
hard to imagine a shareholder of a company that does not have a personal interest in the 
derivative action that is brought to seek relief for the benefit of the company and not for a 
shareholder claimant.1455 Indeed, as long as the wrong is perpetrated against the company, 
it is logical that every shareholder will at least be affected by the outcome of the claim and 
therefore have an interest in the claim.1456 The court, in Iesini, acknowledged the difficulty 
                                                        
1448 Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel (n 1366) 899. 
1449 Stainer v Lee (n 1367) 135.  
1450 Keay (n 6) 454.  
1451 See Kleanthous v Paphitis (n 1388) 678 where the court, inter alia, refused the permission on suspicion 
that the claimant had decided to bring only a derivative action ‘in the hope that he would be able to obtain a 
costs indemnity’. 
1452 Keay (n 6) 454.  
1453 Kleanthous v Paphitis (n 1388) 678.  
1454 Ibid 696.  
1455 Mujih (n 1433) 105.  
1456 Ibid.  
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in understanding subsection (4), suggesting that it might be better interpreted to require the 
court to consider the view of shareholders who were not involved in the alleged wrong and 
who were not in a position to benefit otherwise than in their capacity as shareholders.1457 
Even with this interpretation, the court will face some difficulties in resolving any dispute 
in relation to such matters.1458  
 
5.6 The Right of Shareholders to Litigate: Areas of Uncertainty in Saudi Law 
 
As explained above,1459 the general meeting of shareholders is entitled to make litigation 
decisions against directors and the wrongdoer control of the general meeting is one main 
stumbling block to commencing the company’s proceedings. In response to this issue, the 
law would usually confer the right on an individual shareholder to bring a derivative 
action. As far as the Saudi company law is concerned, one may question whether an 
individual shareholder can litigate, enforcing the breaches of directors’ duties owed to the 
company. As will be argued below, neither the CL 1965 nor the new CL 2015 has 
successfully introduced an alternative judicial mechanism of enforcement for breaches of 
directors’ duties in the form of derivative actions. Failure on the part of the legislation to 
adopt a clear regime of derivative actions does not sufficiently protect the company’s 
interests and, consequently, undermines directors’ accountability.   
 
In respect of shareholders’ right to commence derivative litigation under Saudi law, the 
only statutory provision relevant to this matter is article 80 of the CL 2015 (article 78 of its 
predecessor of 1965). According to article 80, a shareholder is entitled to bring a legal 
action ‘against the members of the board of directors on behalf of the company if the 
wrongful act committed by them is of a nature to cause him personal prejudice’ [emphasis 
added]. Significantly, the statutory provision adds that the shareholder claimant ‘shall be 
adjudged compensation only to the extent of the prejudice caused him’.1460 As a condition 
to initiate such litigation, the shareholder cannot bring a case unless the company’s right to 
litigate is still valid and after he has given notice of his intention of bringing a lawsuit to 
the company.1461 Article 80 of the CL 2015 is drafted the same as its immediate 
predecessor article 78 of the CL 1965. The statutory provision in the CL 1965 was the 
                                                        
1457 Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd (n 1322) 350–451. 
1458 Ibid 451. 
1459 See footnotes 1273–1281 and accompanying text in this Chapter. 
1460 Article 80 of the CL 2015.  
1461 Ibid.  
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subject of criticism by some legal writers.1462 The main shortcomings of article 80 will be 
examined below. 
 
5.6.1 Uncertainty in the nature of article 80 action: Is it, in fact, a derivative 
action? 
 
One of the sources of confusion stems from the fact that while the corporate statute permits 
shareholders to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the company, it clearly requires such a claim to 
be legally based on misconduct that has caused harm to the shareholders’ interests, with 
any compensation flowing to the shareholders.1463 The wording of article 78 (article 80 of 
the CL 2015) has posed a dilemma concerning whether or not the shareholders’ action falls 
within the domain of derivative actions.  
 
The argument put forward here is that although it is stated in article 80 of the CL 2015 that 
the claim is brought on behalf of the company, this is not sufficient to categorise it as a 
derivative action since the primary elements of a derivative action cannot be found in the 
article 80 claim. Legally speaking, whether the potential to instigate a legal action belongs 
to the company or to shareholders will be determined by determining whose rights are 
primarily breached by the wrongful act. If shareholders’ personal rights are directly 
affected by the director’s misconduct, they can bring a direct claim in their own name, and 
such litigation falls outside the domain of derivative action.1464 However, in some instances 
where the wrongful act primarily amounts to the violation of the company’s rights, such as 
breaches of duties of loyalty and care owed to the company, it is the company to which the 
claim belongs. In this case an injured shareholder should be only allowed to initiate the 
litigation derivatively so as to enforce the company’s rights.1465 
 
Another hallmark of derivative actions is that the shareholder claimant seeks a corporate 
relief (e.g., in the form of damages or disgorgement of profit) where any potential 
recovery, as a rule, belongs to the company and only benefits the derivative claimant 
indirectly.1466 Based on this, the claim is understood to be derivative when a person (i.e., a 
director) who owes a duty to the company wrongs the company and when any relief 
                                                        
1462 See, for example, Y Al-Zahrani, ‘Rights of Shareholders under Saudi Company Law 1965’ (Phd Thesis, 
Brunel University 2013) 195.  
1463 Ibid. 
1464 H Baum and D Puchniak, ‘The Derivative Action: An Economic, Historical and Practice-oriented 
Approach’ in D Puchniak, H Baum and M Ewing-Chow (eds), The Derivative Action in Asia: A Comparative 
and Functional Approach (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2012) 10–11. 
1465 Ibid 7, 8. 
1466 Ibid 9. 
 193 
 
received from a successful derivative claim ‘flows directly’ to the company, not to the 
derivative shareholder claimant.1467  
 
From the language of article 80, it appears that a claim is only permitted when a wrongful 
act has resulted in a personal prejudice to a shareholder. Importantly, the company would 
not receive relief for the wrong taken against it even though such claim was brought on its 
behalf. This suggests that the legal basis for 80 article claims cannot be a purely personal 
cause of action belonging to the shareholder, but it appears to be triggered by a wrong done 
to the company in which the interests of an individual shareholder have been indirectly 
prejudiced.1468 In this regard, the shareholder can only seek a personal relief, not a 
corporate relief. A probable exception to that is in relation to self-dealing transactions 
where the shareholder under article 80 can seek a remedy either in the form of the 
rescission of a contract or the disgorgement of unauthorised profit.1469 Still, the shareholder 
has to prove that the directors’ failure to disclose their interest caused personal prejudice to 
him/her and that is not always easily accomplished.  
 
Apart from that, a successful claim under article 80 is likely to result in a personal remedy 
for shareholders rather than a corporate remedy. As the wording of article 80 suggests, the 
claim is introduced to redress harm done to shareholders personally rather than harm done 
to the company. From the theoretical perspective, shareholders’ right to bring legal action 
on behalf of the company is seen as deriving from the right of the company.1470 As a result, 
the law should only allow the initiation of such rights as long as the wrong is done to the 
company and the remedy sought is for the benefit of the company.1471 This means that both 
the direct claim by the company and the derivative claim by a shareholder should only be 
brought to protect the company’s rights. Therefore, it is theoretically improper to allow a 
legal action by shareholders on behalf of the company in order to seek a personal relief for 
the wrong originally perpetrated against the company. In the strict sense it seems that an 
article 80 claim is not a derivative action1472 and tends to be more a personal claim, which 
would legally be based upon the wrong done to the company. 
 
                                                        
1467 Ibid 7. 
1468 Jobran (n 632) 388. 
1469 Article 71(2) of the CL 2015.  
1470 Baum and Puchniak (n 1464) 8. 
1471 A similar view is also expressed in the UK in relation to the debate concerning the interrelationship 
between a derivative claim and an unfair prejudice petition, see Reisberg (n 8) 282. 
1472 This has similarly been claimed regarding the old article 78 of the CL 1965, see Al-Zahrani (n 1462) 19. 
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Shareholders’ use of an article 80 claim may come with some problems and concerns of 
which the following are the most important: first, as long as the remedy sought under an 
article 80 claim will flow to a shareholder claimant, the implication is that the company, 
including shareholders other than the shareholder claimant, will not benefit from any 
remedy granted by the court. As a result, non-shareholder constituencies also do not 
receive benefits. Indeed, creditors, for instance, tend to be well positioned and ‘treated 
equally’ if the wrongful act done to the company is redressed by corporate relief rather 
than a personal relief under article 80.1473 Second, the permission for an individual 
shareholder to obtain personal relief for a wrong done to the company is likely to ‘lead to a 
multiplicity of proceedings’ in connection with the one wrongful act.1474 Consequently, this 
could cause ‘inefficiencies and inconvenience’, and more specifically the incurring of 
greater costs than if there were a claim leading to relief for the company.1475 Third, for an 
article 80 claim to be successful, it appears that shareholders would not only bear the 
burden to prove the breach of directors’ duties, but also that the relevant misconduct on the 
part of a director(s) would have caused them personal prejudice, which could be difficult to 
establish; for example, in terms of self-dealing transactions, if a given director does not 
meet the disclosure requirement under article 71(1) and the company is unable to sue 
him/her, a shareholder may do so on behalf of the company under article 80, Here, he/she 
is likely to have the burden of not only establishing the breach of article 71, but also that 
the breach caused a personal prejudice. In relation to directors’ breach of the duty of care, 
which is regarded as a wrong done to the company, not every instance of negligence 
amounts to shareholders’ personal harm (e.g., reduction in dividends), unless the director 
has been grossly negligent in the company’s management. 
 
5.6.2 Other examples of deficiency 
 
According to article 80 of the CL 2015, shareholders can derivatively sue directors who do 
wrong as long as the company entitlement to file the liability lawsuit is outstanding. The 
main problem with such a requirement is that the company’s decision through the general 
meeting not to initiate litigation against directors would be regarded as a bar to the action 
under article 80 of the CL 2015. Given the issue of wrongdoer control over the general 
                                                        
1473 See Shareholders Remedies: Consultation Paper (n 1297) para 16.4. Although this remark is made by the 
UK Law Commission when rationalising the need for derivative claims, it can also be valid in other 
jurisdictions in which the derivative action is not channelled into unfair prejudice petition. 
1474 Keay (n 1325) 65.  
1475 Ibid.  
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meeting, the law has indeed introduced an inaccessible mechanism available for the 
minority shareholders to enforce the company’s rights. 
 
Another point to consider is that the law ex ante requires shareholders to notify a company 
of their intention to sue directors on their behalf. The rationale behind this rule is to 
provide the company with an opportunity to determine whether to litigate against directors 
since the shareholders’ right to litigation is originally derived from the right of the 
company. To be specific, the notice requirement intends to give the company a chance ‘to 
vindicate its own rights’.1476 In some jurisdictions the demand requirement will be 
submitted to the company’s competent organs, which need to respond to such demand 
within a certain period.1477 With such an arrangement, the law ensures that the company is 
informed and, more importantly, that its view is heard. In this regard, the Saudi law lacks 
certainty, making the demand requirement virtually meaningless. The CL 2015 is unclear 
about the nature of such notice to the company: is the purpose of such notification only to 
inform the company or to offer the company the chance to remedy the wrong before 
resorting to the court? What if the company refuses to take action against a director, will 
the company’s refusal be regarded as a bar to the bringing of derivative litigation? This 
confusion results from the fact that the CL 2015 does not require the company to respond 
to the shareholders’ notice and, equally, it does not oblige the shareholder to wait with 
proceeding with the action until receipt of the company’s response. 
 
From the discussion above it can be said that Saudi law has lacked clarity in designing a 
derivative claim intended to protect companies’ interests. Indeed, the failure by Saudi law 
to introduce a clear system of derivative action undermines the effectiveness of derivative 
actions as a mechanism of accountability, impeding the shareholder’s initiation of legal 
action on behalf of the company as a remedy of last resort. 
 
5.7  The Problem of Funding and the Shareholder’s Incentive to Initiate 
Derivative Actions  
 
In order to determine whether or not the law provides an effective mechanism for 
enforcement in relation to derivative actions, it is not sufficient to evaluate the degree of 
accessibility and certainty of rules allowing for derivative actions to be brought, but it is 
                                                        
1476 Reisberg (n 8) 219.  
1477 Baum and Puchniak (n 1464) 47; see also Martin Gelter, ‘Why Do Shareholder Derivative Suits Remain 
Rare in Continental Europe’ (2011) 37 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 843, 858–859, who reported 
the German law’s adoption of the demand requirement as a procedural rule of derivative action.  
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also important to take into consideration the issue of funding derivative actions. This is 
because the legal costs of derivative actions could be a disincentive for minority 
shareholders.1478 Thus, it can be reasoned that directors’ duties would rarely be enforced by 
derivative actions.1479 As Reisberg explains, if the lawsuit against a wrongdoing director 
failed and an individual shareholder is obliged to incur the costs of the lawsuit, this would 
make the commencement of derivative action uneconomical for the individual 
shareholder.1480 In addition, even in the case of success, an individual shareholder will not 
directly receive any financial benefits, as any award made must be paid to the company as 
a compensation for the damage suffered, and the shareholder will obtain ‘only’ a financial 
benefit equal to ‘a pro rata share’ of the award of total damages.1481 Indeed, the shareholder 
decision to initiate litigation is likely to be significantly affected by the above factors as the 
potential losses suffered from the action, in some instances, could exceed the possible 
potential benefits.1482  
 
5.7.1 Costs rules of derivative actions 
 
In Saudi law, the CL 2015 does not mention that the costs of litigation brought by a 
shareholder on behalf of the company must be incurred or indemnified by the company 
itself. This means that the shareholder plaintiff pursuing an article 80 action is, in the first 
instance, responsible for the financial coats of the litigation, regardless of the outcome of 
the legal proceeding. The absence of legislative arrangements for the issue of funding does 
not come as a surprise since an article 80 claim can only be brought if the shareholder 
claimants have been personally prejudiced and, more importantly, the compensation sought 
will directly flow to them. If shareholders sought corporate relief in the form of 
disgorgement of unauthorised profit, as they are perhaps entitled to do so under 
article 71(2) of the CL 2015, it is unclear whether the costs of litigation would be incurred 
by the company due to the absence of certainty in this area of law. The uncertainty faced 
by shareholders is exacerbated by the fact that the Sharia Procedure Law 2013 (SPL 2013) 
makes no provision for dealing with the issue of the financial costs of proceedings. For the 
Saudi law to encourage a shareholder to bring a derivative action, there must be some 
legislative rules dealing with the issue of funding, because if costs of litigation are not paid 
                                                        
1478 A Reisberg, ‘Funding Derivative Actions: A Re-examination of Costs and Fees as Incentive to 
Commence Litigation’ (2004) 4 J Corp L Stud 345, 345 and 347. 
1479 Ibid 34, 347.  
1480 Ibid 345. 
1481 A Reisberg, ‘Derivative Actions and the Funding Problem: The Way Forward’ (2006) JBL 445, 446.  
1482 Reisberg (n 1478) 347 referring to J D Wilson, ‘Attorney Fees and the Decision to Commence Litigation: 
Analysis, Comparison and an Application to the Shareholder’s Derivative Action’ (1985) 5 Windsor Y B  
Access Just 142, 171. 
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by the company, this may hinder a valid claim and allow those who have caused the 
company’s losses to evade liability.  
 
In contrast to the Saudi jurisdiction, the UK law has dealt with the issue of funding of 
derivative actions by leaving the power to issue indemnity cost orders to the court’s 
discretion.1483 This is illustrated by Civil Procedure Rule 19.9E, which states that the ‘court 
may order the company [ . . . ] to indemnify the claimant against liability for costs incurred 
in the permission application or in the derivative claim or both’. In the UK there is always 
a general concern about the issue of costs in most legal proceedings because unsuccessful 
litigants, as a general principle, will be obliged by the court to incur the costs of their 
lawsuit in addition to the legal costs of the successful party.1484 This principle is called ‘a 
loser pays costs rule’1485 and since it applies to the derivative claim, it is likely to be a 
disincentive for the minority to initiate litigation unless the chances of winning are very 
strong.1486 
 
Therefore, whether the court has adopted a strict or lenient approach to the granting of 
indemnity costs orders is vital as far as the minority shareholders’ incentive to bring 
derivative actions is concerned. In the common law, the judgment of Wallersteiner v 
Moir1487 is an example of a case where the shareholder could obtain the indemnity costs 
orders at an ex parte preliminary hearing.1488 In this case, Moir, a shareholder in the 
company, in the course of a continuing action against Wallersteiner for misconduct in the 
management of the company’s affairs applied to the court for an indemnification order in 
relation to the future costs of litigation against Wallersteiner.1489 The Court of Appeal held 
that, based on principles of equity, a derivative plaintiff had to be indemnified by the 
company against all costs he/she paid on behalf of the company as the company was the 
direct recipient of all benefits from such litigation.1490 Lord Denning asserted that if the 
litigation was successful, the losing party (wrongdoing director) had to incur the costs; if 
he/she could not do so, the court would order the company to indemnify the derivative 
claimant.1491 The Court of Appeal also made it clear that even in the case of failed litigation 
                                                        
1483 Reisberg (n 1481) 445.  
1484 Rule 44.2 (a) of the Civil Procedure Rules (General Rules about costs),  
<https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part-44-general-rules-about-costs> accessed 
1 April 2017. 
1485 Reisberg (n 1481) 446, footnote 4. 
1486 Kershaw (n 310) 632 and 633. 
1487 Wallersteiner v Moir (No. 2) (1975) QB 373 . 
1488 Keay (n 1325) 55.  
1489 Wallersteiner v Moir (No. 2)  (n 1489) 374. 
1490 Ibid 391–392. 
1491 Ibid 392. 
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so long as a shareholder’s commencement of the derivative proceeding was based on 
‘reasonable grounds’ which are meant to be ‘a reasonable and prudent course to take in the 
interests of the company’, the shareholder was entitled to be indemnified by the company 
for the costs.1492  
 
Under the statutory regime of derivative claims, there are indications from the judiciary 
that the granting of indemnity costs orders is not a significant issue for an applicant 
seeking permission; for example, in Iesini the court asserted that once, through its 
discretion, it was satisfied that the claim should continue in the interest of the company, ‘it 
ought normally to order the company to indemnify the claimant against his costs’ in the 
context of derivative actions.1493 The same view was also expressed in the case of Stainer v 
Lee where the court opined that the shareholder claimant being ‘indemnified as to his 
reasonable costs by the company’ is a normal outcome of the successful application for 
permission.1494 
 
However, there have been a number of cases, under both the common law and the statutory 
scheme, which tend to follow a more cautious approach to the indemnity of costs in 
relation to derivative claims. Under the statutory system, in only two out of eight 
successful applications for permission has the court ordered the company to indemnify the 
applicant for the costs incurred.1495 According to Keay, there is uncertainty revolving 
around the question of when the indemnity costs orders will be granted and this may 
undermine shareholders’ confidence and negatively impact on their incentive to bring a 
derivative claim.1496 The court’s reluctance to award costs for a successful applicant is seen 
as unfair and ‘harsh’ as this approach may hinder a valid action, undermining the 
accountability of directors.1497  
 
5.8 Concluding Remarks  
 
The comparative analysis conducted in this chapter has shown that rules governing private 
litigation, as a mechanism of directors’ accountability towards the company and its 
shareholders, are more certain and accessible in the UK compared with Saudi Arabia, 
despite the fact that there are some aspects of uncertainty in the UK law. In theory, whether 
                                                        
1492 Ibid. 
1493 Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd (n 1322) 450. 
1494 Stainer v Lee (n 1367) 148.  
1495 See Keay (n 1325) 57. 
1496 Ibid. 
1497 Ibid 57–58.  
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the litigation decision is vested in the board of directors (e.g., the UK) or in the general 
meeting of shareholders (e.g., Saudi Arabia) comes with problems and concerns that make 
the enforcement of breaches of directors’ duties difficult. As a matter of policy, this 
chapter has shown that the law should not exclusively rely on the board or the general 
meeting to bring the legal action. Alternatively, an accessible and clear mechanism of 
enforcing directors’ duties in the form of derivative action should be established within the 
system of legal accountability. This is simply because even in the presence of public 
enforcement of breaches of directors’ duties, some limits, as have been identified above, to 
the role of public enforcement give room for the private enforcement action, particularly 
derivative action to complement enforcement by the public regulator. 
 
In the UK the statutory derivative scheme has been introduced to address some issues 
relating to the derivative claim under the common law. It is now for the court through two-
stage hearings to determine whether or not the commencement of derivative litigation is in 
the interests of the company. The main observations identified in the UK system of 
derivative actions can be summarised as follows: it seems that it is an easy task for 
shareholders to establish a prima face case that does not reflect whether or not the chance 
of success in the final stage is substantial. Having said that, doubts could be raised about 
whether the court should go through the first stage involving the prima facie enquiry 
because of increased costs and time wasting associated with such an inquiry. In addition, 
within the second stage, while the court’s resistance to engage with the business judgment 
is understandable at the mandatory refusal stage when assessing section 263(2)(a), such 
continued resistance in relation to section 263(3)(b) is not justifiable because this strict 
approach adopted by the court has, to some extent, contributed to the limited accessibility 
to derivative actions.1498 Furthermore, it has been shown that some areas of the law on 
ratifications are complex and vague, and this could lead a minority shareholder to question 
whether the derivative litigation is a remedy worth seeking.  
 
Nevertheless, the UK law tends to be well positioned compared with the Saudi law as far 
as the enforcement of breaches of directors’ duties are concerned. The chapter has shown 
that if the company was incapable of pursuing the legal action because of the wrongdoer’s 
control of the general meeting, the law has not, in fact, introduced a statutory derivative 
action to enforce the company’s rights. The Saudi law, unlike the situation in UK, has 
                                                        
1498 Ibid 67–68.  
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failed to formulate the claim under article 80 of the CL 2015 in such a way that protects the 
company’s interests and ensures the accountability of directors to its company.  
 
With respect to the role of funding in incentivising minority shareholders to bring a 
derivative action, the Saudi law lacks statutory provisions dealing with the issue of funding 
in the context of derivative actions. Since an article 80 claim is more likely to be a personal 
action rather than a derivative action, the absence of rules governing costs of litigation 
cannot be seen as highly desirable. However, in the presence of a derivative action regime, 
there must be rules governing the costs of derivative litigation, as there are in jurisdictions 
such as the UK. 
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Chapter 6: To What Extent Can Saudi Law Benefit from the United 




By using the UK law as a benchmark to evaluate the Saudi law, previous chapters1499 have 
located significant areas of uncertainty and deficiency in the legal system of directors’ 
duties, particularly the duty of care; the duty to act in good faith in the general interests of 
the company; and the duty to avoid conflict of interests with particular focus on the 
corporate opportunities and self-dealing transactions, and the private formal mechanism of 
enforcement. Despite the enactment of the new CL 2015 and the new Saudi CGRs 2017, 
the comparison with UK law has shown that there is still room for improvement. Indeed, 
the law should be designed in a way that creates incentives for directors to behave honestly 
and effectively by imposing legal liability on those who do not. This cannot be properly 
achieved without legal reform that ensures that well-formulated directors’ duties are 
included in the corporate law. This must be combined with an effective private formal 
mechanism, namely a derivative action to enforce breaches of the obligations. Arguably, it 
is believed that resolving this important area of corporate law would enhance the 
accountability of directors, and provide greater protection for the company and its 
shareholders, including the minority. 
 
This chapter, by resorting to legal change through legal transplantation, examines the 
extent to which the Saudi legislature can benefit and learn from the experience of the UK 
in order to correct deficiencies identified in the aforementioned areas of the legal system of 
directors’ duties. The comparative law literature suggests that law reform through the 
transfer of legal ideas and rules from one country to another cannot be accomplished 
without taking into account the legal environment and institutional structure in the host 
country (in the present case, Saudi Arabia).1500 The analysis conducted below will have 
particular regard to the fact that new imported rules do not contradict Sharia, the 
paramount law of Saudi Arabia.1501 The effectiveness and the capability of courts will also 
be taken into account to ensure that rules imported from the UK concerning duties of 
directors and the enforcement of their breach through litigation are likely to fit within the 
                                                        
1499 Particularly, see Chapters 3, 4 and 5 in this thesis. 
1500 See for example Kanda and Milhaupt (n 41) 891. 
1501 See section (1.2), Chapter 1. 
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legal infrastructure.1502 Furthermore, while examining the feasibility of legal 
transplantation, cognisance will be taken of factors such as the limited role of markets as a 
non-legal mechanism of accountability in the Saudi context, as well as the need to ensure 
greater protection for non-controlling shareholders from abusive practices by directors, 
who may also be blockholders. The primary argument submitted here is that the transfer of 
some selective legal ideas and notions from UK law to Saudi law is necessary, and seems 
to be feasible with some adaptions to take account of local circumstances. When 
considering legal reform for Saudi law of directors’ duties and enforcement, it should be 
kept in mind that corporate governance regulation must always attempt to strike a proper 
balance between accountability (reducing agency costs) and authority (directors’ freedom 
to exercise its discretion).1503  
 
Concerning its structure, Chapter 6 is divided into four main sections. The first section 
contains reasons that support the reform by way of legal transplantation in Saudi Arabia 
(6.2) followed by a consideration of the debate over the competing values of accountability 
and authority (6.3). In sections (6.4) and (6.5), the feasibility of transplantation of some 
legal ideas from the UK are examined and a reform agenda for the Saudi law of directors’ 
duties and derivative actions is proposed.  
 
6.2 Legal Transplants As a Strategy of Legal Reform in Saudi Arabia: The 
Necessity and Possible Success 
 
Legal transplantation, an approach adopted in this chapter to remedy deficiencies in Saudi 
law, might be considered as the most productive source of legal development.1504 The 
central question addressed in this section is whether the importation of legal norms from 
Western legal systems, such as the UK, is necessary, and if it is, how legal transplants can 
be effective or successful in the Saudi context.  
 
6.2.1 Justifications for legal transplantation in Saudi Arabia 
 
As has been emphasised earlier in this thesis, the movement of legal ideas and rules across 
national borders is at least possible from the theoretical point of view.1505 In the Saudi 
                                                        
1502 See Pistor and Xu (n 226) who emphasise the important role of courts by arguing that they should be 
given the power to define and enforce fiduciary duties.  
1503 See generally Keay (n 304) 259 –276. 
1504 Watson (n 30) 95. 
1505 See footnotes 29–49 and accompanying text, Introduction of this thesis.  
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context, it can be argued that there is a convincing rationale for legal transplantation in 
relation to company law. What follows are some of the most significant arguments 
supporting the idea that legal transplant is largely possible and necessary to reforming the 
law of directors’ duties.  
 
First, as stated earlier,1506 the long historical practice of voluntary adoption of foreign laws 
by the Saudi legislature, at least in the areas of commercial and business law, demonstrates 
the important role of legal transplant as a process of legal change.1507 This suggests that by 
using the legal transplant approach to improve the law of directors’ duties, this thesis is in 
line with the government policy on modernising the law of business organisations. 
 
Second, with the growth of globalisation and the pressure exerted by competition, it may 
be argued that countries have no option other than to move towards legal convergence by 
means of the voluntary adoption of efficient corporate rules and institutions.1508 This is 
because companies operating with a sound corporate governance system will have an 
advantage in this global competition.1509 In Saudi Arabia, as in other countries in the 
region, the development of corporate governance has been mainly attributable to the state’s 
intervention through legislating legal ideas and concepts.1510 As Amico correctly noted, the 
competition among Middle Eastern countries to establish themselves as regional financial 
centres, was one of the main motivations behind the government’s desire to develop a good 
corporate governance culture.1511 Similarly, as some areas of uncertainty and deficiency 
identified in the legal system of directors’ duties, would undermine the accountability of 
directors and, more generally, the availability of good practices of corporate governance, 
the decision to draw on legal ideas found in well-developed legal systems such as the UK 
tends to be necessary for establishing the sound company law needed to survive in such 
constant competition. It should further be noted that the new Saudi 2030 Vision, along with 
its implementing and transformative programmes, which are intended to help Saudi Arabia 
to increase the non-oil government revenues, will put the Kingdom’s economy on the 
threshold of a new era. It is a significant part of the 2030 Vision to support the private 
                                                        
1506 See section (1.3), Chapter 1 in this thesis.  
1507 See Sfeir (n 124) 733–734. 
1508 F A Gevurtz, ‘The Globalization of Corporate Law: The End of History or a Never-Ending Story?’ 
(2011) 86 Wash L Rev 475, 494. This argument can be linked to the economic efficiency explanation for 
legal change proposed by Mattei, who opined that the race to adopt efficient rules would lead to the legal 
transplants of foreign ideas, see U Mattei, ‘Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law 
and Economics’ (1994) 14 International Review of Law and Economics 3. 
1509 Gevurtz (n 1508) 494. 
1510 See A Amico, ‘Towards ‘Shareholder Spring’ in the Middle East?’ in S Boubaker and D Nguyen (eds), 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets (Berlin Heidelberg Springer 2014).  
1511 Ibid 534. 
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sector through increased involvement and investment, and create a comprehensive 
privatisation programme.1512 In order to help the government achieve the aims of the 
2030 Vision, it has been clearly said that there is a need to update and review the laws and 
regulations.1513 One of main reforms should be directed at reducing the serious levels of 
uncertainty in the legal system of directors’ duties. Indeed, the design of a sound company 
law system where the directors’ accountability towards shareholders, including minority 
shareholders, is promoted, will assist the Saudi government in achieving its goal to make 
investment in the stock market more attractive to domestic and foreign investors. In this 
regard, seeking to benefit from the experience of well-developed legal systems would seem 
to be an effective and efficient strategy.1514  
 
Third, the voluntary adoption of foreign company laws and institutions to meet the 
economic demands of Saudi Arabia is likely to encounter much less cultural resistance 
from the host country, at least from the theoretical perspective.1515 As Cotterrell explains, a 
distinction can be drawn between ‘instrumental law’ and ‘culturally based law’; while the 
former is ‘more loosely connected’ with culture, this is not the case in relation to the 
latter.1516 In developing his theory about the interaction between comparative law and legal 
sociology, Cotterrell categorises the law into four basic kinds of ‘community’: the 
‘instrumental community, traditional community, community of belief and affective 
community’.1517 Commercial law, of which company law is a main element, falls within the 
instrumental community, which involves laws that are not strongly linked with culture, 
compared with, for example, family law.1518 As Cotterrell explains, legal rules 
(e.g., company law) in the instrumental community are tied to ‘economic interests rather 
than national customs and sentiments’.1519 Given the fact that the nature of company law is, 
to a large extent, culturally neutral, the flexible nature of Sharia involving the general 
guiding principle that ‘all things not specifically prohibited are allowed’,1520 will continue 
to facilitate the legal importation of some foreign ideas into the Saudi legal landscape if it 
is both not clearly prohibited and is unlikely to face cultural resistance.  
                                                        
1512 For more details as to the Saudi 2030 vision, see the website of the Saudi 2030 Vision,  
<http://vision2030.gov.sa/en>. 
1513 ‘The Regulation Review Program’ is one of the transformative programmes designed to achieve the aims 
of the 2030 Vision; see the website of Saudi 2030 Vision <http://vision2030.gov.sa/en>.  
1514 See Fedtke (n 14) 550.  
1515 Cotterrell (n 49) 80. 
1516 Ibid. 
1517 Ibid 82. 
1518 Ibid 81–82.  
1519 Ibid 
1520 M Hanson (n 52) 289. 
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Fourth, as has been shown in Chapter 2, although the predominant structure of most 
companies in the Saudi stock market (Tadawul) is one of concentrated share ownership, 
the reliance on monitoring by blockholders is unlikely to ensure that directors are subject 
to an adequate level of control and accountability.1521 Similarly, the role of markets, when 
it comes to the issue of directors’ accountability and governance, tends to be ineffective.1522 
Therefore, a detailed system of legal liability (i.e., well-formulated directors’ duties, 
coupled with effective legal mechanisms available for shareholders) is necessary for 
ensuring greater legal protection for shareholders, including minority shareholders, against 
directors’ misconduct. By imposing a sound system of legal liability, the law would also 
create incentives for directors to behave honestly and diligently. With the support from 
other legal jurisdictions such as the UK which has a long-established system of directors’ 
duties and derivative actions,1523 new legal ideas and concepts can, therefore, be borrowed 
to address legal deficiencies and promote legal certainty in the application of the law.   
 
While the above-mentioned points explain why the approach of legal transplants to address 
deficiencies in the law of directors’ duties is necessary and beneficial, it should be borne in 
mind that this study does not recommend the blind copying of the law from the UK to 
Saudi Arabia without having regard to the appropriateness of imported rules in the Saudi 
context. According to Berkowitz et al., the effectiveness of transplanted law in the host 
country depends upon whether or not the latter is receptive to the foreign transplanted 
law.1524 This argument goes on to reason that the receptivity of the imported law would 
increase if the law is adapted to suit local conditions and/or is transferred to a legal system 
that is familiar with the law of the donor country.1525 Indeed, by making changes to the law 
to ensure that it fits within the legal environment of the host country, it would appear that 
the appropriateness of the imported law has already been taken into account and, therefore, 
the law is likely to be employed in practice.1526 The receptivity of Saudi Arabia to legal 
rules and standards that are recommended for transplantation from the UK to reform the 
Saudi legal system of directors’ duties will be taken into consideration throughout the 
remainder of this chapter.  
                                                        
1521 See generally sections (2.5.2) and (2.5.3), Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
1522 See section (2.8), Chapter 2 in this thesis.  
1523 In terms of company law, see for example, the case of Re Cameron’s Coalbrook Railway Co (n 18) 
concerning fiduciary duties of directors, and the case of Foss v Harbottle (n 19) concerning the derivative 
action. These cases date back to the 19th century.   
1524 Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (n 46) 174. The authors describe the term ‘receptivity’ as ‘the country’s 
ability’ to give meaning to the imported law’. 
1525 Ibid 174, 180.  
1526 Ibid 174.  
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Before discussing the feasibility of legal transplantation, the following section will pay 
attention to an important aspect of the regulation of corporate governance, namely the need 
to strike the proper balance between accountability and authority:  
 
6.3 The Policy Issue: Accountability Versus Authority  
 
When drawing up a reform agenda for a corporate governance provision dealing with the 
board of directors, it is generally accepted that there has to be some balance between the 
authority given to directors and the accountability of directors.1527 As many assume, there 
would be a tension between these two important values (i.e., authority and 
accountability).1528 The conflict, as has been noted, starts with the assumption that 
accountability mechanisms (e.g., directors’ duties and the law of their enforcement) could 
limit the exercise of authority.1529 One of the leading opponents of increasing 
accountability of directors is Bainbridge who opines that if the board of directors is subject 
to greater accountability, this will usually result in an inefficient decision-making process 
because it is necessary for efficient decision-making to expose the board to less risk of 
external review.1530 According to Bainbridge, the increase of accountability comes at a 
price, namely shifting the decision-making power to shareholders or the court,1531 which 
perhaps lacks the necessary expertise to make business judgments.1532 It is also claimed that 
‘accountability unease will etherize necessary and desirable board discretion’.1533 This 
argument goes on to say that accountability and authority are ‘competing values’, and, 
consequently, ‘are ultimately irreconcilable’ because it is impossible to hold directors 
accountable without constraining the directors’ exercise of discretionary powers.1534 
Therefore, when it comes to the question of how to attain a proper balance between 
accountability and authority, scholars such as Bainbridge tend to be in support of granting 
directors significant authority, while placing less emphasis on accountability.1535  
                                                        
1527 See for instance McDonnell (n 580) 140, 142; Arrow (n 303) 65–67, 77–79.  
1528 Bainbridge (n 325) 605.  
1529 See Gevurtz (n 1508) 515. The author gives examples of such tension by saying that the need to seek ex 
ante approval, as an accountability mechanism, which may only contain after-the-fact consequences, would 
undermine the motivation to use the authority.  
1530 S Bainbridge, Director Primacy, (UCLA School of Law Law-Econ Research Paper No. 10-06, 
May 2010) 11 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1615838> accessed 1 May 2017.  
1531 Ibid. 
1532 Bainbridge (n 323) 114, 120–121. According to Bainbridge, the US business judgment rule is a clear 
example of the US Delaware corporate law tilting the balance towards the authority of directors; see 
Bainbridge (n 1530) 11. For more details about the argument that the business judgment rule provides some 
indications that the US Delaware law does focus on the board’s authority, see Bainbridge (n 323) 106-129.  
1533 Hutchinson (n 349) 1202.  
1534 Bainbridge (n 1530) 16.  
1535 See Bainbridge (n 325) 605. 
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Nevertheless, it seems right to say that there has been a general agreement that directors 
should be subject to an adequate volume of accountability while exercising their 
managerial discretion.1536 While one may agree with Bainbridge when he states that it 
would be more efficient to design a corporate law that emphasises authority, Keay asserted 
that one should not overlook other significant principles such as ‘fairness, respect and 
justice’, which justify the imposition of accountability on the board of directors.1537 Even 
proponents of shifting the balance towards authority do not deny the necessity of holding 
directors accountable for irresponsible use of authority, because the survival of any 
organisation requires a balance between accountability and authority within its governance 
system.1538 It should always be borne in mind that the board’s accountability is needed to 
reduce agency costs that result from self-interested conduct.1539 Furthermore, not only do 
most scholars recognise the inevitable importance of board accountability within the legal 
system of corporate governance, there is a line of argument that challenges the 
irreconcilability of accountability and authority; for example, as Moore contends, 
accountability and authority in corporate governance, contrary to common assumption, are 
not ‘mutually offsetting . . . phenomena, such that a gain in one can only be achieved at the 
corresponding loss of the other’.1540 The two concepts are, in fact, ‘mutually sustaining’ 
phenomena;1541 in other words, authority is not sustainable if it is not supplemented with 
effective accountability mechanisms.1542 Similarly, Keay claims that if the law is in favour 
of greater accountability, this approach ‘will just lead to less unaccountable authority, with 
the level of authority remaining the same’.1543 Keay further suggests that increased board 
accountability simply consists of ‘a check on how’ the board of directors uses its 
discretionary powers.1544  
 
It should be noted, however, that it will go against the will of legal reformers to introduce 
an effective corporate governance provision if the reform proposal that imposes greater 
accountability on directors leads to ineffective management and promotion of the 
                                                        
1536 See, for example, Keay (n 304) 264, 276; see McDonnell (n 580) 168, 186; Arrow (n 303) 76. 
1537 Keay (n 304) 264.  
1538 Dooley (n 303) 468–471; Bainbridge (n 325) 573. 
1539 See footnotes 360 – 370 and accompanying text in Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
1540 M Moore, ‘The (Neglected) Value of Board Accountability in Corporate Governance’ (University of 
Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 9/2015, February 2015) 3,  
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2566335> accessed 4 May 2017.  
1541 Ibid 20. 
1542 Ibid 4.  
1543 Keay (n 304) 268. See also McDonnell (n 580) 144, who is in favour of adopting greater mechanisms of 
board accountability in the US corporate governance system. 
1544 Keay (n 304) 727–737; Moore (n 330) 39. 
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company’s business.1545 It seems true to say that in designing any corporate governance 
provision, accountability and authority should be reconciled in a manner that provides 
sufficient accountability in order to correct errors, while not ‘destroy[ing] the genuine 
values of authority’.1546 This indicates that any new corporate governance provision must 
not reduce accountability totally in favour of authority, or vice versa.1547  
 
Having said that, as the current balance between accountability and authority in Saudi 
Arabia is not optimal in relation to the law of directors’ duties and enforcement, it seems 
necessary to reform this area of law in a way that results in enhancing the legal 
accountability of directors, but without reducing directors’ willingness to use their powers 
to efficiently manage the company’s business.  
 
6.4 The Reform of the Duties of Care and Loyalty by Way of Legal 
Transplantation 
 
This section focuses on the feasibility of transferring selective rules and standards from the 
UK law to its Saudi counterpart to correct deficiencies identified in Chapters 3 and 4 of 
this thesis. The section starts with an examination of whether the duties of care and loyalty 
can be transferable. 
 
6.4.1 Why can directors’ duties be transplanted? 
 
One of the important factors to take into consideration is the compatibility of any legal 
reform with Sharia instructions, because the codification of foreign legal ideas is 
permissible only if it produces laws that fall within the Sharia framework.1548 It appears 
credible that recourse to the importation of some legal ideas and concepts from foreign 
legal systems can be justified on the basis that Sharia does not include precise details 
relating to how the corporate form of organisation should be governed and controlled.1549 In 
many areas of law Sharia tends to provide only general guidelines, leaving the details to be 
filled in by the society concerned according to the level of development it has achieved; for 
example, from the primary sources (Qur’an and the Sunnah), Muslim jurists had developed 
                                                        
1545 Keay (n 304) 273. 
1546 Arrow (n 303) 77–78.  
1547 McDonnell (n 580) 143 and 168. 
1548 See generally section (1.3), Chapter 1 in this thesis.  
1549 It is worth mentioning here that there was no recognition of the Western legal notions of corporation, 
legal personality and limited liability in the classical Islamic law literature in which Muslim jurists were 
familiar with a partnership with unlimited liability and with interdependent legal personality; see generally 
Kuran (n 151) 786–787; Foster (n 145) 29–33. 
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the concept of ta’adi to cover negligent acts.1550 While it is generally accepted that the 
failure to act diligently falls within the concept of ta’adi (negligence in a narrow sense),  
the criterion on which the ta’adi is established is not defined in the traditional Islamic 
jurisprudence, leaving this issue to the state concerned to deal with. In this regard, to define 
the negligence standard, Sharia leaves it open as to whether recourse should be made to 
custom,1551 or state legislation introduced in accordance with the Islamic principle of public 
interest.1552 This argument is also valid in relation to some aspects of the duty of loyalty as 
Sharia recognises several general legal principles that can be employed as a theoretical 
basis of the duty of loyalty in the corporate context; for example, Sharia law explicitly 
requires Muslims to comply with the general principles of fairness, honesty, 
trustworthiness and justice in their business activities.1553 Yet, Sharia does not provide 
detailed rules of how the general principles should be applied in specific contexts, leaving 
room for jurists to develop a body of law that can effectively apply to a particular context. 
Having said that, Sharia tends to have a large degree of flexibility and capability for 
development in which it is possible to introduce new rules that were not previously 
recognised in response to varying needs, as long as they are not in conflict with the general 
instructions found in the Qur’an and the Sunnah.1554  
 
This argument is borne out by the fact that although there are still some areas of 
uncertainty and ineffectiveness in the legal standards of directors’ conduct and liability, 
Saudi corporate law has already looked to developed legal systems to improve the law 
governing directors’ duties; for example, self-dealing transactions by directors have been 
regulated since the first corporate legislation in Saudi Arabia in 1965 and were reregulated 
by the recent CL 2015, with further rules introduced by the CGRs 2017 for companies 
listed on Tadawul. With new developments introduced by the CGRs 2017, this is also the 
case in relation to the obligation to act in good faith and to advance the company’s 
interests. The need to prevent directors exploiting corporate opportunities has finally been 
recognised by the CGRs 2017. In this regard, it is fair to say that the aforementioned 
provisions governing directors conduct and liability are clear examples of the use of 
Islamic principles of public interest being employed to protect the welfare of those 
involved in the market. The main point to take from this is that while Sharia provides 
general guidelines in relation to the area of corporate law, the practice of legal 
                                                        
1550 See footnotes 649–655 and accompanying text, Chapter 3 in this thesis. 
1551 See footnotes 691–693 and accompanying text, Chapter 3 in this thesis. 
1552 See footnotes 101 and 133–137 and accompanying text, Chapter 1 in this thesis. 
1553 See footnotes 88– 90, Chapter 1 in this thesis.  
1554 See footnotes 128–137 and accompanying text, Chapter 1 in this thesis. 
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transplantation is not only permissible, but also necessary for supplying specifics and 
ensuring the most effective application of general Islamic instructions. It therefore seems 
that it is unlikely that Sharia will present a barrier to legal transplantation of standards of 
directors’ duties in Saudi Arabia, given the fact that the recognition of directors’ duties of 
care and loyalty are already in place within the legal structure of corporate governance. 
 
Another important point to consider is that the proper application and enforcement of the 
Anglo-American version of directors’ duties require the presence of a highly developed 
court regime. According to Pistor and Xu, it is optimal to empower courts with law-making 
and law enforcement powers to deal successfully with open-ended standards (e.g., duties of 
care and loyalty),1555 which is an example of an incomplete law.1556 As to law-making 
powers, the duty of care and of loyalty is inherently an area of law in which written legal 
provisions are often incomplete,1557 and the standardisation of directors’ actions is usually 
impossible.1558 Hence, there should be a heavy reliance on the role of courts in making the 
incomplete law effective (i.e., more complete) through the allocation of ex post extensive 
law-making powers.1559 This includes the power of interpretation of statutes, of adapting to 
varying conditions and the extension of its application to other cases.1560  
 
In the common law tradition it is not unusual to see judges not only applying the law, but 
also making the law, and the exercise of such a task is more familiar to common law courts 
than civil courts.1561 To clarify this point, for example, the interdoctrinal legal transplant of 
the fiduciary duty of loyalty from trust law to company law within the UK legal system 
should be considered.1562 Although the fiduciary duties are rooted in UK law of equity,1563 
the law of fiduciary duties has been adapted to the needs of those involved in the field of 
companies. As Kershaw points out regarding the law of self-dealing transactions, the 
importation of some equitable principles from trust law was justified to fill in the gaps left 
                                                        
1555 Pistor and Xu (n 226) 6-17. 
1556 Ibid 14. As developed by Pistor and Xu, the idea that the law is inherently incomplete means that when 
the lawmakers enact statutes, it is impossible to design legislation that would cover all future contingencies. 
The incompleteness of law can result from either a situation where the law ‘broadly circumscribes outcomes’ 
while specifying no or only a few actions (Type I incomplete law) or a situation where the law identifies 
certain prohibited actions ‘but fails to capture all relevant actions’ (Type II incomplete law). As far as the 
directors’ duties are concerned, such obligations fall within the domain of type I incomplete law; see 
generally Pistor and Xu (n 398) .  
1557 Pistor and Xu (n 226) 14.  
1558 Ibid 6, 14. 
1559 Ibid 17. 
1560 Pistor and Xu (n 398) 4.  
1561 See J Coffee, ‘Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure’ 
(1999) 25 J Corp L Stud 1, 27. 
1562 Davies and Worthington (n 2) 478. 
1563 See L Sealy, ‘The Director as Trustee’ (1967) Cambridge LJ 83. 
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by the company legislation, but the case law promptly diverged to introduce ‘different 
fiduciary standards for directors’.1564 Arguably, the development of fiduciary duties is 
largely attributable to the significant role played by the court when adapting the fiduciary 
law to fit within the corporate context. Indeed, until the introduction of the CA 2006, the 
law defining the scope of directors’ duties of loyalty was made by judges and the case law 
was the predominant source of law.1565  
 
By contrast, the situation in jurisdictions such as Saudi Arabia is substantially different 
regarding the court’s exercise of law-making power. As the analysis conducted throughout 
Chapters 3 and 4 shows,1566 Saudi courts have not been sufficiently active in filling in the 
legislative vacuum and that is one of main contributing factors to the underdeveloped 
regulation of directors’ duties. It is perhaps true to say that Saudi judges are not willing to 
exercise law-making powers in areas that fall beyond context of Sharia because they may 
not have sufficient expertise in corporate matters.1567 This is illustrated by the court’s 
reluctance, when the legislative vacuum exists, to shape clear boundaries for the duty of 
loyalty in a way that reduces agency costs that result, for example, from the appropriation 
of corporate opportunities. Indeed, in the absence of a legislative provision, a director 
could be allowed to make profits by engaging in a conflict situation.1568 In this regard, 
Saudi Arabia does not differ much from neighbouring jurisdictions that suffer from the 
underdevelopment of fiduciary duties because of the court’s failure to define the limits of 
the concept of the fiduciary relationships and the basis of legal liability adequately.1569 
More generally, Saudi Arabia is similar to other civil law jurisdictions where judges 
usually tend to apply, but not make the law;1570 in other words, the power of law-making is 
primarily allocated to the legislature and the court has very limited discretion to make the 
law.1571    
 
It seems that the blind copying of UK directors’ duties standards into the Saudi company 
law may not be effective as Saudi judges tend to be reluctant to play an active role in 
developing clear guidelines that delineate directors’ liability. This means that Saudi judges 
                                                        
1564 Kershaw (n 1104) 4. 
1565 See the analysis in Chapter 4 in this thesis. This is also the case in relation to the duty of care, see 
Chapter 3 in this thesis.  
1566 See the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 in this thesis. 
1567 This is seemingly a common problem in civil law jurisdictions, See Pistor and Xu (n 226) 7.  
1568 See the discussion concerning Case No. 725/1/Q (n 1068) in section (4.4.2), Chapter 4 in this thesis.  
1569 L Al-Rimawi, ‘Emerging Markets of the Middle East: A Critique of Selected Issues in Arab Securities 
Regulation’ (1999) 7 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 149, 159.  
1570 See, for example, J Coffee (n 1561) 27.  
1571 See section (1.5), Chapter 1 in this thesis.  
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with their current training and experience would not be able to deal with broadly open-
ended standards as effectively as UK judges, who are usually granted wide discretion to 
make the law ex post and are more comfortable with dealing with open-ended concepts. 
Therefore, the transplantation of UK directors’ duties can only be feasible if they are 
adapted to fit properly within the Saudi legal environment.1572 To be specific, the UK 
version of duties of care and loyalty can be successfully transferred into Saudi law (i.e., a 
legal system influenced by, or similar to, the civil law court tradition) only with support of 
detailed legislation, which will help to ensure the effective enforcement of the imported 
rules by Saudi courts.1573 
 
6.4.2 Selecting the legal concepts and ideas to transfer 
 
The comparison made between the UK and Saudi company laws in Chapters 3 and 4 
revealed that there are four main areas of the law of directors’ duties that need to be 
reformed in the Saudi context: (i) the duty to manage the company with diligence; (ii) the 
duty to act in good faith in the general interests of the company; (iii) the duty not to 
appropriate corporate opportunities; and (iv) the duty not to engage in self-dealing 
transactions. In this section the focus will be on examining the extent to which Saudi law 
can benefit from UK law, addressing the question of which UK rules and standards can be 
transferred and what adaption needs to be carried out in order to ensure proper enforcement 
by Saudi courts. 
 
Before examining the feasibility of reforming directors’ duties by way of legal 
transplantation, it is important to note that any proposed reform agenda resulting from such 
an examination should take the form of mandatory rules to be included in the Saudi CL 
2015,1574 either as an amendment to an existing provision or as a new provision. This 
should also be the case in relation to the proposed reform agenda in the context of a 
derivative action,  which is considered later.1575 The presentation of the proposed reform as 
mandatory rules in the CL 2015, can be justified on the basis that unlike the UK, 
mandatory corporate rules are needed in jurisdictions like Saudi Arabia where there are 
incomplete and immature non-legal mechanisms of markets.1576 Hence, the mandatory 
nature of corporate rules would play a central role in providing shareholders (especially 
                                                        
1572 See Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (n 46) 167, 174. 
1573 See Pistor and Xu (n 226) 7 – 8. 
1574 This is subject to one exception in relation to self-dealing transactions where the proposed reform should 
be part of the CGRs 2017.  
1575 See section (6.5.2), Chapter 6 in this thesis. 
1576 See section (2.8), Chapter 2 in this thesis; see generally Paredes (n 608).  
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minority shareholders) with necessary protection against abusive practices by directors, 
filling the vacuum left by the absence of accountability mechanisms of markets.1577 In 
addition, by rendering the law of directors’ duties mandatory, company participants (in our 
case directors) will be bound to comply with them; therefore, such law would provide the 
minimum necessary protection for shareholders because mandatory rules can be adjusted 
upwards, but cannot be adjusted downwards. Furthermore, a mandatory model of company 
law will guarantee that all companies are subject to the proposed reforms, ensuring greater 
accountability of directors and more legal protection for the company and shareholders in 
the Saudi market. Finally, increased legal certainty can be accomplished via a mandatory 
law drafted with intelligible rules and standards,1578 that can be understood by the corporate 
community, which, in turn, can rely on the judiciary to it apply in consistent fashion.              
 
6.4.2.1 The duty of care 
 
Although the CL 2015 does not expressly oblige directors to act diligently, this can be 
implicitly derived from the director–company relationship and from some statutory 
provisions under which the courts can expect directors to act with care to avoid legal 
liability.1579 However, it is not enough simply implicitly to recognise the directors’ need to 
act with diligence. Given the modest role of courts in developing an accessible and 
effective model of the duty of care, there should be legislative intervention to introduce 
clear and authoritative guidance for directors, judges and lawyers to ensure legal 
accountability of directors for negligence. Therefore, under Saudi law, the standard for 
compliance with the diligence requirement should not only be based upon objective 
consideration,1580 but also on subjective factors (i.e., a dual subjective/objective standard) 
drafted in clear terms.  
 
With regard to the formulation of the objective standard for the duty of care, given the 
legislative and judicial vacuum, it is not sufficient to presume that directors’ behaviour will 
be assessed according to an ‘imaginary ordinary careful director test’.1581 Like the UK 
CA 2006,1582 the Saudi legislation should expressly refer, within the design of an objective 
standard, to the need for the court to take into consideration different roles and functions of 
                                                        
1577 Ibid 407.  
1578 Paredes (n 587) 1133–1134.   
1579 For more details on the issue of recognition of director’s duty of care, see section (3.2.2), Chapter 3 in 
this thesis. 
1580 See section (3.3.2), Chapter 3 in this thesis. 
1581 See particularly footnotes 694–696 and accompanying text, Chapter 3 in this thesis. 
1582 See section 174(2)(a) of the CA 2006. 
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the directors concerned. For considerations of fairness and justice, it is important for the 
Saudi law to recognise that the extent of the care obligation varies depending upon the role 
assigned to the respective directors; for example, the performance of non-executive 
directors with less access to information compared with executive directors would be 
assessed pursuant to what can be reasonably expected of non-executive directors.1583 The 
failure to adopt such a model is likely to expose non-executives, including independent 
directors, to a high risk of liability for the breach of duty of care because of the application 
of an over-demanding standard, and this could deter truly independent directors from 
accepting directorships.1584 
 
In addition to the use of an objective standard, the court should take the skill, experience 
and knowledge of the different directors into its consideration (i.e., a subjective standard) 
when determining compliance with the requirement of due care.1585 The adoption of a 
subjective standard would ensure that highly skilled and experienced directors would not 
evade legal liability when they fail to act as a reasonably diligent person with their skills 
and experience. This means that the more expertise directors have, the more care will be 
expected of them. The inclusion of subjective considerations in determining compliance 
with the obligation of due care will perhaps receive a broad welcome from the corporate 
community, especially as far as companies listed on Tadawul are concerned. As has been 
mentioned, listed company usually require certain qualifications and experiences from 
those nominated as board members.1586 Indeed, it is generally expected that directors of a 
listed company will have the appropriate level of qualifications, training, financial 
knowledge and practical experience relevant to the company’s business.1587 Therefore, 
given the fact that directors are usually selected for certain skills and experience, it seems 
fair to accept that they should be judged against the degree of skill and experience 
reasonably expected of a person with their expertise and knowledge.1588  
 
                                                        
1583 See generally section (3.4), Chapter 3 in this thesis. 
1584 See Hoffmann (n 715) 196. Regarding the composition of the board and its committees for listed 
companies, see footnotes 540–544 and accompanying text, Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
1585 This recommendation is based upon the UK standard for the statutory duty found in section 174(2)(b) of 
the CA 2006. 
1586 See footnote 699 and accompanying text, Chapter 3 in this thesis. 
1587 See article 18 of the CGRs 2017 which specifies a set of recommendations regarding conditions for board 
membership; article 39 of the CGRs 2017 which recommends that the company should provide directors and 
senior managers with necessary training. 
1588 A similar argument is put forward in relation to the UK law, see Reed (n 700) 172. 
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Within the legal regime of the duty of care, provisions for best practice in the decision-
making process1589 can be referred to, where appropriate, for the assessment of directors’ 
compliance. It is, therefore, vital to specify a (non-exhaustive) set of statutory factors that 
constitute the breach of such an obligation. Not only will these factors largely guide the 
court, but directors will also be guided to discharge the duty of care successfully. It seems 
that in determining whether or not directors have conducted themselves reasonably, the 
Saudi law should refer to the need for the court, where appropriate, to examine the extent 
of reasonableness in a monitoring role,1590 the extent to which directors have kept 
themselves informed of the company’s affairs,1591 and the extent of reliance upon 
information and advice given by other directors and professionals.1592  
  
6.4.2.1.1 The issue of a high standard of care: Relief granted by the court 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, concerns have been raised concerning the high possibility of 
the courts’ review of business decisions when a single high standard of care is adopted. 
Neither jurisdiction (the UK and Saudi Arabia) has recognised the divergence between the 
standard of conduct and the standard of review, and have introduced a single standard to 
perform the two functions: (i) the establishment of a standard of behavioural expectation 
and (ii) a standard of determining the directors’ liability for a breach.1593 One of the UK’s 
responses to this issue is to grant the court a discretionary power, under section 1157 of the 
CA 2006, to release directors from liability for the breach of their duty towards the 
company.1594 Although the scope of section 1157 is wide enough to include cases other 
than negligence, it has been noted that this provision will usually be taken into account in 
the case of a breach of the duty of care.1595 The question that will be addressed here is 
about the feasible transferability of the same legal idea into the Saudi legal context in order 
to deal with the issue of a single high standard of care.  
 
In this regard, it might be true to say that judicial relief of liability is unlikely to fit within 
the Saudi legal conditions for the following reasons: First, the empowerment of judges to 
release wrongdoers (directors) from liability is not in line with Sharia philosophical 
                                                        
1589 The new CGRs 2017 involves some provisions that need to be observed by directors and managers while 
managing the company; see, for instance, articles 30 and 31 of the CGRs 2017. It is worth saying that there is 
a draft CGRs that is intended to apply to unlisted joint stock companies, but it will be introduced as a set of 
non-binding rules.  
1590 See section (3.4.1), Chapter 3 in this thesis. 
1591 See section (3.4.2), Chapter 3 in this thesis. 
1592 See section (3.4.3), Chapter 3 in this thesis. 
1593 See footnotes 793–808 and accompanying text, Chapter 3 in this thesis.  
1594 See section (3.5.2), Chapter 3 in this thesis. 
1595 Keay (n 6) 529. 
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considerations. From the perspective of Sharia, rights can be broadly categorised into two 
groups: (i) the rights of God (Allah) and (ii) the rights of people. Directors’ failure to take 
care or act in good faith falls within the latter. While the rights of Allah belong to Allah, 
who alone has the right to forgive any violation via an act of repentance, the acts of people 
can be only forgiven by the people;1596 for example, the right to compensation is retained 
individually by an injured person and only he/she may forgo that right; the state (e.g., 
through the judiciary) does not have the right to forgo such a right and release the 
wrongdoer from the liability on behalf of the person concerned.1597 Having said that, it can 
be argued that the judicial relief of liability is not an Islamic idea in the sense that it 
contradicts Sharia doctrines.1598  
 
Second, the application of a judicial relief rule would be characterised by a large degree of 
confusion and uncertainty within the Saudi legal environment. There is nothing in the 
Saudi company law literature suggesting that care (or diligence) and reasonableness are 
different concepts in which the standard of care and diligence is higher than the standard of 
reasonableness for the purpose of determining directors’ liability for the breach of their 
duty of care. As one commentator asserts, Sharia jurists do not even recognise a difference 
between diligence and reasonableness, and a reasonable act cannot be considered 
negligent.1599 By contrast, the UK law, as explained in Chapter 3 of this thesis, has 
attempted to draw a distinction between what amounts to negligence under section 174 and 
what constitutes unreasonableness for the purpose of section 1157; in other words, 
although directors would be found liable for a breach of section 174 under the standard of 
negligence, they could be released from liability under section 1157 according to the 
standard of reasonableness.1600 Nevertheless, even UK judges such as Hoffmann LJ have 
acknowledged that it appears ‘odd that a person found to have been guilty of negligence, 
which involves failing to take reasonable care, can ever satisfy a court that he acted 
reasonably’.1601  
 
In addition, as far as the UK court’s exercise of fairness discretion is concerned, it has been 
noted that it is difficult to extract any fixed guidelines underlying the exercise of 
                                                        
1596 K El-Fadl, ‘The Centrality of Shari’ah to Government and Constitutionalism in Islam’ in R Grote and T J 
Röder (eds), Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and Continuity (Oxford OUP 2012) 
53. 
1597 Ibid 53–54. 
1598 A similar view is expressed by another scholar, see Albrahim (n 1192)102. 
1599 Ibid 102–103. 
1600 See particularly footnotes 833–839 and accompanying text, Chapter 3 in this thesis. 
1601 Re D’Jan of London Ltd (n 665) 649. 
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fairness.1602 As Edmunds and Lowry remark, ‘it is not possible to define clear categories of 
breach that will always be excused’, and for those who need to know whether relief is 
available in their case, it is impossible to give a definite, consistent answer in practice.1603 
The high level of legal unpredictability associated with the judicial relief rule is illustrated 
by the fact that even after the conditions of reasonableness and honesty have been met by 
the director, the UK court is given a very wide discretion to determine whether the liability 
relief ought to be granted or not.1604 The difficulty with the UK judicial relief rule as 
applied in practice is the uncertainty and ambiguity, which are likely to persist in the Saudi 
context.  
 
From the two reasons mentioned above, the transferability of a similar rule that allows the 
court to grant judicial relief for directors’ breach of duty is unlikely to be feasible and it 
would be more appropriate to retain the present system of legal relief (remedies) without 
any significant change. One point to consider is that the potential impact of the absence of 
judicial relief should not be overstated in Saudi Arabia. As long as the basic rules of 
liability are well established, there is no clear need for the adoption of judicial relief. With 
the understanding of the duty of care as providing a legal standard of conduct and review 
of the decision-making process,1605 the court should only assess whether directors have 
taken reasonable steps in reaching their decision, regardless of the outcome of the decision. 
Even if directors could not satisfy the high standard of care, this does not automatically 
give rise to the directors’ legal liability. The court would question whether there is damage 
to the company and whether directors are liable for that damage. In this regard, it is the 
plaintiff’s task to prove the presence of damage and the causal link between directors’ 
breach and the damage. While it is true that judges are not businesspeople, they are 
expected to be experienced in legal affairs, and they can hear and make their decision 
based upon the evidence presented by both parties. 
 
6.4.2.1.2 A proposed reform by way of legal transplantation 
 
As a result of the examination of the feasibility of transplanting the UK duty of care found 
in section 174 of the CA 2006 into the Saudi law, the research suggests that since the CL 
2015 lacks a provision requiring directors of joint stock companies to act diligently, a new 
statutory article should be inserted in the CL 2015 that: 
                                                        
1602 Kershaw (n 310) 454.  
1603 Edmunds and Lowry (n 840) 213.  
1604 Keay (n 6) 527. 




§ Establishes an overriding principle under which an individual director should act 
with reasonable care and skill. 
 
§  Specifies the standard for compliance with the statutory requirement of care in 
which a dual subjective/objective standard for the duty of care must be satisfied. 
This should also state that a reasonable director must perform as a reasonable 
person acting to fulfil the functions of a director and as a reasonable person with 
his/her skill, experience and knowledge.    
 
§ Specifies a non-exhaustive set of factors that constitute the breach of the 
proposed statutory duty of care. This shall particularly include the directors’ 
failure to exercise the required reasonableness in monitoring the conduct of co-
directors and managers, in keeping themselves informed of the company’s 
business, and in their reliance on the conduct, information and advice given by 
other directors and professionals.       
 
6.4.2.2 The affirmative duty to act in good faith in the general interest of the 
company 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4,1606 Saudi law suffers from the problem that the affirmative duty 
of loyalty, which specifies the legal standard of conduct and for a review of a decision 
itself,1607 is left with an improper and rigid standard of liability. It appears that the duty is 
not formulated to reflect two integral components, namely (i) good faith and (ii) acting in 
the company’s interests; in other words, it is unclear whether the law ties the good faith 
requirement to the duty to act in the company’s interests. This, by implication, means that 
directors’ state of mind is completely irrelevant when deciding where the interests of the 
company lie, allowing the court, at least in theory, to place itself in the directors’ position 
to determine what is good or bad for the company. Having said that, there would be a high 
possibility of holding directors personally liable for a breach and the concern of increased 
liability would have a negative impact on the company’s success.1608 
 
A more appropriate test for assessing compliance with the affirmative duty of loyalty can 
be found in section 172(1) of the CA 2006, where good faith, which is used to define the 
                                                        
1606 See section (4.2), Chapter 4 in this thesis.  
1607 See Kershaw (n 310) 455.  
1608 See footnotes 949–956 and accompanying text, Chapter 4 in this thesis 
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state of mind that must be complied with by loyal directors, precludes the court from 
second-guessing directors’ judgement.1609 The test applied by UK courts is a subjective one 
in which it is a ‘director’s honest belief’ that will be taken into account when determining 
compliance with the obligation found in section 172(1).1610 While considering the 
feasibility of transplanting the UK standard for the duty of good faith, it should be borne in 
mind that with a purely subjective test, it might be difficult to demonstrate directors’ 
breach of duty under section 172(1) because it is for the directors, not the court, to 
determine where the company’s interests lie. This is further complicated by the difficulty 
of challenging directors’ assertion that what was done was what they honestly believed 
was in the interest of the company.1611 However, it should be noted that having said that the 
duty of good faith is a subjective one (i.e., the directors’ state of mind), this does not mean 
that the court is compelled to accept without question the directors’ assertion that they 
acted in good faith, especially if the evidence contradicts the directors’ statement.1612 
 
Since good faith is the sole standard for the duty found in section 172(1), coupled with the 
fact that the court’s recourse is to the subjective test, it can be argued that the standard for 
such a statutory duty protects directors’ exercise of business powers rather than exposing 
them to greater legal accountability. Yet, for Saudi Arabia, the focus should be on ensuring 
directors’ accountability for their own misconduct, despite the fact that the protection of 
their authority remains important and should be present in any corporate governance 
provision. The preferred approach should, therefore, combine both subjective and objective 
tests to determine whether directors have breached their duty to act in good faith in the 
general interest of the company.1613 Put differently, the duty is subjective in the sense that it 
is for directors to decide where the company’s interests lie. It is also objective in the sense 
that objective considerations and surrounding circumstances can be taken into account 
when determining whether directors honestly believed that what they had done was for the 
company’s benefit. It is useful to note that the objective consideration focuses on the 
‘honest belief of directors’ and should not assess the quality of the directors’ judgement 
itself.  
 
                                                        
1609 See footnotes 932–933 and 945–946 and accompanying text, Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
1610 For more details, see section (4.2.3.1), Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
1611 This concern has been raised by many in the UK company law literature; see, for example, Keay (n 6) 
128–129. 
1612 For more details, see ibid 134–136.  
1613 A similar argument has been presented by scholars in the UK and Australian law literature, supporting 
the combination of two tests; see Langford and Ramsay (n 919).  
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The proposed approach can be justified by saying that the use of a purely subjective 
standard does not really correspond with the nature of Sharia law, which tends to prefer 
objectivity rather than subjectivity in assessing an individual’s conduct.1614 More 
importantly, it seems that a combination of subjective and objective tests would strike a 
balance between authority and accountability. On the one hand, the focus on the subjective 
belief of directors signifies that their business discretion is appropriately respected and they 
are the ones who are best placed to decide what is in the company’s commercial interest. 
Indeed, the subjectivity of this approach tends to give directors the freedom to exercise 
discretion without being subject to strict judicial review of their business decisions.1615 On 
the other hand, the reference to objective considerations can help to evaluate whether the 
belief is honestly held; this would promote the directors’ accountability and ensure that 
directors will not easily escape legal liability. 
 
When discussing the duty of loyalty to act in the general interest of the company under 
Saudi company law, the question of in whose interests the company should be managed is 
vital in determining whether directors have breached their loyalty obligation. As discussed 
in Chapter 4,1616 Saudi company law, in the relevant legal provision,1617 has used the elusive 
and open-ended phrase of the ‘interests of the company’, which can include the conflicting 
interests of many corporate constituencies. Given the ambiguity and uncertainty revolving 
around what is precisely meant by such a phrase, Ferran seems right when she suggests 
that it is a matter of ‘prioritising’ variously conflicting interests.1618 In the absence of clear 
rules governing the priority of relevant interests, directors are given the opportunity to 
‘play off competing interests against each other and to use them to mask [their] own 
failings’.1619  
 
As in the UK,1620 Saudi law should abandon the reference to the ‘interests of the company’ 
within the legal formulation of the duty of loyalty, in favour of a more precise meaning of 
interests that should be served. To be specific, it should be stated that directors should 
predominantly manage joint stock companies for the benefit of the shareholder 
constituency who should have a priority for due consideration over non-shareholders. This 
view can be justified on the basis that since shareholders are the residual claimants to the 
                                                        
1614 See Al-Sanhuri (n 653) 105. 
1615 See, for example Langford and Ramsay (n 919) 181. 
1616 For details on this issue, see section 4.2.3.3, Chapter 4 in this thesis.  
1617 See article 30 (17) of the CGRs 2017.  
1618 Ferran (n 958) 125. 
1619 Ibid.  
1620 See generally section 4.2.3.4, Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
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company’s income, and they bear the most ‘marginal risks of the [company]’,1621 the 
company has to be run mainly in the interests of shareholders.1622 In addition, the 
formulation of the duty of loyalty in a way that requires directors to act for the benefit of 
all shareholders is in line with the basic feature of Saudi corporate governance, which is 
‘shareholder wealth maximisation’, as the statutory definition of a company is to 
‘participate in enterprise for profit’. 1623  
 
A closer look at the content of the CL 2015 reveals that while rules governing the 
shareholder–management relationship are mentioned in detail, the CL 2015 lacks a single 
statutory provision requiring the board of directors to take into account the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies. This does not mean that the interests of these groups are not 
protected; it merely means that those interests are beyond the scope of protection under 
current company law.1624 Furthermore, if the law were to adopt a pluralist approach, it 
could lead to the same failing identified in the phrase ‘interests of the company’, 1625 that is, 
giving directors wide discretion to balance competing interests, which makes it difficult for 
shareholders to monitor directors and, consequently, weakens director’s accountability.1626  
 
In the view of Hansmann and Kraakman, the attainment of aggregate social wealth requires 
making directors ‘strongly accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, 
only to those interests’.1627 Given the aforementioned arguments, it also seems unnecessary 
for the Saudi CL 2015 to adopt the UK CA 2006’s approach when section 172(1) expressly 
requires directors to have regard for non-shareholder interests within the formulation of the 
affirmative duty of loyalty. As explained earlier,1628 section 172(1) does not, in practice, 
give non-shareholder constituencies a legal remedy in the case of a director’s failure to 
consider their interests, and the section goes no further than educating directors on the need 
to have regard for non-shareholder interests.1629 The Saudi law, similar to the UK law, does 
not give any stakeholder, other than shareholders, the right to bring a ‘liability proceeding’ 
                                                        
1621 Easterbrook and Fischel (n 301) 91. 
1622 Ibid 37–91.  
1623 See article 2 of the CL 2015. 
1624 See H Hansmann and R Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 Georgetown Law 
Journal 439, 442, 449, who say that the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, unlike shareholders, 
might be protected by contracts or other regulations. It should be noted that the Saudi CL 2015 does not 
require corporate constituents, other than shareholders, to select their representatives on the board of 
directors; this is a clear example of the tendency of Saudi law towards the protection of shareholder wealth. 
1625 See particularly footnotes 969–974 and accompanying text, Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
1626 See Keay (n 975) 31. 
1627 Hansmann and Kraakman (n 1624) 441. 
1628 See footnotes 988–1000 and accompanying text, Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
1629 See Alcock (n 993) 368, referring to J Bird’s statement in A Alcock, The Rt Hon the Lord Millett, M 
Todd QC, Gore-Browne on Companies (45th edn, Bristol Jordans 2009) Ch 15 [10A].  
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against directors for wrong done to the company.1630 This means that if the proposed 
legislative provision were designed to extend the notion of loyalty to cover non-
shareholders’ interests, this change would be ineffective in practice within the current 
institutional structure of Saudi corporate governance, and would introduce further 
ambiguity into the legal statement on directors’ duties.1631 With all this in mind, it can be 
said that since the need for due consideration to non-shareholder interests has already been 
referred to in the Saudi CGRs 2017 as a guiding rule,1632 such a statement would be 
sufficient for serving the educational purpose of section 172 of the UK CA 2006.  
 
6.4.2.2.1 A proposed reform by way of legal transplantation 
 
As a result of the above examination of the feasibility of transplanting the UK duty of good 
faith found in section 172(1) of the CA 2006 into the Saudi law, the research suggests that 
since the CL 2015 lacks a provision requiring directors of joint stock companies to act in 
good faith, a new statutory article must be inserted into the CL 2015 that: 
 
§ Establishes an overriding principle under which an individual director is required to 
act in good faith in the general interests of the company (the formulation of the 
duty to act in the company’s interests, to which the good faith is tied). 
 
§  Specifies the standard for compliance with the proposed statutory duty of good 
faith in which a dual subjective/objective standard for the duty of good faith must 
be met. The duty should be formulated to require an individual director to act in a 
way that he/she honestly believes is in the company’s interests in which objective 
considerations and surrounding circumstances should be considered to determine 
the reasonableness of his/her honest belief. 
 
§ Refers to the need to manage the company predominately for the benefit of 
shareholders as whole, abandoning the reference to the interests of the company. 
The proposed article shall therefore require a director to manage the company in a 
way that he/she honestly believes is in the interests of shareholders as whole and in 
which the reasonableness of his/her honest belief must be taken into account.       
 
                                                        
1630 See article 79 and 80 of the CL 2015. 
1631 It seems that the core problems of the Saudi corporate governance still revolve around such issues as 
transparency, accountability, board of directors’ function, directors’ duties and responsibilities, shareholders’ 
rights, and the protection of minority shareholders.  
1632 See particularly articles 83 and 87 of the CGRs 2017.  
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6.4.2.3  Corporate opportunities 
 
As shown earlier, the Saudi regulation on corporate opportunity is underdeveloped, placing 
very limited restrictions on the extent to which directors can personally exploit an 
opportunity during the course of their directorship.1633 As matter of fact, the regulation of 
such a situation had been almost absent in Saudi Arabia until the introduction of the CGRs 
2017, in which the law now requires directors to avoid the appropriation of corporate 
opportunities. Even with this new legal development, the law of corporate opportunities is 
at a nascent stage and there have been no reported judicial cases to analyse. This is coupled 
with the fact that article 44(b)(2) of the CGRs 2017 suffers from serious deficiencies, 
which may pose concerns about whether such a provision signifies an effective and 
appropriate law in practice.1634  
 
While the new regulation, as a starting point, establishes the prohibition of appropriation of 
corporate opportunities, it does not properly and clearly define the scope of the corporate 
opportunities, raising a question about whether it is sufficient to confine the prohibition to 
‘investment opportunities which are within the activities of the company’.1635 It lacks the 
design of an appropriate and workable standard capable of assisting the court in 
determining whether a breach of the corporate opportunities rule has taken place. In 
addition, it does not attempt to establish a procedural mechanism placing directors under 
the obligation of disclosure, or even allow authorisation by the company. Furthermore, if 
the company or a shareholder were to rely on article 44(b)(2) of the CGRs 2017 to sue 
directors for the exploitation of a corporate opportunity, it is not clear whether the directors 
would only be liable for the company’s losses or would also be bound to disgorge the 
profit they have made. Moreover, since the application of such a mandatory provision is 
only limited to companies listed on the Saudi stock exchange, the vast majority of joint 
stock companies are left with uncertain and inadequate regulation to control directors’ 
exploitation of corporate opportunities.1636  
 
Indeed, with the Saudi economic policy being based upon principles of a free-market 
economy,1637 and with government grants and funding options available for small 
                                                        
1633 See the discussion, in section (4.4.2), Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
1634 See section (4.4.2.3), Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
1635 See article 44(b)(2) of the CGRs 2017. 
1636 See the statistics reported by I Abdullah, Aleqtisadiah Newspaper (22 June 2017) (Arabic) 
<http://www.aleqt.com/2017/06/22/article_1208011.html> accessed 20 July 2017. 
1637 See an outline of the Saudi economy published on MOCI’s website at  
<http://mci.gov.sa/en/AboutKingdom/Pages/SaudiEconomy.aspx> accessed 10 July 2017. 
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business,1638 the company’s investment opportunities can be regarded as one of the main 
sources of financial gain for any businessperson. Under such circumstances, it is highly 
possible that directors would take up corporate opportunities for their personal benefit, 
especially when the law is characterised by a lack of clarity and underdevelopment, leaving 
the company and its shareholders insufficiently protected.1639 
 
In the following sub-sections, with reference to the experience of the UK, some important 
changes to the current regulation of corporate opportunities are suggested that are aimed at 
designing workable and effective legislation that could be part of legislative amendments 
to the CL 2015.  
 
6.4.2.3.1 The appropriateness of the no-conflict framework: Designing the scope for the 
directors’ exploitation  
 
As stated in Chapter 4, the UK law adopts the no-conflict approach to corporate 
opportunities in which, if there is a possible conflict, the director may not appropriate 
corporate opportunities without authorisation by the board of directors. The UK law is 
generally viewed as strict because once a conflict situation has arisen, it is irrelevant for 
determining the directors’ liability to investigate bona fides or other relevant circumstances 
(e.g., the financial incapability of the company).1640 The question addressed here is whether 
the UK no-conflict approach can be transferred to the Saudi legal context. 
  
Given the Saudi legal conditions, the UK approach to corporate opportunities is likely to 
be the most appropriate choice for reforming the Saudi legislation for the following two 
reasons. First, the adoption of a strict non-conflict approach would be characterised by 
increased legal certainty around the application of the law and more consistent 
enforcement by the court. To clarify this point it might be important to compare the 
position of the UK with an alternative approach, namely the US ‘corporate opportunities 
doctrine’.1641 ‘The defining feature of’ the US approach to corporate opportunities is to 
focus on answering the question of who is entitled to exploit the corporate opportunities – 
                                                        
1638 See an outline of the investments in Saudi Arabia published on the website of MOCI,  
<http://www.mci.gov.sa/en/AboutKingdom/Pages/InvestmentInKingdom.aspx> accessed 10 July 2017. 
1639 For the effects of absence of legislative intervention in protecting shareholders from insiders’ abuse, see 
the discussion concerning Case No. 725/1/Q (n 1068) in section (4.4.2), Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
1640 See particularly footnotes 208–229 and accompanying text, Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
1641 The US approach is generally known as ‘corporate opportunities doctrine’; see Koh (n 1018) 410. It 
should be noted that US cases are numerous and each state has its own approach. Therefore, it is intended 
here to give a broad outline of the US approach rather than an exhaustive and detailed analysis. 
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is it the director or the company?1642 If the opportunity ‘belongs’ to the company, directors 
should not be allowed to exploit it and if they have done so, they would be in breach of 
their duty of loyalty.1643 For the court to determine to whom the corporate opportunity 
belongs, the US case law (e.g., US Delaware law) has applied a number of different 
approaches; for example, the court may focus on whether the opportunity falls within the 
company’s line of business;1644 whether the company had a prior interest or expectancy in 
the opportunity;1645 whether the company was financially capable of exploiting the 
opportunity;1646 and/or whether the director has treated the company fairly.1647The US 
regulation of corporate opportunities is generally viewed as a more flexible approach 
compared with the UK no-conflict rule because the former basically widens the ambit for 
directors to exploit opportunities without pre-authorisation by the company.1648 In practice, 
this means that a larger number of possible opportunities would be allocated to directors 
under the US approach.1649  
 
Importantly, the effective application of US law requires an active judicial role to 
determine whether or not directors’ exploitation of an opportunity amounts to a breach of 
their duty of loyalty;1650 in others words, the effectiveness of such an approach depends on 
whether or not the court has broad judicial discretion, and on the level of expertise and 
commercial knowledge of the judges.1651 By contrast, the application of the UK no-conflict 
approach does not require an active judicial role since, as stated above, it does not involve 
judicial engagement in an investigation of the facts of the case to determine, for example, 
whether or not the company is financially capable of taking an opportunity.1652 This is 
simply because such an investigation is irrelevant to the inquiry concerning compliance 
with the duty to avoid conflict of interests. The strict judicial approach, as Kershaw notes, 
is borne out by the reality that the facts and evidence in corporate opportunities cases tend 
                                                        
1642 Kershaw (n 1031) 608. 
1643 S Bainbridge, ‘Rethinking Delaware’s Corporate Opportunity Doctrine’ (UCLA School of Law, Law-
Econ Research Paper No. 08-17 November 2008 ) 1 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1296962> accessed 10 July 2017.  
1644 Ibid 5–6. 
1645 Ibid 6–7. 
1646 Ibid. 7–9.  
1647 See, for example, C Chadien, ‘The Law on Corporate Opportunity Transactions by Directors: A 
Comparative Analysis of Delaware Law and Australian Law’ (2016) 5 GSTF Journal of Law and Social 
Sciences 28, 33. 
1648 See Kershaw (n 1031) 608–609. 
1649 Ibid. 
1650 Ibid. 
1651 According to Kershaw, the scope of judicial discretion will be expanded as a logical result of judicial 
engagement in examining the detailed facts of a case under the US flexible approach; see ibid 625.  
1652 In many cases, there would be real difficulties in verifying the company’s financial capability to take up 
an investment opportunity, see Koh (n 1018) 424; Kershaw (n 1031) 621–622. 
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to be largely inaccessible.1653 Unlike the strict rule applied under UK law, the US corporate 
opportunities doctrine has been found by many commentators to involve a greater degree 
of legal uncertainty and ambiguity;1654 for example, the difficulty in ascertaining the 
company’s line of business is that the company’s business is ‘dynamic’ and constantly 
changing,1655 and so it is challenging to determine what the company’s business is.1656 This 
is also the case in relation to the fairness test, which suffers from ambiguity and lack of 
clear criteria for assessing what constitutes fairness.1657 
 
With all this in mind, the UK no-conflict rule is a more straightforward option for Saudi 
judges to apply effectively, compared with the US corporate opportunities doctrine. To 
explain this point: the application of the no-conflict rule does not expand the scope of 
judicial discretion and does not require the presence of a highly experienced judge who can 
deal successfully with broadly open-ended standards in the corporate context. Given the 
Saudi judicial tradition, and the experience of commercial law that Saudi judges have,1658 it 
appears that Saudi courts would face serious difficulties in managing and developing the 
US open-ended standards. This will not, however, be the case in relation to the application 
of the UK no-conflict rule, which is characterised by more certainty and determinacy.1659 
With the strict no-conflict rule, since directors place themselves in a conflict situation, the 
investigation of detailed circumstances and facts of a corporate opportunity case is 
irrelevant when determining directors’ liability. Indeed, the strict rule would relieve the 
Saudi court of having to engage in such an investigation and therefore the length of 
litigation will be significantly reduced.  
 
Second, when the inflexible no-conflict approach is adopted, the integrity of the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty would necessarily be defended against the directors’ capability to benefit 
personally from an investment opportunity that should be exploited by the company.1660 
For scholars such as Koh, who prefers the UK approach to that of the US, any standard 
regarding directors’ duty to avoid conflict of interests (and in particular the exploitation of 
corporate opportunities) that is not totally rigid will produce a state of ambiguity,1661 and 
                                                        
1653 Kershaw (n 1031) 616–617, 621. 
1654 See, for example, Koh (n 1018) ; Bainbridge (n 1643); G Bean, ‘Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Opportunities’ (1994) 15 Company Lawyer 266, 272.  
1655 Kershaw (n 1031) 614; Davies and Worthington (n 2) 548, footnote (351). 
1656 Davies and Worthington (n 2) 548.  
1657 See Bean (n 1654) 271.  
1658 See footnotes 1555–1573 and accompanying text in this Chapter. 
1659 Kershaw (n 1031) 625. 
1660 Ibid 603–604; see also Koh (n 1018) 409. 
1661 Koh (n 1018) 413. 
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‘will do no good, to say the least, to commercial morality’.1662 The Saudi adoption of a 
strict no-conflict approach, which maintains the integrity of the director–company 
relationship, would ensure that the ability of directors to take an opportunity is subject to 
the utmost degree of control, and a greater percentage of opportunities would be allocated 
to the company.1663  
 
In a situation where corporate opportunities regulation has been and remains largely under-
developed, it is highly likely that directors with wide discretionary powers would engage in 
self-interest activities. The argument for a strict application of the standard against 
directors is borne out by recent corporate scandals and fraud in the Saudi market,1664 which 
give a clear indication of the lack of commercial morality among market participants 
(including directors and managers) when the company law system is weak. Seemingly, the 
need to promote responsible directorial behaviour will perhaps be achieved by the 
application of a no-conflict rule that narrows the ability of directors to exploit an 
investment opportunity.1665  
 
From the above discussion, the UK’s strict no-conflict approach is based upon promoting 
legal certainty, as well as protecting the integrity of directors’ duty of loyalty to the 
company; the two primary features that would justify the adoption of such an approach to 
deal with the problem in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the wording of article 44(b)(2) of the Saudi 
CGRs 2017 suffers from ambiguity, and there is a lack of certainty concerning how 
directors’ liability can be triggered.1666  
 
In this regard, when considering the transferability of the UK no-conflict approach into the 
Saudi legal environment, there is an important issue that needs to be considered to ensure 
the proper reception of such an approach. In UK law, directors will be liable under section 
175(1) of the UK CA 2006, to account for the profit made if the circumstances surrounding 
their exploitation of an opportunity have given rise to an actual or possible conflict 
between their personal interests and the company’s interests.1667 With the UK no-conflict 
                                                        
1662 Ibid 413, quoting from F Pollock, ‘Derry v. Peek in the House of Lords’ (1889) 5 LQR , 422. 
1663 This is in contrast to the flexible approach to corporate opportunities; see footnotes 1648–1649 and 
accompanying text in this Chapter. 
1664 This can be best illustrated by the recent corporate scandals of Etihad Etisalat Co. and Al Mojil Group 
Co., which arguably raise questions about the commercial morality of market participants. Furthermore, it 
might be said that the new mandatory CGRs was introduced in 2017 with the purpose of enhancing the 
investors’ confidence in the Saudi stock market following the recent corporate corruption scandals.        
1665 See Kershaw (n 1033) 553. 
1666 See section (4.4.2.3), Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
1667 For more details, see section (4.4.1), Chapter 4 in this thesis.  
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approach, there would be large scope for judicial discretion to determine what amounts to 
actual or possible conflicts.1668  
 
In the context of the Saudi regulation of corporate opportunities, it seems that conflicts of 
interest should be understood as arising from unauthorised exploitation of any profit-
making opportunity during the course of being a director.1669 Put differently, for directors’ 
liability to be established under the no-conflict approach, it is sufficient to prove that the 
directors’ profit came from the unauthorised exploitation during the course of their 
tenure.1670 It should be added to the legislation that it is irrelevant for determining 
directors’ liability to investigate, for example, whether the company could or would exploit 
the opportunity, whether the directors had acted in good faith, whether the opportunity 
came to the directors in their private capacity, whether the opportunity was within the 
company’s line of business, or whether the company had, in fact, benefited from the 
directors’ exploitation.1671  
 
Although such a proposed threshold of liability is high, several reasons can be put forward 
in support of the adoption of the no-profit rule. First, a claimant will be relieved of 
establishing the actual or possible presence of a conflict of interests. Similarly, judges will 
be relieved of close analysis of the facts of a case to decide what constituted a real or 
possible conflict. Second, the strictness of the no-profit rule would effectively 
disincentivise  directors from exploiting an opportunity for their own benefit and therefore 
provide the company and its shareholders (including the minority) with sufficient legal 
protection. Third, while those who are against the strict approach to corporate opportunities 
would say that it would perhaps discourage entrepreneurial activities in the economy,1672 
the validity of such an argument can be challenged in the Saudi context. One of the main 
aspects of the entrepreneurial argument is that the strict approach leads to investment 
opportunities being unused.1673 Such an impact should not be exaggerated. In an 
environment where there is high competition, if the strictness of the approach deters 
                                                        
1668 See Kershaw (n 1033) 537; for a different explanation for the standard of liability under the no-conflict 
approach; see footnotes 204–206 and accompanying text, Chapter 4 in this thesis.  
1669 This is an application of the UK no-profit rule which is a part of the UK common law regulating the issue 
of corporate opportunities; see particularly section (4.3.2), Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
1670 This view is similar to the position of the UK court in the Regal case where the directors were found 
liable due to the no-profit rule only, without reference to the no-conflict rule, see footnotes 1015 – 1018 and 
accompanying text, Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
1671 Those are examples of circumstances surrounding a conflict situation in which the UK case law has 
determined their irrelevance to the inquiry concerning compliance with the director’s duty to avoid conflict 
of interests, see footnotes 1038–1053 and accompanying text, Chapter 4 in this thesis.  
1672 See Kershaw (n 1031) 616–617.  
1673 Ibid 617. 
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directors from exploiting an opportunity, this would not usually result in the opportunity 
remaining unexploited; this is because the opportunity is likely to be taken up by a 
competitor.1674 Furthermore, as will be proposed in the next section, the prohibition here 
will be limited to unauthorised exploitation of an opportunity by directors, and does not 
cover the exploitation by a third party or by the directors following the company’s 
authorisation.1675 
 
It appears from the above analysis that the UK’s strict no-conflict approach, in which the 
company’s interests are understood as any profit-making opportunity, would be the best 
and most appropriate choice for adoption into the Saudi legislation, given the Saudi legal 
conditions. 
 
6.4.2.3.2 Devising an authorisation process 
 
As a stated in Chapter 4 of this thesis, article 44(b)(2) of the CGRs 2017 lacks an 
authorisation procedure that allows directors to exploit an opportunity following the receipt 
of approval either from shareholders or from the board of directors.1676 With the total 
prohibition of any conflicts, there would be an emphasis on control at the expense of 
discretion exercised by the competent body (i.e., the general meeting or the board of 
directors).1677 If the law adopts an authorisation process, it will, along with moving the 
balance towards more discretion,1678 relax the strictness of the no-conflict approach by 
allowing directors to exploit an opportunity when the company gives its approval. 
Furthermore, a rule prohibiting the engagement in a conflict situation, while introducing an 
authorisation process, would arguably be a compromise between fairness and efficiency; 
two important values that should be considered in any corporate governance 
provision.1679Accordingly, the suggestion could be that the Saudi law should not adopt an 
absolute prohibition strategy, but rather allow directors’ exploitation of an opportunity, 
only after obtaining the company’s consent.  
 
In this regard, as a default rule, the UK CA 2006 clearly provides that with respect to 
public companies, unless the company’s articles of association permit authorisation by the 
                                                        
1674 A similar argument is put forward by Kershaw who challenges the claim that the strict approach dampens 
entrepreneurial activities, see ibid 618. 
1675 See the next section (6.4.2.3.2) which proposes an authorisation mechanism to allow a director to exploit 
an investment opportunity.  
1676 See section (4.4.2.3), Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
1677 Keay (n 1029) 136.  
1678 Ibid.  
1679 See ibid 137. 
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board, a conflict involving a business opportunity must be authorised by the company’s 
members.1680 As far as the reform of Saudi law is concerned, there should be a mandatory 
rule obliging directors who wish to exploit an opportunity personally to seek authorisation 
from the shareholders. In addition to the attainment of greater legal certainty through the 
mandatory corporate rules,1681 in developing markets such as Saudi Arabia a mandatory 
rule on the issue of conflict of interests, rather than a default rule, would be more desirable. 
In Saudi Arabia where there are immature and incomplete non-legal mechanisms of 
markets, there is more need for mandatory corporate rules offering more legal protection 
that would shield shareholders, especially minority shareholders from the risk of 
expropriation and opportunism.1682 The enabling version of rules may not always work 
effectively in Saudi Arabia in the absence of markets that complement the law in 
protecting shareholders from abusive practices by insiders (e.g., directors who could be 
controlling shareholders).1683 With the default requirement of approval by shareholders, the 
company that might be controlled by insiders will be given the chance to shift to approval 
by the board; an authorisation process that does not sufficiently protect shareholders, as 
will be seen below.1684 Further, as the interested directors (who could be majority 
shareholders) will be excluded from voting at the general meeting,1685 the approval by 
shareholders, compared with the approval by directors, will offer more transparency and 
better legal protection for minority shareholders. 
 
Within the regulation of corporate opportunities, it should be expressly stated in the 
legislation that if directors have exploited a profit-making opportunity without obtaining 
the approval of the general meeting, the company is entitled to require that these directors 
account for any profit made out of unlawful exploitation in addition to its right to seek 
compensation for losses caused by the directors’ exploitation. 
 
6.4.2.3.3 A proposed reform by way of legal transplantation 
 
When considering the possibility of transferring the UK approach to corporate 
opportunities to the Saudi law, the research submits that there are a substantial number of 
UK rules that can be transplanted. Some important improvements could be made to the 
                                                        
1680 See section 175(5)(b) of the CA 2006.  
1681 Paredes (n 587) 1133–1134.  
1682 See section (2.8), Chapter 2 in this thesis; see generally Paredes (n 608).  
1683 This seems to be the case in emerging markets; see ibid 405–408.  
1684 The appropriateness of board approval will be considered when the discussion focuses on the 
transferability of the UK model of approval in relation to self-dealing transactions, see section (6.4.2.4) in 
this Chapter.  
1685 Article 95(2) of the CL 2015; see also article 44(a)(2) of the CGRs 2017. 
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current regulation of corporate opportunities under the CGRs 2017, and these should be 
part of legislative amendments to the CL 2015.1686 Indeed, it is inappropriate to establish 
the duty to avoid conflicts of interests in the context of corporate opportunities independent 
of the CL 2015. This is because the avoidance of conflicts of interests is one of the 
significant elements of fiduciary obligation owed by directors towards the company, 
regardless of the nature of the company (listed or unlisted). Since the CL 2015 lacks a 
provision requiring directors of joint stock companies to avoid the exploitation of corporate 
opportunities, a new statutory article must be inserted into the CL 2015 and to regulate this 
issue under the following terms: 
 
§ As an application of the director’s duty to avoid conflicts of interests, a director 
shall not personally exploit an investment opportunity or information that would be 
of interest to the company during the course of his/her tenure. 
 
§ It is immaterial for determining directors’ liability to investigate whether the 
company could or would exploit the opportunity, whether the directors had acted in 
good faith, whether the opportunity came to the directors in a private capacity, 
whether the opportunity was within the company’s line of business, or whether the 
company had, in fact, benefited from the directors’ exploitation. 	
§ The company’s interests should be understood as referring to any profit-making 
opportunity. 	
§ As a mandatory rule, a director may exploit an opportunity following the receipt of 
approval by the general meeting of shareholders, at which interested directors will 
be excluded from voting at the general meeting. 	
§ The remedy for the breach of this proposed article is to hold a director accountable 
for any profit made out of unauthorised exploitation.  
 
6.4.2.4 Self-dealing transactions 
 
As the comparative study in Chapter 4 revealed, both jurisdictions (i.e., the UK and Saudi 
Arabia) have relied upon the disclosure and approval requirement as a legal strategy to 
control directors’ engagement in corporate self-dealings, in which the failure to comply 
                                                        
1686 The CGRs 2017 is only applicable to companies listed in the Saudi market, see section (1.4.3), Chapter 1 
in this thesis.  
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with those strategies would constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty.1687 The regulation of 
self-dealing transactions is one of the major areas in Saudi law that has benefitted from 
legal development in the new CL 2015 and the CGRs 2017. The change has promoted 
legal certainty in the application of the law and, consequently, enhanced directors’ 
accountability towards the company and its shareholders. Nevertheless, there is still room 
for improvement to ensure greater legal protection for shareholders, including minority 
shareholders. 
 
It is necessary to begin with considering whether the UK model for authorising self-
dealing transactions can be transferred into the Saudi context. As explained in 
Chapter 4,1688 directors, in principle, are only obliged to disclose their interests to the board 
with a default requirement of approval by directors; for only in certain situations set out in 
the CA 2006 is it mandatory for directors to seek authorisation from the general meeting. 
By contrast, the Saudi law requires directors, as a mandatory rule, to disclose their interest 
to the board and seek ex ante approval from the general meeting. Such authorisation 
process could be accompanied by the board’s recommendation. On top of that, directors 
are required to seek the general meeting’s approval for renewing the authorisation each 
year. In the present researcher’s view, the transplantation of the UK model for approving 
self-dealing transactions is unlikely to be transferred into the Saudi legal environment. One 
of the reasons for such an argument is that the UK law tends to place less constraints on  
directors’ discretion compared with the Saudi law and such lenient approach to self-dealing 
transactions is not appropriate for the Saudi settings. Unlike in the UK, Saudi law should 
focus more on ensuring the integrity of transactions even if this came at the expense of 
efficiency because the minority shareholders incur more severe risks from the insiders’ 
control over the company’s affairs. As explained above, stronger legal protection for 
shareholders against insiders’ abuses is more desirable in the Saudi context.1689 It appears 
that a law that only requires directors to disclose their interest to the board with the default 
requirement of the board’s approval in Saudi Arabia is likely to give a good opportunity 
for directors (who could be blockholders) to engage in more self-dealing transactions that 
may not benefit the company. Furthermore, doubts could be cast on whether disinterested 
directors can be trusted to make independent judgements regarding the authorisation of a 
transaction in which one of their colleagues has an interest. One of the main concerns 
related to approval by the board is its possible contribution to the directors’ adoption of ‘a 
                                                        
1687 See section (4.5), Chapter 4 in this thesis.  
1688 See generally sections (4.5.3), (4.5.4) and (4.5.5), Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
1689 See footnotes 1681–1683 and accompanying text in this Chapter.  
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culture based upon reciprocity’.1690 Davies and Worthington note that such unlawful 
practice ‘you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours’ is not easy to discover and establish 
in court.1691 Even with the Saudi adoption of the institution of independent directors, it is 
questionable whether or not independent directors, as was stressed earlier, are able to make 
independent judgments that are free from social connections and from the influence of 
those who selected them.1692 Moreover, it seems inappropriate to switch from a mandatory 
system requiring approval by shareholders that has been in place for a long time in relation 
to self-dealing transactions and around which practices have developed. Thus, the present 
authorisation process for self-dealing transactions under article 71 of the CL 2015 should 
be retained. 
 
While the discussion above suggests maintaining the present Saudi model of approval, this 
should be done with modification. The primary concern identified in Chapter 4 in this 
thesis relates to the action of approval of self-dealing transactions. While Saudi law makes 
it clear that conflicted directors are not permitted to vote,1693 it is unclear whether persons 
related to directors (particularly family members) must abstain from voting on self-dealing 
transactions, especially at the general meeting of shareholders.1694 Neither the CL 2015 nor 
the CGRs 2017 contain a single provision to that effect. As highlighted earlier, since the 
votes of interested shareholders (i.e., persons connected to interested directors who are not 
members of the board) will be, at least in theory, counted when determining whether 
approval should be granted, this would weaken the effectiveness of the shareholders’ 
approval mechanism as a means of protecting shareholders (especially minority 
shareholders) against self-dealing transactions that have little or no benefit to the 
company.1695 It might also lead to unnecessary judicial involvement in deciding whether or 
not the votes of persons connected to directors should be counted. This could consume 
more judicial time and resources, especially when directors claim that they honestly 
thought that the transaction served the general interests of the company.  
 
Thus, when reforming Saudi law, there should be as a starting point a legal rule requiring 
the approval of self-dealing transactions at the general meeting to be made without 
counting the votes of persons related to interested directors, especially for listed 
                                                        
1690 Keay (n 1029) 142. 
1691 Davies and Worthington (n 2) 556. 
1692 See footnotes 564–576 and accompanying text, Chapter 2 in this thesis.  
1693 See articles 71(1) and 95(2) of the CL 2015. 
1694 This is because the rule requiring approval by disinterested directors should be narrowly interpreted to 
exclude members of the directors’ family who are also board members although they may have no specific 
interest in the conflict situation.  
1695 See section (4.5.5), Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
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companies. As explained earlier, within the meaning of indirect interest in a transaction 
with the company, it seems indisputable that directors should be subject to the disclosure 
and approval requirement set forth in article 71(1) of the CL 2015 as far as related-party 
transactions are concerned.1696 The CGRs 2017 specify 11 categories of related parties of 
which the following are examples relevant to the discussion in this section: (i) entities, 
other than companies, owned by directors or their relatives; (ii) companies, other than joint 
stock companies, in which directors or their relatives are a partner or member of the 
companies’ board; (iii) or joint stock companies in which director or their relatives own at 
least 5% of the share capital.1697  
 
For the purpose of the right to participate in the vote at the general meeting, the question 
that may be asked concerns the appropriate understanding of the concept of ‘relatives’ or 
‘family members’ in the Saudi context. In UK law the concept of family members 
connected to a director under section 253 of the CA 2006 is limited to directors’ spouse (or 
civil partner), child(ren) and parents.1698 In relation to companies with premium listing, 
directors’ associates, who are expected not to participate in a vote at the general 
meeting,1699 can be defined as directors’ spouse or child(ren).1700 It is notable that the 
UK law definition of a family relationship, especially under section 253, is almost the same 
as the definition adopted by the previous Saudi CGRs 2006.1701 However, the new 
CGRs 2017 have rightly expanded the meaning of family relationship to include, in 
addition to first-degree relatives, grandparents, grandchildren, siblings, nephews and 
nieces.1702 Thus, it seems that the family relationship, unlike in the UK, should be broadly 
defined and the present definition of ‘relatives’ in the CGRs 2017 should be retained, if not 
further expanded, for the purpose of abstention from the vote at the general meeting. This 
view is justified on the basis that in a culture such as Saudi Arabia the family and tribe play 
a significant role in shaping people’s behaviour in addition to their role in supporting its 
members in doing business.1703 Given the feeling among family members that each owes a 
moral obligation towards the other to support him/her and serves his/her interests, the 
ability of a director’s family member to make an impartial decision will be 
                                                        
1696 See section (4.5.3), Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
1697 See the definition of ‘related party’ in article 1(e), (f), (g), (h) of the CGRs 2017.  
1698 See section 253 of the CA 2006. 
1699 LR 11.1.8 <https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/LR.pdf> accessed 30 July 2017. 
1700 See LR Appendix, relevant definitions (App 1.1.1).  
1701 According to the CGRs 2006, relatives is defined to include only ‘first-degree relatives’ (i.e., ‘father, 
mother, spouse and children’). 
1702 See the definition of ‘relatives’ in article 1 of the CGRs 2017. 
1703 Saudi society is characterised by strong family and tribal ties, see Falgi (n 208) 128–129. 
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questionable.1704Thus, the broad definition of relatives in the context of self-dealing 
transactions is crucial to ensuring that this type of transaction is approved only for 
commercial reasons rather than family considerations. It may also contribute to ending the 
culture of easy conflict approvals.1705  
 
In the researcher’s opinion, the proposed legal rule that requires the approval of self-
dealing transactions at the general meeting to be made without counting the votes of family 
members of interested directors should only be applicable to listed companies. The 
rationale behind this view is that the general meetings of some unlisted companies are 
formed exclusively of family members. Therefore, if the proposed rule was applied to 
unlisted companies, it would be impossible to obtain approval by the general meeting 
because all shareholders would be disqualified from voting on self-dealing transactions. 
 
6.4.2.4.1 A proposed reform by way of legal transplantation 
 
When addressing the question of legal transferability, it seems possible that the Saudi law 
of self-dealing transactions would partially benefit from the UK in relation to the 
mechanism of approval by shareholders. Since the research is in favour of applying the 
proposed legal rule to listed companies only, a new article should be inserted in the CGRs 
2017 rather than the CL 2015 to establish the following rules: 
 
§ Family members of interested directors (who are not members of the board of 
directors) must abstain from voting on self-dealing transactions at the general 
meeting of shareholders. 
 
§ Family members should be understood in accordance with the definition of 
‘relatives’ set forth in article 1 of the CGRs 2017.  
 
6.5 The reform of the private enforcement action: The transplantation of 
derivative actions 
 
As has been mentioned in Chapter 5, the enforcement of breaches of directors’ duties by 
means of litigation initiated by shareholders has been largely inoperative and ineffective in 
Saudi Arabia because of legislative shortcomings. The Saudi law confers the power to 
                                                        
1704 See footnote 1150, Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
1705 See footnotes 1166–1167 and accompanying text, Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
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initiate the litigation against wrongdoing directors to the general meeting of shareholders. 
The core problem is that if the company was incapable of pursuing the legal action because 
of, inter alia, the wrongdoer’s control of the general meeting, the law has failed to 
introduce an alternative judicial remedy that enables a shareholder to enforce the 
company’s rights. The Saudi law of derivative actions, set forth in article 80 of the CL 
2015,1706 can be described as vague and outmoded.1707 
 
Given that ex post private non-judicial mechanisms such as the removal of directors at the 
general meeting and markets,1708and the public enforcement1709 might suffer from flaws and 
limits, which suggest that such mechanisms cannot substitute the need to put a sound 
system of derivative actions in place within the entire system of enforcement for breaches 
of directors’ duties. It might be true to say that the derivative action, as other mechanisms 
of accountability, may come with costs. There is a potential risk of abuse by a shareholder 
who might bring a legal action to serve his personal interests rather the company’s 
interests.1710 There might be concerns that the derivative action would expose directors to a 
high risk of liability, which may result in reducing risk-taking.1711Nevertheless, the 
introduction of an accessible derivative action in Saudi Arabia can be justified for several 
reasons. Where legal certainty in this area of law is promoted, the reasonable expectation is 
that the company and shareholders will be adequately aware of their legal rights and how 
to use them, and shareholders may become more active in filing litigation against directors 
for the breach of their duties. The court will, in return, have more chances to develop their 
professional knowledge as well as the standards for assessing compliance with. 
Furthermore, unlike with article 80, the derivative action would directly relieve the 
company whilst providing indirect relief to shareholders and non-shareholder 
constituencies.1712 If the law permits a shareholder to commence a derivative claim this can 
be regarded as ‘a powerful ex post mechanism for recovering corporate losses’.1713When 
directors (who could be or be connected to a blockholder) believe they will be the target of 
legal action for their breach, the derivative action is also regarded as a good deterrent as 
well as a way to mitigate agency costs even in companies with a dominant shareholder.1714 
Indeed, the derivative action may be used by the minority shareholder to effectuate the 
                                                        
1706 It is an exact copy of article 78 of the CL 1965.  
1707 See sections (5.6), Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
1708 See sections (2.6.1) and (2.8), Chapter 2 in this thesis.  
1709 See section (5.2), Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
1710 Reisberg (n 8) 83. 
1711 Ibid 49. 
1712 See section (5.6.1), Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
1713 Baum and Puchniak (n 1464) 14.  
1714 Ibid.  
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director’s obligation to act in the general interests of the company rather than the interests 
of a certain group of shareholders. 1715  
 
6.5.1 Considerations in support of the feasible transplantation of derivative 
actions 
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, it is important to ensure the proper reception of any 
imported rule by the host country.1716 To be specific, it should be questioned whether the 
Saudi jurisdiction has the key factors to ensure a successful transplantation of the 
derivative action. There are two encouraging considerations that will be taken into account 
below: 
 
First, the derivative action is a mechanism that requires shareholders who are sufficiently 
motivated to commence the litigation.1717 In this regard, it should be stressed from the 
outset that it is a fundamental right of any citizen and resident in Saudi Arabia to litigate 
before the court. This is a constitutional right that is safeguarded by the state.1718 It is 
noteworthy that the right to litigation is one that Sharia also recognises and the necessity of 
the judiciary in Muslim society is illustrated by the fact that the Prophet Muhammad 
(PBUH) acted as a judge in Al-Madinah and dispatched others as judges in territories such 
as Makkah and Yemen.1719 This implies that there is nothing in Islamic culture 
discouraging the right holder from resorting to the judiciary to seek a remedy and defence.  
 
Another matter to consider is that Saudis’ recourse to the court to resolve disputes is an 
inevitable result of the economic and social changes witnessed by Saudi Arabia over the 
past few decades. This social and economic development has established a very wide range 
of commercial relationships among individuals in Saudi society. It is generally accepted 
that a party to any commercial relationship should fulfil his/her obligations towards the 
other party and bear responsibility for the failure to do so. In the business community it is 
common practice for the injured party to bring a lawsuit before the court against the 
negligent party. This is borne out by the fact that government statistics have indicated a 
rise in the rate of civil or commercial litigation. Consider, for example, financial disputes 
heard by ordinary courts. The judicial sources indicate that there was an increase in the 
                                                        
1715 Ibid. 
1716 See footnotes 1524–1526 and accompanying text in this Chapter.  
1717 See, for example, Q Quach, ‘Transplantation of Derivative Actions to Vietnam: Tip-offs from Absence of 
Academic Debate’ (2012) 7 Asian Journal of Comparative Law 1.  
1718 See article 47 of the BLG 1992.  
1719 A Zidan, The Judicial System in Islamic Sharia (Arabic), (Amman, Al-Bashaer Library 1989) 7.  
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number of financial cases filed in the courts between 1435 and 1437 AH,1720 and a total of 
156,498 cases was registered by the end of 1437 AH; a rise of 20.6% compared with the 
same period for 1435 AH.1721 Looking at the rate of commercial lawsuits, statistics 
published by the Board of Grievances also show an increase in the numbers registered with 
the Board; for example, 3,488 commercial cases were filed in the first quarter of 1437 AH 
(corresponding with the period between 14 October 2015 and 10 January 2016); the figure 
gradually rose each quarter, reaching 5,167 commercial cases by the end of the first quarter 
of the following year (corresponding with the period between 2 October 2016 and 
29 December 2016).1722 It should also be borne in mind that no court fees or the ‘loser pays 
costs rule’ are  imposed on litigants1723 in the Saudi civil procedures.1724 Arguably, these 
two factors have also contributed to the rising rates of civil litigation.  
 
In Saudi Arabia the increasing amount of litigation perhaps suggests a growing willingness 
among individuals to bring legal proceedings against others to enforce their legal rights. 
This might be seen as an important indicator to assume the active use of derivative actions 
by non-controlling shareholders to protect the interests of the company against directors.  
 
Second, while considering the reform of derivative actions, one may doubt the capability 
of the Saudi judiciary to handle the possible increase in derivative litigation following the 
adoption of the proposed reform. This argument tends to be based upon three elements: 
(i) the lack of sufficient skill and competence of Saudi judges, (ii) the long duration of 
litigation, and (iii) the inconsistency of judicial decisions. While such concerns might be 
true to some extent, they should not be overstated as there are several significant 
indications of a shift in the judicial system towards greater efficiency. With the recent 
judicial reform establishing specialised commercial courts, the government has undertaken 
to ensure that specialised courts are staffed with well-trained judges with long-standing 
expertise in commercial matters.1725 In general, a candidate for judge must possess an 
                                                        
1720 AH stands for ‘After Hijra’ which denotes the Islamic calendar system. The period from 1435 to 
1437 AH corresponds to the period between 4 November 2013 and 1 October 2016).  
1721 See official statistics released by the Ministry of Justice and made available to the public in Arabic on the 
Ministry’s website at <https://www.moj.gov.sa/en/Pages/default.aspx#> accessed 6 August 2017.  
1722 See official statistics released by the Board of Grievances and made available to the public on the 
Board’s website at <https://www.bog.gov.sa/MediaCenter/Statistics/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 
6 August 2017. It is worth remembering that this statistic does not yet include other civil or commercial cases 
heard by quasi-judicial committees. Note that there are no published statistics covering the period before the 
year 1437 AH. 
1723 This is a civil procedural rule adopted in the UK; see footnotes 1484–1485 and accompanying text, 
Chapter 5 in this thesis.  
1724 There is nothing in the SPL 2013 suggesting the application of such a rule within the civil procedural 
system.  
1725 See the Implementation Mechanism 2007 (n 237) para 1/8/9.  
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academic degree, among other requirements that need to be met depending on the position 
and the type of court.1726 For specialised courts, the allocation of judges is likely to be made 
according to the competence, academic specialisation and experience, which are the most 
important criteria.1727 A number of  courses and workshops have been held to train judges 
for specialised courts dealing with commercial disputes.1728 Furthermore, the creation of 
specialised courts (in the present case commercial courts)1729 is expected to contribute 
significantly to developing the judges’ expertise in adjudicating disputes arising from a 
particular area of law because judges in these courts frequently deal with such legal 
issues.1730 With all this in mind, it can be assumed that judges in commercial courts tend to 
have a reasonable level of expertise that enables them to deal with the complexities of 
corporate matters.  
 
Concerning the issue of the long duration of litigation, the Board of Grievances had taken 
important steps towards reducing the period of commercial litigation; for example, any 
commercial case should be heard within 20 days from the date of registration. The 
maximum limit for adjournment of the case should not be more than three hearings. In any 
event, a good reason should be presented to secure the postponement of hearings.1731 In 
order to speed up the resolution of cases, judges’ administrative commitments are 
significantly reduced so that they will not be preoccupied with anything other than the 
case.1732 It is worth mentioning here that recent statistics have suggested a growth in the 
performance of commercial divisions of the Board. For example, in the first quarter of 
1438 AH, the number of completed cases  was 5,751, an increase of 53% compared with 
the same period in 1437 AH.1733 With the recent transfer of commercial cases to specialised 
courts, it is envisaged that the duration of litigation will be more reduced.  
 
In terms of the inconsistency of judicial decisions, since there is no system of binding 
judicial precedent in Saudi Arabia,1734 the possibility of inconsistency among judgments on 
derivative action cases with similar facts will always exist. Nevertheless, the severity of 
                                                        
1726 See Part 4 of Chapter 1 of the JL 2007 and Rules for Selection of Judges. 
1727 See Part 4 of Chapter 1 of the JL 2007; see also Draft Rules for Selection of Judges of Specialised Courts 
and Divisions <https://www.scj.gov.sa/newsdesc?ItemID=170> accessed 13 August 2017. 
1728 For example, the Closing Ceremony of the Second Training Program for Judges of Commercial Courts 
on 16 October 2012, see O Aljamaan and M Hamzani, Alriyadh Newspaper (edn 16186, 17 October 2012) 
<http://www.alriyadh.com/776934> accessed 22 December 2016.   
1729 See section 1.5.2, Chapter 1 in this thesis.  
1730 Zimmer (n 267) 1 and 2.  
1731 See the decision of the president of the Board of Grievances,  
<https://www.bog.gov.sa/MediaCenter/news/Pages/455.aspx> accessed 13 August 2017. 
1732 Ibid.  
1733 See official statistics released by the Board of Grievances (n 1722).  
1734 See footnotes 228–232 and accompanying text, Chapter 1 in this thesis.  
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such an issue will be largely reduced due to the founding of specialised commercial courts 
at the first instance and at appeal. When the legislature decides to establish specialised 
courts at the first instance, it will be with the intention of improving the quality of judicial 
decisions.1735 Yet, if the legislature wishes to achieve greater uniformity and predictability 
in the interpretation of a certain area of law, the appeal courts should be staffed by 
specialised, not generalist, judges.1736 With regard to Saudi law, it seems that the Saudi 
legislature intends to accomplish both objectives: an enhancement of the quality of judicial 
rulings, and a high degree of uniformity and predictability in interpreting commercial 
legislation. Furthermore, if the Saudi judiciary expanded its policy on the publication of 
judicial decisions, this would also contribute to greater uniformity and predictability in the 
application of the law. 
 
From the above discussion regarding concerns about the capability of the Saudi judiciary, 
it can be argued that such concerns tend to be exaggerated. The reform that the judicial 
system has been witnessing should be seen as a stepping-stone to an efficient and sound 
system. Put differently, the above analysis demonstrates that concerns about the capability 
of Saudi judiciary tend not to be sufficient justification for discouraging the design of an 
effective derivative action system. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the initiation 
of derivative litigation will go through procedural rules intended to reduce the flow of 
malicious claims. 
 
6.5.2 What legal concepts and ideas will be adopted?  
 
This section intends to specify requirements and conditions for a shareholder to bring a 
derivative action. By examining the extent to which Saudi law can benefit from UK law, 
the elements of a derivative action remedy will be designed, correcting deficiencies 
identified in Chapter 5 of this thesis. It should be borne in mind that although it is 
important to ensure that an effective mechanism of derivative action is in place, this does 
not mean it is necessary to design a derivative action that exposes directors to high risk of 
legal liability and damages the company’s interests. It should also be recalled that any 
proposed reform agenda resulting from the examination of the feasibility of legal transplant 
should take the form of mandatory rules to be included in the CL 2015.1737 
 
                                                        
1735 See Zimmer (n 267) 1– 2 and 6. 
1736 Ibid 7. 
1737 See the accompanying text to footnotes 1575 – 1578, Chapter 6 in this thesis. 
 241 
 
6.5.2.1 The nature of wrongs and the relief to be sought   
 
It has been argued that there is technically no derivative action in Saudi law, as understood 
in other jurisdictions such as the UK. One of the key problems of article 80 of the CL 2015 
is that a shareholder can only bring a legal action on behalf of the company in relation to a 
wrongful act that causes harm to his/her personal interests, with the result that any relief 
will flow directly to the shareholder. By contrast, UK law makes it clear that derivative 
litigation has to be initiated as a result of wrong done to the company and any financial 
gain from it should be given to the company.1738 For reasons put forward in Chapter 5 of 
this thesis,1739 one of the important elements of the proposed reform is to recommend 
derivative action where the cause of action belongs to the company and it is brought to 
seek corporate relief.  
 
The proposed derivative action should be brought in relation to a cause of action that can 
be the subject of the company’s action under article 79 of the CL 2015. This, as explained 
earlier, will include any misconduct causing harm to the company’s interests while 
managing the company.1740 Under UK law, directors might be exposed to the risk of being 
defendants in derivative claims because of wrongs that have been perpetrated.1741 While 
this could be seen as a positive step towards the promotion of directors’ accountability; a 
reform that broadens the scope of causes of actions is, no doubt, undesirable as far as Saudi 
law is concerned. This is because such reform would increase the already high possibility 
of bringing litigation against directors. This, by implication, could deter talented 
individuals from accepting directorships. Furthermore, the design of a derivative action 
system should be guided by the need to achieve the right balance between safeguarding the 
interests of the company and shareholders, and showing appropriate reverence to the 
directors’ exercise of managerial authority.  
 
Since derivative litigation is initiated in relation to wrongs done to the company, the 
claimant should only be allowed to seek corporate relief. This could, for example, be in the 
form of compensation,1742 disgorgement of profit or the rescission of the self-dealing 
transaction.1743 This change would bring article 80 actions in line with the law of other 
                                                        
1738 See footnotes 1440–1443 and accompanying text, Chapter 5 in this thesis.  
1739 See section (5.6.1), Chapter 5 in this thesis.  
1740 See footnotes 1266–1267 and accompanying text, Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
1741 See section 260(3) of the CA 2006. 
1742 See, for example, article 78 of the CL 2015. 
1743 See article 71(2) of the CL 2015. 
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jurisdictions, such as the UK. It would also, as a matter of policy, draw a clear distinction 
between personal and representative actions. 
 
6.5.2.2 Should the claimant be required to obtain the court’s permission to 
continue the claim? 
 
In the UK shareholders may sue wrongdoing directors derivatively. However, they are 
required to obtain the court’s permission to continue the claim. As explained earlier, the 
UK’s adoption of this approach indicates how serious the UK legislator regards the 
problems associated with placing the decision to litigate in the hands of the board of 
directors or the shareholder body to be. Indeed, among other benefits, independent 
decision-making is more likely to be reached with judicial intervention in the derivative 
litigation process.1744 Theoretically, this approach could be seen as a solution for problems 
associated with giving the general meeting or the board of directors the power to make this 
decision. Nevertheless, this does not mean that judicial intervention in the derivative 
litigation decision would fit perfectly within the Saudi legal environment. The UK 
permission procedure has problems and uncertainties that cast doubts upon the feasibility 
of such an approach in Saudi Arabia. 
 
In the UK, although the court is expected in the first stage to consider the probability of a 
claim succeeding, there is some uncertainty about how to establish the prima facie case as 
the court has taken different approaches to the prima facie question and in some cases even 
skipped the prima facie stage and moved straight to the second stage.1745 As stated 
earlier,1746 it is an easy task for a shareholder to establish a prima face case but this does 
not reflect whether or not the chance of success in the final stage is substantial. Therefore, 
doubts have been raised as to whether the court should go through the first stage involving 
the prima facie inquiry because of the increased costs and time wasting associated with 
such an inquiry.  
 
Another source of uncertainty stems from the very wide discretion given to the court at the 
permissive stage to determine whether to permit the application for permission. Although 
the CA 2006 specifies a set of factors that the court can take into consideration while 
exercising its discretion, ambiguity remains concerning how the court will reach its 
decision as the Act does not provide guidance on how the court should weigh various 
                                                        
1744 See section (5.3) and footnotes 1311–1314 and accompanying text, Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
1745 See section (5.5.2.1), Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
1746 See footnotes 1354–1356 and accompanying text, Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
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statutory factors set out in section 263(3) and (4).1747 Put differently, there is no specific 
test that has to be satisfied. A related issue that may be of great concern to parties in the 
litigation is the court’s decision to determine whether to pursue the derivative claim is 
basically an ‘investment decision’1748 that the court (in the present case the Saudi court) 
may not always be able to make.1749 Therefore, it has been argued that the court should not 
be empowered to intervene in the internal affairs of the company.1750 This argument may 
not be sufficiently convincing because it might be true to say that a judge does not need to 
be an expert on the company’s business to make an independent judgment based upon 
evidence submitted about whether the litigation would bring benefits to the company.1751 
Nevertheless, it is a strong argument that should not be discounted while studying the 
adoption of the court approval requirement because judges may differ in terms of their 
understanding of the company’s affairs, and this may require them to spend more time and 
effort to reach a sound decision. 
  
A further problem may be raised concerning the procedure involving the granting of 
permission. In assessing whether the claim would benefit the company, the court cannot 
make a sound judgment without some review of the legal merits of the case.1752 However, it 
has been pointed out that the permission stage in some UK cases has turned to mini-
trials;1753 a matter that should be avoided according to the recommendation of the Law 
Commission.1754 With all this in mind, in Saudi Arabia, if the requirement that the court’s 
permission needs to be obtained were adopted, there would be a high risk that this 
procedure would escalate into mini-trials and a detailed investigation of evidence, resulting 
in lengthy hearings. This is a valid concern that might discourage a shareholder from 
bringing a genuine derivative claim due to the costly and lengthy permission procedure 
associated with the court approval requirement.  
 
6.5.2.3 The standing requirement for the plaintiff 
 
Like in the UK,1755 the bringing of actions on behalf of the company is limited to 
shareholders under article 80 of the Saudi CL 2015. Seemingly, it is generally accepted 
                                                        
1747 See footnotes 1366 and 1367 and accompanying text, Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
1748 See Hirt (n 1214) 165–166. 
1749 Ibid 195.  
1750 Ibid. 
1751 See Keay and Loughrey (n 1335) 161–162; Gevurtz (n 1225) 297–298.  
1752 See  Shareholders Remedies: Consultation Paper (n 1297) para 16.22. 
1753 Keay and Loughrey (n 1335) 177. 
1754 Shareholders Remedies: Consultation Paper (n 1297) para 16.22. 
1755 See section 260(1) of the CA 2006. 
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that as long as the Saudi legislation allows a shareholder to sue directors on behalf of the 
company without giving further details, it is a standing requirement for a plaintiff in 
derivative actions to be a shareholder at the time of bringing the action.1756 It seems that the 
Saudi law, as with its UK counterpart,1757 does not prevent shareholders from bringing a 
lawsuit on behalf of the company in relation to an action that occurred before they became 
shareholders. Neither the UK CA 2006, nor the Saudi CL 2015 requires a plaintiff to have 
been holding stock at the time of the wrongdoing. The law should not allow directors to 
escape liability simply because the plaintiff had not been a shareholder at the time when 
the wrongdoing occurred.  
 
The question that may arise is whether Saudi law should impose a threshold requirement 
on shareholders when bringing derivative actions. While the UK CA 2006 does not contain 
such a requirement, the laws of other jurisdictions only permit the initiation of derivative 
actions following the fulfilment of a minimum ownership requirement.1758 One of the main 
justifications for a shareholding threshold is to prevent malicious lawsuits.1759 Put 
differently, since substantial shareholders have sufficient interests in bringing derivative 
litigation compared with those with smaller shareholding ownership, they are unlikely to 
bring frivolous lawsuits.1760 However, by requiring a minimum shareholding ownership 
(e.g., a 5% or 10% threshold),1761 it might be said that derivative actions will only be 
available for a wealthy minority of shareholders as far as listed companies are concerned. 
In Saudi Arabia, although it is common to find a listed company with a blockholder 
owning at least 5% of the company’s equity,1762 the number of blockholders in each 
company, in an extreme scenario, can be counted on the fingers of one hand. This means 
that tens of thousands of shareholders will practically be excluded from brining a claim. 
For unlisted companies, if the law introduced a shareholding threshold as high as, for 
example, 5% or 10%, this requirement could also make it difficult for minority 
shareholders – who do not have access to a liquid market compared with shareholders of 
listed companies – to protect themselves when directors have breached their duties, 
                                                        
1756 See Jobran (n 632) 387. 
1757 Section 260(4) of the CA 2006. 
1758 See Gelter (n 1477) 859 who provides examples of some European company laws imposing the 
minimum shareholding ownership requirement for bringing derivative actions. 
1759 H Hirt, ‘The Enforcement of Directors’ Duties in Large Companies: Reassessment of the Rule in Foss v 
Harbottle and Analysis of Reform Proposals with Particular Reference to German Company Law’ (PhD 
thesis, University of London 2002 ) 251. 
1760 See Gelter (n 1477) 856. 
1761 Ibid 859, indicting that the shareholding thresholds are 5% in Spain and 10% in Austria. 
1762 Approximately 91% of listed companies have a shareholder with ownership of at least 5%, see Table 2.1, 
Chapter 2 in this thesis.  
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causing harm to the company’s interests. The danger with the high threshold requirement is 
that it may block the initiation of desirable lawsuits.1763  
 
Nevertheless, while it may be said that each shareholder should be entitled to equal 
protection regardless of the size of his/her shareholding, the inclusion of a threshold 
condition in the Saudi law of derivative actions might be necessary for several reasons. 
First, if every individual shareholder were entitled to sue derivatively without any standing 
requirements (e.g., a shareholding threshold) stated in the legislation, there would be a very 
large number of shareholders who could be potential plaintiffs initiating derivative claims, 
some of which may not serve the interests of the company. Indeed, the shareholding 
threshold is needed, especially given that neither the current Saudi law nor the proposed 
reform1764 include the UK model of judicial procedure for permission to sue derivatively. 
The threshold requirement might also be necessary as a means of controlling the flow of 
derivative actions in the absence of the ‘loser pays costs rule’ in Saudi law.1765 
Furthermore, reducing the threshold to 1% or even lower1766 would reduce the negative 
effect of a minimum ownership requirement on the effectiveness of derivative actions, as 
an important mechanism of corporate governance. Finally, the law should expressly allow 
shareholders to aggregate their shares to meet the minimum shareholding requirement. 
 
6.5.2.4 The requirement to provide the company with notice   
 
The need to notify the company of their intention to sue directors on its behalf is one of 
conditions placed upon shareholders under article 80 of the CL 2015.1767 However, as 
explained in Chapter 5 of this thesis, the CL 2015 remains silent on the nature of such 
notification, whether the company should respond to the shareholder’s statement and the 
legal implications of the company’s response.1768 The question that would be posed here 
concerns whether there is a need to retain such a requirement in Saudi law. 
 
In the researcher’s opinion, the law should retain the notice condition for the bringing of 
derivative actions, but with more clarification. It should be made clear from the outset that 
                                                        
1763 Hirt (n 1759) 252. 
1764 See section (6.5.2.2), Chapter 6 in this thesis. 
1765 See footnote 1724 in this Chapter. 
1766 Such reductions have occurred in some European countries such as Germany and Italy. Regarding the 
former, the German law traditionally used to require a qualified minority of 10% and reduced the threshold in 
2005 to 1% or Euro 100,000. It is worth mentioning that the German law also requires the court’s approval, 
see Gelter (n 1477) 858–860.   
1767 In the UK CA 2006 the statutory derivative claim does not demand a shareholder applicant to provide the 
company with such a notice.  
1768 See section (5.6.2), Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
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the notice should take the form of a procedural rule of derivative actions.1769 The rationale 
for the demand requirement is to give the company the opportunity to determine whether to 
litigate against directors, since the shareholders’ right to litigation is originally derived 
from the right of the company. This requirement would control the flow of undesirable 
litigation to the court,1770 prevent the ‘multiplicity of proceedings’ and encourage plainer 
communication between the company and its shareholders.1771 Indeed, it is undoubtedly 
unwise to allow every case to reach courts and the demand requirement may resolve 
disputes before they reach the courts.1772  
 
As in some other jurisdictions, companies should be required to respond within a specific 
period following receipt of the shareholders’ demand.1773 The question that arises is 
whether a shareholder should be allowed to sue derivatively if the demand has been 
refused or the company fails to act within the specific period.1774 It seems that the 
company’s refusal to sue should not prevent a shareholder from bringing derivative 
actions. This is because the independence of the company’s decision can be questionable, 
especially in the presence of the possible influence of the wrongdoer over the company’s 
affairs;1775 for example, if the board of directors was the body responsible for responding to 
the shareholders’ demand, the board may face the problem of a conflict of interests 
regarding the litigation decision.1776 Even if the audit committee, which is formed 
separately from the board, responded, the independence of such a committee would also be 
the subject of concern. This is because the committee’s members1777 will usually be 
nominated by the board and perhaps be appointed by interested persons at the general 
meeting.1778 Indeed, if shareholders were deprived of their right to bring their action due to 
the refusal of their demand to sue, it could be asserted that the role of the derivative action 
as a mechanism of accountability would largely be diminished and its effectiveness to 
deter directors would be significantly undermined.  
 
                                                        
1769 The demand requirement has been adopted by other jurisdictions such as Germany, as a prerequisite to 
the initiation of derivative litigation, see Gelter (n 1477) 860.  
1770 S Jobran (n 632) 388. 
1771 G Zouridakis, ‘Introducing Derivative Actions to the Greek Law on Public Limited Companies: Issues of 
Legal Standing and Lessons from the German and UK Experience’ (2015) 26 International Company and 
Commercial Law Review 271, 282. 
1772 Jobran (n 632) 389. 
1773 Gelter (n 1477). 
1774 This question is closely related to section 263(3)(e) of the CA 2006 regarding the consideration of the 
company’s decision. 
1775 The wrongdoer’s control is a common problem in companies with concentrated ownership structure; see 
footnotes 1226–1230 and accompanying text, Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
1776 For more details, see footnotes 1220–1224 and accompanying text, Chapter 5 in this thesis.  
1777 A board member other than an executive director could be a member of the audit committee. 
1778 Article 101 of the CL 2015. 
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Thus, based upon the discussion above, the notice (demand) requirement should be 
mandatory, but the company’s refusal to sue should not be accepted as a bar to the bringing 
of derivative actions. Nevertheless, if the derivative litigation was initiated after being 
refused earlier by the company, the court should be informed of the grounds for refusal, 
and take them into consideration.  
 
6.5.2.5 Should authorisation, ratification and the availability of alternative remedies 
bar derivative litigation? 
 
In the UK the court is required to refuse the application for permission to bring an action if 
the act complained of has been authorised by the company;1779 in other words, if a director 
had exploited an opportunity or had engaged in a self-dealing transaction after obtaining 
the required approval, a shareholder applicant cannot bring a derivative action in relation to 
an authorised exploitation or self-dealing. This is a logical bar to initiating derivative 
litigation, which is no doubt expected to be a part of the Saudi law. Under an authorised act 
by a director, there is no breach of duties and, consequently, there should be no legal basis 
for a derivative lawsuit.	 
 
The ratification of wrongdoing has been regarded as one of the main legal problems within 
the current UK derivative action system. It seems accurate to suggest that many derivative 
actions could be dismissed because of the ratification of wrongdoing. As pointed out 
earlier, not only can the fact that the wrongdoing has been ratified be grounds for the 
denial of a derivative action, but also the likelihood of ratification could prevent a 
shareholder from bringing a derivative claim.1780 As a result, reform proposals invariably 
suggest the exclusion of any reference to ratification from the UK derivative action 
scheme.1781 With all this in mind, it seems that the Saudi law should be keener than the UK 
law to avoid reference to ratification as far as the derivative action scheme is concerned. In 
jurisdictions such as Saudi Arabia where share ownership tends to be more concentrated 
than in the UK1782 the wrongdoer’s control over the general meeting is more likely to occur 
and the inclusion of ratification in the law may significantly undermine an important 
mechanism of accountability. If the Saudi law adopted ratification as a bar to derivative 
litigation, this could result in a serious problem concerning what constitutes a valid 
                                                        
1779 See section 263(2)(b) and (c) of the CA 2006.  
1780 See footnotes 1410–1411 and accompanying text, Chapter 5 in this thesis.  
1781 See Keay (n 1325) 53. 
1782 The patterns of corporate ownership in the UK and Saudi Arabia was considered in sections (2.5.1) and 
(2.5.2) respectively, Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
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ratification.1783 Given the problems and uncertainties associated with the concept of 
ratification, it would seem inappropriate for Saudi law to provide ratification as a means of 
preventing shareholders from suing wrongdoing directors derivatively.  
  
Regarding the availability of alternative remedies, in some situations directors’ conduct 
may amount to a breach of their duty towards the company and, simultaneously, to a 
violation of shareholders’ personal rights. In this regard, the Saudi law, similar to the UK 
law,1784 should not regard the availability of alternative remedies, such the shareholder’s 
personal action, as a condition that prevents the initiation of derivative litigation. Indeed, 
this should be the positon of Saudi law, as long as the nature of the purported wrongdoing 
and the relief pursued are suitable for a derivative action. 
 
6.5.2.6 The shareholder’s good faith: A proposed approach 
 
A derivative action is one that is brought by a shareholder to seek corporate relief because 
of a wrong done to the company. This means that derivative litigation is initiated for the 
purpose of benefiting the company. In the UK the claimant’s good faith is one of 
discretionary factors set out in the UK CA 2006 that the court needs to consider when 
reaching its decision to permit the continuation of derivative actions.1785 As stated in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis, as long as the company will benefit from the bringing of a 
derivative action, the applicant will be regarded as acting in good faith and the court is 
likely to disregard other minor associated benefits that he/she will gain from the action.1786 
For Saudi Arabia, since there is no cases on this subject. The question here is how the 
Saudi court should address the allegations of a lack of good faith on the part of shareholder 
plaintiffs.  
 
In the hearings of derivative action cases, a lack of good faith on the part of a plaintiff 
shareholder could be one of the defences that defendant directors might raise. It should 
always be born in mind that it depends on the particular circumstances and facts of the 
relevant case in order to determine whether or not good faith is present. In the context of 
derivative actions, the motive and intention of the shareholder in bringing the derivative 
                                                        
1783 The UK law on ratification is a clear example of the complexity of what constitutes an effective 
ratification, see section (5.5.2.2.2), Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
1784 See section (5.5.2.2.4), Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
1785 Section 263(3)(a) of the CA 2006. 
1786 See section (5.5.2.2.3), Chapter 5 in this thesis.  
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action is the subject of an inquiry in relation to the good faith issue.1787 In the UK ulterior 
motives and collateral purposes are clearly relevant in considering the good faith test under 
section 263(3)(a) of the CA 2006.1788 For Saudi courts, there are two possible scenarios: 
First, good faith can only be established in situations where there is no ulterior motive.1789 
In this case derivative actions ‘would be few and far between’.1790 The second scenario is to 
overlook the presence of collateral purpose and focus on the main purpose of the claim; in 
other words, as long as the claim brought by shareholders benefit the company, the 
allegations concerning the shareholders’ good faith should be rejected even if there are 
other collateral benefits, which the shareholders will gain as a result of the claim.1791 The 
main rationale for the adoption of such an approach is not to allow a defendant director to 
evade the liability for the wrong done to the company. Indeed, if the lack of good faith in 
the context of a derivative action is interpreted broadly, this might prevent the initiation of 
legitimate litigation. It is also worth noting that it is the defendant director who bears the 
burden of proving the shareholders’ lack of good faith.1792 In order to deter speculative 
allegations and to avoid hearings being dominated by questions of the shareholders’ good 
faith, it is recommended that the allegations be based upon strong and persuasive evidence 
that is clearly relevant to the issue of good faith.1793  
 
6.5.2.7 A proposed reform by way of legal transplantation 
 
In addressing the question of how Saudi law can benefit from the UK law in designing 
requirements and conditions for a shareholder to bring a derivative action, it seems that 
significant reform by way of legal transplantation is feasible. Consequently, amendments 
to the CL 2015, particularly article 80, should be made in order to regulate the initiation of 
derivative actions as follows:    
 
§ The right to initiate a derivative action should only be exercised to remedy the 
company for a wrong done to the company.  
                                                        
1787 For the meaning of good faith, see footnotes 938–943 and accompanying text, Chapter 4 in this thesis.  
1788 See, for example, Singh v Singh (n 1374) [22]; Hook v Sumner (n 1427) 235. For further details, see J 
Tang, ‘Shareholder Remedies: Demise of the Derivative Claim?’ (2012) 1 UCL Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudenc 178, 192–193. 
1789 Tang (n 1788) 193. 
1790 Ibid.  
1791 It should be acknowledged that the distinction between prime motive and collateral motive is a complex 
one; see ibid 196. 
1792 This is according to the well-established Sharia rule of ‘onus of proof lies with the plaintiff’, see 
N Hamad, ‘Transfer of Burden of Proof in T’adi Cases in Mudarabah and Agency to Trustees’ (2010) 
1 Journal of Judiciary 22, 28.  
1793 The same proposal is made in the UK company law literature, see Keay and Loughrey (n 1335) 169; J 




§ A derivative action should only be brought by a qualified shareholder (one owns a 
minimum of 1% of the company’s equity). The aggregation of shares to meet the 
minimum shareholding requirement shall be allowed.  	
§ The qualified shareholder should notify the company of his/her intention to sue 
directors derivatively and the company should respond within a specified period. 
The company’s refusal to sue should not bar derivative litigation, but the court 
should be informed of the reasons for its refusal and take these reasons into 
consideration. 	
§ An authorisation of the act complained of shall be considered as a bar to a 
derivative action. 	
§  A ratification of the wrongdoing shall not be regarded as a bar to suing directors 
derivatively. 	
§ The availability of an alternative remedy shall not disbar the initiation of a 
derivative action as long as the nature of the wrongdoing purported and the relief 
pursued are suitable for a derivative action. 	
§ The potential of other collateral benefits that may be gained by a shareholder 
plaintiff is irrelevant in determining the validity of allegations concerning the 
shareholder’s good faith, as long as the claim brought by the shareholder will 
benefit the company and there is no strong and persuasive evidence to support the 
allegations regarding the lack of good faith. 
 
6.5.3 Funding of derivative actions 
 
As stated in Chapter 5 of this thesis, shareholders’ decisions to initiate litigation is likely to 
be largely affected by the funding of the action and whether or not the law involves rules 
dealing with the issue.1794 This could be a serious issue and a major barrier to the bringing 
of derivative actions when the law is devoid of any mention of the issue of funding. Saudi 
company law is a case in point.1795 Before considering the extent to which the Saudi law 
can benefit from the UK law, it is important first to establish the theoretical basis of 
indemnification of the plaintiff shareholder in a derivative action. As long as the 
                                                        
1794 See footnotes 1478–1482 and accompanying text, Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
1795 See section (5.7.1), Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
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shareholder is entitled to initiate the litigation against the wrongdoing directors on behalf 
of the company, he/she should be indemnified by the company for all costs, since the 
company is the direct recipient of all benefits from such litigation.1796 This view is borne 
out by a well-established Sharia rule of al-ghurm bil al-ghunm (liability accompanies 
gain).1797 This general principle can suggests that the costs and losses that result from 
something shall be incurred by the person who benefits from them.1798 As far as the funding 
of derivative actions is concerned, it can be said that the incurrence of litigation costs by 
the company finds its theoretical legal basis in the Sharia principle of al-ghurm bil al-
ghunm. 
 
As regards how to reform Saudi law in terms of funding derivative actions, the discussion 
of the UK funding rule1799 has shown that the granting of indemnity costs lies within the 
discretionary power of the court, and it is generally unclear under what circumstances the 
orders will be granted. The broad discretion given to the court is illustrated by the fact that 
the granting of indemnity costs is not an inevitable result of a successful application for the 
continuation of a derivative action. Further, the UK case law seems unresolved in relation 
to whether or not the financial position of the claimant is relevant to the court’s discretion. 
On the one hand, the court in Smith v Croft went with the view that if the plaintiff has 
enough money to incur the costs of litigation, there is no need to grant an indemnification 
order so as not to put financial strain on the company.1800 On the other hand, the court, in 
Jaybird v Greenwood, disagreed with the argument, saying that the court should take the 
financial position of the derivative claimant into account.1801 As one commentator believes, 
if the financial capability of the claimant has a role to play in the court’s discretion, this 
will discourage even wealthy claimants from bringing a derivative action due to the fact 
that the financial benefits of the action, if successful, go directly to the company and the 
claimant’s benefit might be ‘minimal’.1802 
 
Therefore, for Saudi law, the uncertainty associated with the UK courts’ approach to the 
granting of indemnification orders may prevent the feasibility of transferring the UK 
                                                        
1796 See Jobran (n 632) 390. 
1797 Ibid.  
1798 See W Waemustafa and S Suriani, ‘Theory of Gharar and Its Interpretation of Risk and Uncertainty from 
the Perspectives of Authentic Hadith and the Holy Quran: A Qualitative Analysis’ (MPRA Paper No. 78316, 
July 2015) 5 <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/78316/1/MPRA_paper_78316.pdf> accessed 
26 August 2017.  
1799 See footnotes 1493–1497 and accompanying text, Chapter 5 in this thesis.  
1800 Smith v Croft (1986) 1 WLR 580 , 597. 
1801 Jaybird Group Ltd v Greenwood (1986) BCLC 319 , 327 
1802 D D Prentice, ‘Wallersteiner v Moir: A Decade Later’ (1987) Conv 167. 
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funding rule into the Saudi jurisdiction. Put differently, if the UK approach were to be 
adopted, it is essential to clarify the boundaries of the court’s discretion in granting the 
order of indemnity costs. In this regard, it should be mandatory for the company to pay the 
costs of the derivative litigation following the fulfilment of the conditions for the bringing 
of the derivative action.1803 The Saudi court must ensure that the claim is based upon the 
subject of the derivative litigation, the relief sought is for the company, the standing 
requirement for the plaintiff is satisfied, the demand (notice) requirement to the company 
was made before the lawsuit was filed, the act complained of was not authorised, and any 
allegations about the lack of good faith have been disapproved. Indeed, as long as the 
conditions for filling derivative lawsuits are satisfied, the court should show no reluctance 
in requiring that the company pay the costs of litigation. 
 
With the mandatory requirement of the company incurring the costs of litigation, the 
uncertainty associated with the discretionary power of the court to grant indemnity costs 
orders would be substantially reduced and this would provide ‘a shareholder with more 
certainty and confidence’.1804 In the researcher’s view, this approach could succeed in 
encouraging shareholders to commence derivative litigation given the absence of other 
financial disincentives. In Saudi Arabia, the shareholder is unlikely to be at risk of paying 
the legal expenses of the defendant if the action is unsuccessful; in other words, the ‘loser 
pays costs rule’, which is regarded by many as being an impediment to the bringing of 
derivative actions,1805 is not present in Saudi law.1806 Furthermore, there is no requirement 
to pay the court to commence litigation; an element of litigation costs that might 
discourage derivative claims, especially where the court fees are high.1807 Having said that, 
the payment of lawyers’ costs and perhaps the cost of expert evidence, if needed,1808 are 
usually the elements that would make a shareholder think before initiating derivative 
litigation. With the mandatory requirement for the company to indemnify a shareholder for 
costs incurred, this would give the shareholder more confidence and incentives to bring 
derivative litigation.  
 
 
                                                        
1803 This is one of the options considered by Reisberg for dealing with the economic impediment to derivative 
actions, see Reisberg (1478) 371–372. 
1804 Ibid 372. 
1805 See, for example, ibid 348–349 (stating that ‘the American treatment of fees in such actions provides 
significantly lower disincentives to prospective plaintiffs than does the English rule’); Keay (n 1325) 55. 
1806 See footnote 1724, Chapter 6 in this thesis. 
1807 Gelter (n 1477) 869. 
1808 See particularly articles 128 and 129 of the SPL 2013 regarding the expert evidence. 
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6.5.3.1 A proposed reform by way of legal transplantation  
  
When considering the possibility of transferring the UK approach to the funding of 
derivative actions to the Saudi law, the research submits that since the CL 2015 lacks a 
provision dealing with this issue, a new statutory article must be inserted into the CL 2015 
and regulates this issue as follows: 
 
§ It is the court that is entitled to grant the indemnification orders requiring the 
company to incur the costs of the derivative litigation 	
§ It is mandatory for the court to grant the indemnification orders as long as the court 
is convinced that the proposed conditions for filing the derivative lawsuit are 
satisfied. 	
§ The court must ensure that the claim is based upon the subject of the derivative 
litigation, that the relief sought is for the benefit of the company, that the standing 
requirement for the plaintiff is satisfied that the demand (notice) requirement to the 
company was made before the lawsuit was filed, that the act complained of was not 
authorised, and that any allegations concerning the lack of good faith have been 
disapproved. 
 
6.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
This Chapter has revealed that the reform of the Saudi law of directors’ duties by way of 
legal transplantation from the UK is necessary and, to a large extent, feasible as long as the 
imported rules and legal ideas have been adapted to fit properly within the Saudi legal 
context. Given the institutional structure and legal environment of Saudi Arabia, this 
chapter has examined which legal ideas can be transferred from the UK and designed a 
reform agenda for the law of directors’ duties in the light of the need to enhance the 
accountability of directors without damaging the significant value of authority. Table 6.1 
below is a summary of the proposed transplantation together with an indication of any 
current relevant provision in Saudi law. In some situations, there is no relevant Saudi law 




With regard to the reform of directors’ duties, the chapter has ensured that the proposed 
foreign legal standards and rules for directors’ duty of care and of loyalty1809fall within the 
Sharia framework, are formulated where possible with legislative detail to ensure the 
effective enforcement by Saudi courts, and provide greater legal protection for 
shareholders including the minority; for example, while the transplantation of standards 
and tests for the duty of care and for the duty to act in good faith in the general interest of 
the company can be done, the UK model for the approval of self-dealing transactions and 
the judicial relief of liability are not recommended for transplantation into Saudi company 
law. In relation to corporate opportunity, the analysis carried out in this chapter has 
suggested that the UK’s strict no-conflict approach to corporate opportunity is the most 
appropriate choice for Saudi law as directors would be liable for the breach in cases of 
unauthorised exploitation of any profit-making opportunity during the course of their 
tenure. 
 
Table 6. 2: A summary of proposed provisions for reforming the relevant legal issues in 
Saudi law by way of legal transplantation 
Legal issues Relevant Saudi law Proposed transplantations 
The duty of care § No express provision in 
the CL 2015 
§ Article 30 (17) of the 
CGRs 2017 
A new article to be inserted in 
the CL 2015 based upon section 
174 of the UK CA 2006 with 
adaptations 
The duty to act in good faith in 
the general interests of the 
company 
§ No express provision in 
the CL 2015 
§ Article 30 (17) of the 
CGRs 2017 
A new article to be inserted in 
the CL 2015 based upon section 
172 (1) of the UK CA 2006 with 
adaptations 
The avoidance of conflicts of 
interests in the context of 
corporate opportunities 
§ No express provision in 
the CL 2015 
§ Article 44 (b)(2) of the 
CGRs 2017 
A new article to be inserted in 
the CL 2015 based upon section 
175 of the UK CA 2006 with 
adaptations 
A Rule on preventing family 
members of directors from 
voting on self-dealing 
transactions at the general 
meeting 
No express provision A new article to be inserted in 
the CGRs 2017 based upon the 
UK LR 11.1.8, while retaining 
the definition of ‘relatives’ set 
forth in article 1 of the CGRs 
2017  
Requirements for the initiation 
of derivative actions 
Article 80 of the CL 2015 Amendments to article 80 based 
upon sections 260 (1) and 263 of 
the UK CA 2006 with 
adaptations 
Funding of derivative actions No express provision A new article to be inserted in 
the CL 2015 based upon the 
Rule 44.2 (a) of the UK Civil 
Procedures Rules with 
adaptations 
                                                        
1809 It refers to the following sub-duties: the duty to act in good faith in the general interests of the company, 




In terms of the reform of derivative actions, It has been argued that the design of an 
effective derivative action system is supported by the possible willingness of non-
controlling shareholders to resort to such mechanisms of enforcement, as well as the fact 
that concerns about the capability of Saudi judiciary to deal with such actions is largely 
unfounded. With a view to striking the right balance between the enhancement of 
accountability and the deference of the director’s authority, this chapter has examined 
which conditions should be adopted from the UK statutory derivative action system. It has 
been recommended that derivative actions should be brought by qualified shareholders to 
remedy the company for a wrong done to the company (e.g., a breach of directors’ duties 
of loyalty and care) following the submission of a demand requirement to sue wrongdoing 
directors, and the authorisation of the act complained of should be regarded as a bar to 
derivative litigation. The transplantation of the court’s permission requirement into the 
Saudi legal environment is not feasible. The ratification of wrongdoing and the availability 
of an alternative remedy should also not deprive shareholders from initiating derivative 
litigation. To make derivative actions work effectively in Saudi Arabia, a redeveloped form 
of the UK indemnity costs orders has been recommended to deal with the issue of the 




The primary objective of this research was to propose a reform of Saudi law of directors’ 
duties and of derivative actions in order to offer greater legal protection for the company 
and its shareholders (including minority shareholders) against abusive practices by 
directors. The proposed reform, in the researcher’s opinion, would contribute to the 
promotion of good corporate governance and, more generally, the development of the 
commercial environment in Saudi Arabia. This study, which sought to benefit from the 
experience of well-developed law such as that in the UK, designed a novel framework that 
involved clearer, well-defined duties of care and loyalty, reinforced by a more accessible 
derivative action, compared with the current Saudi law. With the proposal that remedies 
the problems of uncertainty and deficiency identified throughout the analysis of Saudi law, 
this study intended to ensure that directors were subject to a sufficient level of 
accountability and control in which the law retained a pivotal role in creating incentives for 
directors to act diligently and loyally by imposing liability on those who failed to do so.  
 
This research put forward the argument that legal uncertainty and deficiency in the current 
Saudi law on the duty of care, the duties of loyalty,1810 and the derivative action, were the 
main reasons that prompted the researcher to propose the reform by way of legal 
transplantation. The argument for such reform is further supported by demonstrating the 
inadequacy of other monitoring and discipline mechanisms that operate within the Saudi 
corporate governance system. While examining the feasibility of transferring selective 
legal models and rules from the UK law to its Saudi counterpart, the research took into 
account the appropriateness of imported rules in the Saudi context; a consideration that 
involves making some adaptations to the foreign rules, if necessary, to fit properly within 
the new legal and institutional environment. This is a vital prerequisite for proper 




In order to achieve the aims of this study, the researcher structured the study to necessarily 
begin with a general overview of the Saudi legal system in which joint stock companies 
operate (Chapter 1). The purpose of this introductory chapter was to bring out the primary 
features of the Saudi legal system and provide an accurate understanding of Saudi law that 
                                                        
1810 For the purpose of this thesis, two main forms of duties of loyalty have been discussed, namely (i) the 
duty to act in good faith in the company’s general interests and (ii) the duty to avoid conflict of interests with 
particular focus on the corporate opportunities and self-dealing transactions.   
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would be discussed in the rest of the study. The unique nature of the Saudi legal system 
involving rules of Islamic origin and rules of foreign origin was highlighted. It was 
necessary to point out that the drafting of legislation, which may involve the importation of 
rules of non-Islamic origin, was only legitimate when it produced laws that did not conflict 
with Sharia, which enjoys primacy over the general legal context. It was equally important 
to emphasise the flexible nature of Sharia from two aspects. First, Sharia, in some areas of 
law such as corporate matters, tends to provide general guidelines rather than detailed 
rules, leaving room for the society concerned to develop detailed rules according to its 
social and economic needs. Second, the principle that ‘all things not specifically prohibited 
are allowed’1811 in Sharia is an important basis that clears the way for introducing new legal 
ideas that were not previously recognised in Sharia as long as they do not conflict with the 
general principles of Quran and the Sunnah. The overview also involved a description of 
the current legal framework for corporate governance that is the main legislation and 
public enforcers (i.e., judicial institutions and regulators). Importantly, the chapter 
referenced aspects of the Saudi judicial system that are relevant to the discussion in the 
chapters that follow. It was stressed that there is no system of binding judicial precedent in 
Saudi Arabia. Saudi judges also tend to apply, not make, the law, adhering to the formal 
application of written rules without deviation. 
 
In Chapter 2 the discussion narrowly focused on the assessment of the main problems 
prevailing in the current accountability framework for directors in Saudi Arabia with the 
purpose of defining where directors’ duties and the enforcement by public enforcers 
(e.g.,  courts) sit within the entire framework. The main theme of this chapter was to 
explain why there was a need for legal reform of directors’ duties and private enforcement 
through derivative actions as mechanisms to ensure directors’ accountability for misuse of 
their powers. This area of law, as highlighted, suffers from legal uncertainty and deficiency 
caused either by the absence of legislative recognition or unclear legislative statement in 
addition to the inactive role of courts in filling in the legislative vacuum. This, by 
implication, undermines the effectiveness of the legal liability system as an essential mode 
of accountability. It is also believed that the legal liability regime has been well recognised 
as a last resort when other mechanisms and market forces fall short in ensuring the board 
accountability. Accordingly, a significant part of this chapter was devoted to arguing that 
the need to remedy deficiencies found in the law of directors’ duties and derivative actions 
                                                        
1811 See Hanson (n 52) 289. 
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was further supported by the limits and drawbacks associated with other mechanisms of 
monitoring and accountability in the Saudi context.  
 
In this regard, the chapter assessed four mechanisms of accountability, namely 
(i)  monitoring by blockholders, (ii) shareholders’ internal mechanisms at the general 
meeting, (iii) the role of independent non-executive directors and (iv) the markets. The 
study argued that although the concentrated ownership structure prevails in most 
companies listed in on Tadawul, this does not underestimate the importance of sound 
company law in ensuring the accountability of directors towards shareholders or even 
towards non-controlling shareholders in the case where directors are under the control of 
blockholders. The study further claimed that blockholders’ incentives to monitor in the 
Saudi context may be affected by a relatively small block of shares,1812 the presence of 
multiple blockholders or the identity of blockholders, as illustrated by the state as a 
blockholder. Similarly, internal mechanisms of accountability that are available to 
shareholders at the general meeting (e.g., removal of directors) and the independent 
director institution operate within limits and so this cannot mask the need for an effective 
system of legal liability. This was also the case in relation to the markets, which tend to be 
immature in the Saudi context, in addition to some significant flaws associated with such a 
mechanism.  
 
The argument of legal uncertainty and deficiency was developed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 by 
using the UK law as a benchmark for the evaluation of the Saudi law of directors’ duties 
and private enforcement by derivative action. In Chapter 3 the study examined the extent 
of clarity and strength in the current Saudi law governing directors’ duty of care. The 
comparative analysis found that this area of law was more certain and settled in the UK 
compared with Saudi Arabia, especially following the UK codification of the duty in the 
CA 2006. In Saudi Arabia the lack of detailed legislative statement on this duty, coupled 
with the almost absent role of the courts in filling the legislative vacuum, creates aspects of 
uncertainty regarding the substantive content of such duty. As regards the standard of 
liability, the UK law follows the objective/subjective standard, whereas the Saudi law 
tends to adopt the purely objective standard. In Saudi Arabia the standard by which 
directors’ actions are reviewed is not clear: Is it ordinary negligence or gross negligence? 
The core problem exists in the absence of a clear line between what constitutes gross 
negligence and what is considered ordinary negligence. There is also uncertainty about 
                                                        
1812 See Table 2.1, Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
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whether the court will consider directors’ experience and skill while assessing their 
compliance with their duty. Failure to do so means that the law does not create incentives 
for highly skilled directors to act in a way that is expected from a reasonable person with 
his or her equivalent experience and skill. In the absence of legislative and judicial 
guidance, it also remains unclear whether the Saudi court recognises that the extent of the 
obligation of care varies, depending upon the role and function assigned to the directors 
concerned. Furthermore, the study found that unlike the CL 2015, the new CGRs 2017, to 
some extent, have established the directors’ need to monitor, to keep themselves informed, 
and not rely completely on the conduct of others (e.g., directors). This chapter ended by 
investigating the effects of a single high standard of care, and how the UK and Saudi laws 
respond to such an issue. Importantly, the analysis showed that the UK law, unlike Saudi 
law, introduces a mechanism (i.e., judicial relief of liability) to address directors’ concern 
about a single high standard of care. Nevertheless, the study questioned the UK judicial 
approach to relief of liability in terms of legal certainty; a consideration that was taken into 
account while examining the feasibility of Saudi reform by legal transplantation.   
 
In Chapter 4 the comparative analysis focused on the duties of loyalty, particularly the 
obligation to act in good faith in the company’s interests, and the obligation to avoid 
conflicts of interest, with particular focus on their application in the area of corporate 
opportunities and self-dealing transactions. This chapter revealed a number of findings of 
which the following are the most central: First, unlike the UK, it appears that the 
components of the loyalty obligation (i.e., the duty to act in good faith and in the interest of 
the company) are not understood as a single obligation. This means that there is no duty to 
act in the company’s interests, to which the good faith requirement is tied. As a result, the 
duty of loyalty is left with an inappropriate standard of liability, which at least permits the 
court to engage in an objective consideration of whether directors, in fact, acted in the 
general interests of the company. Second, when it comes to the question of in whose 
interests the company is to be managed, the Saudi law, unlike in the UK, does not provide 
clear rules governing the priority of competing interests. With reference to the elusive 
concept of ‘the interests of the company’, directors have been given wide discretion to 
determine what the interests of the company are and this weakens the shareholders’ 
monitoring capability. Third, regarding the duty to avoid the exploitation of corporate 
opportunities, the study argued that in comparison with the UK law, this area of directors’ 
duties is poorly developed in the Saudi jurisdiction. Under such conditions, the law, as has 
been submitted, does not sufficiently ensure directors’ accountability for misconduct, 
leaving the company and its shareholders unprotected. Even with the new regulation of 
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corporate opportunities under the CGRs 2017, questions were raised about whether the 
new regulation represented sound law in terms of legal certainty and the striking of the 
right balance between discretion and control. Fourth, concerning directors’ engagement in 
self-dealing transactions, the research found that the recent reform introduced by the CL 
2015 and the new CGRs 2017 has developed the law to a model that approximates to the 
UK CA 2006. However, the comparative analysis revealed that the Saudi law places more 
constraints on directors’ engagement in self-dealing transactions than the UK law by 
placing directors under a mandatory requirement to disclose their conflicting interest to the 
board and seek shareholders’ prior approval. In the Saudi context, the research raised 
concern about the effectiveness of approval by shareholders in the absence of an express 
rule in the CL 2015 on the exclusion of interested shareholders other than board members 
from participating in the voting process. 
 
Following the discussion of directors’ duties of care and loyalty, the research evaluated the 
accessibility of Saudi law of private formal enforcement (Chapter 5). The chapter began 
with an assessment of the role of public enforcement of breaches of directors’ duties, 
especially following the recent reform brought about by the CL 2015 and the CGRs 2017. 
The study argued that the role of public enforcement by regulators tended to suffer from 
significant limits that underlie the important role of private enforcement, including an 
accessible derivative action regime within the overall system of enforcement. Regarding 
the private enforcement action, it is believed, as a matter of policy, that the law should not 
exclusively rely on the board or the general meeting to bring the legal action. The law, 
which does not provide an alternative judicial remedy that enables a shareholder to enforce 
the company’s rights, does not ensure sufficient accountability of directors. It further 
undermines the efficacy of directors’ duties. In the Saudi context, throughout the analysis, 
the main problem was that if the company was incapable of pursuing the legal action 
because of, inter alia, the wrongdoer’s control of the general meeting, the law did not 
formulate an effective mechanism of enforcement in the form of derivative actions, which 
promoted the legal protection of the company and its shareholders especially minority 
shareholders. Although the comparative analysis suggested that he UK law was more 
certain and accessible than its Saudi counterpart, significant problems and uncertainties 
were discussed and highlighted in relation to the UK derivative action regime and rules 
governing the funding of derivative actions. The study highlighted the fact that the UK 
court had wide discretion to control the derivative claim, determine whether or not the 
claim should be allowed, and grant indemnity cost orders. It was necessary to establish this 
in order for it to be taken into account when examining the feasibility of reforming the 
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Saudi law of derivative actions by way of legal transplantation. This is because the wider 
the discretion given to the court, the more uncertain the law is, especially in jurisdictions 
where the court may not have the necessary capability to develop the law without detailed 
legislative guidance. 
 
The study ended, in Chapter 6, with a consideration of the extent to which the Saudi law 
could benefit from the experience of the UK in order to reform the law of directors’ duties 
and derivative actions in Saudi Arabia. To be specific, the extent to which the reform of 
Saudi law by way of legal transplantation was feasible was examined. The research 
approach to this enquiry was that the feasibility of legal transplantation depended on 
whether the imported rules and legal ideas had been adapted to fit properly within the 
Saudi institutional and legal context. The study principally took into account the following 
factors while examining which legal ideas could be transferable: the lack of conflict 
between Sharia and a proposed model; the Saudi court tradition along with the limited 
capability of its judges to deal with broadly open-ended principles; the need to enhance 
legal certainty at the expense of flexibility; the possibility that a director was under the 
control of a blockholder and therefore there was a need to protect non-controlling 
shareholders; the centrality of sound company law in the presence of the limited role of the 
markets as a mechanism of accountability in Saudi Arabia; and concerns over the 
independence of disinterested directors in the Saudi context. The design of a reform agenda 
was guided by the need to enhance the directors’ accountability, but without damaging the 
significant value of their authority. 
 
With all this in mind, the examination of the feasibility of transplanting selective UK rules 
and models into Saudi law concluded with the following recommendations and suggestions 
in relation to the legislation reform:  
 
A.1 Recommendations concerning the duties of care and loyalty  
 
As regards the duty of care, the study recommends that a new statutory provision should be 
included in the CL 2015, codifying it in a way that reflects the adoption of dual 
objective/subjective standards for the duty of care. Within the design of the objective 
standard, there should be express mention of the need for the court to consider various 
roles and functions assigned to the directors concerned. The company statute should 
involve a (non-exhaustive) set of statutory factors that will be taken into account for the 
assessment of directors’ compliance; this shall include the need to consider the extent of 
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directors’ care in monitoring, keeping themselves informed and relying on others. The 
study does not recommend the adoption of the UK model for the judicial relief of liability. 
 
Regarding the affirmative duty to act in good faith in the company’s general interests, a 
new statutory provision should be included in the CL 2015 that requires directors to act in 
a way that they honestly believe is in the interests of shareholders as a whole. The standard 
for the duty should be the directors’ honest belief, which would be judged according to 
subjective/objective considerations. It is recommended that the reference to the interests of 
the company should be abandoned in favour of more specific objective, that is, the interest 
of shareholders as a whole. Directors should predominantly manage companies for the 
benefit of the shareholder constituency who should have priority for due consideration over 
non-shareholders. The present research does not support the express reference to the due 
consideration of the non-shareholder constituency within the statutory formulation of the 
duty. 
 
In terms of the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, the research recommends the 
introduction of a new statutory provision in the CL 2015, codifying the duty in the area of 
exploitation of a corporate opportunity in a way that reflects the adoption of the strict no-
conflict approach. It should be additionally stated that the circumstances surrounding the 
conflict situation be regarded as irrelevant to the inquiry concerning compliance with the 
duty to avoid conflict of interests.1813 The company’s interests should be understood as 
referring to any profit-making opportunity for the purpose of corporate opportunities. 
There should be an authorisation process in the form of a mandatory pre-approval by the 
general meeting, allowing a director to exploit an opportunity following the receipt of 
shareholders’ consent. There should also be a statutory rule entitling the company to 
disgorgement of unauthorised profits. 
 
With regard to the issue of self-dealing transactions, the study does not recommend the 
adoption of the UK model for authorising self-dealing transactions. For listed companies, 
there should be a new provision included in the CGRs 2017 that prevents interested 
shareholders (persons connected to interested directors who are not members of the board) 
from voting on self-dealing transactions at general meetings. The study is not in favour of 
adopting the UK definition of family relationship in the context of self-dealing transactions 
                                                        
1813 See the accompanying text to footnote 1671, Chapter 6 in this thesis.    
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and prefers retaining the current Saudi definition of family members, as a described by the 
CGRs 2017. 
 
A.2 Recommendations concerning the regime of derivative actions 
 
It is submitted that the recommended conditions for a shareholder to bring a derivative 
action should be part of proposed amendments to article 80 of the CL 2015. The study 
suggests that the initiation of derivative litigation should only be permitted to remedy the 
company for a wrong done to the company. It does not recommend the adoption of the UK 
model which requires the plaintiff to obtain the court’s permission to continue the action. 
As a requirement for bringing the action, it should be brought by qualified shareholders 
(who own a minimum of 1% of the company’s equity) and who are allowed to aggregate 
their shares to meet the minimum shareholding requirement. Qualified shareholders should 
notify the company of their intention to sue directors derivatively and the latter should 
respond within a specific period. The company’s refusal to sue should not bar the 
derivative litigation, but the court should be informed of the reasons for its refusal to take 
them into consideration.  
 
The research proposes that a derivative action should not be brought if the act complained 
of is authorised. By contrast, the ratification of wrongdoing should not be regarded as a bar 
to derivative litigation. This should also be the case in relation to the availability of an 
alternative remedy as long as the nature of the wrongdoing purported and the relief pursued 
are suitable for a derivative action. The court’s approach to allegations concerning the 
shareholder’s good faith should be more flexible in the sense that it should reject 
allegations concerning good faith as long as there is no persuasive and strong evidence to 
support such allegations and the claim brought by the shareholder will benefit the company 
irrespective of the presence of other collateral benefits to be gained by a shareholder 
plaintiff.  
 
Regarding the issue of the funding of derivative litigation, the study recommends the 
introduction of a new statutory provision in the CL 2015, requiring the court to order the 
company to pay the costs of litigation as long as the court is convinced that conditions for 
filling the derivative lawsuit are satisfied. In this regard, the Saudi court must ensure that 
the claim is based upon the subject of the derivative litigation; the relief sought is for the 
benefit of the company; the standing requirement for the plaintiff is satisfied; the demand 
(notice) requirement to the company was made before the lawsuit was filed; the act 
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complained of was not authorised; and any allegations about the lack of good faith have 
been disapproved.  
 
B. Contribution to Knowledge 
 
More generally, the research provides an assessment of current Saudi mechanisms of 
directors’ accountability and governance, emphasising the centrality of a sound legal 
liability regime that establishes well-designed duties of care and loyalty, reinforced by 
accessible derivative litigation, in relation to the reform of corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia. By conducting a comparative study with the UK law, the research has evaluated 
the current Saudi law of directors’ duties and private formal enforcement in depth, taking 
into consideration the recent development brought by the CL 2015 and the CGRs 2017. In 
comparison with the UK, the research shows that Saudi law suffers from serious areas of 
deficiency and uncertainty that undermine the effectiveness of directors’ duties and private 
formal enforcement, as mechanisms introduced to ensure that directors are subject to 
sufficient levels of accountability and control. Importantly, the research adopts the legal 
transplantation approach to improve the effectiveness of Saudi company law in the area of 
directors’ duties and private formal enforcement. To the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, it is the first study to examine the feasibility of reforming Saudi law by way of 
legal transplantation from the UK in the areas of directors’ duty of care; duty to act in good 
faith in the company’s general interests; the duty to avoid conflict of interests with 
particular focus on the corporate opportunities and self-dealing transactions; and derivative 
actions. Indeed, the research can be seen as an important contribution to the body of 
literature on the feasibility of legal transplants, as a method to reform corporate governance 
in Saudi Arabia.    
 
When examining the feasibility of legal transplantation in the Saudi context, some practical 
contributions can be highlighted. First, the proper reception of foreign rules requires the 
consideration of institutional structure and legal environment of the host country. As a 
result, the research has concluded that the transferability of some UK legal models is not 
feasible, while others can be transferred with adaptations to fit within the Saudi legal and 
institutional settings. Second, it is important to take the limited capability of public 
enforcers (e.g., courts) into consideration. Under such conditions, the law should contain, 
when possible, more detailed and practicable legal rules rather than ambiguous principles. 
Third, in jurisdictions such as Saudi Arabia where there is a limited role for the market in 
the promotion of good corporate governance, the law is expected to play a more central 
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role in filling in this gap and provide investors with sufficient legal protection against 
abusive practices by directors. 
 
Finally, this research submits recommendations that are intended to reform the Saudi 
company law system in a way that enhances the directors’ accountability in particular and 
the good corporate governance system in general. The findings of the study are relevant for 
various legal participants such as judges, lawyers and legislators. Since the proposed 
reform agenda can be introduced as a bill to amend the current law of directors’ duties and 
derivative actions, this comparative research may significantly contribute to legal 
development in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, by employing legal transplant as a strategy for 
reform, this research intended to develop a legal model that approximated the UK law but 
remained appropriate to Saudi characteristics. This would consequently contribute towards 
producing understandable Saudi law, especially for foreign investors and business people. 
 
C. Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
 
Corporate governance is a wide topic. In this research a specific area within the general 
framework of directors’ accountability and governance in Saudi Arabia was studied, 
namely the law of directors’ duties of care, and loyalty and private formal enforcement. 
The focus was on specific problems and an argument was put forward for the reform of the 
current position of Saudi law by way of legal transplantation from the UK law. This means 
that the study is not comprehensive in that it does not cover all elements in the framework 
of directors’ accountability and governance, but rather attempts to tackle certain 
deficiencies in specific forms of directors’ duties and in the derivative action system.   
 
Therefore, further research could be conducted to examine the effectiveness of other forms 
of directors’ duties (e.g., those owed towards the company or towards specific corporate 
constituencies) and possible solutions for reform. Similarly, while the derivative action is 
expected to be brought against directors in relation to breaches of duties owed to the 
company, an area of research may include the study of personal actions brought by a 
shareholder against directors and other shareholders, and the consideration of the 
feasibility of reform by way of legal transplantation. Within the derivative action system, 
the research only concerns the issue of when a shareholder is allowed to bring a derivative 
action. A further avenue for research may include the discussion of detailed procedural 
rules that govern derivative actions such as the issue of access to information; potential 
defendants; which organ of the company should be responsible for responding to the 
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demand requirement; within which period the company should respond to a shareholder; 
and under which circumstances the notice period can be waived. 
 
The study also limits its scope by focusing on the Saudi and UK laws. On the one hand, 
this means that the findings and recommendations for reforming Saudi law cannot be 
regarded as necessarily applicable to other jurisdictions, such as those in the Middle East 
and North Africa. On the other hand, further research might consider how jurisdictions 
other than the UK may help to develop reforms to the directors’ duties and derivative 
actions through legal transplantation.    
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